senses of touch and of muscular exertion fully awake and active, seems to be a proof of this. But against this must be set the fact, if indeed it be really well authenticated, that somnambulists walk with fixed, though open, eyes; and sometimes, though not so frequently with the eyes closed. But whether the material process be simple, or as complicated as these facts would seem to show, it is evident that there is some material process necessary to sensation, and regulated by laws with which mere mind has nothing to do; and we are not justified in concluding, from any observed phenomena, that the mind, as at present constituted, can under any circumstances dispense, as far as sensation is concerned, with material aid.

It may also be fairly urged, that the sensations of the brutes are similar to our own; that they have the same sort of corporeal apparatus for feeling, and a mental consciousness as perfect as ours. Yet no one ever supposed that the brutes must be immortal, because they can feel. Dr. Butler has stigmatised this mode of argument, which has been frequently used in these pages and in recent works, as invidious and weak: but it is an appeal to the common sense of mankind; and affords a presumption, that all solid proof of man's immortality rests not on physical phenomena;-but is derived either from divine authority, or from moral considerations.

72

CHAPTER V.

ROCES

UTILITY OF THE BODY IN MENTAL PROCESSES.

THIS line of argument might if it were neces

sary be carried much further. It might be shown that every operation of the memory, and every other mental process, and they are exceedingly numerous, which depends upon "the association of ideas”—which is in fact only a peculiar form or forms of the faculty of memory-requires the aid of the very same material organs of sensation and volition as enable a man, nay even an insect, to perceive and avoid a blow.

In performing a process of moral judgment, we do indeed exert, with the aid of certain organs situated in the brain, a faculty immeasurably transcending, in the dignity of its functions, any possessed by the inferior creatures; but the actions or emotions or motives which we contemplate, and which are the subjects upon which that moral judgment is exercised are more or less abstract ideas or notions, ultimately derived, by changes and processes which it would require volumes even imperfectly to explain, from objects of sense. Now there are many physical facts which appear to render it certain, that the same material aids are requisite for the recollection, as for the first perception, of objects of sense.

For if the impressions produced on the mind by those objects of sense which are present be extremely feeble in comparison with the vivid recollections of the past, the latter will sometimes become visible not only to the "mind's eye," but to the eye of the body. If the mind be altogether withdrawn, by sleep, from the immediate influence of sensible things, past recollections, confusedly mingled together, often impress the mind with the force of realities. Now it is most worthy of remark, that they thus impress the mind, rather by their close resemblance to the images which have been the subjects of consciousness when we are awake, than by their equalling these latter images in intensity. For in fact the images that are seen by the sleeping eye are extremely faint and feeble. No sooner do we wake, than the visions are effaced; unless they have produced some strong bodily emotions, which like the waves of the ocean, cannot at once subside into a calm, after they have been strongly excited. Since, then, things recollected, and things perceived, differ rather in degree than in kind; it would be manifestly inconsistent with the general economy of nature, that two distinct sets of corporeal apparatus should be provided, as means of rendering them subjects of mental conscious

ness.

That some corporeal apparatus is in every case necessary, has already been sufficiently proved. It is highly probable, also, from analogy, that the organs of volition perform a similar part in

aiding the formation of abstract ideas, to that which is subserved by the organs of sensation: that in forming even the general conception of any action as of a thing which we might ourselves perform, if we would, the mind is aided by a material mechanism, and especially by the nerves of volition.

That these are in some instances very strongly excited, by the mere thought of performing an action, is shown, in a general and striking manner, by the common habit of gesticulation while speaking, and by the strong propensity of the speaker to enact himself the parts of the actors he describes; and this not merely for the sake of conveying clearer ideas to his auditors, but to gratify a natural impulse. An extremely curious fact is recorded, by a popular and most philosophical writer, which seems to confirm this view and which does not stand quite alone. A somnambulist, who possessed the extraordinary habit of repeating, during sleep, every conversation, and even every word which she had spoken during the course of the previous day, would often rise from her bed at night, and employ herself in her ordinary occupations. "Her occupations," it is stated, "were observed to have a relation to her engagements during the day, being either a repetition of some

* By Dr. John Abercrombie, on the Intellectual Powers. Page 302. 4th edit.

thing she had done, or the accomplishment of what she had INTENDED to do, but had been prevented from performing." In this remarkable instance it appears that an impression made on the nerves of volition by the mere intention to act, occasioned the accomplishment of the action intended, many hours after the impression was made, and without any attendant consciousness. There appears to be some analogy between this remarkable case, and others of a more evidently material, or rather animal, nature. It is well known that fever, sometimes of a very malignant character, will attack persons who have recently removed from an unhealthy to a salubrious climate a pernicious impression having been made upon the constitution, which was in some way incapable of producing its full effect until the bodily vigour was increased.

CHAPTER VI

ON THE ARGUMENT FROM THE INDIVISIBILITY

A

OF MIND.

N endeavour has frequently been made, to vindicate the natural immortality of man, on the ground of the simplicity, and indivisibility, of the thinking principle. "All presumption of death's being the destruction of living beings,"