the fish an animal not only capable of reasoning upon the form of that part of the moving surface with which it was acquainted, but also suffering some inconvenience from the forcible resistance and the rapid motion of the fluid at that part. Such an animal would be just in the same predicament, it is conceived, as the human race; it would be suffering a certain evil, under conditions apparently similar to those from which moral evils arise in the world of humanity. And a more enlarged knowledge could only enable the animal to come to the conclusion,-that the evil it suffered was unavoidable-was reconcilable with perfect wisdom,-AND WOULD NEVER BE RE

MOVED.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE ARGUMENT FROM MORAL DERANGEMENT.

"BY

Y inspecting a mechanism," observes Dr. Chalmers,* "we can infer both the original design of Him who framed it, and the derangement it has subsequently undergone; even as by the inspection of a watch we can infer, from the place of command which its regulator occupies, that it was made for the purpose of moving regu

Bridgewater Treatise. Vol. II. chap. 10.

larly; and that, notwithstanding the state of disrepair and aberration into which it may have fallen. And so, by the obvious place of moral supremacy which is occupied by the Conscience of man in his moral system, we can infer that virtue was the proper and primary design of his creation; and that, notwithstanding the actual prevalence of obviously different principles over the habits and history of his life. *** It is from the native and proper tendency of aught which is made, that we conclude as to the mind and disposition of the Maker; and not from the actual effect, when that tendency has been rendered abortive by the extrinsic operation of some disturbing force on an else goodly and well going mechanism. The original design of the Creator may be read in the natural, the universal tendency of things; and surely it speaks strongly both for His benevolence and His righteousness, that nothing is so fitted to ensure the general happiness of society as the general virtue of them who compose it. And if, instead of this, we behold a world ill at ease with its many heart burnings and many disquietudes, the fair conclusion is that the beneficial tendencies which have been established therein, and which are therefore due to the benevolence of God, have been all thwarted by the moral perversity of man. The compound lesson to be gathered from such a contemplation is, that God is the friend of human happiness, but the enemy of human vice,-seeing He hath set

up an economy in which the former would have grown up and prospered universally, had not the latter stepped in and overborne it."

It is impossible not to suspect that these observations, true and just as they are in a great degree, rest upon a foundation laid not by mere reason, but by the Scriptures; and form no part of the system of natural theology which could recommend itself to a mind unaided by Revelation. For they assume, as an undoubted truth, that moral good and evil proceed from entirely distinct sources; that man is not as his Creator made him, but is a creature cast down from a higher estate. The mechanism is represented as deranged, not through any original defect in its construction, but through an external violence. Such is the doctrine of Scripture: but mere reason cannot establish it, though there may be some good ground for a conjecture that some such disaster has occurred. It is only while the rest of the mechanism continues in correct order that the moral or the material regulator can duly perform its functions. It cannot maintain the action of the machine, nor prevent derangement of its parts. And if we should be wrong in inferring from the presence in a watch of a regulator, calculated to control the movement for an indefinite time, that the watch would continue to move, and would remain in order for an indefinite time, unless interfered with from without, should we not also be wrong in inferring from the presence of Conscience in the moral system, that derange

ment would never occur therein, except from some extrinsic cause?

"It were surely far juster," says Dr. Chalmers, "in arguing for the Divine character, that we founded our interpretation on the happiness which man's original constitution is fitted to secure for him, than on the misery which he suffers from that constitution having been in some way perverted."

But unless reason can show that the perversion has an extrinsic origin, we must take man simply as we now find him; and in arguing for the Divine character found our interpretation alike upon the happiness and upon the misery which spring from the man's present constitution.

Yet, as was observed in a preceding chapter,* if the moral mechanism be still in the hands, and liable to the interference of the Maker, we may entertain a HOPE of the future remedy of defects, unavoidably resulting from the principles on which it was originally framed.

Assuming then that without a Revelation we cannot know whether the moral disorder now prevailing existed from the first, or not; nor whether its introduction should be ascribed to an extrinsic cause, or to some original imperfection, -we have yet some room for an expectation that an interference of the Creator may remove it. And indeed, if the moral evil exist under the

* Book II. Chap. I. page 121.

condition last mentioned, and be the result of an original liability to derangement from internal causes, it does not appear that there is less room for hope than upon the contrary supposition. It does not seem less likely that the Maker should restore action to a watch, after its movements have been stopped by the rusting of some of the wheels, or by the unwinding of the main-spring, than after it has been injured by some force from without. Nor is this rendered more improbable, if we were to know that the Maker could, had he chosen, have constructed the machine so as to be capable of perpetual motion, without suffering at all from the imperfection of materials; and could have prevented, had he seen fit, any external injury.

To whatever cause we ascribe the moral derangement, we are compelled to draw from it a melancholy conclusion. "There is a state which the mind of man may attain, in which there is such a disruption of its moral harmony, that no power appears in the mind itself capable of restoring it to a healthy condition. This important fact in the philosophy of human nature has been already recognised, from the earliest ages, on the mere principles of human science. It is distinctly stated by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, where he draws a striking comparison between a man who being first misled by sophistical reasonings has gone into a life of voluptuousness under an impression that he was doing no wrong,-and