AULD, WILLIAM SCALES, general smith, Darlington. Pet. April 25. May 13, at half-past ten, at office of Sol. Wooler, Darlington

тоз

BANKS, THOMAS, farmer. Hengill. Pet. April 26. May 16, at eleven, at offices of Sols. Eastham and Eastham, ClitheBARKER, GEORGE, beerhouse keeper, Greasley. Pet. April 23. May 15, at twelve, at office of Sol. Fraser, Notting. ham

BERMAN, ABRAHAM, tailor. Chanel Bar. Pet. April 21. May 14, at twelve, at office of Sol. Belk, Nottingham BUTLER, CAROLINE JANE, cabinet maker, Great Yarmouth. Pet. April 23. May 15, at twelve, at offices of Sols.[Burton and Son, Great Yarmouth

BEST, WILLIAM MARTIN, Solicitor, Stockton-on-Tees. Pet. April 25. May 12, at three, at office of Sol. Draper, Stockton-on-Tees

BROWN, FRANCIR, baker, Modbury. Pet. April 21. May 9, at twelve, at office of Sol. Pearse, Plymouth BEVAN, JOHN SAGE, baker, Ilfracombe. Pet. April 26. May 1, at half-past eleven, at offices of Sols. Chanter, Ffinch, and Chanter, Barnstaple

BIRCH, LEVI, wholesale boet manufacturer, Chesham. Pet. April 26. May 13, at two, at offices of Sols. Francis and How, Chesham

BATTY, JAMES, farmer, Stillington. Pet. April 23. May 10, as twelve, at office of Crumbie, solicitor, Stonegate, York. Sols. Robinson and Son, Easingwold

BATEMAN, RICHARD BIRD, mourning warehouseman, Manchester. Pet. April 26. May 22, at three, at omces of Sols. Farrar and Hall, Manchester BETTERIDGE, WILLIAM HARPER, grocer, Ancaster-ter, Albert-rd, Peckham. Pet. April 25. May 15, at three, at office of Sols. Matthews and Wells, John-st. Bedford-row BOETTCHER, CLOTHAR ALEXANDER ADOLPH, toy merchant, Houndsaitch. Pet. April 22. May 7, at three, at office of Sol. Cannon, King-st, Cheapside

BROWN, WILLIAM, draper, Ball's Pond-rd, Kingsland. Pet. April 23. May 12, at three, at the office of Holloway, accountant, Ball's Pond-rd. Sol. Cooper, Chancery-la BUSHELL, EDWIN AUGUSTUS, accountant, Glaskin-rd, Hackney. Pet. April 19. May 10, at 5hree, at office of Sol. Angove, Serjeants'-inn, Fleet-st

CAMPBELL, JOHN, architectural modeller. Darlington. Pet. April 22. May 6, at half-past ten, at office of Sol. Wooler, Darlington

CORK. JOHN, grocer, Holborn, South Shields. Pet. April 24. May 12, at three, at offices of Sol. Mabane, South Shields CLARK, GEORGE, hosier, Sunderland. Pet. April 26. May 12, at three, at office of Sol. Bell, Sunderland CLEMENTS, JOHN, baker, Redhill. Pet. April 24. May 18, at three, at offices of Sols. Wolverstan, Avery, and Jennings, Ironmonger-la

CHRISTIE, THOMAS, draper, Millom. Pet. April 22. May 9, at three, at the rooms of the Manchester Home Trade Association, Manchester. Sol. Dickenson, Broughton-inFurness CUFFLING, RICHARD, tailor, Accrington. Pet. April 26. May 13, at eleven, at the Thatched House hotel, Manchester. Sols. Haworth and Broughton, Accrington CAWTHRAY, ELIJAH, carter. Tong, Bradford. Pet. April 25. May 12, at three, at office of Sol. Beverley, Bradford Cox, STEPHEN FITCHEW, Cox, FITZHUGH, and CHAPMAN, GEORGE, leather factors, Leeds. Pet. April 3. May 9, at twelve, at office of Sols. Rooke and Midgley, Leeds CHILTON, JAMES, boot manufacturer, Stone. Pet. April 25. May 14, at eleven, at the Crown hotel, Stone. Sol. Ashwell, Stoke-upon-Trent

CRISP, CHARLES, draper, Eastbourne. Pet. April 24.

May 14, at twelve, at the Chamber of Commerce, 145, Cheapside. Sols. Carr, Bannister, Davidson, and Morris, Basinghall-st

COOKSEY, JOSEPH, beerhouse keeper, Stafford. Pet. April 24. May 9, at three, at office of Sol. Smith, Wednesbury Cox, GEORGE, out of business, Maids Moreton. Pet. April 26. May 17, at eleven, at office of Small, Buckingham. Sols. Kilby and Mace, Banbury

DAVIES, JAMES, painter, Bridgend. Pet. April 25. May 12, at two, at office of Sol. Stockwood, Bridgend DAVIES, AZARIAH ROBERT, draper, Llanrug.

Pet. April 25. May 16, at twelve, at the Queen's Commercial hotel, Chester. Sol. Owen, Carnarvon

DAVEY, JOHN VEALE, fancy dealer, Plymouth. Pet. April 25. May 10, at twelve, at office of Sol. Bridgman, Plymouth

DE PINNA, AMELIA, and DE PINNA, LETITIA, Ostrich feather manufacturers, Old Kent-rd. Pet. April 26. May 14, at eleven, at the office of Coker, accountant, 32, Cheapside. Sol. Henderson, Old Broad-st EVANS, JOHN, clerk, Morriston. Pet. April 26. May 12, at two, at the office of Sol. Jellicoe, Swansea EVANS, ROBERT RICHARD, draper, Bangor. Pet. April 25. May 15, at two, at offices of Josolyne, Clarke, and Co, accountants, King-st, Cheapside. Sols. Phelps, Sidgewick, and Biddle, Gresham-street FAIRCHILD, THOMAS, butcher, Swansea. Pet. April 24. May 19, at three, at office of Sol. Woodward, Swansea. FLEET, WILLIAM HENRY, chemist, West Malvern. Pet. April 24. May 7, at eleven, at offices of Sols. Corbett and Corbett, Worcester

FISHER, JOHN CLAY, farmer, Mansfie'd. Pet. April 24. May 13, at eleven, at office of Sol. Belk, Nottingham FRECE, ISAAC DE, clothier, Liverpool. Pet. April 25. May 15, at three, at offices of Sols. Nordon and Mason, Liverpool

GASTON, GERARD, chemist, Cardiff. Pet. April 21. May 7. at two, at the office of Tribe, Clark, and Co., Moorgatebidgs. Sols, Downing and Price, Cardiff

GRANT, DUNCAN, grocer, Tavernspite. Pet. April 21. May 10, at eleven, at office of Sol. Lascelles, Narberth GRACE, JAMES, bootmaker, Hertford. Pet. April 18. May 8, at four, at tlle George hotel, Luton. Sol. Cooper, Chancery-la

GREEN, JOHN, tailor, Birmingham. Pet. April 26. May 15, at two. at the Acorn hotel, Birmingham. Sol. Collis, Stourbridge GRAVES, Robert, farmer, Ashby-de-la-Larnd. Pet. April 24. May 12, at eleven, at offices of Sols. Tweed, Stephen, and Dashper, Lincoln

GEACH, GEORGE EDMUND, trimming merchant, Trump-st. Pet. April 23. May 9, at three, at office of Sol. Holder, King-st, Cheapside.

GARDINER, THOMAS EDMUND, auctioneer, Mile End-rd.
Pet. April 26. May 14, at three, at office of Sol. Parnell,
Fenchurch-st

GREGORY, JOSEPH, fruiterer, Harpurhey. Pet. April 25.
May 12, at two, at office of Sol. Lawson, Manchester
GREEN, JOHN ALEXANDER, joiner, Nantwich. Pet. April 22.
May 19, at eleven, at office of Sol. Hill, Crewe
HALSTEAD, DAVID, worsted dyer, Manchester. Pet. April
25. May 14, at three, at office of Sol. Rylance, Manches-

ter

HUBBARD, JOSEPH, printer, Ashwell-rd, Roman-rd, Bow.
Pet. April 18. May 8, at eleven, at the Crown hotel, Old
Ford-rd. Sol. Hicks, Grove-rd, Victoria Park
HOODLES, JACOB, husbandman, Wetheral. Pet. April 23.
May 16, at half-past two, at offices of Sols. Arnison and
Arnison, Penrith

Pet. HAYWARD, GEORGE, greengrocer, Cathay. Bristol. April 23. May 9, at twelve, at office of Triggs, public accountant, Broad-st, Bristol. Sols. Benson and Carpenter, Bristol

HOWLE, HENRY, stationer, Smallthorne. Pet. April 22. May 8, at eleven. at office of Sol. Julian, Burslem HIGHNAM, RICHARD CHARLES, farmer, Doynton. Pet. April 24. May 10, at two, at 3, Miles's-bldgs, Bath. Sols. Gill and Bush

HARRIS, RICHARD, boot manufacturer, Neath. Pet. April 25. May 13, at eleven, at office of Sol. Scale, Neath.

HACKNEY, ALFRED HERBERT, surgeon, Warbleton. Pet. April 25. May 11, at twelve, at the George hotel, Battle. Sol. Sheppard, Batt'e

HERBERT, DANIEL, boot manufacturer, Leicester. Pet. April 21. May 14, at twelve, at offices of Sols. Harvey and Harvey, Leicester HOUNSELL, CHARLES WILLIAM. coffee-house keeper, Fishstreet-hill. Pt. pril. May 12, at twelve, at office of Sol. Robinson. Philpot-la

HARRISON, JOSEPH, bootmaker, Kingston upon-Hull. Pet. April 24. May 10, at half-past one, at the Queen's hotel, Leeds. Sol. Jackson

HENSWALL, JOSEPH, ironmonger, Altrincham Pet. April 24. May 15, at three, at offices of Sols. Nicholls, Hinde, and Co, Altrincham

HORROCKS, JOHN, the younger, and HORROCKS, CHARLES EDWARD, bedroom furniture manufacturers, Manchester. Pet. April 24. May 9, at eleven, at office of Sol. Tremewen, Manchester

HIGGIN, ELIZABETH BELLA, saddler. Burnley. Pet. April 25. May 12, at three, at the Exchange hotel, Burnley. Sol. Sutcliffe, Burnley

HOWELL. GEORGE WILLIAM, traveller, Manchester. Pet. April 24. May 9, at three, at offices of pols. Beaumont and Rickards, Manchester HOWARD, HUGH. tailor, Southport. Pet. April 26 May 19, at three, at offices of Sols. Hinde, Milie, and Sudiow, Manchester

ILETT, PHILIP, fancy draper, Kentish Town rd. Pet. April 26. May 12, at three, at offices of Sols. Matthews and Wells, John-st, Bedford-ro

INGHAM, WILLIAM, grocer. Leeds. Pet. April 22. May 12, at three, at office of Sol. Billington, Leeds

JHNSON, CHARLES, tailor, Kidsgrove. Pet. April 23. May 12. at three, at the Roebuck hotel, Kidsgrove. Sol. Wade, Kidsgrove

JOBSON, EDWARD CHARLES, and BERVEN, JOHANN CHRISTIAN WILHELM, timber merchants, West Hartlepool. Pet. April 25. May 26 at three, at office of Sol. Bell, West Hartlepool

JONES, WILLIAM, currier, Dover. Pet. April 24. May 14, at twelve, at offices of Messrs. Lovering and Co, accountants, Gresham-st. Sol. Mowll, Dover

22.

JOHNSON, WILLIAM ANDREW, groeer, Ilkley. Pet. April
May 12, at two, at office of Burton, accountant, Par-
kinson's-chmbrs, Bradford. Sol. Brumfitt, Ilkley
KAY, STEPHEN, provision dealer, Haulgh. Pet. April 24.
May 9, at three, at office of Sol. Whittingham, Bolton
KLYNE, RICHARD WILLIAM, hatter, Jarrow. Pet. April 26.
May 13, at three, at the rooms of the Incorporated Law
Society, Arcade, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Sol. Fenwick,
Jarrow-on-Tyne

LIGHTBOURNE, WILLIAM ASHBOURNER, general medical
practitioner, Blackburn. Pet. April 21. May 13, at eleven
at offices of Radcliffe and Radcliffe, Blackburn
LEWIS, JACOB, out of business, Mildmay-road. Pet. April
18. May 12, at three, at office of Sol. Green, Queen-st
LAWRENCE, JAMES, in lodgings, Birmingham. Pet. April
25. May 10, at a quarter-past ten, at office of Sol. East,
Birmingham
LLOYD, WILLIAM, farmer, Kirby-Bellairs. Pet. April 26.
May 13, at four, at the Harborough hotel, Melton Mow-
bray. Sols. Dowson and Wright

LISTER, JO EPH, builder, Rotherham. Pet. April 26, May 13, at eleven, at office of Sol. Willis, Rotherham LAWRENSON, THOMAS, Saddler, Preston. Pet. April 2. May 15. at three, at office of Sol. Thompson, Preston MACNAMARA. JOSEPH, cutler, Strand. Pet. April 16. May 7, at three, at the Cleopatra Hotel, Beaufort-oldgs, Strand. Sol. Butterfield, Ironmonger-la

MOSS, BENJAMIN, farmer, Charlton. Pet. April 26. May 16, at three, at offices of Pearse and Taylor, Bridge-st, Banbury. Sol. Pearse, Banbury

MEDCALF, JOHN, and LIVESEY, JOHN, merchants, Man-
chester. Pet. April 22. May 15, at three, at offices of
Sols. Cooper and Sons, Manchester
MOORE, JONAS, merchant, Manchester.

Pet. April 24.
May 21, at three, at office of Sol. Rylance, Manchester
MCS, THOMAS WILLIAM, out of business, Denmark villas,
Ealing. Pet. April 25. May 11, at two, at offices of Sols.
Hogan and Hughes, Martin's-la, Cannon-st
MEADOWS, JAMES POPE, furniture dealer, Dover.
April 24. May 14, at twelve, at the Guildhall coffee-house,
London. Sol. Carder, Dover

Pet.

MOVERLEY, HENRY, innkeeper, Ordsall. Pet. April 23. May 13, at eleven, at office of Sol. Marshall, East Retford NATHAN, NATHANIEL, High-st, Shoreditch. Pet. April 25. May 20, at three, at offices of Sols. Goldberg and Langdon, West-st. Finsbury-circus

NEALE, WILLIAM, grocer, Burton-on-Trent. Pet. April 25.
May 12, at eleven, at the Mid and hotel, Burton-on-Trent.
Sol. Taylor, Burton-on-Trent

NEAVE, HENRY, engineer, Barton-upon-Humber. Pet.
April 25. May 11, at half-past twelve, at office of Sols.
Mason and Mason, Barton-upon-Humber
OSBORNE, JOHN, draper, Brampton. Pet. April 24. May 12,
at three, at offices of Sols. Carrick, Lee, and Sons, bramp-

ton

PARK, WILLIAM, dealer in watches, Lower Broughton. Pet. April 25. May 10, at eleven, at office of Sol. Jones, Manchester

PARKER, JOHN GARNER, pawnbroker, Darlaston. Pet. April 25. May 10, at half-past ten, at office of Sol. Sheldon, Wednesbury

PRICE, WILLIAM, builder, Newport. Pet. April 21. May 16, at twelve, at the offices of Sols. Lloyd, Newport PICKERING, EDWIN, hardware merchant, Sparkbrook. Pet. April 26. May 16, at three, at offices of Sols. Rowlands and Bagnall, Birmingham

PAYNE, WILLIAM, and KENNETH THOMAS, ROBERT, im. porters, High Holborn. Pet. April 24. May 15, at two, at the Cannon-st hotel. Sols. Gush and Phillips, Finsburycircus PALING, FREDERICK, grocer. Castle-ter, Osborne-rd, Acton. Pet. April 21. May 12, at four, at offices of Harvey, accountant, Basinghall-st. Sol. Lay, Staple-inn PROUDLOVE, DAVID, joiner, Newcastle-under-Lyme. Pet. April 2, May 12, at twelve, at office of Sol. Griffith, Newcastle

PRICE, THOMAS, jun, miller. Nantgarw. Pet. April 25. May 18, at 1welve, at the office of Sol. Rosser, Pontypridd PINCHES, THOMAS, builder, Walsall. Pet. April 25. May 10, at eleven, at office of Sol. East, Birmingham PARTRIDGE, ALFRED MUNDEN, boot manufacturer, Wands worth-rd. Pet. April 21. May s, at three, at office of Sol. Moojen, Southampton-st, Bloomsbury-sq

PUGH, MARY, and COLTMAN. EMILY SUE, milllners, Liverpool. Pet. April 25. May 13, at three, at offices of Sols. Barrell, Hodway, and Barrell, Liverpool

PICKLES, JOHN, greengrocer, Dewsbury. Pet. April 25, May 16, at half-past ten, at offics of Sols. Ridgway and Ridgway, Dewsbury

RANDALL, EMMANUEL, leatherboard manufacturer, Romsey. Pet. April 23. May 12, at tro, at the Red Lion hotel, Basingstoke. Sol. West, Poultry-chmbrs, Queen Victoria-st

ROGERS, THOMAS, fruiterer, West Bromwich. Pet. April 25. May 13, at half-past eleven, at office of Sol. Jackson, West Bromwich

REVELL, JOHN ALDRIDGE, grocer, Union-st, Victoria Docks,
Canning Town. Pet. April 25. May 18, at one, at office of
Sol. Willis, Charles-st, Hoxton
SALOMON, ADOLPHE, dealer in works of art, Southampton-
row. Pet. April 24. May 9, at eleven, at offices of Sois.
Howard and Co, New Bridge-st

STONE, SAMUEL, builder, Gloucestershire. Pet. April 25.
May 13. at eleven, at office of Sol. Atchley, Bristol
SALT, NEHEMIAH, beerseller, Hanley. Pet. April 26. May
8, at eleven, at office of Sol. Ashmall, Hanley

SMITH, ALEXANDER, schoolmaster, Bulman's Village. Pet.
April 25. May 16, at three, at office of Sols. Legge and
Denison, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
STREATER, HENRY WILLIAM, artist, Knowle Hill. Pet.
April 23. May 5, at eleven, at the Ship hotel, Reading.
Sol. Dodd, Reading

SUMMERS, GEORGE, shopkeeper, Claines. Pet. April 24,
May 10, at twelve, at office of Sols. Pearse, Corbett and
Corbett, Worcester

SOUTHERN, MARK, bone dealer, Bolton. Pet. April 21
May 7, at three, at office of Sol. Robinson, Bolton
SMITH, HARRY EDEN, bootmaker, Great Lever. Pet. April
26. May 13, at eleven, at office of Healey, accountant,
Acresfield, Bolton. Sol. Balshaw, Bolton
SIMCOX, WILLIAM, contractor, Hednesford. Pet. April 5.
May 12, at half-past three, at the Swan hotel, Stafford.
Sol. Morgan, Stafford

SHEPPARD, THOMAS, fishmonger, Shaftesbury-ter, Hornsey. rise. Pet. April 22. May 7, at twelve, at offices of Sols. Brown and Sons, Finsbury-pl

SHAKESHAFT, CHARLES, cart owner, Liverpool. Pet. April 25. May 16, at three, at offices of Sols. Nerdon and Mason, Liverpool

SCHOFIELD, JAMES, lucifer manufacturer, Martin-st, Stratford. Pet. April 22. May 9, at two, at office of Sol. Biggenden, Finsbury-sq

TATTERSHALL, EDWARD GEORGE, Solicitor, Compton - rd,
Canonbury. Pet. April 19. May 15, at three, at offices
of Sols. Lawrance, Plews, and Baker. Old Jewry-chamb
TELFER, ARCHIBALD, clerk in holy orders. Nottingham,
Pet. April 25, May 13, at four, at office of Sol. Cockayne,
Nottingham

THORPE, WILLIAM. innkeeper, Boston. Pet. April 25 May
12, at twelve, at the Red Lion hotel, Boston. Sol. Bales,
Boston
TAMLYN, CHRISTOPHR, licensed victualler, Swansea Pet,
April 23. May 8, at eleven, at office of Sol. Thomas,
Swansea

TALLBOY, JAMES EDWARD, upholsterer, Cardiff. Pet April 26. May 14, at eleven, at office of Sol. Jones, Cardiff TURNER, JAMES, out of business, Stonegravels. Pet. April 21. May 5, at three, at office of Sol. Cowdell, Chesterfield

VAUGHAN, ABSOLAM, East Dean. Pet. April 25. May 13, at three, at office of Sols. Minnett, Son, and Piddocke, Ross WHITE, EDWARD HULBERT, coach builder, Kingston-onThames. Pet. April 26. May 14, at two, at offices of Messrs. Hughes, Hooker, Buttanshaw, and Thunder. Budge-row WRIGHT, THOMAS, fishmonger, London Wall. Pet, April 26. May 13, at three, at the office of Bath and Son, St. Benets-pl, Gracechurch-st. Sol. Philby, Fenchurch-bldgs

WHITE, JOHN, fruit salesman, Birmingham. Pet. April 19. May 8, at twelve, at office of Sol, Maher, Birmingham WHITESIDE, ROBERT, grocer, Poulton-le-Fylde. Pet. April 26. May 12, at three, at office of Sol. Blackhurst, Blackpool

WALKER, WILLIAM HENRY, commission agent, Moss Side, Manchester. Pet. April 25. May 9, at three, at offi e of Sol. Farrington, Manchester

WHALLEY, JOHN, builder, Manchester. Pet. April 24. May 9, at three, at offices of Sols. Fox and Fox, Manche-ter WILSON, THOMAS, contractor, Bradford.. Pet, April 24. May 12, at half-past three, at office of Sol. Neill, Kirkgate

Dividends.

BANKRUPTS' ESTATES.

The Official Assignees, &c., are given, to whom apply for the Dividends.

Barrett, S. surgeon, first, Cid. Paget, Lincoln's-iun-idHewitt, R. victualler, second, 18. 74d., and 28. 6.d. to new proofs. Paget. Lincoln'inn-flds.-Robinson, C. ol mer chants, third, 28. and 3-8ths of a 1d. Paget. Lincoln-innfilds.-Beau, E. stationer, second and final or 9.d. At offices of Nicholls and Leatherdale, Old Jewry-chmbrs.-Blechlock, D. draper, first and final of 1s. 6d. At Trust. Chesney, Bradford.-Brook, J. A. tailor, first of 6s. 6d. At Trust. Colefax, Bradford. Eeles, H. warehouseman, first of is. Cd. At offices of Ladbury, Collison, and Viney, Cheapside-op, C. D. brewer. div. 2d. At Trust. Hart. Moorgate stLinton, J. brickmaker, first of Gs. At Trust. Stevens, Guilford.-Madgett, T. Diss, first and final of 68 34d. At Trust. Alger, Diss.-Millar, W. traveller, second of 3s. At. Trust. Chesney, Bradford -Reynolds, M. A. innkeeper, second and final of 3s. 2d. At Trust. Langley, Cardiff-Rose, F. horse dealer, first and final of Ss. At office of Serjeant, solicitor. Ramsey.-Shepherd, T. F. stockbroker, second and final of 3. At offices of Wing and Wing, Shetheld.—Stepheur, A. draper, first and final of s 1 At offices of Ladbury, Collison, and Viney, Cheapside.-Wright. E tailor, first and final of 11s. 6d. At offices of Firth and Miller, woollen merchants, Huddersfield.

HOLDEN.-On the 12th ult., at 13, Victoria-park, Dover, the wife of William Rose Holden, Barrister-at-law, of a daughter.

ROBINSON-On the 25th it, at 22, Cambridge-square, the
wife of W. F. Robinson, Esq., Q.C., of a son.
VICKERY.-On the 23rd ult., the wife of T. W. Vickery,
Solicitor, of a son.

MARRIAGES. COPE-WALKER.-On the 26th ult, at St. Peter's, Eatonsquare, Thomas Cope, of Osbaston Hall, Leicestershire, and of Lincoln's inn, Barrister-at-law, to Alice Kate, daughter of the late George Walker, Esq., of Walthamstow, Essex. ELDRED-CAROZZI.-On the 23rd ult., at St. John the Evangelist's, Duncan-terrace, Islington, Joseph Eldred, of S. Old Jewry, and 74, Drayton-park, Highbury, Solicitor, to Josephine Mary, third daughter of Giovanni Carrozi, Esq., of 28, Duncan-terrace, N. MONRO-DINGWALL,-On the 2ith ult., at St. Thomas's, Portman-square, Alexander Monro, Esq, MA. Barrister-at-law, to Evalyn Agnes, only daughter of the late A. Dingwall, Esq., of the Scottish Bar. PAGE SHERRIFF. On the 2nd ult., at St James's Church, Piccadilly, George Henry Page, of Hay, Bevonshire. Solicitor, to Emily Clara Sherriff, elder danguter of the late Alfred Sherriff, of Clifford.

DEATHS. DOYLE.-On the 27t ult, at 8, Montpellier-villa, Chelten ham, Sir William Henry Doyle, K., Chief Justice of Gibraltar, aged 56 years

GREATOREN. On the 2h ult. at Laleham, Middlesex, William Anthony Greatorex, Esq., Solicitor, of 5, Chancery-lane, London, aged 75.

SADD. On the 25th it.. at his residence, Theatre-street, Norwich, in bis 47th year, Willian Sadd, Solicitor, much respected.

Now Ready, 8vo. cloth, THIRD EDITION, price 4s., post free 48. 8d. ATHS IN SUPREME COURTS.-Handbook for use of Commis

Special Forms of Jurats, Oaths, &-Forms and directions for use by Solicitors applying for Commissions-New Regulations-Power and Jurisdiction of Commissioners and other persons as affected by English a d Ir sh Judicature and other Acts; also info mation for se by Perpetual Commissioners for taking acknowledgments. By CHARLES FORD, F.R.S.L, Examiner in Admiralty, S.8.C. (Eng.)

London: Law TIMES Office, 10, Wellington-street, Strand, W.C.

The Law and the Lawyers.

Ir has been stated on authority that the Court of Appeal disposes of one case a day on the average. As there are over 100 causes entered for hearing by the division of the court sitting at Westminster, suitors may calculate when cases about to be set down will probably be heard.

Ir is somewhat curious that men of precisely the same training, of the same habits of thought, and about equal standing both at the Bar and in the House of Commons should take diametrically VOL. LXVII.-No. 1884.

opposite views on the subject of retaining the present remedy for breaches of promise to marry. We find in favour of limiting the right to bring such an action to cases of what we call special damage Sir H. JAMES, Mr. HERSCHELL, Sir W. HARCOURT, Mr. BULWER, the COMMON SERJEANT, and Mr. RODWELL; whilst on the other hand the following gentlemen would keep things as they are: The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Mr. H. T. COLE, Mr. FORSYTH, Mr. GRANTHAM, Mr. A. S. HILL, Mr. A. G. MARTEN, and Mr. MORGAN LLOYD. The latter, we are glad to say, found themselves in a minority of forty-one in a House of 171 members. The idea that the action is a protection to women, and prevents breaches of the peace by indignant relatives was seriously put forward as an argument-which shows the character of the debate. We wish Mr. HERSCHELL success in his effort to reduce the action for breach of promise within reasonable limits.

THE death of Mr. ISAAC BUTT is an event of as much importance in the history of the Irish Bar as it is in the political history of his country. He is spoken of, by those who knew him well, as being head and shoulders above any of his contemporaries as an advocate-which is saying either a great deal for him, or very little for his contemporaries. The class of advocates to which he belonged is that of which SCARLETT and FOLLETT are prominent examples among English barristers, having no very profound knowledge of law, but readiness in acquiring whatever is necessary for the case in hand, and facility in laying facts and arguments before courts and juries. The glories of the profession of the law are perpetuated by men of this class, which, however, is unfortunately becoming more contracted as time goes on. The lawyer with the omnium gatherum of knowledge-CHARLES SUMNER'S Ideal Lawyer -is becoming rare, whilst the mastery of dry items and facts and argumentative reports, is the characteristic of the modern barrister. We should be glad to see the English Bar taking some public notice of the decease of Mr. BUTT. There is, however, little sympathy between the professions in the two countries, and the English Bar is not demonstrative. We nevertheless feel sure that on behalf of the Profession we may express sincere regreat that so brilliant a member of the Bar has been lost to Ireland.

not.

ONLY in a small proportion of cases which are tried in the County Court do the parties require the attendance of a jury. When a jury does attend it is desirable that the judge should act upon their findings, and leave the litigants to their proper remedy, if those findings may be wrong. This, however, does seem to be the view held by Mr. T. E. P. LEFROY, the judge of the Bridport County Court, if we may judge from the way in which he treated the verdict of a jury in a case which recently came before him. In the case in question-Collins v. Morey-the plaintiff claimed for work done in the nature of hauling by horses and men, and a jury was empanelled to try the issue. At the conclusion of the evidence his Honour commenced his summing up by distinguishing his duties from those of the jury, and after strougly impressing upon the latter the importance of attending to his exposition of the law, he concluded by telling them that unless they disbelieved the evidence of the defendant, they could not do otherwise than find for the plaintiff, as the defendant's own evidence showed that he was legally responsible. The jury, however, thought differently to his Honour, and found a verdict for the defendant, which the learned judge declined to accept; and, at the end of an unedifying controversy between judge, jury, and advocates, his Honour gave judgment for the plaintiff. In other words, the jury found a verdict which the judge took upon himself to reverse forthwith. The grounds upon which the learned judge came to the conclusion that he possessed this somewhat arbitrary power does not appear. If the course taken was supported by any rule of practice, a very summary remedy would be provided, where a jury arrived at a finding which did not commend itself to the judge, and a simple means of obviating the necessity of new trials.

THE mode frequently adopted under sect. 5 of the Debtors Act 1869, of cross-examining the debtor, to ascertain whether "he has had since the date of the order or judgment the means to pay," was strongly commented upon by the MASTER of the ROLLS in a case last week. The practice, his Lordship said, was for the judge himself to cross examine the debtor, and he had done so himself many times in chambers, but he had found such practice almost uniformly unsuccessful, as the debtor, if he were fraudulent enough to make away with his property to evade a judgment, would probably also not mind giving a false account of his means. In the case we allude to, his Lordship declined to cross-examine the debtor himself, and the plaintiff then asked for an inquiry under rule 11 of the Orders under the Debtors Act, as to the debtor's means, and that the MASTER of the ROLLS wouldunder the jurisdiction given him by sect. 66 of the Judicature Act 1873, to direct any inquiry to be taken in a district registry-send the inquiry down to the district registry where the debtor resided. The MASTER of the ROLLS directed the inquiry asked for considering that on the admitted facts there was sul cat sus

picion as to what the defendant had done with his property; and probably in the place where the defendant resided, and where the parties were known, the facts would be much more likely to come out, than in chambers in London, where such was not the case. We are not aware whether such inquiries have hitherto been sent by the equity judges to district registrars, although we understand such is the practice at law; but we cannot help thinking that such a mode of procedure is, as suggested by the MASTER of the ROLLS, a very likely method of getting at the truth.

THAT there is a conflict of authority with respect to the right of a shareholder in a company which is being wound-up upon whom a call is made to set off against such call a debt due to him from the company is manifest from the recent decision of Re The West of England and South Wales Bank, which was heard by Mr. Justice FRY, on Saturday last. That was an application of a shareholder and creditor of that bank to be allowed to set off the debt due to him from the bank as against the calls recently made upon him of £10 a share. The applicant was the owner of 131 shares. Inasmuch as the call was payable in two instalments, only £655 was at present due from him. The company was indebted to him in about £777. Hence his claim to set off the debt against the call. The MASTER of the ROLLS had expressed one opinion, Vice-Chancellor MALINS another, with reference to such an application. Mr. Justice FRY followed the former, and dismissed the application. In his Lordship's opinion the effect of granting this application would be to enable the applicant to obtain the immediate payment of the debt due to him out of assets of the bank, whereas the other creditors would have to wait for their money during the process of the winding-up. This, he thought, was contrary to the object of the Act, which required creditors to be paid pari passu. Another objection to the application was, that the liability to pay calls was not a debt due to the company against which he could set off a debt due to him from the company, but was a liability to contribute towards the payment of the company's debts. The case at first sight presents features of hardship, although it is difficult to resist the logic of the reasoning by which the conclusion was arrived at. Nevertheless, it is a misfortune that any difference of opinion should exist amongst the judges with reference to the merits of such an application.

THE House of Lords gave judgment on Tuesday last in the case of The Governors of the Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts and others, in which a point of some practical importance in reference to the operation of the Statute of Limitations was decided. The action was brought by the governors of the hospital to set aside a lease which was granted by their predecessors in 1783 to one GILBERT for ninety-nine years, at a peppercorn rent. A demurrer to the statement of claim was put in by the defendants, against whom no claim to set aside the lease had been made previous to the commencement of this action. The plaintiffs alleged that they had power to set aside the lease in question, inasmuch as it was not granted in conformity with the 13 Eliz. c. 10. The defendants, assuming that the lease was void under that Act, claimed possession in virtue of the Statute of Limitations. The MASTER of the ROLLS, however, overruled the demurrer, and held that the 13 Eliz. c. 10 made the lease voidable only, and not void, and that the statute did not begin to run until the plaintiffs had done some act to avoid the lease, i.e., not until the service of the writ. A defence having been accordingly put in, Mr. Justice FRY ruled at the trial that the plaintiffs had proved their title, and expressing himself as being bound by the decision of the MASTER of the ROLLS as to the effect of the Statute of Limitations, gave judgment for the plaintiffs. On appeal this judgment was reversed. The Court of Appeal held that the possession of the defendants was to be referred to the lease of 1783; that the hospital was within the provisions of 13 Eliz. c. 10, as explained by 14 Eliz. c. 14, and that these provisions were applicable to leases made by an eleemosynary as well as by an ecclesiastical corporation. If so, then clearly the lease of 1783 was prohibited, and the only question was whether, the plaintiffs' title being thus established, their right of action was barred. The Court being of opinion that, inasmuch as there was no personal disability, the right of action and the consequent right of entry, existed immediately upon the granting of the lease of 1783, the Statute of Limitations ran from that moment. This decision was upheld by the House of Lords. The crucial point in the case was the determination of the question whether the lease was void or merely voidable. After the statement of the law by the Court of Appeal, and by Lords CAIRNS, SELBORNE, and GORDON, that point cannot admit of doubt.

THE practice upon disclaimer by a trustee has been in some confusion ever since the Bankruptcy Act came into operation, and is now still far from being settled. The measure of damages in such cases is often a difficulty; but some guidance may be found In the case of Ex parte Blake, Re McEwan, which came the other day before the Court of Appeal, where a question arose as to the Lmount for which the lessor was entitled to prove by reason of the disclaimer of the trustee in the liquidation of the lessee. The

facts were these: Lease for twenty-one years from Christmas 1872, at yearly rent of £130, with power to lessee to determine at end of seven or fourteen years by six months' written notice upon paying rent and performing covenants. In Sept. 1878 debtor filed his petition, and on 4th Dec. 1878 trustee disclaimed by leave of the court. Lessor then tendered proof for £140 for breach of lessee's covenant to repair, and this was admitted. But he further claimed to prove for £150, which sum was made up of £10 a year for the remaining fifteen years, loss suffered by him owing to the rental value of the premises having fallen to £120. This the trustee opposed, allowing only £10 under that head for loss upon the last year of the first seven, and in this he was supported by Mr. Registrar HAZLITT, whose decision was subsequently confirmed by the Court of Appeal. The reasons given in the judgment were that the lessee would have been entitled, on putting the premises in repair, or paying compensation for the want of repair, to determine the lease at the end of seven years; and all the loss that the lessor had sustained was the difference between the value of the house out of repair and the value of the house in repair, plus £10 diminution in value for the remaining year of the first seven. It was to be assumed that the notice to determine the lease would have been given by the lessee if he had remained solvent. It was argued for the lessor that it had become impossible to give the notice to determine by reason of the lessee's breach of the covenant to repair; and that therefore he had become liable to the damages claimed. But the principle laid down by the Court is clear and consistent, and gives some rule by which trustees may be guided in disclaiming leases of this description and allowing proofs thereunder.

AMONGST the decisions of our courts which illustrate the duties and liabilities of gaolers, we anticipate that the decision of the Exchequer Division in Graves v. Keene (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 216) will not be the least prominent. This was an action for false imprisonment. A solicitor had been committed for disobedience to an order for payment into court. The warrant commanded the gaoler safely to keep him "so that the sheriff might have his body before the Queen in the Common Pleas Division," to answer certain matters. The nature of the solicitor's contempt was not disclosed on the face of the warrant, and the plaintiff was kept in prison more than twelvemonths before he was brought before the court. Previous to the expiration of the twelvemonths he gave notice to the gaoler that he demanded his discharge upon the expiration of one year's imprisonment, according to the Imprisonment for Debts Act, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62. By the 4th section of the Debtors Act, no person is to be imprisoned for debt except solicitors making default in payment of costs or sums of money when ordered so to do as officers of the court. There are, however, two provisions, first, that no person in any case excepted from the operation of the Act is to be imprisoned for more than one year; secondly, that the section is not to alter the effect of any judgment or order of any court for the payment of money as regards the arrest and imprisonment of the person making default in payment of such money. At the trial before Baron POLLOCK the case was stopped upon the opening, and a verdict was directed for the defendant, the action being characterised as a groundless one. Subsequently a rule was obtained by the plaintiff calling upon the defendant to show cause why the nonsuit should not be set aside, and a new trial had, on the ground of misdirection. The main contention of the plaintiff was that the gaoler was bound to read the warrant by the light of the Act of Parliament. The LORD CHIEF BARON Summarised the duties of a gaoler under circumstances similar to those in this case in a few words, "If an action is brought against a gaoler for false imprisonment for imprisoning a person for a longer time than it should be alleged he was justified in doing, and in his defence he produces a warrant in the form and terms of the warrant in the present case, which gives him no notice whatever of what was the conduct or the precise offence of the party for whom the imprisonment was ordered, and specifies no limited term of imprisonment, he is not bound to inquire whether or not any statute has been violated, or whether or not any statute exists requiring that the imprisoned party should be discharged at a particular time or under particular circumstances which have not been communicated to the gaoler." This is so reasonable as an interpretation of the law, that little need be said in its favour. The gaoler cannot be expected to solve all questions which may be raised as to the correctness of a warrant, which on its face is correct. His duty is to obey such a warrant.

FROM what was stated during a case of Wake v. Henley, at the Rolls, on Monday, there is apparently some misapprehension in the Common Law Divisions as to the requirements of Order XIV., r. 3, in reference to an affidavit by a defendant that he has a defence. Under Order XIV., r. 1, it was decided in Frederici v. Vanderzee (35 L. T. Rep. N. S. 844) that an application, calling on the defendant to show cause why final judgment should not be signed against him on a specially indorsed writ must be based on an affidavit by the plaintiff himself. As the result of that decision followed the one in Bank of Montreal v. Cameron (36 L. T. Rep. N. S. 415), that no such application could be made by a cor

poration, as there was in fact no plaintiff to swear the necessary affidavit. Hence came the alteration of rule 1, and by rule la the plaintiff, or any other person who can swear positively to the debt or cause of action," may now make the required affidavit. By rule 3 of the same order the defendant can only show cause against the application by offering to bring into court the sum indorsed on the writ, or by affidavit; in which case he "shall state whether the defence he alleges goes to the whole or to part only, and, if so, to what part of the plaintiff's claim, and the judge may, if he think fit, order the defendant to attend and be examined upon oath." No alteration of this rule has been made, but it was stated that the practice in the common law chambers was to give liberty to the defendant to defend on an affidavit showing a defence made by his solicitor or any other person knowing the facts. It appeared that in Wake v. Henley the defendant, on the advice of his counsel, had not made an affidavit relying on the above practice. How such a practice can have been allowed it seems difficult to understand, having regard to Frederici v. Vanderzee, and to the express words of rule 3; but, at all events, the MASTER of the ROLLS stated that he considered it decidedly irregular, and that in all cases the affidavit of the defendant was necessary to entitle him to defend, and that he must pledge his oath that he had a good defence on the merits. He therefore allowed the above case to stand over for such an affidavit to be made by the defendant. The defendant's affidavit need not, his Lordship said, go to more than that he has a defence, as the facts showing what the defence is, may be proved by the affidavits of other persons or aliunde. Another somewhat important point of practice arose in the above case as to whether, when a writ which claimed a large sum-the balance in respect of certain bills of exchange-or in the alternative the payment of a composition on this sum, could be said to be specially indorsed within Order III., r. 6. The MASTER of the ROLLS was clearly of opinion that it could not, as it claimed a second sum in the alternative, and he gave the plaintiffs leave to amend their writ, and also their summons for judgment, so as to be in a position to claim judgment. for one sum only.

CAN money paid into a County Court be attached in the registrar's hands by means of a garnishee summons issued against him for that purpose? This point of practice is one of general importance, as cases are frequently arising, especially in country County Courts, to which it is applicable. Different judges have for some time held various views upon the matter; but now by the decision of the Common Pleas Division in the recent case of Dolphin v. Layton (L. Rep. 4 C. P. Div. 131) this question has been answered in the negative. It was a special case stated by way of appeal from the County Court of Worcestershire, holden at Broomsgrove, showing these facts. At a court in Jan. 1878 LAYTON recovered a judgment against CHAPMAN for debt and costs, amounting to £11 odd. At the same court DOLPHIN obtained judgment against the same LAYTON for a debt and costs, making together some £21. CHAPMAN paid the whole sum due from him to the registrar of the court in satisfaction of LAYTON's judgment; and shortly afterwards DOLPHIN sued out a summons against THOMAS SCOTT, the registrar, claiming the sum so paid into his hands by CHAPMAN, as money received by Scort to the use of LAYTON, or as money held by SCOTT as trustee for LAYTON absolutely. The registrar appeared, and submitted to judgment, but SIMMONS, who had been LAYTON's solicitor, intervened, claiming the money as assignee, upon which he failed; but also raising the point that the proceedings were misconceived, and that a gar nishee summons did not lie against the registrar, who could not. be said to be LAYTON's debtor by reason of the payment of the money into court to LAYTON's credit. The County Court judge, in a careful and considered judgment, decided that such a summons did lie against the registrar, as being quoad hoc the banker of LAYTON, and gave leave to appeal. He said the money, when paid into court, ceased to be the property of the execution debtor, and certainly could not belong to the registrar, who held it ex equo et bono for somebody, who must be the execution creditor; or, as the judge well put the point: "By accepting it as paid in absolutely in satisfaction of the debt, with notice of the purpose for which it is intended, viz., for payment to the judgment creditor, the registrar assents to hold it to his credit, and as his banker." We regret that this case was only argued on the appellant's side, no counsel appearing for either the plaintiff or the garnishee; as we believe the view taken by the County Court judge to be at once correct and consistent with every principle and practice of the County Court system. Lord COLERIDGE gave no reason for his decision that money in the hands of the registrar, as an officer of the court, is not subject to attachment; and Mr. Justice DENMAN merely remarked: "I see no distinction in this respect between the registrar of a County Court and the masters of one of the Superior Courts.' But we think this argument is founded on a false analogy. Money is never paid into the High Court except in part satisfaction or to abide an event; but in the County Courts it is done under the banking system. The registrar, or his clerk, reckons up the amount of debt and costs that have to be paid by defendants, and will take no less; and he as clearly holds the money for payment to the creditor on produc

tion of his plaint note, as could any banker to the order of his customer. The debtor must pay his money into court, for he is not allowed to pay it direct to the creditor as he can elsewhere. For these reasons we think there is a great deal to be urged on behalf of the view taken by the County Court judge, even upon the bare point of law. But as a matter of convenience and expediency the question is still more important, as cases often arise in which a creditor may, without this remedy, be defrauded of his just debt, though his debtor has recovered from another money with which it could be paid. Still, as the court has so held, it is well worthy of consideration whether some power should not be given to County Court judges enabling them to order payment of money in court to the judgment creditor who is really entitled upon the whole facts, and so arrive at the same result as would be attained upon a garnishee summons.

THE application to the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Carr, Re Hofmann (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 299) may be said to be more or less directly due to the previous decision of that court in Johnson v. The Crédit Lyonnais (37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 657). In the latter case it will be remembered that the plaintiff bought of HOFMANN, who was a commission agent and merchant, as well as a dealer in tobacco, a quantity of tobacco which was then lying in bond in HOFMANN's name. The plaintiff paid for the tobacco, and it was agreed that it should be forwarded to him, or to the plaintiff's vendee free of charge, the plaintiff undertaking to remit the amount of the duty and dock charges. The tobacco remained in HOFMANN's name, and he retained the dock warrants; but the sale to the plaintiff was only entered in his books. HOFMANN, representing to the defendants, a French bank, that the tobacco in question belonged to him, pledged it as a security for a loan. In an action to recover the property, the defendants claimed to retain it on the ground that the plaintiff had given HOFMANN ostensible authority to deal with it as his own, or that he had entrusted him with the tobacco or the documents of title within the meaning of the factors. The plaintiff recovered judgment for the sum which he had paid for the goods. The Crédit Lyonnais realised the security, and HOFMANN having subsequently become adjudicated bankrupt, claimed to prove in his bankruptcy for the unsatisfied balance of the debt. In estimating this balance the bank deducted from the sum realised by the sale of the goods the costs of both parties in the action, and the difference between the damages paid to the plaintiff and the amount which his goods fetched. The Registrar sitting as Chief Judge held that they were entitled to make those deductions with the exception of the costs of the appeal in the action. The trustee accordingly appealed. The appellants relied on the case of Ex parte Stephens (2 M. & Ayr. 31), where the Court held, on the petition of an equitable mortgagee for a sale of the mortgaged property, that he was not entitled to be allowed, out of the proceeds of sale, Lord the costs of successfully defending an extent in aid. Justice JAMES, however, quickly disposed of the authority of this case by pointing out that the report was too imperfect to be binding, inasmuch as it gave merely the holding without any statement of facts, or of the reasons which the judgment was based. An attempt, too, was made to show that the costs in the action were, SO far as concerned the right to prove, analogous to interest accrued due after an adjudication, where the rule is, that inasmuch as such interest cannot be proved in the bankruptcy until all the debts in respect of it have been paid in full, a secured creditor cannot, in estimating the balance for which he is to prove, bring into account interest on his debt accrued since the adjudication. This analogy, too, was soon disposed of. "The suggested analogy between interest on a debt and the costs in question in this case," observed Lord Justice JAMES, "does not exist. costs were really expenses incurred by the owners of the security in respect of their security. The mortgagees stand on the same footing as if the security had been a house, and a fire had destroyed it, and they had laid cut money in rebuilding it, or as if a fire had diminished its value. The costs of the action are, in fact, a deduction to be made in estimating the value of the security, The only question is, were the costs reasonably and properly incurred ?" The Court was of opinion that the costs allowed by the registrar were reasonably and properly incurred. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs. The analogy between the costs and interest insisted upon in the argument above stated was based upon the case of Re Savin (27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 466). There, however, the point to be decided was the amount provable. It was there held that the provable debt consisted of the principal debt with interest to the date of the bankruptcy, but no interest which accrued due after the bankruptcy. Hence there is a dis tinction between the cases.

on

The

THE Blackburn and Over Darwen Tramways Bill having been read a second time in the House of Commons, a nice question of liability will soon have to be determined, namely, whether companies which use steam power on their tramways for the conveyance of passengers are liable to pay passenger duty. That question was as a matter of fact raised in the House on Tuesday last, but was not determined. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER

is still in communication with the PRESIDENT of the BOARD of TRADE upon the subject. An Act passed in the year 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 79, s. 2, and sched.) provides that, with certain specified exceptions, there shall be paid "for and in respect of all passengers conveyed for hire, upon or along any railway, a duty at and after the rate of £5 for every £100, upon all sums received or charged for the hire, fare, or conveyance of all such passengers. Are steam tramways railways within the meaning of this Act? The ordinary definition of a railway is that it is a road or way constructed of two parallel lines formed of iron bars united one to the end of another, such bars being called rails. It is a somewhat curious circumstance that none of the Acts relating to railways give a clear definition of the term. The 1st section of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 98, which provides for the conveyance of the mails by railways, provides that in all cases of railways already made, or in progress, by which passengers or goods shall be conveyed in or upon carriages drawn or impelled by the power of steam, or by any locomotive or stationary engine, or animal, or other power whatever, the Postmaster-General may require them to convey the mails. The Railway Regulation Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict. c. 97), which was passed for the regulation of railways, gives, perhaps, what approaches nearest to such a definition by enacting (sect. 21) that wherever the word "railway" is used in the Act it should be construed to extend "to all railways constructed under the powers of any Act of Parliament, and intended for the conveyance of passengers in or upon carriages drawn or impelled by the power of steam, or by any other mechanical power." This meaning appears to be limited to the construction of the Act in question. The same definition is again given to the Railway Regulation Act 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 55, s. 21). The Act by which the passenger duty is imposed enacts that duties shall be raised "for and in respect of (inter alia) the passengers conveyed upon any railway." The 4th section of the same Act provides that "the proprietor or company of proprietors of every railway in Great Britain, and every other person who shall carry, or convey, or cause to be carried or conveyed, any passenger for hire in or upon any railway in Great Britain" shall keep accounts of their receipts. The interpretation clause of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 85 (s. 25) provides that the word "railway" as used in that Act shall be construed to mean any "railways constructed under the powers of any Act of Parliament; " and the words " passenger railway," "railways constructed under the powers of any Act of Parliament upon which one-third or more of the gross annual revenue is derived from the conveyance of passengers by steam or other mechanical power." The text books throw little or no light upon the matter. Taking the ordinary definition of the word railway" in conjunction with the definition given in 3 & 4 Vict. c. 97, s. 21, there would seem to be a strong presumption that companies like the Blackburn and Over Darwen Company are liable to pay passenger duty. Their cars are intended to run upon rails, which must be constructed under the powers of an Act of Parliament; and their lines of rails are intended for the conveyance of passengers in or upon carriages drawn or impelled by the power of steam.' On the other hand it may be said that the Acts above mentioned have nothing to do with tramways, whether steam power is employed or not, inasmuch as the Tramways Act 1870 provides for their working and construction. That Act certainly does not solve the difficulty to which we have drawn attention. It is fortunate that the attention of the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER has been drawn to the subject in good time.

66

THE EXCLUSION OF COUNTER-CLAIMS FROM THE

PLEADINGS.

IN the recent case of Huggons v. Tweed (40 L. T. Rep N. S. 284), which was an appeal from an order of Vice-Chancellor Hall, the Court of Appeal intimated that they would not interfere with the decision of a judge excluding or allowing a counter-claim in his discretion, unless it could be shown that the order of the judge, would be productive of either great inconvenience or probable injustice. We may presume that the Common Law Divisions will be guided by much the same principles, and that so far as previous decisions are binding in questions of discretion, the authorities at present existing upon this subject will furnish most of the assistance in that respect which the Profession is likely to have for some time to come. We propose shortly to consider the nature and extent of the discretionary power in question, and the mode in which it has been exercised with regard to recent cases.

By sub-sect. 3 of sect. 24 of the Judicature Act 1873, the court or a judge is empowered to grant to a defendant in respect of any legal or equitable estate, or right claimed by him, all such relief against any plaintiff as such defendant shall have properly claimed in his pleadings, and as the court or a judge might have granted "in any suit instituted for that purpose by the same defendant against the same plaintiff or petitioner; and also all such relief relating to or connected with the original subject of the cause or matter, and in like manner claimed against any other person who shall have been duly served with notice, &c. as might properly have been granted against such person if he had been made a defendant to a cause duly instituted by the same

defendant for the like purpose." Here it will be observed that there are two distinct and separate powers of counter-claim intended. First, as against the plaintiff himself, to which if in itself actionable, there is no restriction except the discretionary power of exclusion by "the Court or a judge" which we shall notice directly; and, secondly, as against a third person whether already a party to the suit or not to which there is the additional restriction that it must be "relating to or connected with the original subject of the cause or matter." Power of exclusion is conferred in the case of a counter-claim against the plaintiff alone by Order XIX., rule 3, which, after defining the right of" set-off or counter-claim" in the widest terms says, "But the Court or a judge may, on the application of the plaintiff before trial, if in the opinion of the Court or judge such set-off or counter-claim cannot be conveniently disposed of in the pending action, or ought not to be allowed, refuse permission to the defendant to avail himself thereof." Order XXII., rule 9, confers a similar power of exclusion with respect to a counter-claim against a third party thus," Where a defendant by his statement of defence sets up a counter-claim the plaintiff or any other person named in manner aforesaid (i.e., made a defendant to the counter-claim by the requisite notice, see Order XXII., rules 5 and 6)...." may at any time before reply apply to the Court or a judge for an order that such counter-claim may be excluded, and the Court or a judge may, on the hearing of such application, make such order as shall be just." The only noticeable difference arising from the language of these two rules seems to be that under the latter, the application must be made before reply; whereas, under the former, it may be made at any time before trial. In applying them, however, it will be seen that the courts follow the distinction created by the Act of the two different sorts of counter-claim and the rights to be thereby set up.

66

This distinction seems, indeed, to have been at first lost sight of; and it was at one time thought that the mere non-connection of the counter-claim with the subject-matter of the claim, was of itself a sufficient objection to the counter-claim when it was set up against the plaintiff alone. Thus, in Lee v. Collyer (1 Charley's Ca. Ch. 86) the action was for assault, and the counter-claim for breach of a parol agreement to repair. In the pleading it was sought to establish a sort of connection by alleging that the assault was committed at a time when the parties were talking about the house, but the counter-claim was excluded by Mr. Justice Quain, on the ground that the matters alleged in it were not really in any way connected with the plaintiff's cause of action." Here the conclusion of the learned judge may have been right, but the reason was in itself not sufficient, and this is shown by the case of Huggons v. Tweed first above-mentioned, where it will be seen that there was no connection between the plaintiffs cause of action and the counter-claim, which was against the plaintiff alone, and yet the counter-claim was allowed to stand. Without going into the facts of this case, we prefer to exemplify the distinction in question by an Irish case recently reported by us, which, though not an authority in our Court, would undoubtedly be listened to with respect on account of its instructive nature. We refer to Quin v. Hession (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 70). There the plaintiff's action was for slander, and the defendant's counter-claim against him was for a slander by him of the defendant. As in Lee v. Collyer, the pleader tried to connect the causes of action, which were obviously distinct, by alleging certain matters wholly immaterial; viz., certain disputes between the wives of the plaintiff and defendant. The Exchequer Division in Ireland struck out this immaterial matter, but at the same time allowed the counterclaim, thinking that no inconvenience would thereby be occasioned, and holding that a connection of subject-matter was not necessary. "It has been contended," said Chief Baron Palles, "that the words of the Act relating to, or connected with, the original subject of the cause or matter qualify the nature of the relief which may be sought by counter-claim by a defendant against a plaintiff alone as well as against a plaintiff and any other person.'. . . . I think, however, that the words qualify only that portion of the section with which they are in immediate connection, namely, a counter-claim which seeks relief against a third party as well as against the plaintiff.”

The qualification to the right of counter-claim which the Irish Court held to be applicable only in case of counter-claims against third persons, has been recognised in such cases in our Courts. In Padwick v. Scott (L. Rep. 2 Ch. Div. 736), which is the leading English case upon the subject, and the facts of which are too complicated to be here set out, but to which most of our readers have probably had occasion to advert, it may be remembered that the second counter-claim was excluded upon the ground of its being altogether separate from the original cause of action, and that that was stated as of itself a sufficient reason for the exclusion in the case of a counter-claim against a third person. Where, however, the connection does exist, the Courts incline to a liberal exercise of the right of counter-claim: (Dear v. Sworder, Sworder v. Dear, 4 Ch. Div. 476.)

It may therefore be said that the only inherent restriction upon the right of counter-claim is that, when it is set up against a third party it must be in respect of a right connected with the plaintiff's claim, but that in all cases the judges have a discretion,