to be inferred from circumstances rendering it probable that a trust exists; for not only does such a mortgage indicate, almost to demonstration, that the money so lent is trust-money, since a joint tenancy between beneficial owners is of rare occurrence, but from a large proportion of loans upon mortgage being made by the Insurance Companies, the occurrence of certain names indicates unmistakeably to the conveyancer to whom the mortgage money in fact belongs. The well established conventional right to disregard these inferences should not, it is conceived, stop here; but transfers not actually disclosing a trust, though tending by their form to strengthen the inference that a trust exists, ought to have the benefit of a similar liberality of construction, enabling the conveyancer to shut his eyes to all but their literal import (e). (e) The principle on which it is conceived that these transactions should be protected has some analogy with that on which, in the well-known case of McQueen v. Farquhar, 11 Ves. 467, Lord Eldon refused to treat circumstances of mere suspicion, as affording a ground for inquiry into the details of a past transaction, which was correct on the face of the documents, and on which the title to an estate depended. Another mode noticed by Mr. Lewin (Trusts, 347), of dealing with the transfer of a mortgage of trust money not disclosing the trust, is to recite that the trustees (by name) are possessed of the mortgage monies and security in trust for the new trustees (by name), to whom the same belong on a joint account. This has the advantage of not pointing to a change in the title, but being consistent with the circumstance that the trust may have existed at the date of the original mortgage; but it is calculated to lead to an inquiry as to the origin of the trust, as embarrassing as that The above observations as to investing trust money upon mortgage securities, with the cases referred to, may serve to show the caution with which trustees must proceed in making investments of this description. ments in Bank and East India stock. Bank stock is of course not a Government As to investsecurity (f); it will not pass by the description of stock in the public funds (g), and under the law as it existed previously to the recent Acts, a trustee investing without authority in Bank stock was chargeable with loss occasioned thereby (h). Bank stock and South Sea stock (before its conversion), were not considered as good securities within a relating to the change of title. Even if the modes resorted to of avoiding the disclosure of the trust upon transfer could not be relied on, the practice of taking the mortgage in the names of the trustees without disclosure, would be advantageous; for a change of trustees is usually made at long intervals, and in the great majority of cases, probably, mortgages taken by trustees are paid off or transferred before any new appointment of trustees is made. The difficulty which may to some extent be admitted to exist as to the mode and effect of transferring the mortgage, with reference to the disclosure of the trust, may be considered a reason for filling up the trust, (f) See per Lord Eldon, C., (g) See per Shadwell, V. C., in Miles v. Miles, 7 Sim. 508. In Grainger v. Slingsby, 2 Jur. N. S. 276, on app., 8 De G. M. & G. 385, in Dom. Proc. nom. Slingsby v. Grainger, 7 H. L. Ca. 273, it was held that Bank stock did not pass under the description of "my fortune in the funds." (h) Hynes v. Redington, 1 Jo. & Lat. 589. Right of tenant for life of Bank stock to bonuses. Right of tenant for life to bonuses, &c. power to invest on Government or other good securities, because of their being dependent upon the management of the governors and directors, and subject to losses (i). So too East India stock or an East India Company's loan (k), or other loans secured on the revenues of India, were investments that could not be taken by trustees except under a power containing terms applicable to such investments. But since the recent Acts above referred to (1), it has been seen that investments may be made without special authority in stock of the Bank of England or of Ireland, and in the old and new East India stocks. The question whether and under what circumstances the tenant for life of Bank stock is entitled to extra dividends or bonuses, has not unfrequently arisen (m). It was formerly the practice of the Court (i) Per Lord Hardwicke, C., in Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 444. (k) Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195. (1) Supra pp. 19 et seq. 12 Jur. N. S. 638; Re Blackwood, Weekly N., 1867, 114; the like question arose in relation to the shares and stock of other companies. The inference from the authorities is that, when the investment is to be enjoyed in specie, an extra dividend, or bonus in the nature of an extra dividend, belongs to the tenant for life; but that a bonus properly so called, being in the nature of capital, is to be invested for the benefit of the remainderman. The question, however, whether a bonus of Chancery, whenever the half-yearly dividend on Bank stock exceeded the rate of 7 per cent. per annum, to issue a general order, directing the Accountant-General to draw only for £3 10s. per cent., except where the dividends were to be laid out, and except in cases specially excepted in a schedule to the order (n); but the practice of the Court in this respect has, in consequence of Lord St. Leonards' Act, and the General is to be treated as capital or income is frequently one of considerable difficulty. In Hollis v. Allan it was said by Kindersley, V. C., "the general law is, that what is properly called bonus is capital, as distinguished from dividends and income. It is hard to lay down any general rule as to what bonus is; but I think that whatever comes from an accumulated fund, which has either become too large or else unnecessary, is a bonus; but what is usually called so, being merely an extra dividend, is not so in reality;" but see Re Blackwood (ubi sup.), where a sum arising from the division of part of an accumulated fund was held to be income, on the ground apparently that the fund had arisen from the reserve of profits made during the tenancy for life; and see, of dividends. on the other hand, Re Barton, L. R. 5 Eq. 238; Baring v. Ashburton, Weekly N., 1868, 14; in which cases new shares allotted by way of bonus, although resulting from the profits of the preceding year, were considered to be capital. As to the apportionment Apportionment between tenant for life and remainderman of the dividends of companies, see Hartley v. Allen, 4 Jur. N. S. 500, 27 L. J. (Ch.) 621; Wright v. Tuckett, 1 J. & H. 266; Re Maxwell's Trusts, 1 H. & M. 610. That the Court will not in general apportion the proceeds of stocks and shares sold between dividend days, see Scholefield v. Redfern, 2 Dr. & Sm. 173. (n) See Seton on Decrees, 3rd ed. 220. The terms of an order for this purpose will be found in 15 Sim. 476. Order of the 1st of February, 1861, above mentioned, been remodelled by a General Order, dated the 16th of August, 1861, whereby the Accountant-General is required, in acting under future orders for the payment of dividends on Bank stock, to draw for the whole dividend, unless the particular order should otherwise provide. Under the old practice of the Court, cases in which there was a right of enjoyment of the Bank stock in specie, would, it is conceived, have been specially scheduled, so as to have the benefit of the exception to the General Order (o); and now, whether the power to invest in Bank stock arises from express declaration in the settlement, or under the recent enactments, the tenant for life will have a right to enjoy it in specie, and the trustees will not be justified in withholding from him any part of the dividend, or of a bonus in the nature of an extra dividend, although exceeding the rate of £7 per cent., as of late years has frequently been the case (p). (0) See Dale v. Hayes, 2 Sm. & G., App. vii. (p) In Hume v. Richardson, 4 De G. F. & J. 29, in which large sums of East India stock and stock of the Banks of England and Ireland had been retained by the trustees of a will which came into operation in 1858, and which contained a general direction for conversion, the tenant for life was held entitled to the whole income accruing after the passing of the Amendment Act of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, but only to so much of the prior income as would have been produced by the equivalent in Consols, of the investments retained (see supra, p. 29, note (u)), the 12th clause of the Amendment Act, rendering the 32nd clause |