COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PROMOTERSHIP-PROMOTION MONEY-LIABILITY TO REFUND APPLICATION OF PURCHASE MONEY-FIDUCIARY CHARACTER.-The plaintiffs, a company formed to purchase and work an American mine, sued the defendants for the return of profits received by the defendants to the use of and as trustees for the plaintiffs. The defendants were metal brokers who had hitherto sold the ore in England at a higher rate of commission than would be paid if the mine passed to an English company, and they received from vendor £5000 in paid-up shares of the company, which he had received in part payment for the mine. The defendants alleged that this was received under an arrangement with the vendor by which they were to be compensated for their decreased commission, and to be remunerated for any assistance they might give in selling the mine. The defendants did in fact introduce the vendor to an intending purchaser, but this purchase went off; and the defendants, having acquiesced in a prospectus which referred to them as willing and able to answer inquiries relative to the mine, did in fact answer such inquiries made by intending shareholders, without disclosing that they had reasons for doubting as to the future prospects of The arrangements between the vendor and the defendants, and the payment to the latter, were unknown to the company. The jury found that the defendants were promoters, and added that if the question of promotership was left to them, they intended to find for the plaintiffs for the amount of the paid-up shares received by the defendants. Held, that there was evidence of promotership to go to the jury; and that the judge, in abstaining from explaining to the jury the meaning of the word "promoter," had not misdirected them. Persons who get up and form a company have duties towards it before it comes into existence. There may be promoters of a company, even after it is registered and incorporated, other than its directors, so long as it is not in a position to perform the obligations imposed upon it by its creators: (Emma Silver Mining Company v. Lewis, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 719, C. P.) the concern. MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-CONTRACT TO DELIVER GOODS FREE ON BOARD-SHIP CHARTERED BY PURCHASER-ULTIMATE DESTINATION NOT STATED.-Delivery of goods by a vendor on board a ship chartered by the purchaser is only constructive, and not actual, delivery to the purchaser, inasmuch as the contract with the master of the ship to carry the goods does not make him the agent of the purchaser, and so long as the goods remain in the hands of the master of the ship as carrier, the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu continues. Till the goods are actually delivered to the purchaser or his agent the transitus is not at an end, and it makes no difference that the ultimate destination of the goods has not been communicated by the purchaser to the vendor. A contract was made for the sale of a quantity of china clay to be delivered free on board at a specified port, payment to be by the purchaser's acceptance. The purchaser chartered a ship and gave notice to the vendor, who then delivered the clay on board the ship at the specified port. Before the ship left the port the vendor, hearing that the purchaser was insolvent, gave notice to the master of the ship to stop the clay in transitu. No bill of lading had been signed, nor had the purchaser given any acceptance in payment of the contract price: Held, that the clay was in the possession of the master of the ship only as carrier, and not as agent of the purchaser, that the transitus was therefore not at an end, and that the vendor had duly exercised his right of stoppage in transitu. Decision of Bacon, C.J. reversed: (Re Cock, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 730. Ct. of App.) BANKRUPTCY LAW. PROTECTED TRANSACTION. and be a security for every and all future sum or the table at a monthly rate. This agreement is Per James, L.J.-This is a debt provable under B. Money lent to pay a lost bet is not money knowingly advanced for gaming or betting within the meaning of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, s. 1, and the lender will be admitted to prove in the bankruptcy of the borrower for money so lent: (Ex parte Pyke; Re Lister, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 923.) A loan society advanced £250 to B. upon terms of his paying to the society £550 in respect of the loan and interest by monthly instalments. having paid several instalments to a considerable amount filed his petition. At the first meeting the society claimed to prove for the sum of £313 10s. 6d. as the balance due to them. Held that the society was entitled to prove for the full amount claimed upon the ground that the original debt was a certain sum of £550, and consequently did not come within the rule by which all interest is made to cease at the date of the bankruptcy: (Ex parte Cockburn, Re Lundy, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 362.) Per Chief Judge.-It is a lawful transaction between the borrower and the lender, and neither conscience nor anything else can affect that: (Ib.) PROPERTY DIVISIBLE AMONGST CREDITORS. An undischarged bankrupt having recovered £250 as damages in an action of slander brought by him, long subsequently to the adjudication. Held, that the sum recovered did not pass to the trustee as property divisible amongst the creditors: (Ex parte Vine, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 327, 730.) Per James, L.J.-The general principle always be an ontlaw-a mere slave to his trustee; it was DIGEST OF BANKRUTCY DECISIONS IN a personal wrong done to an uncertificated bank 1878. (Continued from page 250.) A bank held the guarantee of B. for their debtor's account, whereby it was provided that the guarantee should extend to the repayment of all moneys which should at any time be due from the debtor to the bank, and should be a continuing guarantee to the extent of £800, and that the guarantee should not be considered as wholly or partially satisfied by the payment or liquidation at any time or times hereafter of any sums for the time being due, but should extend to A. and B. contracted for the purchase by B. of a billiard table, the price to be paid by instalments. The table was delivered, and part of the price paid, B. having failed to pay some of the instalments as they became due was induced by A. to sign the following agreement for the hire of A debtor, after the presentation of a bankruptcy petition against him, but before adjudication, entered into a contract for the sale of certain leasehold property, the purchaser paying a deposit. After adjudication, the purchaser, who had no knowledge of the adjudication or of the bankruptcy, or of the commission of any act of bankruptcy by the vendor, paid the remainder of the purchase money to the bankrupt, and obtained possession of the title deeds and of the property, but no assignment to him was executed. On an application by the purchaser to the Court of Bankruptcy for an order that the trustee should assign the property to him. Held, that the trustee being the legal owner of the property subject to the equity of the purchaser to have it assigned to him on payment of the balance of the purchase-money, the purchaser could not enforce his equitable right except upon paying to the trustee the balance of the purchase-money: (E parte Rabbinge, Re Pooley, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 663.) Per Thesiger, L.J.-If the trustee had been merely assignee of a chose in action, if, for instance, the property had been assigned before the date of the order of adjudication, but all the purchase money had not been paid, there might have been some ground for the contention of the respondent, that payment of the balance of the purchase money to the bankrupt without notice, was a good payment, and entitled him to an order that the trustee should assign the property to him; but the payment to the bankrupt was not a good payment. It is not a payment to the bankrupt, protected by the 95th section of the Act because it was made after the order of adjudica tion. It was not a payment to the bankrupt as agent of the trustee, for there are no special cir cumstances to raise any presumption of agency, and apart from special circumstances there is no implied authority in a bankrupt to receive money on behalf of the trustee : (Ib.) Per James, L.J.: It is an ordinary case of pay ment of money for a sale of real estate to the wrong person: (Ib.) PURCHASES FROM BANKRUPT. The mere fact that the trustee has not taker possession of a debtors property for two months after the date of his appointment, but has allowed the debtor to continue trading as before, will not be sufficient to destroy the trustee's right to the property, notwithstanding that it has been sold by the debtor to a bona fide purchaser in the meantime (Ex parte Cooper; Re Green, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 260.) Per the Chief Judge.-The principle involved is clear. By the appointment of the trustee all the debtor's assets vest in him from the date of his appointment, and unless something is done by the trustee to deprive him of the right, he has a right to all the assets of the debtor: (Ib.) (To be continued.) LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT. fraudulent preference? 4payment made by an insolvent debtor, on the THIS was a motion to set aside an alleged once examined as to this payment. He stated that it was made to protect his friend, as he looked npon the transaction as a debt of honour. The motion now brought was for the purpose of testing the legality of such a payment under such cir cumstances. Kennedy (instructed by Barrell, Rodway, and Barrell) appeared for Mr. Bolland." Hodgson Bremner (instructed by Bremner and Pennington) for the respondents. Kennedy, after shortly stating the facts of the case, and adducing evidence in support, contended that a payment like the present made voluntarily, and in contemplation of bankruptcy, was a fraud upon the rest of the creditors, the essence of the bankruptcy law being that when a man knows he cannot pay his debts in full, and is contemplating bankruptcy, he shall not be able legally to divert any of his estate so as to prefer a particular creditor over the rest, but that it shall be kept intact for equal division amongst all of them. The case of Butcher v. Stead in the House of Lords had considerably trenched on this doctrine, and created difficulties in carrying out the principle, but the circumstances there were distinguishable from those in the case before the court. Bremner argued that the case referred to was a direct authority against the trustee's claim, as it was there laid down that a bona fide creditor who received payment of his debt, even if it was only an hour before his debtor filed his petition, was protected providing he did not know of his debtor's insolvency, and was not shown to be acting in collusion with him with a view to withdraw from division amongst the rest of the creditors the assets which belong to all alike. To be a fraudulent preference there must be proof of a knowledge on the part of the person preferred that he was obtaining a preference from a person contemplating bankruptcy. Kennedy was heard at length in reply, and the Court afterwards reserved its judgment. His HONOUR, on the 31st July, gave judgment as follows:-In this case the debtor, on the morning of the day on which he filed his petition, viz., the 6th March, but before he filed it, paid to the Union Loan and Discount Company the whole balance of a loan then unpaid, amounting to £235. The loan originally was for £300, and was secured by a promissory note made by the debtor and Mr. John Henstock. The instalments payable had been duly met, except one due in February, the nonpayment of which, according to the terms of the note, made the sum remaining then unpaid due; but it was in evidence that the instalments would still have been received. The debtor states that he paid the amount to save his friend, Mr. Henstock, from his liability on the note. Leaving out of consideration for the moment the proviso to the 92nd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71), I cannot doubt that this pay: ment had all the ingredients of a fraudulent preference. It was made after the debtor's petition for liquidation had been prepared; it was purely voluntary, and its effect was to give a preference to the loan company over the other creditors. I do not think that the preference contemplated by the statute is a merely sentimental preference, if I may so express it; but a payment is a payment in preference if it is voluntary, and puts the payee in a better position than the other creditors. The payment of 20s. in the pound to one creditor, not only pays that creditor in full, when he has only a right to a dividend, but reduces the dividend which would be payable to the creditors generally. The debtor could not have made this payment without knowing that he DIGEST OF COUNTY COURT DECISIONS SINCE NOVEMBER 1875. (Continued from page 252.) ATTACHMENT OF DEBTS. County Court Rules, 1875, Order 24, rule 3. Defendant, the judgment debtor, was entitled to an annual salary from the garnishees, payable on certain days, for so long since each last payment as he held his office. A County Court judge made an order, under order 24, rule 3 and 4 of the County Court Rules 1875, that the sum which should be due a fortnight after the date of the order be attached, and be then paid to the plaintiffs, the judgment creditors. Held on appeal that this was not a debt accruing from the garnishees at the date of the order, and that the order must be set aside: (Hall v. Pritchett, Corporation of Huddersfield, Garnishees, 37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 671.) The jurisdiction to make an order for substituted service of a debtor's summons lies with the court of the district in which the debtor happens to be, and therefore in a case where a debtor had absconded from his usual place of abode, within a particular district, and gone no one knew whither, it was held that the County Court of that district had no jurisdiction to make an order for substituted service against the debtor under rule 61 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870: (Ex parte The North Kent Bank Limited; Re F. H. Holdsworth, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 536.) Time for Appealing. decision or order" referred to in rule 143, BankThe period of twenty-one days "from the said ruptcy Rules 1870, is to be computed as from the time the decision or order appealed against is finally settled. Therefore, where an order was made by the judge of a County Court on the 26th April, but not finally settled and signed until the 7th May, it was held the time for appealing to the Chief Judge did not begin to run until that date: (Ex parte Cochram; Re Sendall, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 820.) in force for regulating the procedure on entering Rule 145 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870 remains appeals from County Courts to the Chief Judge in of the Court of Appeal under Order LVIII. rule 15 Bankruptcy, but does not interfere with the power of the Rules of Court 1875, to consider the question of security for costs without limit as to amount: (Re Baum; Ex parte Cooper, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 924.) Protected Transaction. Substituted Service. upon An execution levied by service upon the goods was giving a preference to the loan company, of a trader under a County Court judgment, and and if he knew that he was giving them a sold by the high bailiff by consent of both parties, preference he must have intended it. It re- after the commission of an act of bankruptcy of mains to consider whether the payment is which the execution creditor had notice, and protected by the proviso to the 92nd sec- which the execution subsequently proceeded, but tion. There is no doubt as to the considera- before the expiration of the five days required by tion, and the only question remaining is whether the County Courts Act 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 95) the loan company was a payee in good faith. As s. 106, is not a protected transaction within sect. to this I do not think the evidence warrants me in 95, clause 3 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869: (Ex parte doubting the good faith of the manager of the Baum; Re Hughes, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 40.) loan company. He says he was rather surprised at the payment, but that such payments are not uncommon, and that he was quite ignorant of the affairs of the debtor; moreover the sum paid was actually and legally due. The fact that the debtor, by paying beforehand, would sacrifice some of the interest which had been deducted when the money was borrowed would prima facie lead one to think rather that he was in funds than short of money. There is therefore nothing from which I can draw the inference that the manager had notice that the debtor was doing anything injurious to his other creditors. Under the authority, therefore, of Butcher v. Stead (L. Rep. 7 E. & I. App. 839), I must hold that the payment in question is pro- An appeal against an order of adjudication by tected by the proviso to the 92nd section of the a person aggrieved must be brought within twentyBankruptcy Act. As to this and another payment made the same day being a cessio bonorum, and therefore an act of bankruptcy, and fraudu abode, and a creditor cannot effect personal When a debtor absconds from his usual place of service of a debtor's summons upon him, and cannot discover that he he has any residence other than the old one from which he has absconded, the County Court of the district within which he last resided has jurisdiction to order substituted service of the the summons under rule 61 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870 (Ex parte The North Kent Bank Limited, Re Holdsworth, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. Rep. 379.) : Appeal. one days notwithstanding that the alleged aggrievment does not arise until long after the twentyone days prescribed by the 143rd rule (of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870) have expired. Upon an appeal from the decision of a County Court, the Chief Judge will not shut out evidence not before the court below, when the proposed evidence has been filed and notice given in ample time to allow the effect of such proposed evidence to be fully considered and answered by the other side: (Ex parte Wigg; Re Johnson, 40 L. T.'Rep. N. S. 528.) The introduction of the name of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy in the bond given by a trustee and his surety as specified in form 40 in the schedule to the Bankruptcy Rules 1870, is a mere matter of form, and the bond when required can be enforded in the County Court without application to the Chief Judge: (Re Parry, 35 L. T. Rep. N. S. 768.) (To be continued.) MELKSHAM COUNTY COURT. (Before C. F. D. CAILLARD, Esq., Judge.) GODWIN WARREN and Co. v. JOHN FOURNIER AND FRANCIS WILLIAM COPE. THOMAS REYNOLDS AND SON v. SAME. Partnership - Alteration of firm Notice Evidence. A. G. Smith, of Melksham, appeared for the plaintiffs, and E. D. B. Locke for the defendants, in each action. HONOUR having reserved his decision, which he The cases were adjourned from last court, his now delivered as follows: tried together, but there was in the latter case These cases were (by arrangement) practically some further evidence which was not applicable to the former case and to which I will presently refer. The facts not in dispute are as follows: Previous to 1877 the defendant, Jno. Fournier, carried on business as a bicycle manufacturer, in Melksham, and during that year he did so jointly and in partnership with a Mr. Bluett, under the firm of Fournier and Co. Fournier managed the business in Melksham, and Bluett a branch business at Bath. In February 1878, Bluett retired from the partnership, and thereupon the defendant, F. W. Cope, as a dormant partner, joined Fournier in the business, which was still carried on under the style of Fournier and Co. During 1877 Godwin Warren and Co. supplied goods to Fournier and Co. to the amount of £13 2s. 8d., which was not paid when Bluett retired. On the 3rd June 1878 the same firm drew a four months' bill of exchange upon Fournier and Co. for £13 2s. 8d., which was accepted by Fournier in the name of his firm and was returned on 30th Sept. 1878, when a new bill for £13 9s. 8d. was given in lieu of the former, also accepted in the bill the action in which Godwin Warren and Co. name of the firm by Fournier. Upon this latter are plaintiffs is brought. Cope was also partner in another firm (Cope and Hill) carrying on business as agricultural engineers upon the same premises as Fournier and Co. No notice of the dissolution of partnership when Bluett retired was his petition for liquidation. He scheduled the given either in the Gazette or by circular letters. In Nov. 1878, the defendant, Fournier, alone filed drew it, and the resolutions were not registered. defendant Cope as a creditor for a large amount. Objections were made to Cope's proof. He withFrom Feb. 1878, till Fournier filed his petition, Cope was his partner in the firm of Fournier and Co. After that Cope sold the effects of Fournier and Co., and received the proceeds of the sale. The partnership between Fournier and Cope was by parol. Cope was to pay in £250, each was to receive £1 a week from the profits; they were to be entitled equally to the assets and liable equally for losses. Mutatis mutandis, all these facts apply to both actions. The chief fact in dispute is one of the highest importance: it is whether or not the plaintiffs (I am now speaking of the plaintiffs in both actions) respectively knew or had notice of the dissolution of the partnership between Fournier and Bluett, or of the introduction of Cope into the firm of Fournier and Co. This is one of the questions for my decision, and upon consideration of the evidence before me, had any such notice. In the action in which I am clearly of opinion that none of the plaintiff's Reynolds and Son are plaintiffs there was some further evidence (to which I have before adverted) upon this question. There were two letters -- one 26th Sept. 1877, Fournier to Reynolds, and another (dated 4th Oct. 1877), which is Reynolds's answer to Fournier. It was argued against Reynolds at the hearing that these letters amounted to notice of the dissolution and change. In my opinion they approach nothing of the sort. In a few words they come to this: Fournier expresses dissatisfaction with his partner, asks Reynolds if he can recommend another and intimates terms. Reynolds answers that he knows no one suitable, and thinks it unlikely that he shall. Assuredly there is nothing from the order, because it stated that proceedings should abide the further order of his Honour. Now, an application was made for a further order, and by the notice of motion given the other side recognised the fact that the court in the bankruptcy had jurisdiction over those chattels, Warren said, of course the court had jurisdiction over their own trustee. What they asked for was that the person having the goods or money should give them up. His HONOUR.-The money is now in the name of the trustee. Who is the trustee? Redman. Mr. Charles John Harries. Redman went on further to say that the trustee simply held the money by virtue of his appointment. The goods were sold and the proceeds were put into the bank. Honour, said the execution was levied about halfWarren, in answer to a question put by his past eleven o'clock on the 20th March, and the petition was put on the file a few minutes to one o'clock the same day. Redman contended that the claimants were in the same position as plaintiffs; it was for them to make out their case. There was no evidence of the seizure of those chattels. His HONOUR.-Oh, yes; the affidavits state that the warrant was received on the 15th and executed on the 20th. in this to show any actual change, nor reasonably valid. He (Mr. Warren) did not know what to put Reynolds on a sort of constant inquiry Mr. Redman's grounds were for saying so, whether any takes place or not in the constitution but he should lay before the court the affiof the firm of Fournier and Co. Such being my davits of the under-sheriff, his clerk, and that opinion on the chief fact at issue, it follows vir- of Mr. Hall himself, and show the arrangetually that the plaintiffs in each action must be ments made, and further that they were not successful. On consideration of the authorities it contradicted at all in any shape or form. will be found that the paramount general principle There was not a single affidavit on the file on the which must prevail in this case is one of wide part of the trustee denying the sale in any way. application, and which would govern many other Mr. Warren then proceeded to read extracts from cases as well. It is this: "That the holder for the affidavits filed, including that of the undervolue of a bill of exchange is not prejudiced by a sheriff, who stated that on the 15th March last fraud of which he has no notice; but which would he received a warrant from Bann to levy upon otherwise affect the security." The pith and Townsend's goods for £80 78. 11d., but at the effect of the decision in Shirreff v. Wilkes, 1 East, latter's urgent request he delayed having the p. 48 (cited for the plaintiffs) are thus stated in warrant put in force until the 17th March. He Byles on Bills, at p. 40 of the 7th edit.: "If a new then received a letter from Bann telling him to partner be introduced into a firm an acceptance by execute the warrant. On the 19th March the old partners for an old debt in the name of the Townsend called upon him (the under-sheriff) new firm will not in the hands of the party taking with Mr. Hall, and at the request of Townsend it, and cognisant of the facts, bind the new part- it was agreed, in order to save him the trouble ner." This I have no doubt is the law; but from and annoyance of the public levy that Mr. Hall this very case and from others the inference if not should become the purchaser of certain goods to the positive ruling is that the new partner be selected by Townsend. What followed on the would be bound if the party taking the subject will best be gleaned from the affidavit of acceptance for value were not cognisant of William Wilde Barnaby, Mr. Salt's confidential the facts. It is a fraud, primâ facie, by the oid clerk, in which he stated that on Wednesday, the partners as against the new partner to give an 19th of March, between eleven and twelve o'clock, acceptance for an old debt in the name of the new he was called into the under-sheriff's office, where firm; but this fraud does not affect those who he found Mr. Townsend and Mr. William Hall, take the bill, unless they do so with notice, or not with the under-sheriff, Mr. W. Salt. Barnaby for value. It is to be observed that in the present heard in the presence of all that Mr. Townsend Redman said his Honour must remember the case there never was any change in the name of was to select effects to the value of the judg-evidence was that the seizure was made by Barthe firm, and that the incoming partner, Cope, was ment debt and the costs incurred, and to be in- naby; therefore the only person who could speak a dormant partner. Another observation this: curred, and that the sheriff was to sell them to to the seizure was Barnaby. He, however, did not I agree with the proposition stated in "Lindley on Mr. Hall at that amount. The under-sheriff say that anything was seized; therefore he did Partnership," 2nd edition, pp. 396 and 397, that cautioned Townsend that the arrangement was not say that the specific things which they carried "Even if an incoming partner agrees with his co- made by his wish, and was to be carried out on away were seized. partners that the debts of the old shall be taken his own responsibility; that Barnaby was not to by the new firm, this, though valid and binding be responsible for the selection of the articles, between the partners, is (as regards strangers) res but only to see the list selected by Townsend and inter alios acta, and does not confer upon them Mr. Hall completed, so as to enable the sale to be any right to fix the old debts upon the new part- carried out. He had no instructions to seize the ner. But I think that the effect of such an but only prepare for the sale to be carried agreement between the old partners and the new out. At three o'clock the same day Barnaby might well be that there would be no fraud com- went with Mr. Hall and Townsend to Shelton. mitted against the latter by the former if they Townsend first took them into the stable gave an acceptance for an old debt in the name of yard and forced open his coach-house, stable, and the new firm; and so the taker of the bill would saddle room doors (his coachman being absent), have an unimpeachable security. In the present and pointed out the articles for Mr. Hall to levy. cases there is evidence from which I infer, with Mr. Hall afterwards informed the under-sheriff but little if any doubt, that there was some such that he (Mr. Hall) should be from home the next agreement or arrangement between Fournier and day, but that Barnaby could act for all parties, Cope. Cope did not go into the witness box; I and he (Mr. Hall) would send a cheque for the think this was most unsatisfactory. Fournier's amount. On Thursday, the 20th March, about own evidence shows at the very least that Cope, eleven o'clock, the under-sheriff instructed him to although he was not aware perhaps of the specific proceed to Shelton to carry out the sale as transaction, the actual giving of the very bills arranged with Mr. William Hall, which Barnaby which are in question, knew well that assets of did by leaving George Sidney Lewis in possession the new partnership were employed by Fournier of the articles. Barnaby returned back to the in payment of debts of the old firm, and permitted office by 12.45, and, as the clock struck one, a clerk that this should be done. In each of the actions from the office of the solicitor to the debtor (Townsthere must be judgment for the plaintiffs for the end) was shown into the under-sheriff's office, and respective amounts claimed with costs accordingly. served a restraining order from the Court of Bankruptcy upon the under-sheriff. Mr. Warren also read portions from the affidavit of Mr. Hall, after which he went on to argue that upon them there was no doubt that certain articles were selected by the debtor and Mr. Hall, and that they were sold by the under-sheriff to Mr. Hall for the sum of the levy and the costs. It was also clear that Barnaby, who made the levy, was acting for both parties; acting as sheriff's officer in making the levy and seizure, and also for Mr. Hall, who was unable to be present, he on the second date being SHREWSBURY COUNTY COURT. (Before ARUNDEL ROGERS, Esq., Judge.) Seizure-Sale by sheriff-Procedure-Title of Loxdale Warren (of the Oxford Circuit, instructed by Messrs. Salt) was for Mr. Hall, and Redman (of the Oxford Circuit, instructed by H. C. Clarke) appeared for the trustees appointed in the bankruptcy matter. Loxdale Warren, in opening the proceedings, said this was an application made on behalf of Mr. W. Hall, whom his Honour would remember was ordered by the court to give up possession of certain goods to the receiver in the liquidation of Mr. T. C. Townsend, and which had since passed into the possession of the trustee in the bankruptcy; therefore the application was against the trustee in the bankruptcy for an order that he might give up the goods which he held, and which were the property of Mr. Hall, but delivered up to the receiver in accordance with an order made by his Honour, or in the alternative and in the case of goods being sold that the receiver pay to Mr. W. Hall the sum and costs incidental to that motion. A number of affidavits had been filed in support of the motion, and he and his friend had decided to at once go to the points which were contested in the affidavits. Mr. Hall contends that in this case the goods were sold to him by the under-sheriff under an execution levied by the under-sheriff for a person of the name of Bann, and that the goods so sold were selected by the debtor himself previous to the liquidation, and sold to the present claimant to satisfy the execu tion and costs. What Mr. Redman now contended was that the levy, seizure, and sale were not same, out of town. He submitted that those affidavits In reply to his Honour, Warren said the liquidation proceedings fell through owing to the meeting of creditors refusing to pass a resolution. They afterwards proceeded to make the debtor a bankrupt. He further contended that when the receiver under the liquidation ceased to exist the chattels ought to have reverted to Mr. Hall. His HONOUR intimated that Mr. Redman had to show him that the trustee under the bankruptcy Redman expressed surprise that the question His HONOUR said it came very near to s seizure. Redman urged that it might be inferentially construed as seized, but the affidavit did not say what he seized. It was for the other side to show that they seized the specific articles which were removed, but that they had not shown. His HONOUR.-If they show that, do you contend that the title of the trustee only goes back to the act of bankruptcy, which you say was the filing of the petition for liquidation? Redman said he did not intend the power of the trustee to go any further than that; that was his contention upon the facts before them. His second point would be, granting that his Honour was of opinion that the affidavits proved a seizure His HONOUR.-I think there is evidence of a seizure. The other questions to be discussed are what goods were seized, and whether the sale by private contract was a good and valid sale. Redman contended that the sale in the manner described and under the circumstances was not a proper sale. His HONOUR asked if the under-sheriff might not sell goods by private contract. Redman replied that unquestionably the under sheriff could sell by private contract as well as by public auction, but subject to the qualification that he was bound to sell at the best price. In this case it was stated that the goods were sold for £80, whilst according to the affidavits they were eventually sold for upwards of £177 11s., more than double the amount. His HONOUR did not think that would affect the validity of the sale. The points given were then argued at consider able length between the learned counsel and his Honour, during which the latter said one point he had to consider was whether the goods at the time of the seizure were the goods of the bankrupt. If they were, no one had a right to seize or sell them. Salt.-No, the debtor; he was not a bankrupt. Warren pointed out that the seizure took place before the bankruptcy or proceedings for liquida tion. It was perfectly uncontradicted that the seizure and sale took place at that particular time, and that the petition for liquidation was not filed until after that time; therefore, it was impossible that the trustee, or anyone else, could have any claim upon them. His Honour said the point at issue was, if there was any sale under the execution, and if the goods passed to the purchaser. Redman said: Assuming there was a seizure no third person could have a title to them unless there was a valid sale to him by the sheriff. Warren contended that, according to the aff davits before the court, there was evidence of 3 seizure and sale prior to the liquidation proceedings. The points having been fully argued, his HONOUR said he was of opinion in that case, upon a fair and reasonable construction of the affidavits, that there was not a seizure or sale of those goods to Mr. Hall, the alleged parchaser. In matters of that kind there was generally a great deal more strictness required than in ordinary purchases. If the sheriff sold goods by private contract to Mr. Hall, there should have been a transfer of the goods from the sheriff's officer to the purchaser. It was not clearly shown to him that such was the case. It was shown that after the alleged sale the goods never were removed from the place where they were seized into the possession of Mr. Hall. He must rule that the seizure and sale of the goods to Mr. Hall was not made in that case, and therefore refuse the order. Redman asked for costs on behalf of the trustee. His HONOUR said he did not think there had been straightforward conduct in the way in which Mr. Hall was treated. There was some intention to allow him to be the purchaser of those goods, and therefore he should make no order as to costs beyond allowing those of the trustee. His HONOUR fixed the amount at £20. LEGAL NEWS. cations were made for the production of the security and other documents, and a number of appointments were made, but never kept. Proceedings were taken in the Court of Chancery for the deposit of the documents, and a number were so deposited, the defendant filing an affidavit that they were all he had. The security for the £2500 was, however, not amongst them. Every endeavour had been made to ascertain what he had done with it, but he refused to give any explanation, except that it had never been invested at all, but had been lost in speculation. P. C. Norris deposed: I am stationed at Patcham. I was on duty in the Claremont-road, Preston, this morning, and saw the defendant coming towards the railway-station from the morning, sir, I believe your name is Mr. Fullagar.' He said, "No, you're mistaken." I told him Superintendent Osbon, at Lewes, held a warrant for his apprehension, and he replied, "You must Warren asked what amount would be necessary show me the warrant." I said I had not got it, as a deposit in order to appeal? but I should take him into custody on a charge of embezzlement, and he must consider himself a prisoner. We walked to the Patcham policestation, nearly a mile distant, and when within about twenty yards of the gate he said, "How far is it to the station?" I replied, "That's it, there." He had a bag in his left hand, which he threw down, saying, "I shall have a run for it before I go in." He then ran down the road. One of Mr. Elphick's men, the butcher, at Preston, was riding up the road, and endeavoured to stop him. He had a walking stick, and with that he hit the horse on the side of the head, and got past. He went about 100 yards down the road, and turned to go into a field, when I caught him. He said, "If I hadn't walked so far this morning, you would not have caught I then took him to the police-station at Lewes, and read the warrant over to him. He said, before." Yes, all right; it has been read to me direction of the main London-road. I said, Good CHARGE AGAINST A SOLICITOR. Ar the Petty Sessions, Lewes, on Saturday morning last, Lewis Greene Fullagar, forty-one, coroner of East Sussex and a solicitor, was brought ap in custody charged on a warrant issued by Mr. Godlee, on the 1st July last, for that he "having been intrusted, as solicitor, with the sum of £2500 in money, with a certain direction in writing to apply the said sum of money for a certain purpose specified in the said direction, unlawfully, in violation of good faith, and contrary to the terms of the said direction, did convert to his own use and benefit the said sum of money contrary to the statute, &c., at St. Michael's, Lewes, on the 13th April 1872. Merrifield, barrister, prosecuted; the defendant, who was accompanied by his brother (Mr. Edward Fullagar), was not legally represented. Merrifield, in opening the case, referred to the well-known position of the defendant, expressing his unfeigned regret that it had been found necessary to take the present proceedings. After hearing the evidence he should bring before them, they would, however, see that there was no other alternative. The defendant acted as solicitor to Mr. William Martin, of Arlington, who died in 1860, having, by his will, bequeathed his property, sworn under £4000, as follows:-Three persons, Mrs. Martin (widow), Mr. Body, and Mr. Weston, were appointed trustees under the will, and they were to pay the income to the widow for her life; afterwards to her daughter, Mrs. Mary Mockett (the prosecutrix), for her life; and afterwards to the latter's children and issues surviving her. Mrs. Martin and Mr. Weston died, and subse quently Mr. Body died, the latter leaving executors, who appointed as new trustees Mrs Mary Mockett, Mr. J. W. Body, and Mr. S. Goldsmith. The two latter died last year, leaving the prosecutrix the only surviving trustee. Part of the testator's estate consisted of £2500 owing from a Mr. Ridge, which was repaid on the demise of that gentleman to the defendant. The following letter was then received from Mr. Fallagar, dated Lewes, 8th April 1872:-"Madam, Mr. Ridge's money was paid on Saturday last, 6th April £2500 and interest. I enclose a cheque for £97 18s. 4d., thus,-One year's interest £100, less income tax £2 10s., error in former payments 83. 4d. Let me know how you would like to have the £2500 invested, whether in the funds or on mortgage. I can get you £4 per cent. on a good security, but not more. More than four per cent. is not to be obtained upon such securities as trustees would be justified in investing in. Yours faithfully, Lewis G. Fullagar. To Mrs. Mockett, Arlington." Upon receipt of that letter Mrs. Mockett called her co-trustees together, and they decided to invest the money upon mortgage, and a letter was sent to Mr. Fullagar in reply to his communication, instructing him to that effect. Mrs. Mockett called on Mr. Fullagar shortly after that, and in the course of the interview he admitted having received instructions, and told her that the investment had been made on an estate at Worth. She asked to see the security, and he pointed to a parchment lying on the table, and said that was it. From April 1872, to October 1878, Mr Fullagar regularly remitted the interest. On the 8th Oct. 1872, on the first six months' interest becoming due, Mr. Fullagar wrote as follows:-"I enclose a cheque for £59 in payment of interest due to you on the £500 and £200, after deducting 20s. for income tax. Please Sign and return to me the inclosed receipt.L. G. Fullagar." There were many other letters to a similar effect. In Aug. 1878, Mrs. Mockett berume under some apprehension as to the security, and Mr. Vinall was consulted. Repeated appli me. The accused was remanded until Thursday, bail being refused. The case has previously been before the civil courts, and an order made for the restoration of the money, but as this was not complied with, the present criminal proceedings were instituted. THE Solicitors of Faversham have adopted the plan of closing their chambers at two o'clock on Saturday afternoons. LAW OF LIBEL.-A meeting of the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to report on the law of libel, and on a Bill prepared by Mr. J. D. Hutchinson, the member for Halifax, which Bill proposes to deal with this important subject, was held on Wednesday last, the Attorney-General presiding; and among the witnesses examined by the committee were Mr. John Hollams, the ex-president of the Incorporated Law Society; Mr. Francis Larken Soames, the solicitor of the Times newspaper; and Mr. Charles Ford. Mr. Soames furnished statistics as to the number of actions for libel brought against the Times newspaper within a given period, the amount of the costs incurred by the proprietors in defending such actions, and the comparatively small sum recovered by the plaintiffs in such actions, which were often of a purely speculative character; and Mr. Soames generally disapproved of most of the provisions in Mr. Hutchinson's Bill. Mr. Ford's evidence was principally directed to the facts of the recent important decisions in The Queen v. Holbrook and others (37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 530; and 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 536), in which he represented the defendants, who are the proprietors of a newspaper called the Portsmouth Times. criminal information for libel. Mr. Ford considered Mr. Hutchinson's Bill for the most part unsatisfactory, but favoured legislation, embody ing the decision of the Queen's Bench in The Queen v. Holbrook as explaining the meaning of the 7th section of Lord Campbell's Libel Act of 1843; and as protecting innocent proprietors of newspapers against criminal proceedings. The evidence of Mr. Hollams was principally directed to the question of whether fair reports in newspapers of what takes place at public meetings lawfully authorised, even though such newspaper report contains libellous matter, such a report should be privileged. It was a THE CLASSIFICATION OF MURDER.-Lord Justice Thesiger, in charging the grand jury at the Warwickshire Assizes on Monday, referred to several murder cases, and said he could only express his deep regret that, owing to the postponment of the passing of the Criminal Code, the law in reference to murder still remained in a state entirely out of harmony with the tone of public sentiment, and he might say with human and reasonable sentiment. Any one who had thought at all on the subject must realise the fact that murder was a crime which admitted of classification, and required to be divided into classes. He was happy to think that before long, if the code passed, they would find murder divided into classes. It was abhorrent to the mind of every humane person to find placed in the same category with heinou crimes cases in which a woman at a time of considerable bodily and mental anguish got rid of her new-born babe, or a case like that which they recently had at Derby, where a woman, wickedly no doubt, endeavoured to assist another to procure abortion, and by her ignorance and unskilfulness caused her death. It was abhorrent, he maintained, to all their feelings to have cases of that kind placed in the same category of wilful murder with crimes such as that of Palmer, where a wilful and premeditated murder was committed, or even with cases such as that which called forth the last penalty of the law last week, of brutal and ferocious murder. One could not help feeling it was a scandal that to all of those cases there should be one punishment appropriated. What was the consequence? In the first place it had a demoralising effect upon their juries, because the only way the defect in the law was remedied was by juries straining their consciences, and against what was admittedly the law, finding that the case was only that of concealment of birth, instead of murder. If the jury performed their duty, and found the case of wilful murder, then it would be thrown upon the judge to inflict the most solemn sentence known to the law, and a very humilitating duty it was. He felt very strongly upon the matter, particularly from the cases which had forced themselves upon their attention, and he regretted that in the wish to have their criminal law dealt with as a code, they should have overlooked the necessity of giving an important instalment in the nature of a classification of the crime of murder. THE LAW OF DOMICILE.-On Tuesday morning Sir James Hannen, President of the Probate and Divorce Division, delivered an important judg ment in the case of Sottomayor, otherwise De Barros v. De Barros (the Queen's Proctor intervening). The petitioner, Ignacia Clara Maxima Sottomayor, of Lisbon, prayed for a decree of nullity of marriage so long ago as 1874, with the respondent, Gonzalo Lobo de Barros. They were both natives of Portugal, and in 1866 there was a form of marriage between the parties at a registry office in London. It appeared that they were both natives of Portugal, that they were natural and lawful first cousins, and that, according to the law in force in Portugal, first cousins were incapable of contracting marriage on account of consanguinity; that they had never never cohabited as husband and wife, and that the marriage had never been consummated; and that when the petitioner went through the ceremony of marriage she was ignorant that she was contracting a valid and binding marriage At the date of the marriage the petitioner was fourteen and a half years, and the respondent sixteen years of age. The suit was heard before Sir R. J. Phillimore, who directed the Queen's Proctor to take up the case as to whether the petitioner had shown sufficient ground for the decree of nullity of marriage. In the result the learned judge held that the marriage was valid by English law, and dismissed the petition. Against this decision the petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeal held that the petitioner and respondent were, under the law of their domicile (Portuguese) under a personal incapacity to contract marriage, and that the judgment appealed from should be reversed. The Queen's Proctor then intervened, alleging collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage, that there was a lawful marriage which had been consummated; and that at the time they were domiciled in England and not in Portugal. Sir James Hannen said that he was of oppiaion that the charge of collusion was not established; as to whether the parties were lawfully married it was disputed whether a ceremony of marriage was gone through which was valid according to the law of England; and whether it would be considered valid according to the law of Portugal would be considered hereafter. In respect to the third issue, whether the marriage was procured by fraud, he was of opinion that this was not established. Whether the petitioner intended to contract a lawful marriage, the evidence left no doubt upon his mind that the petitioner intended to contract a lawful marriage. Whether they corresponded as husband and wife, he did not give an opinion, as he did not consider it material to the purposes of this cause. But the most important question was whether the petitioner and the respondent were at the time of the marriage domiciled in England. As the petitioner was a minor at the time of the marriage her domicile was that of her father; and he (Sir James Hannen) found that the domicile of the petitioner at the time of the marriage was Portuguese. The respondent was also a minor, and his domicile also was that of his father, who it was proved, was domiciled in this country. His lordship held that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent, according to the law of this country, was valid, and he dismissed the petition. CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSION. NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics,the Editors do not hold themselves responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it. 66 ORDER XIV.-I beg to inform you that the much vexed question as to whether or not a corporation aggregate as defendants were within the provisions of this Order, has been at last set at rest by the decision of the Lords Justices yesterday, in an appeal from an order of the divisional court, made on the 14th July last, their Lordships holding that Order XIV. did apply to such defendants, and that they were liable to its provisions; the grounds being, as I gathered from the judgment, shortly, that the words or otherwise," in rule la were not used in contradistinction to affidavit, but that although a corporation could not swear, yet the words or otherwise" would admit the affidavit of their secretary, directors, or other officers, or any other means of satisfying the court, &c., or of disclosing such facts, &c.; and that rule 3 of the same Order did not limit or restrict rule 1a, and that the words " or otherwise" were not, therefore, limited to payment into court;" and that they were not so limited was to be gathered from the wording of rule la, "that unless the defendant by affidavit or otherwise satisfy the court or a judge that he has a good defence to the action on the merits, or disclose such facts," &c., as payment into court could not satisfy the court or a judge that the defendant had a good defence, &c., or disclose facts. 66 W. R. A. KIME. A CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY.-Would one of your correspondents inform me which view of the law is correct; that of Serjeant Wheeler, the judge of the Marylebone County Court, or that of Mr. Bushby, the stipendiary magistrate at Worship-street police court. (1) A passenger took a return ticket from Westbourne for West Drayton, and on the return journey, upon the arrival of the train at the former station, claimed to be entitled to go on to Paddington without further payment, as the return fares between Paddington and West Drayton, and Westbourne Park and West Drayton were identical. The company brought an action for the fare from Westbourne Park to Paddington, which Serjeant Wheeler promptly dismissed. (Vide Daily Telegraph, 13th June 1879.) (2) A passenger appeared to a summons charging him with having knowingly and wilfully refused to quit a carriage on the prose cuting company's railway on arriving at a point to which he had paid his fare. On the 28th June last the defendant took a ticket from Dalston to Camden Town and back. On his return he travelled two stations beyond Dalston, and refused to pay any excess, pointing out, which was the defence, that the fare was the same for the extended journey. Mr. Bushby fined the defendant 208. and costs: (vide Daily News, 4th Aug. instant). So much for the facts; now note the spirit in which each judge dealt with his respective case. The County Court Judge stigmatises the action of the company as paltry, while the magistrate, after admitting that in the case before him no frand was contemplated, and that the defendant had acted within his rights, goes on to say that it was a question of contract, and that, as the point had been decided by Mr. D'Eyncourt on a previous occasion, he thought the company should be protected against the vexation of having the question raised again and again. But how about Sergeant Wheeler's ruling? TRAVELLER. NOTES AND QUERIES. None are inserted unless the name and address of the writer are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides. Queries. 51. MARRIED WOMAN AS EXECUTRIX-CHAIN OF RE. PRESENTATION.-Williams on Personal Property, 10th edit. 369: "A married woman, being an executrix, may make a will without the consent of her husband, confined to the personal estate of which she is executrix; and the executor of her will so made will be the executor of the original testator. For it is a general rule, that if any executor should die before having completely ad. ministered the estate of his testator, the executor appointed by the will of such executor will be entitled to complete the distribution of the estate of the former testator." He refers to Williams on Executors, pt, 1, bk. 2, ch. 1, sect. 3. A consideration of the following cases would seem to point to the fact that the mere making of a will by such executrix naming executors will not be sufficient to continue the chain of representation:-In In the goods of Hughes (4 Sw. & Tr. 209; s. c. 29 L. J. 64, P. M. & A.). Sir C. Cresswell held that the will of a married woman, made under a power, and appointing executors, did not continue the chain of representation from a former will of which the married woman was executrix. In In the goods of Bridger (L. Rep. 4 P. Div. 77) E. C. S., surviving executrix of W. B., made while covert a will, and appointed J. S. her executor, J. S. was also solely had no disposing power. Held, that J. S. as adminisentitled to all the estate of E. C. S., of which E. C. S. trator with the will annexed of E. C. S., did not represent W. B. In In the goods of Martin (3 Sw. & Tr. 1; s. c. 32 L. J. 5, P. M. & A.) the circumstances were the same as in case last cited, but the executor of the married woman took ont limited probate of her will, and also administration to the rest of her effects. Held that he was entitled, as representing the whole of his wife's personal estate, to the administration of the effects unadministered by her. But a fresh grant was necessary. Will the fact, that the will of such married executrix fails to dispose of the whole of her personal property, prevent her executor from being thereby made executor of the original testator? Or must the will distinctly state that she appoints A. B. as executor of goods held by herself, en autre droit, as executrix? Answers. T. H. G. (Q. 50.) REAL PROPERTY LIMITATION ACT. By 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, a right of way is not to be ment, by showing its first enjoyment prior to that defeated after twenty years uninterrupted enjoy. period; and after forty years the right is absolute unless it shall appear that it was enjoyed by agreement to be proved by deed or writing. The 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 shortens the period within which actions for the recovery of land may be brought from twenty years to twelve. I am unable to see that the latter Act affects the former in the smallest degree, either expressly or constructively. J. J. W. PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS. NOTA BENE.-Information intended for publication under the above heading should reach us not later than Thursday morning in each week, as publication is otherwise delayed. MR. WILLIAM ADAMS, Solicitor, Plymouth, has been appointed clerk to the Plymouth Court of Guardians, in succession to Mr. John Williams Matthews, solicitor, resigned. Mr. Adams, who was chosen from seven candidates, was admitted in 1867. MR. W. F. FLETCHER BOUGHEY, of Oxford Circuit, has been appointed Stipendiary Magistrate for the Wolverhampton district, in succession to Mr. Isaac Spooner, resigned. Mr. Boughey, who was called to the bar both of Lincoln's Inn and the Middle Temple in 1839, has for some years held the position of Recorder of Shrewsbury. MR. SAMUEL TILLEY, of the firm of Tilley & Soames, Solicitors, 10 Finsbury-place South, E.C. has been appointed clerk to the Hendon Local Board. Mr. Tilley was admitted in 1867. MR. CHARLES WILLIAM PALMER, of the firm of Barlow, Palmer, and Bonnett, Solicitors, Cambridge, has been appointed Clerk the Justices for the Cambridge division, in succession to Mr. Frederick Barlow, resigned. The new clerk was admitted in 1869. MR. CHARLES ELTON LONGMORE was, on the 2nd inst., appointed clerk to the Hertford County Division of Magistrates in the place of his grandather, the late Mr. Philip Longmore. MR JOHN ANTHONY ENGALL, of Staines, in the county of Middlesex, has been appointed by the Lord Chancellor a Commissioner to Administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. LEGAL OBITUARY. the Commissioners of Taxes. In 1825 he was appointed under-sheriff of Herts, and with two exceptions he filled that office until the year 1871. This office he held in conjunction with his partner, Mr. Sworder, who died two or three years ago. The Times, in its announcement of the opening of recent assizes at Hertford, says: "These gen tlemen (Mr. Philip Longmore and Mr. Sworder), for a great many years, had ably executed the im portant duties of under-sheriff for the countyan office on which practically the administration of justice, especially at the assizes, largely depends. Indeed, all the arrangements at the assizes reception and lodging of the judges, the attenare made by the under-sheriffs, including the dance on them during the assizes, and the preser vation of order in court, &c. In this county the judges are in the habit of lodging at the Castle. which stands on the site of the ancient Castle of Hereford (a castle of some celebrity in old times, long the seat of the Cowpers); but in consequence which has been the residence of Royalty, and was of the death of Mr. Longmore, the judges, of course, did not go there on this occasion, and were received at the residence of Mr. Sworder, the son and successor of the late under-sheriff, the duties of the office having for some years been transacted by the two sons and successors of the late undersheriffs, so that singularly enough the undersheriffs of this county are still Messrs. Longmore and Sworder. there is or was (for it may have been repealed in recent repealing Acts) an old statute prohibiting attorneys from acting as under-sheriffs for more than a year at a time. At the time the statute was passed there no doubt were reasons connected with the administration of justice which made it dangerous that the same attorney should hold the office for more than a year. But the Act, even while in force, sheriffs and the two partners acting in alternate was evaded by a firm being appointed underwhich led to the statute have long ceased to be years. And the reasons, whatever they were, regarded, and not only has it been found practically so convenient that the business of the office should remain in the same house that it has been continued in the same firm as long as they exist, but there has been a tendency, as in this instance, to render the office almost hereditary, by continuing it, if possible, in the hands of members of the same family." The deceased gentleman retired from the firm of Longmore, Sworder, and Longmore, in 1872. Mr. Longmore married, in 1823, Sabine, daughter of Jacob Elton, Esq., of Little Burstead and Dedham, Essex, and by her, who died in 1868, he had a numerous family. The remains of the deceased gentleman were interred in the family vault in All Saints' churchyard, Hertford, the funeral being attended by the mayor, aldermen, and other members of the Hertford Town Council, and a large number of friends. This is the more remarkable as E. F. BURTON, ESQ. THE late Edward Frederick Burton, Esq., solicitor. of Lincoln's-inn-fields, of the firm of Messrs. Burton, Yeates, and Hart, solicitors for the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple, who died on the 11th ult., at Eastbourne, Sussex, after some months' illness, was admitted a solicitor in Trinity Term 1843, and passed the early years of his professional life as a managing clerk to Messrs. Osbaldeston and Murray (now Murray, Hutchins, and Stirling), and after practising for two years with Mr. Whitehouse he joined Mr. Henry Charles Chilton. Mr. Burton was a commissioner for administering oaths, a perpetual commissioner, a commissioner for taking affidavits, for examining witnesses in England for the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, and also for taking acknowledg ments of married women in England in respect of property in Bombay. He was for many years a director of the Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association, and also of the Solicitors Hert-Benevolent Association. In 1865 he was elected to the council of the Incorporated Law Society, of which he held the office of president in 1877-78: and he devoted much time and attention to the improvement of the social and intellectual status of his profession, Mr. Burton was married, and has left a family. NOTE. This department of the LAW TIMES, is contributed by EDWARD WALFORD, M.A., and late scholar of Balliol College, Oxford, and Fellow of the Genealogical and Historical Society of Great Britain; and, as it is desired to make it as perfect a record as possible, the families and friends of deceased members of the Profession will oblige by forwarding to the LAW TIMES Office any dates and materials required for a biographical notice. P. LONGMORE, ESQ. THE late Philip Longmore, Esq., solicitor, who died on the 18th July, at his residence, The Castle, ford, in the eightieth year of hisage, was well known throughout Hertfordshire as a member of the firm of Longmore, Sworder, and Longmore, solicitors, but had for some time past been incapacitated through failing health from taking an active part in the important business of his office. The son of the late Rev. Alexander Longmore, vicar of Great Baddow, Essex, he was born in the year 1799, and was articled to Mr. Sterry, of Romford, in that county. He was admitted a solicitor in Easter Term 1821. For a short time he was in practice in Chelmsford, but in 1822 he removed to Hertford, and entered into partnership with Mr. George Nicholson. In 1829 Mr. Longmore was elected town clerk of Hertford, which office he held for thirty-seven years. On the death of Mr. Henry Alington, Mr. Longmore was appointed county treasurer, the duties of which office he fulfilled until the time of his death. He also, jointly with his son, the late Mr. M. S. Longmore, filled the office of clerk to the magistrates of the Hertford and Welwyn Petty Sessional Division, and was for many years one of the coroners for the county of Hertford. He was also clerk to |