Local and philosophical memory- Abercrombie, Part 3, sec. 1.

Greatly improvable - Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6.

Objects which awaken emotion easily remembered - Stewart, vol. i., chap. 6, sec. 1.

Ideas fade from memory - Locke, Book 2, chap. 10, secs. 4, 5.

Reviewing fixes knowledge - Abercrombie, Part 4.

Effect of disease on memory-Abercrombie, Part 3, sec. 1.

SECTION III. THE IMPORTANCE OF MEMORY.

IN treating of this subject, I shall consider, first, the relation of memory to our other faculties; and, secondly, the importance of a cultivated memory to professional success.

I. The relation between memory and our other intellectual faculties.

Memory is not necessary either to perception or consciousness. We could see, and hear, and feel, and be conscious of all the operations of our faculties, as well without memory as with it. It is not necessary to some acts of original suggestion. Without it we might have a notion of existence, both objective and subjective. We could not, however, without it, form those original suggestions which involve the idea of succession. Thus, without it, we could have no notion either of duration or of cause and effect.

Memory, on the other hand, is essential to the existence of all those ideas into which the element of time enters. Without it our whole knowledge would consist of the impressions made upon us now and here. Our intellectual existence would thus be reduced to a single point. Whatever we had known previously to the present moment, whatever ideas had occupied our minds before the one which now occupies them, would be blotted out forever. Hence, though we could form a notion of that which was immediately before us, we could not retain that notion, or anything corre

sponding to it, after it was withdrawn. Being unable to form conceptions, we could perform no acts either of analysis, generalization, or combination. We could form no notion of classes, and could have no general ideas. We could exercise no power of association, for there would be nothing within the scope of our mental vision, except the single idea with which we were at the moment occupied. Equally impossible would it be for us to reason. We reason by the comparison of propositions; but every proposition involves two ideas, and one of these must designate a class; and without memory, as I have remarked, the notion of classes would be impossible. But if this be true of the single propositions which form a syllogism, how much stronger is the case when we consider the syllogism itself, and, still more, the series of syllogisms which form an argument.

Thus, "memory holds an intermediate place between those mental acts into which time does and those into which it does not enter. It originates nothing; it gives us no new ideas; it merely retains the ideas given us by the originating faculties, and presents them to those other faculties whose office it is, by modifying, comparing, and combining, to enlarge our knowledge, and extend indefinitely the range of human intelligence. Thus, though memory originates nothing, yet, without it, the faculties which originate would be useless. Though it neither analyzes nor compares, yet, without it, the powers by which we analyze and compare might as well not exist. Were we possessed of this alone, our existence would be an absolute blank; yet, possessed of every other but this, our existence would be reduced to a single point. If this be the relation which memory sustains to our other faculties, it must evidently be one of the most invaluable of our intellectual endowments. The greater the perfection in which it exists, the broader foundation is laid for the exercise of our powers of analysis, combination,

and reasoning. The more accurately we retain and the more promptly we recall our knowledge of the past, the richer is our supply of material for every form of intellectual exercise.

II. The importance of a cultivated memory to professional success.

By a cultivated memory, I mean a memory so improved by education that it can treasure up with ease, retain with firmness, and recall with promptitude, the knowledge acquired by the other faculties.

1. Without such a memory it is evident that reading must be, to a great degree, useless. Without it, a man may be what Horace calls a "helluo librorum," a devourer of books; but he will rarely be anything more. We sometimes meet with men of this class, omnivorous readers, who seize upon books with avidity, with no other object than, either present enjoyment, or the reputation of vast general knowledge. They are pleased with the images spread before them. These pass away to be succeeded by others, until the labor is completed, and nothing remains but a confused recollection of pleasant or painful emotions, and the consciousness that another unit has been added to the number of books which they have read. It is evident that a man may read, in this manner, forever, without any increase of mental energy, or any real addition to the amount of his knowledge.

2. A cultivated memory is also indispensable to a vigorous imagination. Imagination is the power of forming complex conceptions out of materials already existing in the mind. But it is evidently impossible to combine into images elements which we have never collected, or which, if we have previously collected, we are unable to recall. Hence, we find that those authors who have been remarked for boundless fertility of imagination have always been endowed

with the highest gifts of memory. Scott, Goethe, Coleridge, Milton, and others, might be easily referred to as illustrations. A distinguished poet must be an intense and accurate observer of nature, and the conceptions formed from actual observation must be the materials from which he creates the images of beauty or sublimity which please or subdue us. The case is similar in philosophical imagination. Unless we are possessed of all the facts in a phenomenon or a series of phenomena, we can never form any adequate conception of the rationale which binds them together in one scientific idea. Without an accurate knowledge of the facts in astronomy, Copernicus could never have formed his idea of the solar system.

3. The importance of a cultivated memory to reasoning is equally obvious. Reasoning is a series of mental acts by which we pass from the known to the unknown. Whenever a proposition is capable of being proved, there exist certain other propositions, which connect it indissolubly with truths already known. These intermediate propositions are called the argument or proof. Suppose, now, that we desire to demonstrate a particular proposition; if we can summon at will all that we have ever known on the subject, we can easily determine whether we possess the required media of proof. If, on the other hand, our knowledge is vague and undetermined, and we are unable to recall it to our recollection, we weary ourselves and perplex others by multiplying irrelevant truths by which nothing is determined. The value of this power is specially illustrated in the case of forensic or legislative orators. They are frequently obliged to construct an argument, or reply to an opponent, when there is neither opportunity for consulting authorities nor examining digests. All that can possibly avail a man is the knowledge which he has previously acquired, and he must be able to bring it to bear at once on the point at issue, or the op

portunity is lost forever. On this power must, therefore, frequently depend the skill of a debater, or the success of an advocate.

4. A cultivated memory is necessary to the attainment of accuracy of practical judgment.

By practical judgment I mean an ability to predict the future from a knowledge of the past, and to form an opinion of the doubtful from a knowledge of the true. This talent, more than almost any other, gives us influence among men ; and sometimes seems, in the most favored individuals, to attain almost to the certainty of prescience. Burke, in his writings on the French Revolution, predicted the course of events almost precisely as they subsequently occurred. Other skilful statesmen have been able, from the present aspect of affairs, to anticipate the changes which were approaching in the distance. Several of Napoleon's predictions of the course of events in Europe, have been, in a remarkable manner, verified by the political revolutions that have occurred since his death.

The dependence of this talent upon memory is easily perceived. As our judgments respecting the future must proceed upon the supposition that the course of nature is uniform, how can we predict the future without a knowledge of the past? But mere general and indefinite knowledge will not here suffice. He who would attain to soundness of judgment must possess himself of facts in particular, with the circumstances by which they were surrounded, the limitations by which they were fixed, and the conditions under which they existed. This, of course, supposes an accurate and comprehensive memory. We shall find that the most eminently sagacious men have been favored with a memory of this character. Of this type of mind Dr. Franklin seems to present a remarkable instance.

But this, of itself, will not confer that eminence of prac