Christ condescended to give, was adapted with the most exquisite discernment to the case. The reasoning is from the greater to the less. The argument is inductive. The same power, which by a word can heal a confirmed palsy, a disease incurable by human art, must be alike efficacious to forgive sins. The same energy, which, by a suspension of all the laws which govern the material world, can give instantaneous vigor to impotence, can animate the torpid fibre and quicken the stagnant circulations of life, must also pos sess a like control over the moral world; must be able to renovate the decays of spiritual nature, to rekindle the extinguished spark of virtue, to purge the pollutions of a guilty life, and restore to vice itself the spotless purity of innocence.

To one of these two processes then, ratiocination and induction, all arguments may be reduced; and the same argument may be presented in either of the forms, or in both. And here I shall close my remarks on the subject of proof, as it is applied in confirmation. The part, which I am next to treat, is however so intimately connected with it, that my subsequent lecture will be little more than a further pursuit of the considerations, presented to you in this and the last.

LECTURE XXII.

CONFUTATION.

THERE are two very distinct senses, applied

In one

by Quinctilian to the term confutation. of which it has reference only to judicial trials, and in the other it is adapted to every form of public speaking. By confutation it appears, that in the Roman courts of his age was understood what in ours we call the defence of a cause. And in this sense the confutation was exclusively confined to one of the parties, the defendant. The other signification was that, which the word now bears; and generally meant the answer to an adversary's allegations. There is indeed a natural coincidence between the two meanings of the word, since the whole task of a defendant before the tribunals of

justice must be to resist some charge brought against him, and since the altercation of contested points in every other mode of oratory must in its principles be managed, as in the conflicts of jurisprudence. All the topics of All the topics of argument, which may be used for the purpose of confirmation, are equally suited to confutation; and here lies the most difficult part of every cause. So long as your antagonist is out of sight and out of hearing, the field of controversy must be your own. But here is the " tug of war." Here is the touchstone of your powers. Here it is that you have only the alternative of victory or defeat. And there are some particulars, in which a defendant cannot enjoy advantages equal to those of the plaintiff. He is more restricted in his resources, and requires a greater versatility of talents. Accusation is simple; the mode of advancing the charge is uniform, and its truth alone is to be established. But the defendant, as occasion offers, may deny, or justify, or excuse, or extenuate. He may sometimes assume the defiance of scorn, and sometimes humble himself to intreaty. The plaintiff has the time for premeditation at his own command. The defendant must often meet and repel the charge without any indulgence of preparation. The plaintiff knows the

extent of what he is to prove, and may know how far his witnesses will support him. The defendant must always adapt his refutation to the case, often without knowing what the testimony will be, until the moment, when it is brought to bear against him. It has therefore been remarked, that very moderate abilities are sufficient to qualify an accuser, but that eminence in defensive practice could be obtained only by the brightest endowments of eloquence; and Quinctilian gives it as his deliberate opinion, that accusation is as much easier than defence, as it is easier to inflict, than to heal a wound.

Let us then consider confutation successively under both its meanings; first as applicable to the practice of the bar alone; and secondly as the function of repelling arguments.

It is impossible to prescribe any useful rules of eloquence for an orator at the bar in our country, without directing his first attention to that system of pleadings, which I have so often mentioned in these lectures. You remember I have heretofore told you, that every judicial cause with us undergoes in substance a double trial; the one in writing by the means of pleading, the other oral by testimony and argument. That the forms of plead

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ing are constructed upon the principles of the profoundest logic, and are intended to bring the controversy between the parties into the narrowest possible compass. Now that part of these pleadings, by means of which the plaintiff or accuser is authorised to summon the defendant before the judge, is called the declaration; which, as I have told you, contains the plaintiff's narration of his case, and his charge against the defendant. And when he, in obedience to the summons, comes into court, he may place his confutation or defence First he may upon one of four distinct grounds. take exception to the forms of the plaintiff's proeceding, or to the jurisdiction of the court, by a plea in abatement. Secondly he may dispute the right of the plaintiff to prosecute his action at all, by a plea in bar. Thirdly he may take issue upon the facts, and put them upon trial by jury. And fourthly he may admit the facts, the jurisdiction of the court, and the plaintiff's right to sue; but deny that he has shown by his own story any breach of the law, for which the defendant ought

to answer.

This is done by a demurrer to the declaration. In all these cases, excepting that of the issue upon the facts, the pleadings being closed,