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its resources in men and money increase, let us briefly compare statistics of the war of 1812 with those of the Revolution:

Population of the United States in 1775.

Same in 1812....

the

Total number of Regulars employed during the Revolution

Same during the war of 1812 (approximately).

Total number of militia employed during the Revolution
Same, including volunteers and rangers, 1812..

a 3, 000, 000 7,500,000 231, 771 50,000 164, 087

471, 622

Largest force of regulars and militia employed in any one year of the

Revolution (1776) was..

89, 651

The same in the war of 1812 (1814).

235, 839

The number of British Regulars opposed to the Continentals and militia in 1776 exceeded....

20,000

The same in 1812 did not exceed

b 5,000

The largest force of British Regulars in the United States and Canada any one year of the Revolution (1781) was..

The same during during war of 1812 (year 1814) was

The total number of United States troops employed during the Revolution

was

Same in war of 1812 was

€ 41, 586 d 16,500

395, 858 527,654

The length of the Revolutionary war, from the battle of Lexington till the cessation of hostilities pending negotiation for peace, was seven years; the same in 1812, from the declaration of war till the treaty of peace, two and one-half years. To complete the comparison the reader will recollect that the Continentals and militia in 1777 captured at Saratoga all that remained of the British army which began the invasion with 10,000 men; and that four years later the Continentals, in cooperation with the French, captured a second British army exceeding 8,000 men.

In contrast with these achievements, not to dwell on battles like Trenton, Princeton, Monmouth, Guilford Court-House, and Eutaw Springs, the only decisive victory of the war of 1812 before the conclusion of the treaty of peace was at the battle of the Thames, where the force of British regulars dispersed and captured numbered but little more than 800.

PENSIONS.

Up to the year 1871 no pensions were granted for the war of 1812 except to disabled soldiers, and to widows whose husbands had been killed in battle or died of their wounds.

The number of widows pensioned under these conditions was 4,955. The number of soldiers added to the rolls as invalids up to December 31, 1817, was 1,733; total, 6,688.

From December, 1817, to June, 1861, 9,483 invalids from various wars were added to the rolls, many of whom, according to the statement of the Commissioner of Pensions, were disabled in 1812, but whose number can not be definitely stated.

a These figures are approximated. The population of the United States in 1790 was 3,929,214; in 1810, 7,239,881.

b Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. 1, p. 220.

p. 545.

This included the German troops. Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 5, d Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. 1, p. 220.

Partly through the violent opposition to the war, but more especially through the dissatisfaction attending its feeble and disastrous prosecution, the soldiers who fought for the honor of their flag were never able to inspire the respect and affection which were so freely bestowed by the people on the soldiers of the Revolution.

In 1871, however, the just and natural desire to reward the nation's defenders found expression in the law of February 14, which bestowed a pension upon every survivor who had served sixty days. The benefits of the law were also extended to every widow married before February 17, 1815, whose husband had served the same period. The number of soldiers pensioned under this law up to June 30, 1877, was 21,767; the number of widows, 6,913; total, 28,680. a If to this number be added 6,688 pensioned for disability, the total number of pensioners up to 1877 amounted to 35,368.

The survivors of this army in 1874 still numbered 22,932, who received for the year ending the 30th of June the sum of $2,204,849.35. This gratuity exceeded by more than $150,000 the total expenditures for the active army in 1811, the year immediately preceding the war. But the effect of short enlistments, or short periods of service, in forcing debt on succeeding generations appears still more clearly through the operation of the law of March 8, 1878, by which the conditions of pensions for survivors have been reduced to a service of fourteen days, with no restriction as to the date of marriage of the widows.

This modification extends the gratuity to the survivors of a large portion of the 147,200 men who are reported by the Commissioner of Pensions as having served less than a month, and also to the survivors of that portion of the 125,307 whose terms of service for want of more exact figures are reported as ranging between one and three months.

Already as the result of the new law 23,000 applications have been filed, and should all of them be granted the number of pensioners up to 1878 will be increased to 58,368, a figure more than double the effective strength of the Regular Army maintained at any time during the war.

Moreover, as the pay of each pensioner is $8 per month, the same as was paid to the soldiers in the field, it will be discovered that while the present generation is carrying the debt of the last war, and is supporting the invalids of the Florida war, the Mexican war, and the rebellion, the policy of our forefathers will compel us in the present decade to disburse in gratuities more than three times the sum paid to the Regular Army between the years 1812-1815. But the drain on the national resources will not cease with the present decade. The removal of all restrictions in reference to the date of marriage may make it possible for widows to remain on the rolls of the Pension Office for

a Statement furnished by Commissioner of Pensions, Aug. 8, 1878.
This figure does not include pensioners of the Navy and privateers.

more than a century and a quarter after the discharge of the last soldier from active service."

COST OF THE WAR.

As the surest means of enabling the reader to appreciate the cost of the war, and to aid him in forming an opinion in regard to the mistaken economy of our system, the following table is inserted, showing the total expenditures of the government in the departments of war and of the navy from 1791 to 1816, inclusive.

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From the above table it will be perceived that while through motives of economy and dread of a standing army, the expenditures of the Government for the twenty-one years preceding the war, amounted to $35,669,930.65; the same for the ensuing five years amounted to $82,627,009.14.

The expenditures for the Navy during the preceding eighteen years was $27,150,424.81; the same during the ensuing five years, which were largely increased by our failures on land, were $30,285,534.40.

a From Annual Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1903.-EDITORS. The number of pensioners in 1903 and amounts paid, according to wars, is as follows:

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Conclusive as these figures should be, a more exact idea of the penalty inflicted on the people through the neglect of military preparation, may be formed by a reference to the gross expenditures of the Government from the year 1811 to 1823. These show that, beginning with the year 1811, when the annual expenditures including all departments of the Government, averaged $13,000,000, they jumped to $39,000,000 in 1813; $48,000,000 in 1816, and then declining to $35,000,000 in 1818, only reached the normal limit in 1823, when, through the natural development of the country, they amounted to $15,300,000.

During the intervening eleven years, allowing a progressive increase of $200,000 for national growth, the difference between the normal and actual expenditures of the Government amounted to more than $198,000,000.

These figures, which do not embrace the millions paid for pensions since 1823, may be accepted with slight variation as the immediate cost of the war.

Had Congress from 1808 to 1811 applied one-fourth of this sum to the maintenance of an army of 15,000 men, so organized as to have been capable of expansion by the aid of voluntary enlistments and obligatory service to double or triple its numbers, there is little reason to doubt that Canada would have been ours, and the war brought to a close on a single campaign.

LESSONS OF THE WAR.

The lessons of the war are so obvious that they need not be stated. Nearly all the blunders committed were repetitions in an aggravated form of the same blunders in the Revolution, and like them had their origin either in the mistakes or omissions of military legislation.

In the war under the Confederation Congress in its own name could not raise a dollar, nor arm and equip a single soldier. Under the Constitution, it had the sovereign authority to call forth the entire financial and military resources of the people.

In one war, with a debt of $200,000,000 the nation became bankrupt at the end of five years; in the other, a debt of nearly equal magnitude was contracted in two and one-half years.

In the first war, notwithstanding the steady decline of our military strength two British armies of more than 6,000 men each, were made captive; in the other, less than 5,000 men, for the period of two years brought war and devastation into our territory, and successfully withstood the misapplied power of 7,000,000 of people."

a The following pencil notes of Gen. James A. Garfield and Gen. William T. Sherman, on General Upton's original manuscripts, are added as being of interest.-EDITORS. "I renew the suggestion that a further statement of the composition of the British forces against us ought to be made.

"J. A. G."

"A compliance with General Garfield's suggestion will strengthen your argument. Many strong men will contest your conclusions by charging the lamentable failure of the war of 1812 to other causes than false legislation; to want of skill by generals and officers, such as the want of concert of action and dispersion of our strength, the want of men of action as leaders, rather than want of wisdom in council. I doubt if you will convince the powers that be, but the facts stated, the references from authority, and the military conclusions are most valuable, and should be printed and made accessible. The time may not be now, but will come, when these will be appreciated, and may bear fruit even in our day.

CHAPTER XIII.

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE WAR OF 1812 TO THE FLORIDA WAR.

REORGANIZATION OF 1815.

As soon as hostilities ceased the Army was reduced, and the peace establishment fixed by the act of March 3, 1815. The first three sec

tions of the act were as follows:

1. That the military peace establishment of the United States shall consist of such proportions of artillery, infantry, and riflemen, not exceeding, in the whole, ten thousand men, as the President of the United States shall judge proper, and that the Corps of Engineers, as at present established, be retained.

2. That the corps of artillery shall have the same organization as is prescribed by the act passed the 30th of March, 1814, and the regiment of light artillery the same organization as is prescribed by the act passed the 12th day of April, 1808; and that each regiment of infantry and riflemen shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenantcolonel, one major, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one paymaster, one surgeon, and two surgeon's mates, one sergeant-major, one quartermaster-sergeant, two principal musicians, and ten companies; each company to consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, and one second lieutenant, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians, and sixty-eight privates.

3. That there shall be two major-generals and four brigadier-generals; the majorgenerals to be entitled to two aids-de-camp, and the brigadier-generals to one aid-decamp; each to be taken from the subalterns of the line; four brigade inspectors and four brigade quartermasters, and such number of hospital surgeons and surgeon's mates as the service may require, not exceeding five surgeons and fifteen mates, with one steward and one ward master to each hospital. The brigade inspectors appointed under this act shall be taken from the line, and the brigade quartermasters, the adjutants, regimental quartermasters, and paymasters, from the subalterns of the line. a

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So far as the line of the Army was concerned, a marked contrast will be observed between the laws of 1815 and those immediately subsequent to the Revolution. By the latter, all knowledge of the military art was practically extinguished, by reducing the Army to 80 persons, after which a small force of less than 1,000 men was created, whose doubtful existence was prolonged for successive periods of three years.

The law of 1815, on the contrary, at once declared in favor of a permanent peace establishment of not less than 10,000 men. Great as was this advance for the time, the organization was still radically defective. The law totally suppressed the Adjutant-General's and Topographical Department; abolished the Inspector-General's Department, substituting therefor 4 brigade inspectors; also abolished the

a Callan's Military Laws of the United States, 1776 to 1863, secs. 1, 2, 3, p. 266.

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