South Coast Railway Bill, in 1848, determined that the general rule, that in the case of a joint-stock company the decision of the majority is binding on the minority, ought to be observed, and that the minority of the shareholders in this case had no locus standi before the committee.' In the Queensferry Passage Bill, in 1848, it was decided that individual trustees of the Queensferry Passage could not be heard against the bill promoted by the general body of the trustees. On the other hand, in the Manchester Cemetery Bill, in 1848, objection was taken to the locus standi of certain petitioners, being trustees and proprietors of shares in the cemetery, on the ground that they were a minority of a corporate body, in respect of interest in which body, they opposed the bill; but the committee determined that they were entitled to be heard. In 1850, the committees on the Shrewsbury and Hereford, the Shropshire Union, &c., and the Waterford and Kilkenny Railway Bills determined that dissentient shareholders could not be heard. With very few exceptions, indeed, it has been the rule, in the Commons, not to hear dissentient shareholders, unless they have any interest different from that of the general body of shareholders. In the Lords a different rule has prevailed; and shareholders who have dissented to the bill at the meeting called in pursuance of Lord Wharncliffe's order, are expressly permitted to be heard, and have even been heard without such dissent. In the case of preference shareholders, the Commons have been obliged to depart from their usual practice. The proprietor of preference shares has a special interest often opposed to that of the general body of shareholders, and justice requires that he should not be excluded from a hearing.

"Objection may also be taken that a petition is informal, according to the rules and orders of the house applicable to petitions generally, or as specially applicable to petitions against private bills."— pp. 543-546.

It will be seen that the anomalies existing in the courts of law or equity, as well as in the ecclesiastical courts, by which parties most interested in the decision of a particular question are frequently excluded from taking part in the argument, extend to the proceedings before the makers of the laws; and though the rules of the House of Lords afford somewhat greater latitude to prevent injury to individuals, than does the practice of the Lower House, yet both Houses are lamentably deficient in affording sufficient security. If nothing else would be a bar, the enormous expenses attending the parliamentary contests would work a virtual exclusion. We shall not, probably, hear again of any leading counsel making 50,000l. in one session of parliament; certainly we shall not have the bar again called together to consider the pitiable case of leaders who have given credit to parliamentary agents for fees amounting to thousands, and cannot procure payment; nor shall we see again the wonderful and

almost miraculous items for law charges, which have figured in the capital accounts of the leading railways; this has passed away, and some slight remedy at a late day has been afforded, by the appointment of officers to tax the costs of proceedings in either house; yet after all, the great fact remains-law, ever an expensive luxury (county court law not excepted)—is beyond comparison expensive when private legislation is needed; few individuals who have once indulged in it will again venture upon a parliamentary contest. Private bills still partake largely of the character of judicial proceedings: they are not distinguishable in principle from judicial decrees for the redress of private wrongs; and unless a reformation take place, and the costs be largely reduced, it cannot with truth be affirmed that the spirit of the Great Charter, "nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justitiam," is acted up to.

W. D. C.

ART. IV.-NEW LAW STATUTES OF THE SESSION.

course of legislation upon many of the promised questions of law reform has not been rapid during the last three months, and we have but a very small instalment of new statutes to which we can refer, as affecting legal proceedings, civil or criminal. Discussions of legal topics do not seem favourites in the House of Commons. As a general proposition, all are willing to join in one object of interest-the attainment of cheap and speedy determination of legal rights, or an attack upon that caput lupinum, the Court of Chancery, which ever since the days of Lord Eldon has been a favourite topic for reformers. The technicalities of the superior courts of common law-the delays and costliness of a chancery suit, are subjects which come home to the hearts, and—what is more to the purpose-to the pockets of the people at large. But if members are called upon to enact some remedy for the abuses of which they complain, they find the details so distasteful or so difficult to a nonprofessional mind, that they are apt to dispose of any proposed alteration hastily, or to postpone its consideration to a more convenient season. It is proverbial, that as a class lawyers are listened to with greater impatience than any other in the House of Commons. Their motives are frequently sus

pected, and their suggestions distrusted. We sincerely believe that in this respect they frequently do not receive justice at the hands of lay members. In the House of Lords a different course prevails. The consideration of these questions is confided almost entirely to the law lords, who are enabled to bring long experience and practical knowledge to bear on the framing of acts which are to affect the rights or liabilities of the members of the community, or to regulate the procedure of courts of justice. So far the bearings of the subject will generally be well considered. The consequence is, that it is in the Upper House that nearly all the useful law reforms of the day have originated. The consequence also is, that law reforms are delayed in their transit through the House of Commons. They are referred to a select committee, or some of their provisions materially changed, by the insertion or rejection of clauses which affect the whole scope of the bill, and return it shorn of its due proportions. Thus the session passes away; and the bill, which has been thus tossed from house to house, is hurried through its final stages at the very moment of prorogation. Some of the branches of the legal system are, to the misfortune of the suitor, and to the perplexity of the judge, in a perpetual state of transition. Scarcely has a new enactment come into operation, scarcely have the public and the courts become familiar with its details, when it is found insufficient to meet some proposed case, and new legislation immediately ensues. A strong illustration of this is afforded by the important subject of the Bankrupt Law. It is almost impossible for any person to carry in his mind the existing provisions, with a certainty of being accurate as to the course of proceeding. Even judges, it has been said by high authority, do not know the state of the law upon this subject. After all the experiments of recent years, after creating local and metropolitan courts of bankruptcy, which have certainly worked well, it has been now proposed to throw all this business, as well as many of the functions of a court of equity, upon the County Courtsthose tribunals, which are at this moment so popular, that they are treated with the additional burthens of every kind of question, legal or equitable, of bankruptcy or insolvency, of law or of fact, as to which there is any complaint. It is only while we are writing, that this idea has been abandoned by its originator, from whose fertile brain most of the legislation on this point has emanated. In another session we may expect to see it revived. The County Court Extension Act, however, which is now in its progress through the House of Commons, proposes to make use of these tribunals as adjuncts to the Court of Chancery in the investigation of matters which may be referred thence to them. We

think that the county court judges have reason for their complaint, that so much additional work should be cast upon them annually without a corresponding increase of salary. We suppose the public are satisfied that all this multifarious business can be done efficiently in the time allowed by the constitution of these courts, and are content to accept a speedy termination of their disputes at the expense of some few mistakes in point of law, or in point of fact. That they are willing to accept this alteration at the present moment appears clear; but we foresee, that if this heaping up of subject upon subject is to continue, one of two effects must result-either the business will be done in a hurried and perfunctory manner, or it will be postponed from month to month, until the suitor, wearied with delay, and sick at heart from the hope of the end being so long delayed, will at length discover that the constant small attrition has worn away as much of his substance as would have been carried off at once if he had been content to abide in Westminster Hall, and he will in disgust prefer to abandon the assertion of his right, and to bear the present loss, instead of incurring indefinite future expense; or, perchance, if he is fortunate enough in the end to get any decision, he may not after all be satisfied that his case has had justice done to it. If such be the alternative, it is difficult to see who is the gainer.

These observations apply to matters of civil procedure, as to which, it is idle to suppose, that in a large and old country like England, any complete amalgamation of the functions of a court of law and a court of equity can be effected. There has of late years sprung up among our lawyers a mania in favour of American jurisprudence. A scheme, just set on foot across the Atlantic, for the entire fusion of the legal and equitable systems-albeit, scarcely tested by experience-is extolled as the highest effort of human genius. Without refusing assent to the authority of many of the United States' decisions, founded as they are upon the common law of England-without denying that American writers of the greatest learning, and American judges of the highest ability, have illustrated or enunciated doctrines of law strictly applicable to questions arising in our own courts, it may be permitted to us to doubt whether we ought, by so indiscriminate an admiration of their system, to abrogate at once institutions which have stood the test of centuries, in favour of a plan, which, however specious and attractive, must savour somewhat of crudity and novelty. We are far from saying that, because a system is of long standing, all alteration should be repudiated. On the contrary, we believe, that by no means can ancient and valuable institutions be so effectually preserved, as by modifying

them from time according to the requirements of the day. But where a system has been long established, and where it has been in the main successfully administered, its age should at least give it a title to be duly considered before it is rudely swept away. Tacitus, in speaking of a totally different subject, says, "Hi ritus quoquo modo inducti antiquitate defenduntur." In like manner it may be reasonably asked, that a course of proceeding, originally applicable to a different state of society, should not be swept away, root and branch, until, at least, it has been endeavoured to render it applicable to our present wants. The presumption is, that the old system, properly adapted, will be more effectual than a new and untried scheme. On this principle, a judicious reconstruction of our own tribunals is surely a safer and wiser policy than the erection of these model judicatures. We cannot deal with judicial questions as we do with manufactures, -introduce a machine, which shall unite in one comprehensive action all the processes which were before performed singly. In legislation, especially on such subjects, there can be vestigia nulla retrorsum, at least, without vast inconvenience and uncertainty; therefore it behoves law reformers to introduce changes gradually, carefully to weigh their effects, and to wait to judge of their practical effect before proceeding to further and greater alteration. Such are the observations which, it appears to us, arise upon this part of the proposed legislation of the session which is now abandoned. It is to be hoped, that before these measures can be again introduced some effective plan may be promulgated for rendering more accessible and speedy the superior courts.

To the criminal law reforms, which have been of late years. enacted, many of these remarks are inapplicable. In these matters there is no tendency to alter the constitution of the existing tribunals, except in a few instances, where an increased power of dealing summarily with minor offences has been given to justices of the peace. For the general criminal business of the country, it seems to be assumed, that a trial by jury in the courts of assize or quarter sessions is satisfactory, and that justice is, in the main, effected according to the mode in which the law is in this respect ordinarily administered. Indeed, we believe that all who have had any experience in criminal courts will agree, that when juries err in their verdicts it is most commonly on the side of the party accused. It is rare, indeed, that a person is convicted against the evidence; but it is by no means unfrequent, that he who is-morally speaking-clearly the perpetrator of an offence, escapes either by some defect of strict proof, or by one of those loopholes which are afforded by