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in general, occasioned by the circumstance of early and long-continued intercourse. It is this. When other persons, not members of the same family, are brought up neath the same roof, although we love them very much, yet we never have that peculiar feeling (distinct from every other, and known only by experience) which flows out to a brother or sister. There is something in having the same father and mother, in looking upward to the same source of origin, in being nourished at the same fountain in infancy, in feeling the same life-blood course through our veins, which constitutes, under the creative hand of nature, a sacred tie, unlike any other.

There are other views of the subject, besides that which has just been noticed, which contribute to show the connaturalness and permanency of this affection. A number of the remarks which have been made in support of the implanted or connatural origin of the Parental and Filial affections, will apply here. But we leave the subject to the decision of such reflections as will be likely to suggest themselves to the mind of the reader himself.

§ 173. On the utility of the domestic affections.

In the institution of the affections, which have now passed under a rapid and imperfect review, and which, taken together, may be spoken of under the general denomination of the Domestic affections, we have evidence of that benevolence and wisdom which are seen so frequently in the arrangements of our mental nature. These affections are not only sources of happiness to individuals and families, diffusing an undefinable but powerful charm over the intercourse of life; they also indirectly exert a great influence in the support of society generally.

It was, indeed, a strange notion of some of the ancients, of Plato in particular, that the domestic affections are at variance with the love of country; and that, in order to extinguish these affections, children should be taken from their parents at their birth, and transferred to the state, to be educated at the public expense. But the domestic affections are too deeply planted, particularly that of parents, to be generally destroyed by any process of this kind; and if it were otherwise, the result would

be as injurious to the public as to individual happiness. It is unquestionable, that one of the great supports of society is the family relation. Who is most watchful and diligent in his business? Who is the most constant friend of public order, and is most prompt in rallying to the standard of the law? Who, as a general thing, is the best friend, the best neighbour, and the best citizen? Not he who is set loose from family relationships, and wanders abroad without a home; but he, however poor and unknown to fame, who has a father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters; who sees his own sorrows and happiness multiplied in the sorrows and happiness of those around him; and who is strong in the advocacy and support of the common and public good, not only because it involves his own personal interest, but the interest and happiness of all those who are linked arm in arm with himself by the beauty and sacredness of domestic ties.

§ 174. Of the moral character of the domestic affections, and of the bẹnevolent affections generally.

One of the most interesting inquiries in connexion with the domestic affections, and the benevolent affections generally, and one, too, on which there has been a great diversity of opinion, is, whether these affections possess a moral character, and what that character is. The more common opinion seems to have been, that all affections which are truly benevolent are necessarily, and from the mere fact of their being benevolent, morally good or virtuous. Nor is it, perhaps, surprising that this opinion should be so often entertained. Certainly, as compared with the other active principles, coming under the general head of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, they hold the highest rank; and we frequently apply epithets to them which indicate our belief of their comparative pre-eminence. We speak of them not only as innocent and useful, but as interesting, amiable, and lovely; and from time to time apply other epithets, which equally show the favourable place which they occupy in our regard. All this we allow; but still they are not necessarily, and in consequence of their own nature simply, morally good.

The correct view on this subject we apprehend to be this (the same that has been taken of other principles, that are analogous in their nature and operation): So far as the benevolent affections are constitutional or instinctive in their action, they are indifferent as to their moral character, being neither morally good nor evil. So far as they have a voluntary action, they will be either the one or the other, according to the circumstances of the case. When, for instance, the mother hears the sudden and unexpected scream of her child in another room, and impetuously rushes to its relief, we allow the action to be naturally good, and exceedingly interesting and lovely; but we do not feel at liberty to predicate virtue of it, and to pronounce it morally good, because it is obviously constitutional or instinctive. If the act done under such circumstances be necessarily virtuous, then it clearly follows that virtue may be predicated of sheep, cows, and other brute animals, who exhibit, under like circumstances, the same instinctive attachment to their offspring. So far, therefore, as the benevolent affections are instinctive in their operation, they are to be regarded, however interesting and amiable they may appear, as neither morally good nor evil.

§ 175. Of the moral character of the voluntary exercises of the benevolent affections.

But, so far as the benevolent affections are voluntary; in other words, so far as they exist in view of motives voluntarily and deliberately brought before the mind, they may be, according to the nature of the voluntary effort, either virtuous or vicious. Take, as an illustration, another instance of the operations of the maternal affection. The basis of this affection is unquestionably pure instinct. But it has, in addition to this, a voluntary operation; and this accessory operation, it is to be presumed, is in the majority of cases virtuous. Nevertheless, whenever this amiable and ennobling affection becomes inordinately strong; when, under its influence, the mother leaves the child to vicious courses, against the remonstrances of the sentiment of duty, its exercise evidently becomes vicious.-On the other hand, if the mother, perhaps

in consequence of the improper conduct of the child, or a perplexing inability to meet its numerous wants, or for some other reason, finds its affection falling below the standard which is requisite in order to fulfil the intentions of nature, and in this state of things restores and invigorates its exercise by a careful and serious consideration of all the responsibilities involved in the maternal relation, it is equally clear that its exercise at once assumes the opposite character, not merely of amiableness, but of virtue.

It is proper, perhaps, to remind the reader, that sometimes a theological or religious difficulty is presented here. It is said, and we suppose said correctly, not only that the great element of the religious life is LOVE, but that the consciousness of Christians indicates an extraneous origin and continuance of it. That is to say, it is implanted, is the gift of God, rather than a thing of their own voluntary creation. And yet Christian love, although it is the gift of God rather than a purely volitive or voluntary product, is unquestionably a virtuous or holy state of mind. But there is really no difficulty here which is of such a nature as to place itself in opposition to the views which have been presented. The truth is, Christian love will be found so effectually to carry with itself the consent of the understanding and the harmonious concurrence of the Will, that, as it seems to us, there is no impropriety and no philosophical obstacle in the way of ascribing to it the character of virtue, which is asserted to belong to it.

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§ 176. Of the connexion between benevolence and rectitude. We may add to what has now been remarked, that the highest and most ennobling form of benevolence exists in connexion with strict justice. Perfect justice is, by the constitution of things, indissolubly conjoined with the eral and the highest good. All forms and degrees of benevolence, which are at variance, whether more or less, with perfect rectitude, although they are aiming at good or happiness, are nevertheless seeking something less than the greatest possible happiness. Even benevolence, therefore, is, and ought to be, subjected to some regulating power. Whenever we distinctly perceive that its pres

ent indulgence, in any given cases w tend, whatever may be its immediate bearing, to ultimate unhappiness and misery, we are sacredly bound, by the higher considerations of duty, to repress it And there is as much virtue in repressing its action at such times, as there would be at other times in stimulating it.

One of the most benevolent men of whom history gives us any account was Bartholomew Las Casas, bishop of Chiapa. In 1502 he accompanied Ovando to Hispanio la, who had been commissioned and sent out as the Spanish governor to that island. He there witnessed, with all the pain of a naturally benevolent heart, the cruel treatment which was there experienced by the native inhabitants; the deprivation of their personal rights, the seizure of their lands, their severe toil, and inexorable punishment. He was deeply affected; and from that time devoted the whole of his subsequent life, a period of more than sixty years, to exertions in their behalf. Under the impulse of a most unquestionable benevolence, this good man recommended to Cardinal Ximenes, who was at that time at the head of Spanish affairs, the introduction of Negro slaves into the West India Islands as one of the best methods of relief to the native inhabitants.

We introduce this statement for the purpose of illustrating our subject. The measures of Las Casas, which tended to introduce enslaved Africans into the Spanish islands, were the results, beyond all question, of a holy and exalted benevolence. But if he could have foreseen the treatment of the Negroes, still more dreadful than that to which the native inhabitants were subjected; if he could have beheld, in anticipation, the desolations which have spread over Africa in consequence of the Slavetrade, it would have been his duty, whatever good might have immediately resulted to the Indians in whose behalf he was so deeply interested, to have checked and controlled his benevolent feelings, and to have endured the present rather than have been accessory to the future evil. The indulgence of his benevolence to the native inhabitants, under such circumstances and in such a form (however amiable and interesting benevolence, in itself considered, undoubtedly is in all cases whatever), would have