better known to the Americans, on the theory that this incident will induce the two parties to procure for themselves more ample information concerning each other.

We must bear in mind that America does not know Turkey. We realize full well, moreover, the campaign which has been waged in that country to prejudice Americans against us. Since an actual rupture of relations cannot take place, however, Americans will eventually come to understand the facts. Realizing as we do that the truth will ultimately prevail, we need not feel the slightest alarm or nervousness over the strange action of the American Senate, which has been dictated entirely by prejudice and emotion instead of reason.

This hostility surprises us when we remember the sympathy with which America watched our struggle for independence. But we are geographically remote from America, and we have few close associations with her. We have not been able, therefore, to make ourselves known to her people, who have been misled by our implacable and powerful enemies. We owe our vexation of to-day to that inauspicious propaganda. . . . We are, however, perfectly convinced that, after having submitted the question to a more serious and profound study, America will not fail to recognize in the new Turkey, in republican Turkey, anation which merits esteem and good-will.

III

The Europeans have had difficulty in understanding the Americans. Everything is new, colossal, and hurried in their country. Business houses there used to have twelve stories; to-day they have thirty and more. We must certainly not attempt to judge America after our own conceptions, lest they utterly mislead us.

My object in writing this is to caution our people against blind criticism of that country because its Senate has not ratified the treaty. Predictions as to the future cannot but lead us astray. Since, however, we are a people still in a process of rebirth, we shall eventually succeed in making ourselves understood by America. There is no reason for us to fall into a rage because of the failure of the treaty. We must contemplate the fact with resignation.

We should regret very much the departure of Admiral Bristol. Both he and Mrs. Bristol have always been good friends of Turkey. The Admiral has worked valiantly for the ratification of the treaty, as have also other Americans residing here. We express to them all our cordial appreciation, and we hope they will continue to be our friends.

IV

The regret which the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty causes us does not arise from any effect which that action may have on our business interests. The commercial relations of the two countries are governed by economic necessities. Turkey will not be injured in a material way by the rejection of the treaty. It is rather the moral side of the question which engages our attention.

Why is it that America, who has always professed herself an ardent champion of peace, refuses to ratify a treaty which is a guaranty of security and peace? We simply cannot grasp the reason for her refusal. But if this action had resulted from careful examination and rational study our regret would have been still more profound than it actually is.

We are convinced that it was not logic and reason which governed the attitude of the American Senate. That body has simply obeyed the voice of

sentiment. Certain racial elements which formerly tried to destroy the very life and independence of Turkey here in our own country have been at work also on the other side of the Atlantic, while we have not defended ourselves against their attacks. Our failure to do so is not due to negligence alone; publicity is expensive in America, and our Budget has not permitted us to make the necessary sacrifice.

In Europe, also, we suffer from lack of a fair hearing. If some Europeans know our situation from actual experience and have grasped the real meaning of our revolution, it is because our contact with Europe is for obvious geographical reasons much closer than it is with America.

Another peculiarity distinguishes the United States from Europe. The Americans, despite their marvelous progress, have not freed themselves from the preponderant influence of the clergy. Our enemies have no doubt profited from this, and it is through certain of the clergy that they have cultivated hostility against us in that country.

We did not want our relations with a great nation like the United States to remain unsettled. Nevertheless, a re

sumption of normal diplomatic intercourse with that country is not a matter of vital importance for us.

Some of the Americans have feared that their schools here would be closed or their business interfered with. Any such action on our part would doubtless be quite satisfying to certain Turcophobes in America. Perhaps it was to irritate us and to push us to reprisals that they worked so hard to defeat the treaty. . . . While, however, our enemies expect us to cry out against Americans in general and mistreat their representatives who have been receiving hospitality in our country, here we are calmly, smilingly, moderately, patiently waiting. With faith in ourselves and in our future, we shall continue to extend our hospitality to all Americans. In the near future we expect to meet one of their football teams, from the 'floating university,' Ryndam, in an international match. Does America desire to continue to receive treatment in commercial and other matters on the basis of the most favored nation? We accord her that with or without a treaty or convention. Since the people of America do not know us, let them have more time to learn!

THERE is nothing sentimental in political agreements between governments. Whether the contractual relationship existing between two nations is known as a 'treaty,' an 'exchange of notes,' a 'trade agreement,' an 'alliance,' or what not, the benefits must be mutual, otherwise the contract cannot be continued provided, of course, the two parties to the agreement are on a plane of equality and are dealing with each other as equals.

Great Britain terminated the AngloJapanese Alliance in 1922 at the Washington Conference simply because it was of no further value to Britain. Great Britain made the alliance because she needed Japan's help against the aggressions of Germany and Russia in the British sphere in the Far East. But after the World War, when Germany and Russia ceased to be aggressive factors, - from the military standpoint, - Britain found that in the face of opposition to the alliance on the part of America and the British Dominions the alliance was more of a handicap than a benefit. Hence Britain dropped the alliance without further ado, and had the Japanese been able to view the question from the standpoint of their erstwhile British partners their disillusionment would have been less. I repeat that there is no such thing as sentiment in the political or economic relations of nations; the thing must pay dividends, or it goes overboard.

1 From the China Weekly Review (Shanghai American English-language weekly), January 15

In Russia's modern dealings with China, the Soviet has been unhampered by a 'burden of inheritance,' so to speak. The Russians had emerged from a revolution with a clean slate. Owing to the destruction wrought by the war and the further destruction wrought by the Revolution, Russia was so weakened that she had lost her 'special position' of dominance in the Far East, so that she could offer no resistence even to China when China moved to revise the 'unequal' treaties. Therefore the Russians simply capitalized the position of 'equality' which they were forced to accept, and made the best of a bad bargain. The Russians had to make good in China and make their relationships with Chinese pay dividends for both parties, otherwise there was no field for them in China.

When the Soviet made its first deal with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, it was very necessary for the Soviet to prove to Dr. Sun and his followers that the deal would be mutually beneficial. The same thing applied in the Soviet's dealings with the Christian General, Feng Yu-hsiang. After the collapse of the Kuominchun, or 'People's Army,' at Nankow, it was thought, and confidently hoped, in many quarters that this would prove the death knell of Sino-Russian relations. Especially, it was thought that Canton, seeing Feng Yu-hsiang defeated, would immediately lose confidence in the ability of the Bolsheviki to 'put it over' at Canton. It is known that there were many important conferences among the

leaders of the Nationalist movement on this very point of continuing their relations with the Russians. Many influential Cantonese were of opinion the Russians should be thrown overboard. At this critical point in the relations of Canton and Russia no highsounding speeches by Karakhan or benevolent utterances by Borodin could possibly have influenced the Cantonese to go on with the past arrangement. It was at this point that the Cantonese searched their hearts and, after summing up the evidence, decided to carry on with the Russians.

The reasons for this are what I intend to discuss in as impartial a manner as possible in the light of my recent visit to Canton and inspection of the situation existing there under the so-called Nationalist Government.

Much as the Cantonese had hoped for the moral support of the Chinese people and the 'People's Government,' still they had to reckon with the opposition of China's own militarists. Force can only be met with force, they realized, and immediately saw the necessity of organizing a big army, well equipped and disciplined, able to cope with any Chinese opponent.

Here is where the Russians came in, for after but two years of work as instructors the Russian officers succeeded in placing at the disposal of the Cantonese generals a well-trained army of about fifty thousand soldiers, with up-to-date equipment. The so-called Whampoa 'Cadets,' in groups of thirty to forty, were placed in every regiment. They were and are the leaders in attack, the pièce de resistance in defense. For the first time in the history of Chinese civil warfare the Cantonese General Staff under Russian guidance made a proper use of railway lines and hinterland connections. Reënforcements could be shifted hither and thither, not aimlessly, but according to

well-laid-out plans. Reserves could be depended upon to arrive in time and turn the scale in Canton's favor. The artillery units, though surpassed by their opponents, could show a fine discipline heretofore unknown in China; and on top of it all was the successful propaganda work as conducted by Russia among the Cantonese soldiers of all descriptions.

No war ever starts in China without both parties issuing bombastic manifestoes and claiming that they are 'compelled' to fight owing to their opponents' attitude, and that they aim at nothing but China's welfare, and so on. It is one thing to put such stuff on paper, but quite another to make the people, or even the leaders' own soldiers, believe it. I have visited the Whampoa Academy twice, and have had talks with many Cantonese soldiers on different occasions. It is surprising how familiar all are with the party phraseology. They have a clear view of what they believe to be their just cause; they have no illusions as to China's being but a little wheel in a big machine, somewhat vaguely referred to as the 'international revolution' or 'the proletariat's fight against international capitalism.' Yet the fact cannot be too strongly emphasized these Whampoa Cadets have ideas; they think they are fighting for a cause, which appeals to them, and their commanders can rely on them.

I venture the unusual statement that, whatever the outcome may be of the present fighting, a breakdown of the Cantonese army is not likely to be due to the Cantonese soldiers being 'bought over.' By means of a very elaborate organization, which shall be dealt with later on, the present Government of Canton has taken precautions to make sure of its generals. For once it seems that the usual treachery common to Chinese wars will be eliminated. As for

the soldiers, the Government does not have to worry; they belong to the 'Cause of the Three Theories,' thanks largely to the Russian organized propaganda.

Before continuing the enumeration of items in Russia's credit account with Canton, two things should be thoroughly understood. The writer does not venture his own opinion as to their merits or whether they will prove wholesome or beneficial to China, nor do these accomplishments form the only innovations brought forth in Canton by the Russians. Many a change of no less importance has been championed by the Cantonese themselves, partly in accordance with the principles of 'Sun-Yat-senism,' and partly as the result of the efforts of foreign-educated returned students.

Striking evidence of the determination of the Kuomintang to see things through in their own way may be found in the methods of their employing foreign advisers. Since the so-called 'unilateral treaties' were signed with the then Imperial Chinese Government the Powers have seen to it that a certain number of 'advisers' have always been employed by the Chinese Government in order to help the Chinese operate their respective departments. With the exception, however, of a few governmental branches such as the Administration of the Customs Revenues, the Post and Telegraph, and Communications these advisers have neither expected to nor have been wanted by the Chinese to do much actual work. They were provided with nice offices in Peking; they received nice salaries; sometimes they were given nice decorations and rank. Well, such adviserships have been what we might term in business slang 'a soft job.' The less actual work the foreigner did, the more he confined his activities to the club bar, to speech-making or

evolving memoranda, the more he was a welcome guest and persona grata with the Chinese Government.

Now for this sort of thing Canton has, first and before all, not enough money. Canton had to pay her astonishingly low salaries out of her own chest, for nobody gives loans to Canton on the strength of what her advisers promise to accomplish. Secondly, for a government proclaiming the Chinese to be the foreigners' equals and for this reason fighting against foreign tutelage, it would be ridiculous to make the foreign advisers superiors to the Chinese. The Cantonese put their advisers to work and made them 'work like niggers.' A case is known to the writer of a well-known German doctor who, using old connection with influential Cantonese, applied for a job as medical adviser to the Canton Government. His application was turned down and preference given to a qualified Chinese doctor. This action was not due to antiforeignism, but, as was pointed out to the German, the very point which he supposed to be in his favor-namely, a twenty years' stay in China - was considered by the appointing committee as being against him. With all due regard for the excellent German medical school, there is little doubt that as regards professional skill and training a young Chinese doctor just returned from the United States, and familiar with the latest discoveries of importance, should be better fitted for so responsible a position. Surely it does not require a long official letter to explain why preference is given to an up-to-date Chinese against an out-of-date foreigner.

The biggest achievement, for which Canton must thank Russia, and this time the writer associates himself whole-heartedly with the Chinese, — is in this matter of distribution of power