There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge ArgumentPeter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar MIT Press, 2004. nov. 19. - 486 oldal In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism—the doctrine that everything is physical—is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time? Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy.There's Something About Mary—the first book devoted solely to the argument—collects the main essays in which Jackson presents (and later rejects) his argument along with key responses by other philosophers. These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how (the ability hypothesis), or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously (the acquaintance hypothesis)? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise? And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness. |
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1 - 5 találat összesen 60 találatból.
xx. oldal
... denies .... It seems , however , that Mary does not know all there is to know . For when she is let out of the black - and - white room or given a color television , she will learn what it is like to see something red , say . This is ...
... denies .... It seems , however , that Mary does not know all there is to know . For when she is let out of the black - and - white room or given a color television , she will learn what it is like to see something red , say . This is ...
xx. oldal
... deny that it may have other prop- erties ; but if so , such other properties are not useful to the man of science , and in no way assist him in explaining the phenomena . It is sometimes said that ' light is a form of wave - motion ...
... deny that it may have other prop- erties ; but if so , such other properties are not useful to the man of science , and in no way assist him in explaining the phenomena . It is sometimes said that ' light is a form of wave - motion ...
8. oldal
... not fully understand the meaning of the term ' red ' , or the concept of red . But he insists that it does not follow from this that any- thing ontological - like the denial of physicalism or the 8 D. Stoljar and Y. Nagasawa.
... not fully understand the meaning of the term ' red ' , or the concept of red . But he insists that it does not follow from this that any- thing ontological - like the denial of physicalism or the 8 D. Stoljar and Y. Nagasawa.
9. oldal
... denial of physicalism or the identity theory - is true . As we will see later on , Meehl's suggestion here that there is some- thing illicit in the knowledge argument since it apparently moves from an epistemological premise to an ...
... denial of physicalism or the identity theory - is true . As we will see later on , Meehl's suggestion here that there is some- thing illicit in the knowledge argument since it apparently moves from an epistemological premise to an ...
10. oldal
... denying the intuition . Broad would then be in the weak position of insisting that his intuitions go one way , while the mechanist's intuitions go the other way , and matters would quickly degenerate into a stalemate . What the Mary ...
... denying the intuition . Broad would then be in the weak position of insisting that his intuitions go one way , while the mechanist's intuitions go the other way , and matters would quickly degenerate into a stalemate . What the Mary ...
Tartalomjegyzék
Epiphenomenal Qualia | 39 |
What Mary Didnt Know | 51 |
Does She Learn Anything? | 57 |
Epiphenomenal Qualia? | 59 |
Dennett on the Knowledge Argument | 69 |
The Ability Hypothesis | 75 |
What Experience Teaches | 77 |
Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument | 105 |
What Mary Couldnt Know Belief About Phenomenal States | 241 |
Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument | 269 |
Did She Know Everything Physical? | 299 |
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia | 301 |
Two Conceptions of the Physical | 309 |
Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument | 333 |
So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary | 365 |
Postscripts | 407 |
Knowing What It Is Like The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument | 143 |
The Acquaintance Hypothesis | 161 |
Knowing Qualia A Reply to Jackson with Postscript 1997 | 163 |
Acquaintance with Qualia | 179 |
10 Phenomenal Knowledge | 197 |
Old Facts New Modes | 217 |
Phenomenal States Revised Version | 219 |
Más kiadások - Összes megtekintése
There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank ... Peter Ludlow,Yujin Nagasawa,Daniel Stoljar Nincs elérhető előnézet - 2004 |
There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank ... Peter Ludlow,Yujin Nagasawa,Daniel Stoljar Nincs elérhető előnézet - 2004 |
Gyakori szavak és kifejezések
ability hypothesis acquaintance antiphysicalist argue blue Cambridge causal Chalmers chap Churchland claim cognitive color experience color vision Consciousness David Lewis distinct epiphenomenal Epiphenomenal Qualia epistemic intension epistemic possibilities example Frank Jackson Fred imagine introspection Journal of Philosophy knowledge argument Lewis Loar Lycan Marianna Mary gains Mary knows Mary learns Mary's metaphysical Mind mode of presentation motion nature Nemirow Nida-Rümelin nonphysical normally sighted o-physical object overt powers Oxford phenomenal belief phenomenal concepts phenomenal information phenomenal knowledge phenomenal quality phenomenal redness Philosophy of Mind physical facts physical information physical property physical theory physicalism is false physicalist plausible possible worlds posteriori premise priori problem propositional attitudes propositional knowledge propositions qualia question reason recognitional concepts red thing relation release relevant representation Reprinted role sense sky appears sort Stoljar stroboscopic supervenience suppose t-physical taste Vegemite thesis thought tion University Press Vegemite visual experience
Népszerű szakaszok
xx. oldal - Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-andwhite books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of "physical...
xx. oldal - She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of "physical" which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies.