of course, simple to every one. What became familiar to him only by severe and protracted effort, seems capable of being learned by his pupil in a shorter time than is actually possible. In these respects it becomes an instructor to be on his guard. He should consider, not what he can do now, but what he could have done when under the circumstances of his pupils. He should, therefore, be careful to assure himself that what he teaches is understood. He who will bear these things in mind will not often have to complain of the stupidity of his pupils. When an instructor finds all his pupils blockheads, the indication is certainly ambiguous; there is a blockhead somewhere, but whether it belong to the teacher or the pupil becomes a proper subject of inquiry. 2. What has been rendered simple may be easily illustrated. Skill in illustration, therefore, is of great importance to a teacher. He perhaps presents to a pupil a new idea which is not readily comprehended. The conception of the one is not grasped by the other; or, if it is, the pupil does not certainly know that the idea in his mind is that which the teacher means to communicate. The teacher must, therefore, call up some analogous idea with which the pupil is familiar, so that, from ground common to both, he may pass by easy gradation to that which is new and uncomprehended. Things dissimilar in themselves frequently stand to each other in similar relations, thus affording wide range for analogies. In this manner the known is made to teach the unknown. Nor is this all. The illustration associates a new with a familiar idea. An interesting and apposite image is presented, and thus whatever is learned is more easily remembered. An illustration addressed to the eye is always the most successful. Hence, maps, diagrams, experiments, are among the most indispensable aids of an instructor. 3. It is scarcely necessary to add that the progress of the pupil will be greatly accelerated by reducing his knowledge, as far as possible, to practice. From the necessity of the case, it is evident that much of the pupil's time must be occupied in learning rules. If, however, the teaching is confined to these alone, it becomes intolerably irksome. The mind struggles against it, and is willing quickly to forget what is associated with nothing but pain. These difficulties, however, may in a great degree be removed, by teaching the pupil, as soon as he has learned a rule, to put it into practice. He then discovers that the knowledge of rules is a means of power, for it enables him to do what he could not do before, and he becomes conscious of progress and increased ability. Every step in advance brings with it an immediate reward, and he proceeds to the next step with new consciousness of power, and more earnest desire for other acquisitions. It was formerly the practice to carry a boy through the Latin grammar before he began to translate a word; and months were consumed in this dry and repulsive labor. It would be no wonder if, under such a discipline, he learned to abominate the grammar, the language, and the instructor, together. But if, as soon as he has learned a single rule, or mastered a single inflexion, he is taught to use it in the construction of easy phrases, and when, with the knowledge thus gained, he proceeds to the next rule, and finds the increased power derived from adding these knowledges together, further progress becomes desirable in itself, and learning is no longer a drudgery. While it would be absurd to say that, in all respects, our modes of teaching are preferable to those of our fathers, it is delightful to a benevolent mind to contemplate the improvements which have been introduced in the modes of instructing the young. The labor required is better adapted to the faculties of the learner, though here, it must be confessed, we yet need improvement. Study ministers more to the growth of the mind, instead of being a barren exercise of memory; and a vast amount of misery has been lifted off from the human race certainly no trifling consideration. REFERENCES. Relation of memory to philosophical genius-Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 8. - Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 3. Stewart, vol. i., chap. 2. Improvement of memory Theory and practice-Stewart, vol. i., chap. 4, section 7. Attention connected with memory-Locke, Book 2, chap. 10, section 3; Abercrombie, Part 3, section 1. Connected knowledge easily retained-Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 3; sections 1, 2, 4; Abercrombie, Part 3, section 1. Memory aided by method - Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 3; Abercrombie, Part 3, section 1. Nature and use of hypothesis - Locke, Book 4, chap. 12, sections 12, 13; Abercrombie, Part 3, section 4; Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 7. Artificial memoryStewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 6. Rules for study-Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 5. Effects of writing on memory - Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 5. Visible objects easily remembered -Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, section 2. Memory a storehouse-Reid, Essay 3, chap. 7. CHAPTER VI. REASONING. SECTION I. THE NATURE AND OBJECT OF REASONING, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH IT PROCEEDS. WE now come to the consideration of that series of mental acts denominated reasoning. Before, however, we enter upon this branch of our subject, it may be useful to review again, very briefly, the ground which we have gone over, that we may distinctly perceive the point from which we proceed, and learn the relation which this form of mental action holds to the other acts of the mind. By our perceptive powers, we become acquainted with the qualities of external objects, and, in general, with the facts in the external world. By our consciousness, we learn the facts existing in the world within us. By original suggestion, various intuitive truths and relations become objects of cognition. By abstraction, conceptions of individuals assume the form of general ideas; and by memory, all this knowledge is retained and recalled to our consciousness at the command of the will. Were we endowed with no other powers than these, we might enjoy the pleasures of knowledge. Whatever we had observed or experienced, and whatever had been observed and experienced by others, might be retained, generalized and combined, and thus our acquisitions might be both ex tensive and valuable. But, with no other faculties, we could only know what we or other men had actually observed or experienced. We could never make use of this knowledge to penetrate into the unknown. In a word, we could observe, and feel, and generalize, and classify, and remember, but we could not reason. But such is not the condition of the human mind. As soon as we acquire any knowledge whatever, we are prompted to use it for the purpose of acquiring other knowledge. We are continually saying to ourselves, if this be thus, then this other must be so; or this must be so, because this and that are so. If this be so, what must of necessity follow? This is the language of human beings, young and old, savage and civilized, learned and ignorant. It is the impulse of our common nature, and one of the endowments with which we have been blessed by a merciful Creator. He has enabled us to cognize relations existing between certain truths, from which emanate other truths different from the preceding, but which, without a knowledge of them, could never have been discovered. The results of the exercise of this faculty have been most astonishing. Unlike our other endowments, every one of its acts provides a wider field for its future employment, and thus its range is absolutely illimitable. The perception of one color gives me no additional power to perceive another color. A fact remembered furnishes only accidentally a basis or an aid to wider recollection. But every truth discovered by the reasoning power, and, in fact, every truth, however acquired, becomes, by use of this power, the means for proceeding to further discovery. Through the elementary cognitions in geometry, our reason at first discovers certain truths concerning lines, angles and triangles. Using these increased means of knowledge, it proceeds to discover truths concerning circles and squares; and, using |