Coalition Ministry mainly because of their hostility to Home Rule. Undoubtedly, the more Conservative section of these Liberal seceders have been drifting further and further away from their old creed and their old associates. The conflicts of the last ten years have generated new antipathies and new attachments. But in a large number of them there are still true Liberal proclivities which have not had their perfect work simply because of their fear of Home Rule. They have not only scored a victory on the present occasion, but they have gone very far to prove that until some cataclysmal change shall come over the constituencies, Home Rule will not be conceded by the predominant partner.

It would be extremely unwise, however, were the majority to conclude that they have settled this knotty problem once and for ever. It meets the new Government with its essential conditions unchanged, and one of the most urgent questions with which Lord Salisbury will have to deal is, how it is to be settled. The difficulty is increased by the fact that Ireland seems likely to press her demand with more unanimity than ever.

A grander opportunity has seldom fallen to the lot of any Administration. They are in a position to act independently, and even among their political opponents there are numbers who will rejoice to welcome a policy which promises to strengthen Imperial unity by bringing about contentment in Ireland. The action of the Irish party themselves has done very much to chill the enthusiasm for Home Rule which was largely created and fostered by the influence of Mr. Gladstone. The belief in the wisdom, and indeed the necessity, of a Statutory Parliament for Ireland has not passed away; but there is, to say the least, a much more sober state of feeling in regard to it, and certainly there is less disposition to pay unhesitating deference to the wishes of the Irish party upon the subject. It has even come to be a matter of doubt with some whether the members of that party themselves are as passionately in earnest as was once believed. There is so much to be said on the opposite side, that it is with extreme reluctance that I throw out even a hint that might seem disparaging to men who have been fighting a gallant and arduous fight. For nearly ten years that keen and trying struggle has been going on, and the pressure upon the Irish party has been marked by a severity which outsiders are hardly able to appreciate. Had their own internal life been smooth and easy, the difficulties of their position as a body of poor men contending against the mighty forces of the English aristocracy and plutocracy, guided by some of its keenest intellects and sustained by a strong national sentiment, were enormous. But these were multiplied indefinitely by the moral collapse of a leader who had been the very life and soul of the party and the fierce internal strife to which it led. If they have made many mistakes under these trying con

ditions, let that English party which has been completely free from blunders cast the first stone at them.

It is very hard for Englishmen and Irishmen to judge each other fairly. They are so opposed in temperament and habit that it is extremely difficult to escape mutual misunderstanding. Messrs. Healey and Dillon, for example, are simply puzzles to their English allies. Many who are disposed to judge most favourably of them find it hard to understand what they are quarrelling about, but much harder still to believe in the sincerity and ardour of a patriotism which does not teach them to repress personal jealousies and silence upbraidings which can bring nothing but peril and mischief to their common cause. Certain it is that these disputes have seriously damped the zeal of many among their English sympathisers. It is just the kind of incident which affects the English mind, and which, after all the explanations that can be given, leaves behind it a feeling that is not very reasonable, but which we cannot afford to despise and which is distinctly unfavourable to Home Rule. If the Government, recognising that this kind of sentiment, the result partly of weariness of the strife, makes the time favourable for a wise measure of compromise, it may render a service to the nation of the highest kind. If, on the contrary, it is encouraged to an uncompromising resistance, it will only perpetuate and embitter a strife which already has wrought incalculable evil to all parties concerned.

It is necessary, in the first place, to get rid of the idea which is embodied in the miserable nickname of Separatists, which is constantly employed to describe men who are as loyal to the empire as the most decided Unionist of them all and of the idea which underlies it. In his telegram of congratulation on the Glasgow victories, Mr. Chamberlain says: Rejoice that Glasgow is joining Birmingham in defence of the empire.' A good deal may be tolerated to men in the heat of a battle, but this kind of bunkum in the hour of success is a trifle below the dignity of a leader. Where can Mr. Chamberlain's sense of humour have fled when he suggests so comical an idea as that of Birmingham posing as the champion defender of the empire? When the circumstances of the Glasgow elections are considered, the suggestion is simply farcical. The truth is, this self-constituted championship of the empire has been a good deal overdone. It is to be hoped that men burdened with the responsibility of office will rise to the occasion, and, discarding the claptrap of vulgar partisans, will show the sagacity and insight of statesmen. It is not for me even to speculate as to how far such an expectation may be realised. The only certainty in the very doubtful outlook is that, should an opposite temper prevail, and the old mode of ruling Ireland be resumed, should the interests of the Irish landlords be regarded as the paramount consideration,

should the policy of Coercion be resumed, there can be nothing before us but the renewal of the dreary story of the past, only made more ghastly by the fresh element of despair which the bitter disappointment of the present has introduced.

The same kind of observation applies to the general policy of the Government. They may treat the election as a verdict in favour of Toryism pur et simple, or only as a distinct condemnation of the policy of the late Ministry or of some particular features in it. Those who take the first view are not without reasons to support their contention. Lord Salisbury is the Prime Minister, and he, at all events, has not left the country without the clearest indication of his position. About him there is nothing of the new-fangled Tory democrat. If he has won the suffrages of the people, it certainly has not been by any playing to the gallery. No one could ever charge him with stooping to conquer. He has set himself fearlessly in opposition to tendencies which are strong even in his own party, and, in truth, is a Tory of a far more decided type than any Prime Minister since the Reform Bill. His latest speech in the House of Lords was a monumental example of aristocratic arrogance. Instead of seeking to minimise the claims of the House of Lords, he boasted that it had forged manacles to restrain Radical madness, and then, with scoffing cynicism, told his opponents that when they were clothed and in their right mind the manacles would not be found embarrassing. This is the man whom the democracy of England has invested with power. The inference that the democracy is Tory at heart, and longs for resolute and even reactionary government, hardly seems unwarrantable or extreme. Nevertheless, I venture to think it fallacious.

In the midst of the election there appeared a very suggestive correspondence between a 'Liberal though a Unionist' and the Duke of Devonshire, in which the former, objecting to 'certain recent proceedings' as appearing 'to indicate a premature endeavour to convert an alliance into a fusion,' says: The fear of being labelled "Tories" with any semblance of justification is already leading many Liberal Unionists to abstain from active work in the constituencies, and even inducing some of them to assist Gladstonian candidates.' The writer unquestionably represents a powerful section, though stronger possibly in influence than in numbers. How far it has contributed to the success of the Ministry it is not possible to estimate. But it would certainly be a very serious mistake to imagine that it is fully indicated by the number of Liberal Unionist representatives. It has certainly been a potent factor in constituencies where Tories have been returned. The decisive character of the Unionist majority is likely to increase its numbers and to intensify the feeling. Whether or not the ghost of Home Rule is finally laid,' it has surely, for the present, ceased to be a disquieting element. When once the danger has been removed, then men who, even in their recent alliance, have clung so

fondly to their old associations that they have been unwilling to sacrifice even the name of Liberal will assert themselves. However far Mr. Chamberlain may have travelled in the direction of Toryism, the Ministry remains a coalition. Mr. Chamberlain's consciousness of this fact is shown by the vigour with which he maintains the 'compact' which, so far as it goes, assures him of a personal following in the party.

But this is not the only difficulty in the way of the suggestion that the nation has suddenly become Tory. A strong gust of feeling has swept across the country, driving the constituencies to an anti-Liberal vote. Whence it has come and whither it goes are questions which admit of very different answers. But certainly to treat it as a strong Tory sentiment would be to show indifference to the facts. Perhaps the most marked feature in the whole is the action of the Labour party. A friend was travelling in a railway carriage just prior to the elections, and happened to get into conversation with a fellow-traveller on the topic of the hour. The latter was a Trade Unionist of a robust type, and indulged pretty freely in impartial condemnation of Liberal and Tory. A plague on both the Houses!' he cried. Clearly he hated both. Home Rule, Disestablishment, the House of Lords, he cared for none of them. What could

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it matter to him or his pals how the questions which are supposed to be agitating the country were settled? The only matters that interested him and them were those which related to their own affairs. 'But,' said my friend, who was a decided Liberal, you have the Factory Act.' The mention of that only called forth a fresh series of criticisms. His friends cared nothing for it. They had seen Mr. Asquith and told him their views, but he would not carry them out. Evidently he did not attach the slightest value to anything that the Liberals had done for his class, and he certainly did not expect more from the Tories. The natural inference would be that he and those who thought with him (who are a very numerous section of the working people) would stand aloof, and so in all probability they did, except where they resolved to oppose those from whom they had received so little of what they had expected. Whether the neutrals or the active opponents of the Liberal party were the more numerous it would be hard to say. In either case that party was the sufferer.

The effects of this want of a cordial understanding between the Liberals and the Labour party had been foreseen, but they have proved to be more serious than was anticipated, and it is doubtful whether even now they have been estimated at their full value. Of course, they are not confined to the constituencies in which seats were given to the Conservatives by the intervention of Labour candidates. These form a tolerably considerable item, but they are far from being the most serious in the account. In the large towns the working-class element is very powerful, and the abstention of a considerable section

of its members who had previously voted Liberal was sufficient to turn the balance. On the other side, the very advantages secured for the workers by the very party they deserted in its hour of need had driven from its ranks some of its oldest and most effective supporters in another class. It has suffered severely on both sides from those who recoiled from what they regarded as masked Socialism on the one hand, and from those who wanted a more decided advance in the Socialist direction on the other.

The plain fact is that one consequence of the Unionist schism was to change the centre of gravity in the Liberal party. The withdrawal of men of influence and of statesmanlike qualities threw the balance on to the side of those of more extreme opinions. The old ship had to make a difficult and dangerous voyage without an adequate supply of ballast. Far be it from me to indulge in unjust or disparaging reflections upon men whose passionate zeal even on behalf of views which I regard as extreme and unwise is still an element of strength in the army of progress. There must be room in a truly Liberal party for great diversity of opinions. But it is one thing to exercise tolerance even in relation to extremists and faddists, and another and very different one to install them in the position of leaders, or allow them to dictate policy. But it is to this danger that Liberals have been exposed during the last two or three years, and, in my judgment, it has been the chief cause of the calamity by which they have now been overtaken. Resolutions have been eagerly adopted by gatherings of ardent enthusiasts, and, the more advanced they were, the stronger the excitement awakened on their behalf. Under the spell of oratory and the inspiration of generous sentiment, men were led to regard no counsel as too extravagant and no hope as too sanguine. All that was necessary to do was to lay out a scheme of Reform, and to shout in its favour, regardless as to any question of expediency, even as to the time for the introduction of its separate measures. The wise counsel of Mr. Bright not to try and run half a dozen omnibuses through Temple Bar at the same time was cast to the winds. It was assumed that the country was Radical to the core, and that the one thing necessary to success was to present to it a programme sufficiently Radical.

There are few things less admirable than the criticism of the superior person who is wise after the event. The policy of filling up the cup' has been a failure, and there are not a few who are ready now to blame the leaders who adopted it. They may be right, but their censures are as lacking in sound judgment as in true chivalry. It is probable that it was unwise to engage in 'ploughing the sands. of the sea shore,' but it remains to be shown that any other course was possible. Mr. Chauncey Depew, speaking with the experience of an American politician, says: A conglomerate party, with all its internal antagonism, all its opposing cliques and disunited forces,