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faith which is required to be believed by every one, viz. "That the dead should be raised with the very same bodies that they had before in this life;' which article proposed in these or the like plain and express words, could have left no room for doubt in the meanest capacities, nor for contest in the most perverse minds.

Your lordship adds in the next words, *. And so it hath been always understood by the christian church, viz. That the resurrection of the same body, in your lordship's sense of the same body, is an article of faith.' Answer, What the christian church has always understood, is beyond my knowledge. But for those who coming short of your lordship's great learning, cannot gather their articles of faith from the un. derstanding of all the whole christian church, ever since the preaching of the gospel, (who make the far greater part of the christians, I think I may say nine hundred ninety and nine of a thousand) but are forced to have recourse to the scripture to find them there, I do not see, that they will easily find there this proposed as an article of faith, that there shall be a resurrection of the same body; but that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, without explicitly determining, That they shall be raised with bodies made up wholly of the same particles which were once vitally united to their souls in their former life, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter; which is that which your lordship means by the same body.

But supposing your lordship to have demonstrated this to be an article of faith, though I crave leave to own, that I do not see, that all that your lordship has said here, makes it so much as probable; What is all this to me? Yes, says your lordship in the following words, + My idea of personal identity is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection. But any material substance united to the same prin. ciple of consciousness, makes the same body.' '

This is an argument of your lordship’s which I am obliged to answer: to. But is it not fit I should first understand it, before I answer it? Now here I do not well know, what it is 'to make a thing not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection. But to help myself out the best I can, with a guess, I will conjecture (which, in disputing with learned men, is not very safe) your lordship’s meaning is, that 'my idea of personal identity makes it not necessary,' that for the raising the same person, the body should be the same.

Your lordship’s next word is "but;' to which I am ready to reply, But what? What does my idea of personal identity do? For something of that kind the adyersative particle • but should, in the ordinary construction of our language, introduce, to make the proposition clear and intelligible : but here is no such thing. But,' is one of your lordship’s pri. vileged particles, which I must not meddle with, for fear your lordship complain of me again, 'as so severe a critic, that for the least ambiguity in any particle fill up pages in my answer, to make my book look considerable for the bulk of it.' But since this proposition here,' my idea of personal identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul, not necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection : But any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body,' is brought to prove my idea of personal identity inconsitent * 2d Answe + Ibid.

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with the article of the resurrection; I must make it out in some direct sense or other, that I may see whether it be both true and conclusive. I therefore venture to read it thus : My idea of personal identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary at the resurrection ; but allows, that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body. Ergo, my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the same body.'

If this be your lordship’s sense in this passage, as I here have guessed it to be, or else I know not what it is, I answer,

1. That my idea of personal identity does not allow, that any mate. rial substance, being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body. I say no such thing in my book, nor any thing from whence it may be inferred ; and your lordship would have done me a fa.. vour to have set down the words where I say so, or those from which you infer so, and showed how it follows from any thing I have said."

2. Granting, that it were a consequence from my idea of personal identity, that any material substance, being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body,' this would not prove that my idea of personal identity was inconsistent with this proposition, that the same body shall be raised ;' but, on the contrary, affirms it : since, if I affirm, as I do, that the same persons shall be raised, and it be a consequence of my idea of personal identity, that “any material substance, being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body ;' it follows, that if the same person be raised, the same body must be raised ; and so I have herein not only said nothing inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, but have said more for it than your lordship. For there can be nothing plainer, than that in the scripture it is revealed, that the same persons shall be raised, and appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to answer for what they have done in their bodies. If therefore whatever matter be joined to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, it is demonstration, that if the same persons are raised, they have the same bodies. ,

How then your lordship makes this an inconsistency with the resurrection, is beyond my conception. Yes,' says your lordship, *. it is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary.'

3. I answer. therefore, Thirdly, That this is the first time I ever learnt, that ‘not necessary' was the same with inconsistent. I say, that a body made up of the same numerical parts of matter, is not necessary to the making of the same person ; from whence it will indeed follow, that to the resurrection of the same person, the same numerical particles of matter are not required. What does your lordship infer from, hence ?

To wit, this : Therefore he who thinks, that the same particles of matter are not necessary to the making of the same person, cannot believe, that the same persons shall be raised with bodies made of the very same particles of matter, if God should reveal, that it shall be so, viz. That the same persons shall be raised with the same bodies they had be. fore. Which is all one as to say, that he who thought the blowing of sams horns was not necessary in itself to the falling down of the walls of

* 2d Ans.

Jericho,

Jericho, could not believe, that they should fall upon the blowing of rams horns, when God had declared it should be so.

Your lordship says, “my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection :' the reason you ground it on, is this, because it makes not the same body necessary to the making the same per. son. Let us grant your lordship’s consequence to be good, what will fol. low from it? No less than this, that your lordship’s notion (for I dare not say your lordship has any so dangerous things as ideas) of personal identity, is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection. The de. monstration of it is thus; your lordship says, * It is not necessary that the body, to be raised at the last day, should consist of the same particles of matter which were united at the point of leath; for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingering disease, as if a fat man falls into a consumption: you do not say the same particles which the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins ; for then a long sinner must have a vast body, considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration.' And again, here your lordship says, +"You allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter.' From which words it is evident, that your lordship supposes a per. son in this world may be continued and preserved the same in a body not consisting of the same individual particles of matter; and hence it de.. monstratively follows, That let your lordship’s notion of personal iden. tity be what it will, it makes the same body not to be necessary to the same person; and therefore it is by your lordship's rule inconsistent with the article of the resurrection. When your lordship shall think fit to clear your own notion of personal identity from this inconsistency with the article of the resurrection, I do not doubt but my idea of persoaal identity will be thereby cleared too. 'Till then, all inconsistency with that article, which your lordship has here charged on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your lordship's too.

But for the clearing of both, give me leave to say, my lord, that whatsoever is not necessary, does not thereby become inconsistent. It is not necessary to the same person, that his body should always consist of the same numerical particles; this is demonstration, because the particles of the bodies of the same persons in this life change every moment, and your lordship cannot deny it; and yet this makes it not inconsistent with God's preserving, if he thinks fit, to the same persons, bodies con: sisting of the same numerical particles always from the resurrection to eternity. And so likewise though I say any thing that supposes it not necessary, that the same numerical particles, which were vitally united to the soul in this life, should be reunited to it at the resurrection, and constitute the body it shall then have; yet it is not inconsistent with this, that God may, if he pleases, give to every one a body consisting only of such particles as were before vitally united to his soul. And thus, I think, I have cleared my book from all that inconsistency which your lordship chargés on it, and would persuade the world it has with the ar. ticle of the resurrection of the dead.

Only before I leave 'it, I will set down the remainder of what your lordship says upon this head, that though I see not the coherence nor tendency of it, nor the force of any argument in it against me; yet that nothing may be omitted that your lordship has thought fit to entertain * 2d Ans. + Ibid.

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your reader with on this new point, nor any one have reason to suspect, that I have passed by any word of your lordship’s, (on this now first introduced subject) wherein he might find your lordship had proved what yor had promised in your title-page. Your remaining words are these; * " The dispute is not how far personal identity in itself may consist in the very same material substance ; for we allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital union between the soul and body, and the life, which is consequent upon it ; and therefore in the resurrection, the same material substance must be re-united, or else it cannot be called a resurrection, but a renovation, i. e. it may be a new life, but not a raising the body from the dead.' I confess, I do not see how what is here ushered in by the words and therefore,' is a consequence from the preceding words ; but as to the propriety of the name, I think it will not be much questioned, that if the same man rise who was dead, it may very properly be called the resurrection of the dead; which is the language of the scripture.

1 must not part with this article of the resurrection, without returning my thanks to your lordship for making me + take notice.of a fault in my Essay. When I wrote that book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the scripture had mentioned, in express terms, the resurrection of the body.' But upon the occasion your lord. ship has given me in your last letter, to look a little more narrowly into what revelation has declared concerning the resurrection, and finding no such express words in the scripture, as that the body shall rise or be raised, or the resurrection of the body;' I shall in the next edition of it, change these words of my book, I• The dead bodies of men shall rise,' into these of the scripture, the dead shall rise.' Not that I question, that the dead shall be raised with bodies ; but in matters of revelation, I think it not only safest, but our duty, as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep close to the words of the scripture, unless he will assume to himself the authority of one inspired, or make himself wiser than the Holy Spirit himself. If I had spoke of the resurrection in precisely scripture terms, I had avoided giving your lordship the occasion of mak. ing || here such a verbal reflection on my words : What! not if there be an idea of identity as to the body?

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ESIDES the before-mentioned Proportional. S

occasions of time, place, and caufality, of comparing, or referring things one to ano

ther,

ther, there are as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

First, The first I shall name is some one simple idea; which being capable of parts or degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple idea, v. g. whiter, sweeter, equal, more, &c. These relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea, in several subjects, may be called, if one will, proportional; and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

§. 2. Secondly, Another occasion of com.. Natural. paring things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that consideration some other thing, is the circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong; v. g. father and son, brothers, cousin-germans, &c. which have their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in several degrees : countrymen, i. e. those who were born in the same country, or tract of ground; and these I call natural relations: wherein we may observe, that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that in reality the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the several races of other animals as well as men: but yet it is seldom said, this bull is the grandfather of such a calf; or that two pigeons are cousin-germans. It is very convenient, that by distinct names, these relations should be observed, and marked out in mankind; there being occasion, both in laws, and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under these relations: from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men. Whereas in brutes, men having very little or no cause" to mind these relations, they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us some light into the different state and growth ...

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