I worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. If nothing else could be done, I would load a cord of wood on a wagon, and take it to the city for sale. I managed to keep along very well until 1858, when I was attacked by fever and ague. I had suffered very severely, and for a long time, from this disease, while a boy in Ohio. It lasted now over a year, and while it did not keep me in the house, it did greatly interfere with the amount of work I was able to perform. In the fall of 1858 I sold out my stock, crops, and farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming.

In the winter I established a partnership with a cousin of Mrs. Grant, in the real estate agency business. I spent that winter at St. Louis myself, but did not take my family into town until spring. Our business might have become prosperous if I had been able to wait for it to grow. As it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two families. While a citizen of St. Louis, and engaged in the real estate agency business, I was a candidate for the office of county engineer - an office of respectability and emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at the time. The incumbent was appointed by the County Court, which consisted of five members. My opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. I now withdrew from the copartnership, and in May, 1860, removed to Galena, Illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. - Personal Memoirs, Chap. XVI.

THE CRISIS AT FORT DONELSON.

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. McClernand's division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. His men had stood gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. When they found themselves without ammunition they

could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. The division broke, and a portion of it fled; but most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. At all events, the enemy fell back within his intrenchments, and was there when I got on the field.

I saw the men standing in knots, talking in the most excited manner. No officer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "Some of our men are pretty badly demoralized; but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be victorious, and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." I determined to make the assault at once on our left. It was clear to my mind that the enemy had started out with his entire force except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could re-distribute his force along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis.

I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: "Fill your cartridge-boxes quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape, and he must not be permitted to do so." This acted like a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. We rode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to him, and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly short time, going in ad

vance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and the enemy. The outer line of riflepits was passed, and the night of the 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederates must surrender or be captured the next day.- Personal Memoirs, Chap. XXII.

CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

During the night of the 6th rain fell in torrents, and our troops were exposed to the storm without shelter. I made my head-quarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river bank. My ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that I could get no rest. The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without this additional cause. Some time after midnight, growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house under the bank. This had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or arm amputated, as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.

The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced portion of the Confederates on the day before. It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell's command. Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gun-boats every fifteen minutes during the night.

In a very short time the battle became general all along the line. This day everything was favorable to the Union side. We had now become the attacking party. The enemy was driven back all day, as we had

been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. The last point held by him was near the road leading from the Landing to Corinth, on the left of Sherman and right of McClernand. About three o'clock, being near that point, and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle, and marched them forward going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. At this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. I knew the enemy were ready to break, and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly, and join their friends who had started earlier. After marching to within musket-range I stopped and let the troops pass. The command Charge! was given, and was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy broke.- Personal Memoirs, Chap. XXIV.

THE INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG.

I now determined upon a regular siege to "outcamp' the enemy, as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of April 22 convinced officers and men that this was the best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men, and munitions of war, to what they had on hand. These could not last always.

The enemy's line of defence followed the crest of the ridge from the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the Jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a southwesterly direction to the river. Deep ravines lay in front of these defences. As there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. Generally, there

fore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work, triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. The work to be done to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had but four engineer officers with us. To provide assistant's on such a long line, I directed that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to their other duties assist in the work.

We had no siege-guns except six 32-pounders, and there were none at the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field-artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they could occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy, but as near as possible, and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways to connect the entire command by the shortest route. The enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery-ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head wherever it showed itself above the rebel works. In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. To give additional protection, sand-bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry; on top of these logs were put. By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. The enemy used in their defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not remember a single case where a man was injured