In order to illustrate the subject more fully, let us consider a moment an instance in Roman history still more directly to our present purpose. The Roman Regulus was a prisoner at Carthage. The Carthaginians sent him to Rome in order to procure a peace; but with the expectation, and on the condition, if peace were not procured, of his returning. He no sooner arrived at his native city, than, contrary to the hopes and expectations of the Carthaginians, he advised and urged the Romans to continue the war. Some persons, when he had seen fit to take this course, proposed to him not to return, as the most distressing results would be likely to follow. Regulus replied, "Though I am well acquainted with the tortures which await me at Carthage, I prefer them to an act which would cover me with infamy in my tomb. It is my duty to return, and for all else let the gods provide." He accordingly went back, and was put to death with unheardof sufferings. This high-minded act of the noble Roman has been applauded, not only by the historians who record it, but by the whole human race, although nothing could be more unwise under the existing circumstances, if there was no such thing as a moral nature, no such thing as conscience and conscientious or moral obligations.

221. Evidence of a moral nature from Scripture.

We close this examination of the reasons which may be brought forward in support of the general doctrine of a moral nature, by remarking further, that the doctrine is fully recognised in the Scriptures. All those passages in which men are called upon to do what is just and right, in distinction from pursuing their own selfish and private ends, imply not only that there is a right and wrong, but that men are capable of understanding what is right, and that they are under obligation to do what is right. The term CONSCIENCE, in particular, as expressive of the fact of man's moral nature, is frequently used in the Scriptures. Men are directed to have a good conscience; the testimony of conscience is spoken of as a matter of rejoicing; the Apostle and his associates are said to commend themselves to every man's conscience; passages which, together with others like them, can hardly be said to have

any meaning, if there be not in man some moral element which is capable of taking cognizance of the right and wrong of things, in distinction from the merely prudential view, the mere apparent expediency or profitableness of things.

And not only this, God himself, in various passages, calls upon men to sit in judgment upon the course, whatever it may be, which He has thought fit to pursue. He does not simply appeal to them for a decision, whether his providential administration is an advantageous one or not, but whether it is right. All passages of this kind appear to take it for granted, that man has a power of moral judgment.-But the passage of Scripture which, standing by itself, is most decisive on this subject, is to be found in Romans, ii., 14, 15. The passage, which we commit without comment to the reader, is as follows. "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another."

§ 222. Concluding remarks on the general fact of a moral nature.

In view of the various considerations which have been brought forward, we may certainly feel authorized to speak with entire confidence of the existence of the Moral Sensibilities as a portion of man's nature essentially distinct from the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. When we give to these considerations the weight to which they are obviously entitled, the only matter of wonder is, that the subject should have hitherto been involved in so much obscurity and doubt; and that men of no small learning and of no dishonourable reputation should have lent the countenance of their authority to doctrines the opposite of those we have endeavoured to support. In making this remark, we have not reference so much to such writers as Hobbes, and Mandeville, and others of that class, who have never had great weight with the popular mind, as to the distinguished and highly-influential names of Locke and Paley. The circum

stance that such men have had doubts as to the fact of an original and distinct moral department in the mind, is one reason, aside from the intrinsic interest and value of the subject, why we have been led in this Chapter, and shall be led hereafter, to pursue the investigation with a degree of minuteness, and with a regard to such objections as may be likely to be suggested, which might not otherwise have been supposed to be necessary.

CHAPTER II.

EMOTIONS OF MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

223. Classification of the moral sensibilities.

THE remarks of the preceding chapter, it will be noticed, have had a relation exclusively to the general subject. If we are satisfied on the general question whether man has a moral nature, we are ready to commence a consideration of what that nature is.

We proceed, accordingly, to make the general remark, that the Moral nature is less complicated than the Pathematic, although the general division of the Moral Sensibilities corresponds precisely to the general division of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. As the Natural Sensibilities resolved themselves, in the first instance, into the subordinate classification of the Emotions and Desires, so the Moral Sensibilities, in a manner precisely corresponding, resolve themselves into the subordinate classification of moral Emotions and feelings of Moral Obligation. But both divisions of the Natural Sensibilities, it will be recollected, viz., the Emotive and the Desirous, were found to be susceptible of numerous minor divisions. It is not so in the moral department. The class of moral emotions, and the obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation, which are based upon them, will be found, exclusive of any subordinate divisions, to comprehend the whole subject.

It might be supposed, therefore, that this subject would

be despatched in a few words. And so it would if the discussion could properly be limited to the mere examination of these feelings. But the moral sentiments, both the emotive and the obligatory, sustain such important relations, and involve so many important consequences, that it seems to be proper not only to examine them in their own nature, but also to consider them, to some extent, in their multiplied connexions.

§ 224. Nature of the moral emotions of approval and disapproval. In accordance with what has been said in the foregoing section, we repeat, that there are but two classes of mental states which belong, in strictness of speech, to the Moral sensibilities, considered as being by nature an essential portion of the human mind; although it is very true that there are a number of things in the mind, such as the abstract conceptions of right and wrong, and the feelings of remorse, which have both theoretically and practically an important connexion with morals. The Moral Nature, properly so called, putting out of view the incidental relations it sustains, exists and developes itself, FIRST, in the moral Emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval; and, SECOND, in the feelings of moral Obligation.

While there are many kinds of the Natural or Pathematic emotions, such as the emotions of beauty, of sublimity, of the ludicrous, of cheerfulness, of surprise, of reverence, of shame, and the like, there is but one kind or class of Moral emotions. And these are known, considered as distinct states of mind, by the names by which they have just been described, viz., as feelings of APPROVAL and DISAPPROVAL. Of these states of mind we now proceed to give some account.-And our first remark is, that they are original feelings; which implies, that in the appropriate circumstances of their existence, they are called forth by the original or constitutional tendencies of the mind, and also that they are elementary or simple. Of course they are not susceptible of definition, since defining, except that sort of apparent defining which consists in the mere use of synonymous terms, is predicable only of what is complex. Hence, in their distinctive or appropriate nature, in that which constitutes them what VOL. IL-Z

they are, considered as separate from anything and everything else, they cannot be known by description, but by consciousness only. Nevertheless, we are not at liberty to suppose that their nature is either absolutely unknown, or, as a general thing, even misunderstood, inasmuch as the consciousness of such feelings is universal, and as no form of knowledge, it is generally admitted, is more distinct to our apprehension than that which has consciousness for its basis. Whoever, therefore, has had placed before him any case of right and wrong, of such a nature that he could have, and did in fact have, a clear apprehension of it, in itself and in its relations, must, we suppose, have a knowledge (and if he has not, it is impossible he ever should have) of emotions of approval and disapproval.

§ 225. Of the place or position, mentally considered, of the emotions of approval and disapproval.

Moral emotions, or emotions of moral approval and disapproval, occupy a place, considered in reference to other departments of the mind, immediately successive to intellections, or acts of the intellect.In this respect they agree with the natural or pathematic emotions, which occupy the same position. It is, for instance, impossible for us to feel the beauty of an object, which is an act of the Natural sensibilities, without first having a perception or knowledge of the object itself. In like manner, it is impossible for us to approve or disapprove a thing, in the moral sense of the terms, without first having some perception, some knowledge of the thing approved or disapproved.

And as the natural emotions are immediately followed by Desires, so the moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval (for these are all the states of mind that are properly comprehended under that phrase), are followed, in like manner, by Obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation. The position, therefore, of moral emotions, and they are found nowhere else, is between perceptions or intellective acts on the one hand, and Obligatory sentiments on the other. And as there can be no moral emotions without antecedent perceptions, so there can be