MILITIA FORCED UPON THE GOVERNMENT. The weakness of our military system was proven at various times during the War of 1812, by the refusal of governors to call out the militia. The Florida War, by way of contrast, afforded instances where militia were persistently forced upon the Government, in spite of its efforts to economize. Such was notably the case in 1841, when, on account of a few murders and some alleged signs of Indians, the Secretary of War was induced to authorize Colonel Worth, to muster in two companies of militia for three months. On the 17th of August, in a reply to the Secretary, after stating that it was not in human foresight to prevent even isolated cases of violence, Colonel Worth added that it will be with extreme reluctance, and only in the last resort, that I shall muster in militia, and I must be permitted to add that a desire for the service enters largely into every panic. One feature of this proposed employment of the militia was that they should be independent of the army commander, a proposition which was promptly rejected by the Secretary. He wrote to the governor as follows: It is not perceived that any advantage can be reasonably expected from a division of the command in Florida, but rather, it is apprehended that great inconvenience might result, from want of concert, of action between two commanders. The Government has entire confidence in the disposition and ability of Colonel Worth, not only to conduct offensive operations against Indians, but also through his subordinate officers, to afford all requisite and proper protection to the frontier and inhabitants, and for this purpose he has been authorized, whenever he might deem it expedient, to call into service any portion of the militia, not exceeding one regiment. Efforts to have the militia called out were not confined to Florida. Governor McDonald, of Georgia, being unable to convince either the military commander, or the authorities at Washington of actual danger, as evinced by signs and tracks, finally, on his own authority, ordered two companies into the field, and in explanation of his action wrote to Colonel Worth, September 15, 1841, as follows: But, be the cause what it may, I can not consent to permit the people of this State to be exposed to the depredations of the Indians, and have ordered out 2 companies of mounted men for their protection. I must ask you to supply them with the necessary forage and subsistence, as long as it is necessary to retain them in service. To this Colonel Worth replied: I do not consider myself authorized to comply with your Excellency's requisition to supply these troops with forage and subsistence. The subject will be referred to the proper department at Washington, whence I may expect to receive instructions. This reply was accompanied by a report as to the disposition of 10 companies, occupying nine different posts, for the protection of Georgia, and stated that active scouting parties had been kept up during the summer, from Traders Hill and Fort Moniac, without discovering any Indian signs. On the same date, October 17, 1841, Colonel Worth, in reporting the disposition of the troops, wrote to the Commander in Chief: In reply to his Excellency I have considered it out of place to make any remark touching the expediency of the measure, but have deemed it my duty to admonish the staff departments to do no act, that would in any sense commit the Department of War, in respect of troops thus in the field. Under instructions from the General in Chief, General Scott, Cap mustering in or mustering out the companies called out by the governor. After investigation, one company was mustered in November 18 and discharged December 30; the other was mustered in a few days later and discharged November 30. Reporting to the Adjutant-General of the Army, Captain Bliss stated: From the best information I can obtain, there has not existed the slightest necessity for calling these militia companies into the service. Intelligent officers assure me that there has not been an Indian in the swamps this summer. Persons are not wanting to report signs from time to time, and parties of regular troops have repeatedly been called out on the most frivolous alarms. On his return to Washington, Captain Bliss made a full report as to affairs in Georgia, showing that adequate measures had been taken for the protection of the frontier. In transmitting this report to Governor McDonald, December 27, 1841, the Secretary of War, J. C. Spencer, stated: An Indian frontier, in time of war, can not expect absolute immunity from the depredations of small parties. No amount of force, regular or militia, can prevent the occasional inroads of a daring enemy. * * It is believed that even were * a mounted militia force kept continuously in service, it would contribute but little additional protection to the frontier, beyond that which the inhabitants can afford themselves. Accustomed to the use of arms, and provided as they are with them, the border settlers must necessarily rely upon their material aid for the surest and best protection. This remark is corroborated by the tendency which is known to exist among embodied militia, to disperse to their homes when serving near them. They are aware that when a large portion of a sparse population is collected at a few points, all others are left exposed, and they feel that their families and firesides can not be free from alarm or danger in their absence. In reference to your remarks respecting the hazard of relying upon the opinions of the officers of the Regular Army, as to the nature and extent of the danger, and the means of guarding against it, it is proper to remark, that those who have served on the frontier have, at least, as good means of information as the militia officers or inhabitants, and are at least disinterested in the recommendations they make. The officer commanding the army in Florida, is responsible for the suitable application of the force under his orders, not only for the purpose of offensive operations, but also the defense of the settlements of Georgia and Florida. Acting under the high responsibility and with much better means of information than any possessed by this department, he has deemed the existing dispositions for the protection of the Okefenokee Frontier adequate for that purpose, and has therefore declined the services of a militia force. Confirmed as the correctness of his decision has been, by the most recent intelligence received here, I can not undertake to countermand his order for the discharge of the militia force. * * * I trust there will be no more occasion for calling the militia into service, as all accounts from Florida concur in representing the great probability of a speedy termination to the conflict. Copies of your communication will, however, be sent to Colonel Worth; but I am bound to advise you that the service of the troops discharged, subsequent to that event and prior to any order from Colonel Worth to retain them, can not be recognized. I have the honor to forward to you a communication from General Knight, which furnishes evidence of Indian signs that can not be contradicted, and proof of the indisposition of the regular forces to pursue the Indians into their hiding places. It is useless for me to apply to the Government for an efficient force. Those stationed for the protection of the country, instead of discharging their duty, are almost as troublesome as the savages in the work of murder and destruction of property. Of this I have sent you the testimony. I have taken the defense of the State into my own hands, and only write to ask you to remove the regular troops from the territory of Georgia, that I may have the posts occupied by a military force that may be relied on for the protection of the people. I shall ask the delegation of Georgia in Congress to have appropriations made for the militia. The issue sought in this letter was avoided by the action of Colonel Worth; unaware, he had already withdrawn the troops to strengthen NUMBER OF TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE FLORIDA WAR. The number of troops at the commencement of active operations each year, from 1836 to 1841, was as follows: The number of volunteers and militia called into the service from 1835 to 1842 was as follows: More than 24,500 officers and men were called out during the year 1836. If to 48,152 be added 12,539, the largest figures for the Regular Army at any time during the war, the total number of troops in the service at different times from 1835 tc 1842 amounts to 60,691. c LOSSES OF THE WAR. с The bad policy of depending upon war levies engaged for brief terms of service, greatly protracted the long struggle with the Seminoles. The prolongation of war, inhuman at best, became, in the deadly climate of Florida, an act of absolute cruelty. In the Regular Army alone, there being no statistics available for the volunteers and militia, the number of men killed or died of wounds was: Officers. Total.. 74 1,392 d. 1, 466 The loss by death alone, in a portion of our Army, whose maximum strength during this seven years' contest was 4,191, fell but 411 short a Figures furnished by Adjutant-General's Office. The troops for the Cherokee War did not engage in active hostilities. They were called out to enforce the emigration of the Cherokees west of the Mississippi. This was peacefully accomplished by General Scott, during the interval between the affair of the Caroline and the dispute as to the Maine boundary. The Commissioner of Pensions gives the number of soldiers in the service from 1836 to 1843 as follows: of the total number of killed in the War of 1812, in which we had more than half a million of men. The following figures show the casualties by death in several of the regular regiments: a These figures, without parallel in our history, may be accepted as a test of the sacrifices which an American army will cheerfully undergo, when disciplined and commanded by officers of military experience and training. COST OF THE WAR. Leaving out of consideration the loss of life along the frontiers, as well as to the pecuniary damage incident to the destruction or forced abandonment of property, and without computing the losses due to the calling away from their active industries, the thousands of citizens who were summoned to the field, at the beginning of the Indian hostilities in 1835 and 1836, the subjoined tables demonstrate with how little success the Government economized, from the close of the War of 1812 to the end of the Florida campaign. The first table gives the expenditures of the United States for the War and Navy Departments from 1817, when the Army reduction of 1815 took effect, to the reduction of the Army in 1821; the second gives the same expenditures from the reduction of the Army in 1821, to the year 1835; the third, the expenditures for all Indian disturbances in Florida and elsewhere, during the seven years' war with the Seminoles." 6 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1877, p. 14. We see from the second table that by maintaining a nonexpansive Army of less than 4,000 combatants, for fourteen years the expenditures from 1821 to 1836 were $63,000,000. The third table shows that as a consequence of this economy, expenditures for the next seven years were $69,000,000. the To fully appreciate the cost of unwise legislation it must be remembered-- First. That as the President could not add an enlisted man to the Army, he was forced to call upon the governors for militia, and that the number who rushed to arms in 1835 approached 25,000. Second. That Congress in 1836, contrary to the reiterated recommendations of the Secretary of War and the military commanders, expressed its preference for raw levies, not only by refusing to increase the enlisted men in the skeleton companies of the Regular Army, but more markedly still, by authorizing the President to accept the services of 10,000 volunteers, enlisted not for the war but for the period of six or twelve months. Third. That it was not till 1838, or until after the militia enthusiasm had subsided and the law authorizing the employment of volunteers had expired, that Congress could be induced to increase the Army to 12,539 men. With these peculiarities of legislation before us, if we recur to the table, it will appear that the expenditures for the first three years of the war were $38,327,300.21, while for the last four years they were $31,424,311.29, which was equivalent to a saving of nearly $5,000,000 a year. The following statement called for by Congress, March 22, 1838, and submitted to it May 8, nearly two months before the increase of the Army, exhibits the comparative cost of a company of regulars, of volunteers, and of militia: In this table are included expenses for traveling to and from rendezvous, hire of horses, indemnity for same, as also clothing, etc. |