remains to be noted-not a misconception peculiar to himself, but one which men at large entertain. Speaking of the groups of chemical elements, he says:-

"The discovery of these co-ordinate families dimly points to some identical origin, without suggesting the method of their genesis or the nature of their common parentage. If they were organic beings all our difficulties would be solved by muttering the comfortable word "evolution "-one of those indefinite words from time to time vouchsafed to humanity, which have the gift of alleviating so many perplexities and masking so many gaps in our knowledge. But the families of elementary atoms do not breed; and we cannot therefore ascribe their ordered difference to accidental variations perpetuated by heredity under the influence of natural selection.'

This passage obliges us to infer that Lord Salisbury supposes the theory of evolution to be concerned only with things that 'breed.' If the molecules of matter were 'organic beings,' he says, the comfortable word "evolution"' might be thought to suggest a solution; but since they are not organic beings, evolution has no place. Apparently, then, Lord Salisbury thinks evolution is concerned only with animals and plants. It is difficult to believe that, well acquainted as he is with the science of the day, he really means that which his words imply. We seem almost bound to assume inadvertence of expression or a lapse of thought. Still as his statement and his apparent belief have been put before a million or two of readers, it seems needful to do something towards dissipating the misapprehension caused, by briefly indicating what is meant by evolution as rightly understood.

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The Cosmos as a whole and in all its parts has reached its present state either supernaturally or naturally; and if naturally then not living things only but all other things have come naturally to be what they are. A doctrine which alleges evolution for the animate

world and assumes creation of the inanimate world is absurd. Evolution, if alleged at all, must be alleged as co-extensive with all existence-save that which is undergoing the reverse process of dissolution.

One who sees that our interpretations must leave us for ever ignorant concerning the data of the process-the space and the time, the matter and the motion, as well as the ultimate energy manifested through them-may yet rationally seek a proximate interpretation. If things of all kinds, inorganic, organic, and super-organic, have become what they are, not supernaturally but naturally, the implication is that their present state is the outcome of preceding states; and that the genesis of changes throughout the past has been of like nature with the genesis of changes at present. What, then, is the most dominant trait common to successions of changes?

A thing ever being modified and re-modified diverges more and more from its original condition: accumulated changes produce transformation. What is the general nature of that progressive

transformation which constitutes evolution? The first answer to this question was suggested on observing the changes passed through by every unfolding plant and animal. Immeasurably as do the multitudinous kinds of organisms differ from one another, yet the unfoldings of them proceed in similar ways. The detailed changes gone through are infinitely varied, but the general change is the same for all. It has since become apparent that the abstract formula expressing this transformation in all living things, also expresses the transformation which is, and has been, in progress everywhere. The Solar System, in passing from its primitive state to its present state, has exemplified it; and, if we accept Lord Kelvin's conclusion respecting the dissipation of its energy and consequent ultimate fate, it will continue to exemplify it. The transformation of the Earth from those early stages in which its surface began to solidify, down to its present stage, has likewise conformed to the general law. Among living things it is conformed to not only in the unfolding of every organism, but also, if we draw the conclusion pointed to above, by the organic world in general, considered as an aggregate of species. The phenomena of mind, in rising from its lowest forms in inferior creatures up to its form in Man, and again in rising from the lowest human form to the highest, illustrate it. It is again illustrated by the successive stages of social progress, beginning with groups of savages and ending with civilised nations. And we see it no less displayed in all the products of social life-in language, in the industrial arts, in the development of literature, in the genesis of science.

Is this inductive generalisation capable of deductive verification? Does this uniformity of process result from uniformity of cause? The answer is Yes. As the changes universally in progress now and through all past time have resulted in transformations having certain common traits, so also, in the actions everywhere producing them, there are certain common traits. However vast or however minute, every aggregate is like every other aggregate in being subject to the actions of outer things and in having parts that act on one another. Be it the Solar System, which by its motion through space shows that the Stellar Universe around influences it, and which shows that its component bodies influence one another, or be it an infusorium exposed to currents and to living things in the surrounding water, and made up of interdependent organs, we are equally shown that external incident forces affect everything, and that everything is affected by the mutual actions of its parts. But if there is a fundamental unity in the relations of aggregates to their environments and of their components to one another, there must also be a fundamental unity in the processes of change set up in all cases. Hence, then, a certain community of character in the transformations gradually produced. The empirical generalisation indicated above as reached by contemplation of phenomena of various orders, becomes a rational generalisa

tion on finding that throughout these various orders of phenomena a like co-operation of causes inevitably works out similar observed effects. It is not by accident but by necessity that these transformations of all kinds have common traits.

This is not the place in which to explain and illustrate this universal law of transformation and these universal causes of transformation. Here I am concerned merely to indicate their scope, and to say that the Doctrine of Evolution, rightly conceived, has for its subject-matter not the changes exhibited by the organic world only, but also the changes which went on during an enormous period before life began, and the changes which have gone on since life rose to its highest form, and Man, passing into the associated state, gave origin to the endlessly varied products of social life. It has for its subjectmatter the entire cosmic process, from nebular condensation down to the development of picture-records into written language, or the formation of local dialects; and its general result is to show that all the minor transformations in their infinite varieties are parts of the one vast transformation, and display throughout the same law and cause that the Infinite and Eternal Energy has manifested itself everywhere and always in modes ever unlike in results but ever like in principle.

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How utterly different the popular conception of evolution is from evolution as rightly conceived will now be manifest. The prevailing belief is doubly erroneous-contains an error within an error. theory of natural selection is wrongly supposed to be identical with the theory of organic evolution; and the theory of organic evolution is wrongly supposed to be identical with the theory of evolution at large. In current thought the entire transformation is included in one part of it, and that part of it is included in one of its factors. From his place of vantage Lord Salisbury might have done much to dissipate these delusions; but, unhappily, both his language and his arguments have tended to do the reverse.

HERBERT SPENCER.

GREAT BRITAIN,

VENEZUELA, AND THE UNITED STATES

THE future of the South American continent in general, and the final settlement of the Venezuelan boundary dispute in particular, are of themselves matters of small importance to Great Britain, except in so far as they might lead to complications with the United States.

Many persons have drawn pictures of the future in which the great English-speaking world of commerce turned to rend itself, and was finally consumed in the smoke of Anglo-Saxon battles. If this calamity should ever befall, it may be predicted with certainty that it will be brought about, not by the policy and intrigue of Governments, but by mutual popular misunderstanding of attitude and prejudice. Although the time for the discussion of a possible war is, happily, far distant, still, the differences of opinion of England and the States with regard to South America and our Venezuelan boundary have lately been so largely discussed that some final settlement of the controversy ought to be arrived at before national prejudices are strongly stirred up.

The question is an old one, and the history of our dispute with Venezuela, from the British point of view, has so many times appeared in the press that I feel that some apology is due for again unearthing the details. The boundary dispute, however, will serve the purpose of this article in bringing out for the inspection of the public the attitude of the United States and Great Britain with regard to South America generally.

In 1797 Great Britain took the territory of Guiana from the Dutch, and, finding that no very definite limits had been set between them and their Spanish neighbours, proceeded to demark a rough boundaryline following as closely as possible the extreme limit of the borders of their predecessors.

The frontier-lines of the eighteenth century had been necessarily of the vaguest character, for they ran through great wastes of untravelled forest land, and the Spaniards, at least, do not seem to have been anxious to guard against a certain amount of encroachment on the part of the Dutch.

The latter, however, had been more on the alert, and had not only spread into the Venezuelan colony, but had from time to time

obtained an unwilling concession to a part of the Cuyuni River, and a general extension of their influence to the north of the Essequibo.

The English on their arrival ran their boundary-lines inland from Point Barima, claiming that they only wished to rule over Dutch territory, and that they believed this to be the frontier of the country which they had taken by right of conquest.

For the next forty years Great Britain continued to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of their colony, and paid those subsidies promised to the Indians by their Dutch predecessors.

On the declaration of Venezuelan independence it was felt that some arrangement might be arrived at more satisfactory to both parties, and a discussion arose with a view to the settlement of a more definite and fully surveyed frontier.

This was natural. The Republic, flushed with success, and eager for liberty of action, felt that an absolute line must be drawn between its own citizenship and the colony of even the mildest of monarchies. An extreme boundary, that might have seemed of small importance to a colonial governor of Spain, was of far greater moment to the young country.

Great Britain opened the negotiations by laying down the claim which she had inherited from the Dutch in 1797, but declared that, in the interests of peace, she would be willing to withdraw her right to some miles of waste ground on certain conditions.

Evil days fell upon Venezuela: her attention was turned towards more pressing affairs at home, and the British and their worthless forests were forgotten, whilst England maintained her peace and held her rule in undisturbed tranquillity.

The northern half of the English colony of Honduras is marked as Mexican on the official maps of that country; the western part is claimed by Guatemala; but the country in dispute is worthless and almost uninhabited, and the difficulty of its capture would outweigh the pride of possession.

Thus it was with the Cuyuni until the discovery of gold in 1850. The Monroe doctrine had already been declared; but the fact that it distinctly recognised existing monarchical colonies did not deter the Venezuelans from attempting to do violence to British subjects in thinly populated districts, in the hope that they might ultimately drive them from their new-found wealth.

The English Government, in view of the increased value of their territory, ordered a small force to the gold-mining districts for the protection of British subjects, and demanded of Venezuela a recognition of their boundary rights as they stood until such time as a more full survey of the country should have been made by both Governments and a final and definite frontier decided upon. Venezuela answered by reciting the Papal Bull of the sixteenth century, which divided the New World amongst the Catholic countries of Spain and