PATENT.-1. Extension not granted.-A patentee entered into an agreement with certain parties to work the patent, but owing to disputes between them, the invention was not prosecuted until a short time before the expiration of the term of letters-patent; in such circumstances an extension was refused. Patterson's Patent, In re, 6 Moore, 469.

2. Term, extension of, granted.-Where the executor of the surviving assignee of a patentee petitioned for an extension of the term of the letters-patent, and it was established that a valuable consideration had been given for the assignment, and that the assignee had sustained considerable loss, the Judicial Committee, in granting an extension of the term, refused to impose terms upon the petitioners in favour of the patentee. Bodwer's Patent, In re, 6 Moore, 468.

PRACTICE.-1. Bounties awarded under the statute 6 Geo. 4, c. 49, to the commander, officers and crew of her majesty's ship Samarang, upon the capture and destruction of piratical prahus in the Straits of Gilolo, in respect of the piratical crew on board the prahus. Leave to appeal against an interlocutory decree of the Admiralty Court awarding such bounties, granted to the admiralty proctor on behalf of the crown, notwithstanding an appeal had not been interposed within due time, the circumstances of the case entitling the appellants to such indulgence. Reg. v. Belcher, 6 Moore, 271.

2. After the institution of an appeal from the Arches Court, in a suit against a clergyman for adultery, fornication or incontinence, this court refused to receive additional articles charging acts of adultery alleged to have been committed subsequently to the close of the case in the Arches Court, or to examine vivâ voce the witnesses examined in the court below, upon the allegation that they had been tampered with previous to their examination. Craig v. Farnell, 6 Moore, 446.

3. Compensation.-Parties to an appeal agreed to compromise the same, and that the appellant should have paid over to him a certain sum of money, the amount of compensation, in respect of slaves attached to an estate, the subject of the appeal. Upon petition to dismiss the appeal, an order of dismissal made, containing also an order for the accountant-general of the Court of Chancery to pay to the appellant the compensation money in question. M'Turk v. Douglass, 6 Moore, 500.

SIGNED AT THE FOOT OR END.-Will invalid.-The words" signed at the foot or end thereof," in the 9th section of the Statute of Wills, 1 Vict. c. 26, are to be construed strictly. Therefore, where a holograph will, written on a sheet of foolscap paper, the dispositive part of which ended on the third side, leaving at the foot or end of the third side a space sufficient to have received the signature of the deceased and also that of the two attesting witnesses, if not accompanied by a formal attestation clause, was signed with an attestation clause in the middle of the fourth side, no part of the

will being immediately above it: Held not to have been signed" at the foot or end" according to the requisites of the statute, and the will declared invalid. Smee v. Bryer, 6 Moore, 404.

SLAVES.-3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73—Compensation for loss of service. -Testator, resident in Jamaica, and seised of plantations and slaves in the island, by his will, dated June, 1834, after giving certain bequests, proceeded as follows:-" Also I give, devise and bequeath, share and share alike, unto R. and her children, all my right, title and claim to compensation such as may be awarded to me as my portion of the compensation-fund for the emancipation of such slaves as may belong to me and be living on the 1st August, 1834." will was not attested so as to pass real estate, but was properly executed to pass personalty. By the law of Jamaica slaves could only be directly devised as real estate. The Act for the Abolition of Slavery (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73, passed on the 28th of August, 1833,) provided that on the 1st of August, 1834, slavery should cease in the British dominions, and gave to the owners of the slaves a right to their services as apprentices, and to compensation for the loss of their services as slaves. The testator died before this period of manumission arrived. The court in Jamaica decreed that the compensation money partook of the nature of real estate to the same extent as the slaves, and did not pass under the will. Upon appeal, Held, reversing such decree, that (treating the slaves as real estate) the legislature became purchasers under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73, from the date of the act, giving a limited interest in the slaves for a term of years to the vendor, and that the money to be received under the compulsory sale of the slaves was converted into personal estate and passed to H. and her children as specific legatees under the will. Although the testator's will was inoperative as to the real estate, the executors took possession of the real estate, and filed a bill of interpleader against R. and her children, and the heiress-at-law of the testator, for the administration of the compensation fund: Held, that the suit was improperly brought, as the question could have been determined by the commissioners of compensation, and the executors refused their costs out of the fund. Where costs had been improperly paid out of the compensation fund, the reversal of the decree was made without prejudice to the right of the legatees taking proceedings for the recovery of the fund. The rules made in pursuance of the act, and when allowed by her majesty in council declared to have the same force and effect as the act, must, when made, be construed with reference to the provisions of the act itself; the second and fifth rules of the commissioners of compensation to be construed and applied upon this principle. Richards v. Attorney-General of Jamaica, 6 Moore, 381.

TOWAGE.-Judicial Committee.-A steam-tug entered into a verbal agreement with the master of a vessel having a licensed pilot on board to tow her to London. In coming up the river they came across a brig near a tier of vessels. The pilot hailed the tug to go

to the westward of the brig; but the master of the tug disobeyed the order and went to the eastward, and thereby caused a collision between the vessels. The tug afterwards completed the towage and brought the vessel to her destination: Held, in such circumstances, that the disobedience of the orders of the pilot was not justifiable, and that the towage was forfeited. Quære, whether, notwithstanding such misconduct, the tug could recover towage from the owners of the vessel under the contract, and leave the vessel towed to a crossaction for the damage. This question not having been properly raised or discussed in the Admiralty Court, the Judicial Committee, sitting as a court of appeal, refused to entertain it. Petley v. Catto, 6 Moore, 371.

WILL.-Undue influence. The principles expounded in the cases of Paske v. Ollatt (2 Phill. 323), and Barry v. Butlin (2 Moore's P. C. Cases, 480), that the burden of proof lies upon the party propounding a will, and that the court is not bound to pronounce in favour of a will, unless it is judicially satisfied that it is the last will of a free and capable testator, considered and affirmed. The execution of a will by a competent testator being duly proved, the presumption is that the testator was cognizant of its contents, and that the instrument expresses his will, unless there be other circumstances to lead to a different conclusion, or to render it doubtful for the court to act upon that presumption. Exaggeration of the conduct of a party benefited by a will towards the testatrix, though it induce her to revoke the will and the bequest made in his favour, and to execute another will to his exclusion, is not such a fraud as to destroy free agency and render the will valid. Neither does such conduct amount to undue influence or importunity. Browning v. Budd, 6 Moore, 430.