An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: And of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings, 1. kötetH. Holt, 1874 |
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abso Absolute admit affirm argument assertion Association psychology attributes body Brown called cause cognize color conceive conception condition Cosmothetic Idealists Cousin deny Dissertations on Reid distinction distinguished doctrine doubt effect evidence existence experience express extension external object external world faculties feeling finite Hamilton Ibid idea immediate knowledge impossible impression inconceivable inference infinite inseparable association intuitive intuitive knowledge knowl known laws Laws of Thought Lectures limited lute Mansel matter meaning mediate merely metaphysical metaphysicians mode muscular sensations natural beliefs natural signs ness never non-ego notion Noumena Noumenon opinion outward objects perceive perception Permanent Possibilities phænomena phænomenon philosophers philosophical scepticism plurality positive possibilities of sensation present Primary Qualities proposition prove psychological reality relation relative Relativity of Knowledge represent rience sciousness sense Sir W space supposed theory thing thinkers thought tion touch true truth unknown veracity whole words
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263. oldal - If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
82. oldal - America, but know that we are alive, that two and two make four, and that the sum of any two sides of a triangle is greater than the third side.
133. oldal - Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do : he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures ; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go."— (P.
37. oldal - Thus, mind and matter, as known or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities ; mind and matter, as unknown and unknowable, are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities, are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena ; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena...
122. oldal - That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.
79. oldal - That the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge ; and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed.
238. oldal - This idea of something which is distinguished from our fleeting impressions by what, in Kantian language, is called Perdurability ; something which is fixed and the same, while our impressions vary; something which exists whether we are aware of it or not, and which is always square (or of some other given figure) whether it appears to us square or round, constitutes altogether our idea of external substance. Whoever can assign an origin to this complex conception, has accounted for what we mean...
99. oldal - ... are free, is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability ; and this fact of liberty cannot be...
121. oldal - ... conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being.
228. oldal - Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led, by my nature, to conclude some quality to be in the rose which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived; and that act of my mind by which I have the conviction and belief of this quality is what in this case I call perception.