source whence the authority is derived, in cases where it is acknowledged.

The first cause of indistinctness in Mr Lieber's exposition is, that he has nowhere determined what constitutes the society which he calls the state. If a society, as he informs us, consists of a number of individuals between whom a common relation exists, and if the relation of the members of the society called the state, is the relation of right, then the state must contain the whole human species at least, since the relation of right subsists between every man and every other man. On the other hand, if the society consists of any portion of the human race, Mr Lieber has failed to inform us what is the specific relation by which the members of such society are bound, as distinct from the general relation of right which binds all mankind. Nay, he takes pains to exclude every imaginable relation of a specific kind. Thus, in the following piece of mysticism: The state ' is aboriginal with man: it is no voluntary association, no contrivance of art or invention of suffering, no company of share'holders; no machine, no work of contract by individuals who lived previously out of it; no necessary evil, no ill of humanity, 'which will be cured in time and by civilization; no accidental thing, no institution above and separate from society, no instrument for one or a few; the state is a form and faculty of ' mankind to lead the species towards perfection-it is the glory ' of man.'

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So the state is not a family, (p. 151,)-not an insurance company, (p. 178.) In short, Mr Lieber seems to have been more. successful in making up his mind as to what the state is not, than what it is. Judging, indeed, from the tenor of some of his expressions, we might suppose the state to have presented itself to his view, clothed in that species of mysterious attributes with which some visionary theologians have delighted to invest the church, and some as visionary politicians the kingly office-attributes of which the comprehension is not to be acquired or communicated by any ordinary process of reason or speech, but must be generated in the light and warmth of rapt contemplation.

But waving all objection to the author's mode of defining the society which constitutes the state, or rather to the want of such definition, is it, we may ask, true in point of fact, that it is by a society, in any proper sense of the term, that laws and governments have generally, or even that they have ever been formed; or is it on such ground that governments claim the right to rule, or that subjects acknowledge that right? To argue such a point

as this, would be idle. Mr Lieber has sought to conceal from himself the inconsistency between his theory and the fact, by such qualifying explanations as the following. Speaking of the earlier stages of society and civil government, he says:- The patriarch 'ruled over the whole. A state existed indeed, for there was 'justice administered; and where justice is administered there are ' rights acknowledged, and where rights are acknowledged there is the state; but it was the state in its incipient stage.'

To say that a patriarchal government is a state in an incipient stage if implying that it would, in the progress of society, become more popular in its character, or that it would not attain its perfection until it did so, is nothing to the present purpose. It is enough that the patriarchal government is admitted to be a rightful one; and (which must also be admitted) that such a government does not receive its authority from a society. The hypothesis, then, of a society, to explain the nature of the state, and thence the rights of government, is just as much a fiction as Locke's Social Compact.' We shall briefly point out the fallacies by which Mr Lieber seems to have imposed upon himself in maintaining his doctrine.

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First, then, he has all along confounded natural with political relations; and, as applicable to the existence of these respectively, he has further mixed up two different imports of the word necessity. By this confusion he establishes his favourite, and often-repeated position, that the society composing the state, both exists and exercises sovereignty, by necessity-in other words, he shows that to take place by necessity, which does not take place in fact. The confusion is easily exposed. Natural relations, (of right,) and the society bound together by these relations, (comprehending the whole human race,) may be said to exist by necessity in the strict sense: political relations, and the societies of which these form the bond, exist by necessity only in the sense of high expediency. But, at all events, any necessity that is in the case, is only a necessity for government, not a necessity that government should originate from a society.

Next, Mr Lieber has confounded the proposition, that all governments that have originated from a society are rightful governments, with this other, that all rightful governments have originated from a society. The one proposition is obviously not the converse of the other. How many governments,' he asks, has the world seen within the last fifty years in France; yet has France, the French state-that is, the jural society compo'sed of all the French, ever ceased on that account? Was France in England when Louis XVIII. resided there, or Eng

land in Holland when Charles II. resided in the United Pro'vinces?' And no question can be more reasonable, if used to show the absurdity of an inherent sovereignty in Louis or Charles; or to assert the indubitable right of the "jural society' in France and England, to establish a government-could the society, in either case, have been brought to act as a society. But if the impression were meant to be conveyed, that the society did so act in point of fact (our sole concern), might it not be as fairly askedWas France in Paris?-perhaps we might say-in one house, in ' one chamber of Paris? was England in London, when a government was settled in each country respectively ?'-For in these settlements, or any of the others, the most apt to be cited as instances of popular action in the formation of a government-by how small a fraction of the society were the arrangements in effect made?

Lastly, Mr Lieber has been misled by his own mode of proposing the enquiry. He has taken the word 'State' to be one expressing a single precise notion-a notion which may be defined and from the definition of which the properties of the state may be deduced, just as the properties of triangles and circles are deduced from their respective definitions. If the word state has different meanings, as it has, the question' what is the 'state,' may, it is obvious, be merely a verbal enquiry, implying, what is this term used to express; and there can be no doubt that the state is used to designate a society or community. In a figurative sense, this society exercises sovereignty, in so far as every government, professedly at least, acts in its behalf, and may be presumed to convey its will. In a more proper sense it must even be admitted that the society exercises sovereignty; namely, in so far as all the acts of the government must, to a certain extent, be acquiesced in by the society, and that no measure could be enforced against the universal will. But to say, in any of these senses, that a society exercises sovereignty, is not even to offer an explanation of the right by which governments assume and exercise their functions, (for even acquiescence in the acts of government is rather founded in an opinion of the right, than felt to convey it)-it is merely the giving a statement of the circumstances and conditions under which laws and governments must have their very existence, and which indeed are essential suppositions in any theory that can be formed upon the subject: or it is a mere affirmation of the fact in question, to the effect that the right of forming a government lies somewhere within the community. In short, the author has fallen into the not uncommon delusion of supposing himself to be giving an explanation of a fact, while merely stating or describing the fact itself.

VOL. LXXIII. NO. CXLVII.

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For, again, let us beg it may be observed that we are solely concerned in the explanation of a fact assumed to be such-not in settling a point of opinion when the fact really and truly exists as assumed. We are not determining whether this or that particular government can be considered as rightfully exercising its authority as such; but whether, supposing the authority to be rightful, it is derived from a society. As matter of opinion regarding the justest or most expedient mode of forming governments and laws, some may maintain that they ought to be formed according to the will of the community or society, and that, unless so formed, they do not possess the rightful authority. This is not Mr Lieber's meaning. He would allow that the most despotic government may have the rights of a government; but he contends,* (by a fiction as we think, or in a sense foreign to the purpose,) that such government derives its powers and rights from a society. To show, indeed, how little of a literal or pertinent sense belongs to Mr Lieber's proposition, we need merely cite his own illustration: The crew of a vessel are in a state of mutiny; the captain ⚫ has been killed; an energetic man among the passengers unites the latter and part of the crew with himself; he seizes the muti"nous sailors; there is no possibility of subduing or preventing them in any other way from piratical acts. He tries them with "the assistance of his fellow-passengers, and hangs them. He is right; and provided he can prove every thing as stated above, 'he will be justified by any court which decides according to 'strict justice, and this alone.' Did the passenger, then, who is here supposed to quell the mutiny, acquire his right to do so from the society composed of the persons on board; or was the act of such society needed to create his right, however much some degree of consent and co-operation may have been so to supply him with the necessary power?

But we must now observe, that, as already hinted, any difficulty that exists at all as to the foundation of the right of control exercised by a government over its subjects, remains the same whether that control is exercised by a community collectively, or by any fraction of it. For though all the members of a community, except a single individual, are in favour of waging

* Much as we may disapprove of many acts of the Russian government, no one can deny her to be a state.' As Mr Lieber can admit this in perfect consistency with his argument, so we might deny it in perfect consistency with ours; and we observe this with a purpose the very reverse of offering an opinion on such a point, and with the view of evincing more clearly that this is not at all the sort of question under discussion.

war against a foreign power, what right have they to subject him to a part of the charge? Is not this an interference with his natural liberty? And by what arguments can the right of any number of men, (for the question really comes to this,) to exercise such interference, be made out, that would not establish the sameright-in kind if not in degree-in favour of any individual possessing the necessary power, and employing it for the common benefit? Mr Lieber's theory of a society, then, really leaves the difficulty where it was.

If we seem to have examined Mr Lieber's theory somewhat over-curiously, it is partly because the problem which it aims at resolving, is one that has attracted considerable attention among philosophical politicians; and partly because the author's speculations have seemed, both to himself and to some persons of consideration in the United States, whose opinions are quoted at the beginning of the work, to have set the matter in a new and just light. On the merits of the question itself that, namely, as to the right of compulsion or restraint which every government assumes over its subjects-we shall take this opportunity of offering a few observations.

The individual citizen of a political state appears, at first view, to be singularly, and even unaccountably circumstanced. He may have a debt owing to him, which is notoriously withheld from motives of wilful injustice; yet, though perfectly able to exact payment by force, he is prevented from doing so. If his wife has been debauched or his son murdered, he dares not take vengeance. He is compelled to contribute to the formation of a road here, to the erection of a bridge there, though he wants neither. A judge is upheld partly at his expense, though no one can reproach him with ever injuring a neighbour, and he needs nobody's help to prevent or avenge injury to himself. He must pay for the maintenance of soldiers to fight at the other end of the globe, in a quarrel of which he does not even know the subject. And, if he complains of the hardship of all this, he meets with no sympathy. No man will allow that he suffers any wrong; or that those who exercise such power over him do any thing but what they have a right to do. The persuasion of the right of government, in short, is found to be universal, be that government exercised by one man, or any number of men. This is the fact. The question is, How is the fact to be explained; on what is the right felt to be founded?

Now, every one knows and admits what would be the consequences of the want of government-what would ensue if such powers were not exercised. Person and property would be utterly insecure-theft, violence, and murder, would universally