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BOOK IV.

OF KNOWLEDGE and OPINION,

СНАР. І.

Of knowledge in general.
SECT.

1. Our knowledge conver-
sant about our ideas.
2. Knowledge is the percep-
tion of the agreement,
or disagreement, of two
ideas.

3. This agreement fourfold.
4. First, of identity, or di-
versity.

5. Secondly, relation.

6. Thirdly, of co-existence.
7. Fourthly of real existence.
8. Knowledge actual or ha-
bitual.

9. Habitual knowledge, two-
fold.

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3. Thirdly, intuitive know.
ledge extends itself not to
all the relations of all our
ideas.

4. Fourthly, not demonstra-
tive knowledge.

5. Fifthly, sensitive know-
ledge, narrower than ei
ther.

6. Sixthly, our knowledge,
therefore, narrower than
our ideas.

7. How far our knowledge
reaches.

8. First, our knowledge of
identity and diversity, as
far as our ideas.

9. Secondly, of co-existence,
a very little

way.

10. Because the connexion be

tween most simple ideas

is unknown.

11. Especially of secondary
qualities.

12-14. And farther, because all
connexion between any se-
condary and primary qua-
lities is undiscoverable.

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OF

OF

Human Understanding.

BOOK II.. CHAP. XXIII.

Of our complex Ideas of Substances.

Ideas of sub

stances how

§. 1. THE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in made. by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result which therefore we call substance (1).

§. 2. So

(1) This section, which was intended only to show how the individuals of distinct species of substances came to be looked upon as simple ideas, and so to have simple names, viz. from the supposed substratum or substance, which was looked upon as the thing itself in which inhered, VOL. II.

B

and

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Our idea of substance in general

§. 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no

other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or

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and from which resulted that complication of ideas, by which it was represented to us, hath been mistaken for an account of the idea of substance in general; and as such, hath been represented in these words; But how comes the general idea of substance to be framed in our minds ? Is this by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas? No: But it is by a complication of many simple ideas together: because, not imagining ' how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from whence they do result; which therefore we call substance.' And is this all, indeed, that is to be said for the being of substance, That we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum? Is that custom grounded upon true reason, or not? If not, then accidents or modes must subsist of themselves; and these simple ideas need no tortoise to support them: for figures and colours, &c. would do well enough of themselves, but for some fancies men have accustomed themselves to.

To which objection of the bishop of Worcester, our author answers thus: Herein your lordship seems to charge me with two faults: one, That I make the general idea of substance to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas, but by a complication of many simple ideas together the other, as if I had said, the being of substance had no other foundation but the fancies of men.

:

As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your lordship, that I say in more places than one, and particularly Book 3. Chap. 3. §. 6. and Book 1. Chap. 11. §. 9. where, ex professo, I treat of abstraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abstracting, and therefore could not be understood to mean, that that of substance was made any other way; however my pen might have slipt, or the negligence of expression, where I might have something else than the general idea of substance in view, might make me seem to say so.

That I was not speaking of the general idea of substance in the passage your lordship quotes, is manifest from the title of that chapter, which is, Of the complex idea of substances: and the first section of it, which your lordship cites for those words you have set down.

In which words I do not observe any that deny the general idea of substance to be made by abstracting, nor any that say it is made by a

* In his first letter to the bishop of Worcester.

com.

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