which, as we have seen, will not in general be interfered with by the Court of Appeal, to exclude counter-claims when it is desirable to do so. In the exercise of this discretion, the judges are actuated by motives of justice and convenience. The first counter-claim in Padwick v. Scott involved the whole matter of the administration of an estate, and in order to have adjudicated upon it, inquiries as to how the assets had been applied would have been necessary. It would, therefore, have had the effect of keeping the plaintiff for a long time out of his rights, and it was excluded on the ground of the probable injustice to him. On the score of inconvenience, the judge will often exclude a counter-claim, where the issue raised by it is one of a totally different character to that raised by the claim, not as of right, but in his discretion, according to the nature of the case, and because of the confusion and difficulty which might arise from allowing it to remain. Thus, in Nicholson v. Jackson (2 Charley's Ca. Ch. 37), to a claim for libel brought by the director of a company, the defendant opposed a counter-claim for false representations made by the directors in respect of shares in the company held by the defendant, and this counter-claim was excluded by order of Mr. Justice Lindley. So, too, confusion might be likely to arise if a defendant were permitted to counter-claim against a plaintiff in a capacity different from that in which he makes his claim. In Macdonald v. Carrington (4 C. P. Div. 28) it was held that a defendant must not set up by way of counter-claim against the claim of a plaintiff suing only in a distinct personal character claims, against him personally and also as executor, and so much as charged him as executor was struck out, notwithstanding that by Order XVII., r. 5, it is provided that claims by or against an executor may be joined with claims by or against him personally. In giving judgment, Mr. Justice Lindley intimated that the right of counter-claim given by Order XIX., r. 3, was a right to claim against the plaintiff "in the same character in which he sues himself." This, however, does not appear upon the face of the rule, and the true objection to a counter-claim of this sort probably is the difficulty and inconvenience of always bearing in mind the plaintiff's twofold character. Moreover, if the defendant's claim exceeded the plaintiff's, it would not be possible to give him judgment for the balance under Order XXII., r. 10.

In conclusion, there is one further restriction, not upon the right of counter-claim, but on the mode of exercising it, which we should like to mention. The relief claimed by the defendant by set-off or counter-claim must be "properly claimed by his pleading." Besides the rules of pleading contained in Order XIX., which must be followed, we must be careful to distinguish between a claim by way of set-off and one by way of counter-claim. The nature of a set-off has not been affected by the Judicature Acts (Newell v. The Provincial Bank of England, 34 L. T. Rep. 533), and a set-off will not be allowed to be pleaded as a counter-claim (Young v. Kitchen, 3 Ex. Div. 127). The difference between the two may sometimes be important with respect to the judgment to be entered and the right to costs, the tendency of modern decisions being to treat a counterclaim in respect of these matters in the light of a cross action entirely distinct from the plaintiff's claim, and not in the light of an extended set-off.

THE AMENDED COUNTY COURT BILL. THE Government County Court Bill, as it has come out from the select committee of the House of Lords, is a very different measure from what it was when it went in; and is certainly much improved. In its present shape it will doubtless pass the Upper House very shortly; but whether or not the House of Commons will find time for its consideration this session is another and a very doubtful matter. In any event, however, the various amendments made in the clumsy Bill as it was drawn originally are of so much practical importance, that we purpose briefly to point out their results. It will be convenient to consider the differences between the former and the present Bill under the three heads of omissions, amendments, and additions, instead of going through the clauses consecutively.

The most important omission is the clause affecting costs in the High Court in cases which would have come within the enlarged County Court jurisdiction. The section containing the awkward device of allowing plaintiffs certain costs, not exceeding two-fifths of those passed on taxation, in cases which might have been brought in County Courts has, very properly, been abandoned. We pointed out at the time the many objections to this provision; especially the impracticability of working a sliding scale of charges wholly dependent upon judicial discretion. But, by the omission of this clause, the Bill becomes in practice, as well as in principle, and with regard to the High Court, purely permissive. It is thus so far in accord with the report of the select committee of the House of Commons, who recommended against the increase of the jurisdiction of the County Courts as protected by costs; and upon which report Mr. Norwood's Bill was founded. This section having gone, the main alteration in the measure is the raising the present limit from 501. to 2001., but then that jurisdiction remains entirely optional, though a wide power of transfer is still proposed. The original Bill contained a clause extending the jurisdiction in cases of eject

ment and claims where title came in question under sects. 11 and 12 of the Act of 1867 from the present limit of 201. to that of 401. annual value. This was also in Mr. Norwood's Bill, and seemed an unobjectionable if not a useful reform; but, for some reason or other, it has now been abandoned, and matters therefore stand as they were.

The next important omission is as to the enlargement of the equity jurisdiction now possessed by the County Courts under the Act of 1865. It was proposed to increase that jurisdiction from the present limit of £500 to one of £1000, but that also has been abandoned. As the Bill now stands, the only alterations affecting equity cases are the allowing suits and petitions for relief against fraud and mistake, for enforcing payment of debt against a married woman, and in proceedings for orders in the nature of injunctions; but these must be under the present limit of £500. With the omission of these proposals from the Bill, sect. 9 of the Act of 1865, which gives power to transfer a cause that is beyond the jurisdiction of the County Court where it was commenced to the Court of Chancery, and sect. 8 of the Act of 1867, under which the Court of Chancery may send a cause down to the County Court where it should have been brought, have been taken out of the schedule of repeals. They therefore remain as hitherto, though, so far as we know, neither ever has been or ever will be used in practice, for reasons of cost and convenience. Another omission from the list of repeals is sect .96 of the Act of 1846, affecting the question as to what goods may be taken in execution by bailiffs, and which was probably put in the old Bill by mistake. One more repeal is abandoned, and that is sect. 23 of the Act of 1856, under which parties can, by signing an agreement, consent to give a court jurisdiction: a provision rarely, if ever, used in practice, but now allowed to remain. The only other clause dropped out of the Bill is that giving power to either party to require the action to be tried in a County Court, where he could more easily and cheaply obtain legal assistance, and which court was presided over by the same judge as that in which the action was commenced. It was badly drawn and likely to be of but little use in practice, so there need be no regret at its omission.

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We now come to the amendments that have been made in the sense of altering clauses that were in the former Bill. The section giving County Courts a jurisdiction co-equal with that of the High Court, but allowing defendants to remove as of right when the cases were beyond their limits, originally applied to any County Court." The absurdity of thus conferring such wide powers upon the courts of every country town, some of which have hardly any business, has been discovered, and the clause is now restricted in its operation, for it affects only "every County Court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy, and every County Court mentioned in Schedule B to this Act and the City of London Court." The courts set down in the schedule are those in and near the metropolis, and include Bloomsbury, Bow, Brompton, Clerkenwell, Lambeth, Marylebone, Shoreditch, Southwark, Westminster, Whitechapel, Wandsworth, Greenwich and Woolwich, and Brentford. With these alterations the clause remains as before; its effect will be but slight, if not invisible; but, as it is quite optional with plaintiffs, and practically also with defendants, who have the right of removal, it can do no harm, and will test some favourite theories of those who support the County Court system. The next material amendment is to be found in the clause as to transferring actions from the High Court. As originally drawn it was most clumsy and applied to "any action or proceeding pending in the High Court of Justice which might have been commenced or taken in a County Court." This would seem to include cases of tort, which was never intended, for they were, and still are, left to be dealt with under sect. 10 of the Act of 1867. The whole clause has been remodelled, and is

now clear and comprehensible. It will be best to quote the important words, which run thus: "Where in any action of contract brought in the High Court the claim indorsed on the writ does not exceed two hundred pounds, or where such claim though it originally exceeded two hundred pounds is reduced by payment, an admitted set-off, or otherwise, to a sum not exceeding two hundred pounds, a judge of such court, on the application of either party, after service of the writ, may, unless he is of opinion that there is a question of fact or law to be tried of sufficient importance or difficulty to warrant the action being tried in the High Court, order the action to be tried in the County Court, or one of the County Courts, in which the action might have been commenced, or in some court near or adjoining to one of such courts." This is really framed upon sect. 7 of the Act of 1867, which, of course, the Bill proposes to repeal. But, as will be observed, the application can be made at any time and by either party, while the kind of rule laid down for the judge's guidance in using his discretion is entirely new, and may become most important. The procedure would be the same as at present when defendant gets the action transferred within eight days after writ, but the effect of the section wholly depends upon the judges, who have in some recent cases shown no desire to use their powers of transfer without good cause being shown. It would perhaps be as well to include cases in which the sum has been reduced below £200 by payment into court, as can now be done immediately

after action. In he original clause there was a power of transfer, "without such application," but that is now omitted, which is as well, for one cannot see how such a power could possibly be

used in practice. The last amendment, properly speaking, is in the clause affecting costs in the inferior courts, which lately troubled the corporation as being likely to reduce the business of the Mayor's Court, London. The section still states that only County Court costs will be allowed in actions of contract not exceeding £20, and of tort not exceeding £10, upon "verdict, judgment by default or demurrer, or otherwise." But there is now this very significant addition, "unless, in the case of a verdict, the judge shall otherwise order." From former experience we believe that this requisite certificate will rarely, if ever, he refused to a successful plaintiff. The effect of these few words will be to revive the drooping fortunes of the Mayor's Court and others of a similar character; for it is upon the trial that the costs given by the County Court scale compare most unfavourably with those allowed in the other inferior courts on taxation. Upon judgments by default, so high are the fees in County Courts, and so low are they in the Mayor's Court, that plaintiffs and their solicitors will often get actually more under the new plan than they can by the present system, though the having a sort of sliding scale will probably be found somewhat inconvenient in working.

The additions made to the Bill do not seem of much importance. One new clause provides that an officer of a County Court shall not sue or be sued in his own court, but he may in one adjoining, if it be not under the same judge. Another empowers the registrar to take admissions of counter-claims as well as of claims, and to settle and enter up judgment accordingly, which is inserted owing to a doubt about the registrar's authority in this respect. The last new clause is in the shape of an amendment of sect. 10 of the Act of 1856, which prevents one solicitor acting as advocate for another. It would, perhaps, be as well if this restriction were wholly repealed, as it is daily evaded in practice, but the proposal does not go so far, for it only extends the right of audience to a duly qualified and certificated solicitor who is in "the permanent and exclusive employment " of the solicitor to the party before the court. This, again, has been daily done in practice, so there is no harm in saying that it may be done legally. We have now thoroughly sifted the measure as it stands at present, and it is found to have been really reduced to the dimensions of Mr. Norwood's Bill, which was founded on the report of the Commons Committee. It will doubtless be still further toned down and amended; but, even if passed in the shape it now takes, there is little that could injuriously affect the interests of the Profession. The increase of jurisdiction is purely permissive, and while proceeding in a County Court is left optional to the suitor, he will prefer the High Court of Justice. The power of transfer is certainly much enlarged, but that may, we think, be safely left to the discretion of our judges, guided, as it will be, by the conditions contained in the clause itself.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES ON BREACH OF COVENANT FOR QUIET ENJOYMENT.

THE decision of the Court of Appeal in Child v. Stenning (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 302) is one of a class which illustrates the right to damages of a lessee, and may therefore be appropriately classed with Lock v. Furze (L. Rep. 1 C. P. 441), Williams v. Burrell (1 C. B. 402), and Dennett v. Atherton (L. Rep. 7 Q. B. 316). In Child v. Stenning the lessor had demised a piece of building land to A., and granted him certain rights of way. He afterwards demised an adjoining piece of land to B., and covenanted with him in the ordinary way for quiet enjoyment. A. claimed to be entitled under his lease to a right of way over part of the land demised to B. The lessor alleged that he had granted no such right of way to A. Thereupon B. brought an action against A. and the lessor, claiming an injunction and damages against A., or, in case the court should hold that A. was entitled to the right in question, then damages against the lessor. The action was tried before Mr. Justice Fry, who held that A. was entitled to the right of way, and dismissed the action as against him with costs to be paid by the plaintiff, and gave £400 damages against the lessor. The lessor appealed on the question of damages.

The appellant relied upon the decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Dennett v. Atherton in support of the proposition that, inasmuch as the plaintiff had not been evicted, he was only entitled to the amount of damage actually sustained by him. In that case the facts were as follows: Land was conveyed to the defendant in fee, the defendant covenanting with B., the vendor, that the defendant and his assigns would not permit to be carried on in any building built on any part of the land the trade of a seller of beer. The defendant afterwards demised for twenty-one years a building on part of the land which was used as a grocer's shop. The lessee covenanted that he and his assigns would not carry on therein, or permit to be carried on, certain trades (that of a seller of beer not being one). The defendant covenanted that the lessee and his assigns should peaceably enjoy the demised premises without any lawful let, suit, or interruption by or from the defendant or any other person lawfully claiming by, from, or under him. This lease was assigned to the plaintiff, and he,

without notice of the defendant's covenant with B., altered and fitted up the premises as a beershop, upon which B. obtained an injunction from the Court of Chancery restraining the plaintiff from carrying on the trade of a beerhouse on the premises. The plaintiff then brought an action against the defendant for a breach of the express covenant for quiet enjoyment, as well as of an implied one, but unsuccessfully.

The bearing of the case last quoted is not nearly as close to the question under examination as the case of Williams v. Burrell, which was quoted by the Master of the Rolls. There a tenant for life, with a power of leasing, demised for ninety-nine years if three persons indicated should live so long. There was a covenant which the Court held was a covenant for quiet enjoyment. After the death of the tenant for life it was held that the power was badly executed, so that the lease terminated with his life. The assignee of the lease thereupon brought an action against the executors of the grantor of the lease. It was shown that the executors were cognisant of the defence of the action of ejectment which had been brought by the remainderman, and that they had to a certain extent incited the lessee to defend. The Court of Common Pleas unanimously gave as damages, in addition to the value of the property, the costs incurred in defending the ejectment by the lessee, who was evicted by the remainderman.

In the early decisions there appears to have been a want of a precise measure of damages. Thus, in an old case reported in Noy's Reports (Gray v. Briscoe, p. 142), it is said: "B. covenants that he was seised of Blackacre in fee simple, when in truth it was copyhold land in fee according to the custom. By the Court: The covenant is broken, and the jury shall give damages in their consciences according to that rate, that the county values fee simple land more than copyhold land." Again, in Pomery v. Partington (3 T. R. 665), which was an action of covenant, it appeared that A. had made a lease of the moiety of certain tithes of corn and grain to the plaintiff for years with covenant of title. The plaintiff was ejected by title paramount, and brought an action. At the trial it was contended for the plaintiff that the true mode of estimating his damages was to ascertain the value of the interest in the term, and to add to the amount thereof the cost of defending the ejectment. On behalf of the defendants, however, it was urged that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover the fine paid on the making of the lease, the interest to the time of the judgment, and the costs of the defendants through ejectment. The Court of King's Bench intimated that the latter expressed their opinion, but did not decide the point. Similarly, when the defendant had conveyed to the plaintiff with covenants of title, and the plaintiff had been sued by a party having title paramount, and had paid a sum of money to compromise the claim, it was held in Smith v. Compton (3 B. & Ad. 407) that in an action on the covenant he could recover the whole amount paid by way of compromise, together with the costs of the ejectment suit, and that although no notice of the suit had been given to the defendant. In another action for breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment (Brinny v. Hopkinson, 1 L. T. Rep. N. S. 53), the Master of the Rolls allowed the full amount of the vendee's expenditures in converting the land to the purpose for which it was bought by erecting buildings on it.

In Child v. Stenning the plaintiff had not been evicted, and the inquiry was consequently limited to a consideration of what damages he was entitled to under those circumstances. In Mayne on Damages (p. 144, 2nd edit.) the rule is thus stated: "A breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment cannot occur till the plaintiff has actually been dispossessed or otherwise disturbed." İn America the rule of damages in regard to eviction is generally presented (Sedgwick on Damages, p. 175) under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, or of warranty, and in these cases it is well established that the mere existence of a paramount legal title is not sufficient, but that the plaintiff must allege and prove an ouster or eviction by a paramount title. It need not, however, be by process of law; the grantee may surrender possession, but in such case he assumes the whole burden of proving that the title to which he surrenders without contest is actually paramount to that derived from his grantor. There must be an actual loss of the land to support the plaintiff's claim, otherwise he is entitled to recover nominal damages only. 'It has been held," said the Master of the Rolls in Child v. Stenning, that where there has been an eviction, so that you can never have another action under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, but are ousted once and for ever, there, of course, the damages must be assessed once for all; but where there has been no eviction, the damages, of course, are only the damages actually sustained, because you cannot tell what will happen in the future; you cannot tell how far persons who have a right to interfere and disturb the quiet enjoyment may choose to avail themselves of that right, or whether they will interfere at all. That being so, the evidence should have been directed to show that some actual damage had been sustained by the plaintiff." The damages were accordingly reduced to 40s., the usual sum in actions to try a right. In the court below Mr. Justice Fry made B. pay the costs of A., but did not give B. those costs over against the lessor. "I think he is entitled to complain of so much of the decision," said the Master

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of the Rolls. "Whose was the cause of the action? Whose error was it gave rise to the whole litigation. Clearly the lessor's." His Lordship thought, on principle, that he who was the person that caused the litigation, whose error and representation caused it, ought to be the person to pay the costs thereby occasioned.

With reference to the amount of damages recoverable a few more authorities may be cited. Where an action was brought against the occupier by a person with a title paramount, and the former compromised by paying money, the Court held him to be entitled upon the covenant for title to recover the whole sum so paid, and his costs as between attorney and client, although he gave the covenantor no notice of this intention to compromise: (Smith v. Compton, 3 B. & Ad. 407.) The only effect of want of notice is to let in the party who is called upon for an indemnity to show that the plaintiff has no claim in respect of the alleged loss, or not to the amount alleged: (Ib.) In Lock v. Furze (sup.), where a lessor being tenant for life, with power to grant leases in possession, granted to a lessee in possession a reversionary lease, which the lessor, the reversioner, refused to ratify, the lessee recovered from the lessor's executor the premium which he had paid to the lessor, and the difference in value between the term professed to be granted by the lessor and that ultimately granted by the reversioner, together with the excess of the costs of the second lease over that of the void lease. Finally, in illustration of the remarks of the Master of the Rolls in the case above quoted, the case of Vane v. Barnard (Gilb. Eq. Rep. 7) may be quoted, where the Court decided that where an action was

LAW LIBRARY.

LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE.

HOUSE OF COMMONS. Monday, May 5.

CRIMINAL CODE BILL.

Ox the order for the second reading of the Criminal Code (Indietable Offences) Bill,

Sir H. JAMES observed that the measure had been greatly improved since last year, and that the work of revision had been admirably done by the learned commissioners to whom the work had been entrusted.

Mr. GRANTHAM earnestly hoped that every effort would be made to pass the Bill this session. Mr. HOPWOOD regarded the measure as a great improvement upon the Code of last year, but doubted whether sufficient time would be found to deal with it.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL repudiated the idea that the Government wished the House to accept the measure upon trust, or without complete examination; but he thought the points which had been raised might be discussed more satisfactorily in committee than on the second reading.

Mr. M. LLOYD expressed a general approval of the measure.

Mr. GREGORY approved of the Bill, remarking that there was no good reason why it should not i pass this session.

Mr. HERSCHELL urged the House to abstain from mere verbal criticism, otherwise it could not be passed.

Sir GEORGE BOWYER, while supporting the Bill, was of opinion that it should be carefully discussed before being passed, and that if possible it should be passed this session.

Mr. WATKIN WILLIAMS and Mr. CHARLEY congratulated the Government upon the introduc

tion of the measure.

Mr. COLE said the Government must not sup. pose that the Bill would pass without a great deal of criticism.

Mr. BULWER supported the second reading.
Sir A. LUSK hoped the Bill would be passed

this session.

Tuesday, May 6.

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

WE call the attention of the Profession to the suggestions made by Mr. Russell Cover in his speech at the last annual general meeting of the members of the Legal Practitioners' Society, a report of which appears in our columns of to-day. These suggestions seem to us to be worthy of consideration by those with whom it rests to adopt the reports of the committee on the legal offices which reports have appeared in Blue-books, &c. It is stated that by the adoption of the suggestions made in such reports thousands of pounas a year would be saved, and besides much loss of time and annoyance would be avoided. As at the present time many of the offices are being removed from various places to the New Law Mr. S. TANHOPE advocated the reduction of Courts, it is convenient to consider how the prothe minimum term of penal servitude to three years. posals made for the concentration of the various Mr. MUNDELLA remarked that they should all law offices, and with regard to the assizes, would endeavou to facilitate the progress of the Bill. be likely to work. The details of Mr. Cover's scheme The ATTORNEY-GENERAL had feared a lurking were of course only shortly alluded to at the meetinclination on the part of some hon. members noting of the society referred to. The Associates' to forward this Bill, though they might not openly disapprove of it, but in the discussion he had found no indication of such a spirit, but, on the contray, a sonâ fide disposition to facilitate its passig. He defended the resolution of the Govenment not only to codify but to remove glarig absurdities in the existing law. Consideng the character of the discussion they won! have heard serious objections if they crisd. The three radical changes proposed

Offices are at present amalgamated. It is proposed to include in that office the duties of the clerks in the Rule Office, the officers of assize, and the office of the clerk of the Crown, who attends court with two of his clerks. This office would then contain all the officers attending court or the assizes. The recommendation in the Blue Book that the common law masters and their clerks should be relieved from attending court could be acted on, and this would, as vacancies

occur, cause a saving of about £5000 a year, as so many masters and clerks might not be required, The writ and process departments might be amalgamated into one office of three divisions of letters, like the Record and Writ Clerks Office in Chancery. To this office the officer of the clerk of the Crown who attends to the issuing of writs and his clerks might be transferred. All affidavits should be filed in this office as in Chancery, and sworn in it or before a commissioner. As at present there are about 50,000 writs issued, and 20,000 appearances entered in common law divisions in each year, and three clerks kept in each department of each of the three divisions to attend to this work; and as there are an equal number of clerks kept in each of the judgment offices, it would, we are sure, be found on amalgamation that there would be more clerks than would be required, and a great saving would in course of time be thus effected. The Bills of Sale Office could be removed to the Law Registry Office and the Enrolment Office, which, with the Queen's Remembrancer's Office, and the Registry of Judg ment Office (if kept on foot) could form one office. The admission of articled clerks in the Queen's Bench has already been transferred to the Rolls Court. The Petty Bag Office could form part of the Enrolment and Land Registry Office, with which the Acknowledgment Office could also be amalgamated. We can see no reason why motions should not be set down, and why applications for new trials should not be argued out in the first instance. It is now impossible to know when a motion for a new trial will come on, and the change proposed would, we feel assured, be for the benefit of all. Some of the judges have said that the present arrangements for the dispatch of business are "a complete muddle." The proposal as to motions and new trials, and also that for the abolition of divisional courts, and for the judges to sit by themselves, and to have London causes marked for them in the first instances, might probably remove some of the present complaints. Matters could not well be worse than at present, and it seems to be worth while to adopt the suggestions if only by way of experiment in the first instance. Much time is even now lost at the Common Law Chambers, and there seems to be no reason why judgment debtor summonses which occupy a great deal of the judges' time should not be heard at the Bankruptcy Court as proposed. County Court judges hear such cases in their courts. Acknowledg ments of deeds by married women might be taken by the masters or at the Land Registry Office or the Enrolment Office, instead of by the judges of the High Court, or a special officer might be appointed for the purpose. The present arrangements of the assizes are far from perfect. At present the judges meet and fix the commission days for each town, but they have no knowledge of how many causes or prisoners there are for trial, but calculate what there ought to be, having regard to the average of previous years. The

appeal will lie. Their Lordships were further of opinion that this power of the divisional courts was not taken away by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, the provisions of which as to all proceedings in an action being taken before a single judge being directory only and not imperative. BAGGALLAY, L.J., while not dissenting from the judgment, observed that he had entertained doubts which were not entirely removed.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE-CHANCERY DIVISION.

Monday, May 5.

(Before JESSEL, M.R.)

Re WHEATCROFT AND DAINTREY (Solicitors). Solicitors in partnership-Right of a creditor of an individual member of a firm, to set off the debt against a sum due from such creditor to the firm of solicitors for professional services rendered.

Ince, Q.C. (with him E. Wilberforce) applied on behalf of Mr. Wheatcroft, solicitor, that certain sums of £142 15s. 8d., and £61 4s. 4d., which, on taking the cash account by the Master, had been debited to Messrs. Wheatcroft and Co. by their clients Messrs. Alexander Hurst and Co., might be disallowed. It appeared that Messrs. Wheatcroft and Daintrey carried on business as solicitors in London and Eastbourne, the former managing the London and the latter the Eastbourne business. In January, 1878, Messrs. Hurst and Co. paid to Mr. Daintrey, at Eastbourne, a cheque for £240, on account of costs, and received from Daintrey a cheque for £89 7s. 6d., for rent of offices, &c., and other cheques drawn in the name of G. Daintrey for £142 15s. 8d., which came out of the partnership account. In Sept., 1878, Hurst wrote to Wheatcroft, informing him of his partner's misconduct, and Wheatcroft wrote in reply that he had already taken steps for a dissolution of partnership. In November following, Hurst and Co. having received the bills of costs due to the firm, again communicated with Daintrey, paid him a cheque drawn in favour of his firm for £110, and took from him two partnership cheques, one for £24 12s. 6d. in payment of office rent, and another for £61 48. 4d., in payment of a private debt of Daintrey's. It appeared that Wheatcroft had on several occasions during the year 1878 applied to Hurst and Co. for a cheque on account of payments made by him and work done in London, but had been unable to get one. It was contended that Hurst and Co. knew that the moneys they received from Daintrey in payment of his private debts were partnership moneys, and that they were not justified in receiving them without the authority of Daintrey's partner. He cited Re Riches (34 L. J. Bank.); Rep and Kendall V. Wood 6 L. Rep. Ex. 248), in support of his argument. Chitty, Q.C. (with him Bleby) contended that the partner Daintrey had power to draw cheques in the name of the firm, and that it was not incumbent on Messrs. Hurst and Co. to show that Daintrey had his partner's authority to pay his private debts with partnership cheques.

JESSEL, M.R.-This is a perfectly plain case. First, as regards the larger sum, the £142 15s. 8d., there is no evidence at all that Messrs. Hurst and Co. knew that it was partnership money. The cheque was drawn by Mr. Daintrey, on his private account, and in the absence of evidence that they knew it, though it was, in fact, partnership money (it was a very improper act on the part of Mr. Daintrey), I cannot make them liable to repay it in any shape or way. Upon that the master is clearly right. The other point was taken in such a way that I am afraid the master must have been a little misled. It seem that the £110 was paid by Messrs. Hurst and Co. for a bill of costs. At the same time they took from Mr. Daintrey a cheque for £61 some odd shillings, for payment of a private debt. This cheque was drawn by Mr. Daintrey in the partnership name on the partnership bankers in his own favour, and indorsed by him to Messrs. Hurst and Co. Therefore they had, in the face of the cheque itself, notice that it was partnership money, and drawn on the partnership account. Well, if people will take partnership money in payment of a private debt, of course they take it subject to the obligation of proof that the partners have a right to apply the partnership money. In this case it is quite clear that he had not, and therefore they have not taken the trouble to attempt to discharge the obligation. The result, therefore, is, that it was a payment to them by the partner: ship of £61 48. 4d., and ought to have been allowed in taking the cash account. I do not know what the result of taking the account is.

Ince.-There is a balance found due to Messrs. Wheatcroft and Daintrey.

JESSEL, M.R.-Then Messrs. Wheatcroft and Daintrey must have credit for £61 4s. 4d. in addition to that balance. Each party to pay his

own costs.

Solicitors for Wheatcroft and Co., W. G. Wheatcroft; for Hurst & Co., Dearle & Co.

REPORTS OF SALES.

Tuesday. May 6.

Mart.

By Messrs. Driver and Co., at the Mart. Stoke Newington-No. 22, Mildmay-park, term 72 yearssold for £750. By Messrs. CHINNOCK, GALSWORTHY, and CHINNOCK, at the Fifty shares of £100 each (£10 paid), in Law Life Assurance Company-sold for £5805. Two shares of £100 each (£10 paid up and £70 capitalised) in the County Fire Office Company-sold for £276. By Mr. F. W. GLAZIER, at the Mart. Brixton-No. 11, Acre-lane, term 27 years-sold for £400. Holloway-No. 15, Francis-terrace, term 75 years-sold for £375.

Wednesday, May 7.

By Mr. F. STATHAM HOBSON, at the Mart.

Canonbury-No. 16, 17, and 18, Douglas-road North, term Nos. 22, 24, 25, and 27, Douglas-road North, term 46 years

49 years-sold for £1400.

sold for £1860.

Highbury-Nos. 36 and 88, Beresford-road, term 70 years— sold for £1350.

Nos. 1, 3 and 5, Pyrland-road, term 70 years-sold for £2205. Nos. 4 and 6, Petherton-road, term years-sold for £2205. Hackney-Nos. 187, 139, and 149, Amhurst-road, term 87 years-sold for £2400.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL. Inquiries, as to Students' Societies, as to Service under Articles, as to the several Examinations, as to admission on the Roll of the Supreme Court, as to being called to the Bar, and as to taking out and renewal of solicitors' annual Certificates, should be addressed to the Editor (Law Students' Department).

WE are anxious to call special attention to the fact that on the 1st April last a resolution in the following terms was adopted at a meeting of the members of the Law Students' Debating Society: "That two prizes of books of the value of £5 58. and £3 3s. respectively, be given to the two best speakers during the session, excluding past and present members of the committee, and former winners of the first prize; the decision to be by general ballot at the next annual meeting in July." We have felt for some time past that this society was rather behindhand in offering to its members special encouragement for competition among themselves. We regard the proposal before us as an excellent one, and the mode of awarding the prizes as a fairly good one, though the comparative merits of public speaking is not by any means an easy matter for determination. We hope the competition will be well sustained.

ALTHOUGH Some of the questions in the last final examination papers of the Law Society are of the offered to students excellent facilities for proving stereotyped character, taken as a whole they the care with which they had pursued their studies during articles.

THE Nottingham Law Students' Society has, among its members, some decidedly active and energetic men, if we may judge by the annual report of the committee, which we publish in our present issue. It is proposed to form a students' law library in Nottingham. We are glad to hear it; but it would be even better if the library of the local law society were stocked with works required for use by students. It is also proposed to establish a course of law lectures for students in Nottingham. This ought certainly to be done in all large towns. As we have said before, the action of this society in regard to the exemption from passing the preliminary examination was most commendable. The society was only established in 1867.

THE Condition of the United Law Students' Society (judging by the quarterly report of Mr. W. C. Owen, the hon. secretary of that useful institution), which report we publish elsewhere, seems to be almost all that can be wished as a self-supporting and selfgoverned association of law students, for both branches of the profession. The subjects for debate have been for the most part well selected, governing body of the society. and much credit is due to the officers, and to the We hope the approaching joint debate of this society with the Law Students' Debating Society will prove a success. As we have repeatedly urged, these two associations should be one society. It is especially gratifying to notice the distinctions at law examinations, which are mentioned in the report as having been secured by members of the socitety studying for the one or the other branch of the profession.

THE following lectures and classes will be delivered and held during the ensuing week in the Lecture Hall of The Incorporated Law Society, U.K., Chancery-lane: Conveyancing Class, on Monday, 4.30 to 6 o'clock p.m.; Tuesday, ditto; Wednes

day, ditto; Thursday, Conveyancing Lecture, 6 to 7 o'clock p.m.

IN July 1878, the Law Society issued a circular upon the subject of the intermediate examinations for 1879 and 1880, but without requiring the use of any particular edition of Stephens's Commentaries for the year 1880. Subsequently, however, the use of the seventh edition of the work (1874) has been required. Another edition (the eighth) of the work will be published by Messrs. Butterworth about March next.

THE elementary works selected for the intermediate examination of persons under articles of clerkship for the year 1879, and which examination is held under the authority of the Solicitors Act 1877, are: Smith on Contracts, 6th edition, 1874; Williams on the Principles of the Law of Real Property, 11th or 12th edition; Williams on the Principles of the Law of Personal Property, 10th edition; Haynes' Outlines of Equity, 3rd or 4th edition.

THE subjects for the Final Examination (under the authority of the Solicitors Act 1877) during the dure: A. In matters usually determined or admiyear 1879, are: 1. Principles of Law and Procenistered in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice-B. In matters usually determined or administered in the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer Divisions of the High Court of Justice. 2. Principles of the Law of Real and Personal Property and the Practice of Conveyancing. 3. The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy. 4. Criminal Law and Practice; Proceedings before of the Probate and Divorce Division of the High Court of Justice. Subjects numbered 3, 4, and 5 are still optional.

Justices of the Peace. 5. The Law and Practice

THE days appointed for the final examinations of the Incorporated Law Society in 1879 are: Tuesday 17th, and Wednesday 18th June, at 10; Tuesday 4th, and Wednesday 5th Nov., at 10.

Candidates are required, by the regulations of the 27th Nov. and 5th Dec. 1877, to give notice in writing forty-two days at least before the date of the examination to the secretary of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, London.

Candidates are also required at the same time to leave with the secretary of the society their articles of clerkship and any assignment thereof, or supplemental articles, and the certificates of their having passed the preliminary examination, or evidence of their exemption therefrom, and certificates of having passed the intermediate examination, together with answers to the questions as to due service and conduct. Prints of these questions can be obtained on application at the office of the Incorporated Law Society.

at least before the date of the examination. A renewed notice must be given fourteen days

The fee payable on giving notice of examination is £5, and for a renewed notice £2 10s.

CALLS TO THE BAR.

THE undermentioned gentlemen were called to the Bar on Wednesday:

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INNER TEMPLE. - Francis Burdett Thomas Money, LL.M. and M.A., Cambridge; George Moffatt Rhys Layton, B.A., Cambridge; George Howard Cartland, B.A., Oxford; Henry Hills Meredith, B.A., Oxford Herry Pigeon, late of Cambridge; Lewis Robert Abbey Williams, B.A., Oxford; Arthur Raymond Heath, LL.B., Cambridge; Arthur Peters; John McDonald, M.A., Oxford; James Ramsay-Parsons, B.A., Oxford; James William Lowther, LL.B., Cambridge; William Francis Taylor, B.A., Oxford; Innes Watson, B.A., Oxford; Richard Taswell Richardson, B.A., Oxford; the Hon. Francis Herbert Dawnay, Oxford; Arthur Russell Johnson, B.A., Oxford; Woomesh Chandra Ghose, Calcutta ; William Frederick Whetstone, B.A., LL.B., Cambridge; Alfred Tillotson, Esq. (holder of a pupil scholarship in Real Property Law, awarded by the Inner Temple, Feb. 1879); Bowen Pottinger Woosnam, B.A., Oxford; Charles William Mitcalfe Dale, B.A., LL.B., Cambridge; James Edward John Julian, B.A., Oxford; Thomas John Bowles, B.A., Oxford; Francis Randle Twemlow, B.A., Oxford; Arthur Knocker Dibb, B.A. Cambridge; Charles Edmund Robinson, B.A., Cambridge; the Hon. Robert Henry Manners-Sutton; George Stallard, LL.B., Cambridge; Clement Erskine Linwood Strong; Evan Edgar David, B.A., Cambridge; Albert Gray; John Stewart Odiarne Robertson-Luxford, B.A., Oxford; William Evans Hartopp, London; Delabene Weston Marsden (holder of a pupil scholarship in Equity, awarded by the Inner Temple, February, 1879); Charles Valentine Knightley, B.A., Oxford; Richard Charles Percy Gethin, Arthur Maw Mitchison, B.A., Oxford; Leicester Paul Beaufort, B.A., Oxford; and William Edward Davidson, B.A., Oxford.