Oldalképek
PDF
ePub

SECTION V. THE SENSE OF TASTE.

THE nerves of taste are spread over the tongue and the back part of the fauces. They terminate in numerous papillæ, or small excrescences, which form together the organ of taste. It is almost needless to observe that the nerves are everywhere covered with the membrane lining the mouth, and never come in immediate contact with the sapid substance. These papillæ are most numerous on the tip, the edges, and the root of the tongue, leaving many portions of the intermediate surface almost destitute of this sensation.

The sense of taste is never excited except by solutions. The saliva, which is copiously furnished by the glands of the mouth, is an active solvent. By mastication, the solid food becomes intimately mixed with this animal fluid, is partially dissolved by it, and, in this condition, is brought into relation to the papilla which constitute the organ of taste. Insoluble substances are, therefore, tasteless. When the papillæ of the tongue either become dry, or are covered with the thick coating produced by fever, taste becomes imperfect or is wholly suspended.

When a sapid body, under normal circumstances, is brought into relation with the organ of taste, a sensation either pleasing or displeasing immediately ensues. When the sensation is pleasant, we are instinctively impelled to swallow, and with the act of swallowing the sensation is perfected and ceases. When the sensation is unpleasant, we are, on the other hand, impelled to reject whatever may be the cause of it, and frequently it requires a strong effort of the will to control this impulse. The sensation of taste is not consummated without the act of swallowing. It would seem

probable that the anterior and posterior nerves of the tongue were designed to perform different offices, the former giving us an imperfect sensation, which creates the disposition either to swallow or to reject the sapid substance; the latter awakening the perfected sensation as the substance passes over it.

As in the case of smell, so in that of taste, I think that with the sensation no perception is connected. A particular sensibility is excited; a feeling either pleasant or unpleasant is created; a simple knowledge is given us;-but no cognition of anything external can be observed. Whatever notions of externality come to us, by means of this sense, they are derived from other sources than the sense itself. Thus, we can receive nothing into the mouth except by bringing it into contact with the lips. The sense of touch then cognizes it as something external to ourselves. The suggestion of cause and effect might lead us possibly to the same conclusion. These, however, are no parts of the sense of taste. The taste in the mouth which frequently accompanies disease, awakens no idea of anything external. When, however, by means of our other senses, we have learned that a particular flavor is produced by any substance, we associate the flavor with the substance, and give it a name accordingly. We thus speak of the taste of an apple, a pear, or a peach.

So far as I am able to discover, the remarks made in the last section, respecting conception as derived from smell, apply with equal truth to the sense of taste. I think that men generally have no distinct conception of an absent taste, but only a conviction that they should easily recognize it if it were again presented to them. This form of recollection may be so strong as to create a longing for a particular flavor, but still there is no conception like that produced by either sight or touch.

The same ambiguity may be observed here as in the analogous sense. The taste of an apple, means both the quality in the fruit which produces the sensation and the affection of the sentient being produced by it. The one is objective, belonging exclusively to the non ego; the other is subjective, belonging wholly to the ego. Of the sensation. we have a very definite knowledge; it can be nothing but what we feel it to be. Of the cause we are, as in the sense of smell, wholly ignorant.

The number of sensations derived from taste is, I think, much greater than that derived from smell. An epicure becomes capable of multiplying them, and distinguishing them from each other to a very great extent. We are able, also, to classify our sensations of taste much more definitely than those of smell. Thus, we speak of acid, subacid, sweet, bitter, astringent, and many other classes of tastes, to which we refer a large number of individuals. In this manner we designate various kinds of fruit, medicines, &c. While, therefore, these two senses seem to be governed by the same general laws, I think that in man the knowledge derived from taste is more definite and more varied than the other. By means of the sense of touch, which so completely surrounds the sense of taste, we should, in the use of it, also arrive at the idea of externality. In this respect it is indirectly the source of knowledge which is not given us by the sense of smell. In blind mutes, however, to whom the sense of smell becomes much more important, in all probability the case is reversed, and smell furnishes more numerous and definite cognitions than taste.

I have said above that the sensation of taste is not perfectly experienced unless the sapid substance is swallowed. Whatever is swallowed enters the stomach, undergoes the process of digestion, and, whether nutritious or deleterious, enters the circulation and becomes assimilated with our ma

terial system. It is manifest, therefore, that if a substance be pleasing to the taste, we may, by gratifying this sense, swallow either what is in itself deleterious, or that which becomes deleterious by being partaken of in excess. It is, hence, evidently important that the gratification of the sense be made subordinate to the higher design: that of promoting the health and vigor, physical and intellectual, of the whole man.

In brutes, for the most part, the gratification of the appetite is controlled by instinct. The instances are very rare in which one of the lower animals has any desire for food which is not nutritious, or desires it in larger quantity than the health of the system demands. Man, however, is endowed with no such instinct. The regulation of his appetite is submitted to his will, directed by reason and conscience. Guided by these, a perfect harmony will exist between his gustatory desire and the wants of his material and intellectual organization.

But suppose it to be otherwise. Suppose the human being to swallow neither what nor as much as his health requires, but what and as much as will furnish gratification to his palate. He will eat or drink much that is deleterious, and much which, by excess, becomes destructive to health. When, by frequent indulgence, this subjection to appetite has grown into a habit, the control of the spiritual over the sensual is lost, and the man becomes either a glutton or a drunkard, and very commonly both.

The effects of these forms of indulgence are too well known to require specification. Gluttony, or the excessive love of food, renders the intellect sluggish, torpid and inefficient, cultivates the most degrading forms of selfishness, exposes the body to painful and lingering disease, and frequently terminates in sudden death.

"The full-fed glutton apoplexy knocks

Down to the ground at once, as butcher felleth ox."
Thompson's Castle of Indolence.

The appetite for deleterious drinks leads to consequences still more appalling. In a very short time it ruins the health, enfeebles the intellect, maddens the passions, destroys all self-respect, and, in the most disgusting manner, brutalizes the whole being. It speedily and insensibly grows into a habit which enslaves the nervous organism, sets at defiance the power of the will, and thus renders the ruin of the being, both for time and eternity, inevitable. We hence perceive the importance of holding our appetites in strict subjection to the dictates of reason and conscience, and especially of excluding the possibility of ever becoming the victims of intemperance.

REFERENCE.

Reid's Inquiry, chapter 3.

SECTION VI.- - THE SENSE OF HEARING.

THE organ of this sense is the ear. two parts, the external and internal ear.

It is composed of

The external ear

is intended merely to collect and concentrate the vibrations of the air, and conduct them to the tympanum, which forms the division between the two portions of this organ. The external ear thus performs the functions of an ear-trumpet. The tympanum, or drum, is a thin membrane stretched across the lower extremity of the tube in which the outward ear terminates. The vibrations of the air, thus produced upon the tympanum, are, by a series of small bones occupying its inner chamber, transmitted to certain cells filled with fluid, in which the extremity of the auditory nerve

« ElőzőTovább »