one unanimous resentment, and the war became a popular war: and therefore, Sir, I say this war with America was a just, and has been a popular war. Why it has not been a successful one, I will not now take upon me to say.

The want of success, and the length of its continuance, has at last brought upon us the insults and meditated attacks of our enemies, the French, who are become their allies. And it seems as if it was the duty of a good man, who loves his country, to paint our affairs (become thus indeed perplexed) as though they were desperate, and that we had not even the means of defence left to resist any attack which the enemy might make upon us here at our own doors. The force that we have in Britain has been represented as nothing. Now, Sir, I may venture to affirm, on certain authority, that, exclusive of officers and serjeants, we have now in Britain 17,300 effective men, rank and file. As to the state of our funds, the fall is not so great, as the means used by our enemies abroad, and our interested enemies at home, to sink them, ought to have made them. The time was critical and perilous. There was a call in more countries than ours for money on loan: greater calls were still expected; the very paper on your table would not have been presented at this very moment, had it not been the moment in which the French politicians and their advisers thought it would most affect the present loan. Instead of that effect, it has shewn the relative strength of our credit. The loan has even risen to-day; and I understand the first payment will be made.

ever.

But, Sir, credit, which is nothing but opinion, must from its nature be estimated as relative; having no absolute basis but trust. The question is not, whether I shall trust or not; but whom I had best trust. In this view of it, which is the real one, all the monied world had rather trust Great Britain, than any other power whatWhile interested and party people decry our credit, look at that of France. The French could not borrow above one million, and that loan is now 20 per cent under par. France, even in time of peace, has not been able to go on upon her peace establishment; and yet, under these circumstances, she has a marine to raise and form. In short, Sir, to speak out; it is not our credit alone, it is not the French credit, so much more than ours, that is sinking. This phantom of credit, whose

whole foundation is trust and opinion, and which, by a mutual concurrence of that opinion and trust, has created funds, and become as money to the great trading maritime powers of Europe for so long a time, has now at last almost spent itself in its operation; and the great politicians of the world begin to look only to real force, supplied with real money; while the efficiency of the great maritime powers who have made their exertions on credit is every where at the highest pitch to which it can go, and will every day decline. The great military powers in the interior parts of Europe, who have amassed together great treasures, and have modelled their subjects into great armies, will in the next and succeeding period of time, become the predominant powers. France and Great Britain, which have been the first and second rate powers of the European world, will perhaps for the future be but of the third and fourth rate.

But it is not in the sinking of credit only that France is distressed: the spirit of free enquiry, and the effects of an extended commerce, have introduced a spirit among the French people that is wholly incompatible with their government. Contrary to all precedent, contrary to all ideas of that government; a reasoning has propagated, and even entered into some of the lines of business, that the vingtieme is a don gratuit, and that every individual has a right to judge of it. Besides this; one bad effect of the zeal with which they affected to take up the American cause, and which they now learn in earnest to have an affection for, has tainted their principles with the spirit of republicanism. These principles of liberty always diminish the force of government; and if they take root and grow up in France, we shall see that government as distracted and unsettled as any other. I do not, therefore, think we have much to fear from France. We may repose ourselves on the superior credit and actual strength of our own government, and ought not to suffer any insult to go unresented.

General Conway began by expressing the resentment he felt as a Briton, at the treatment we had received from France; and was sorry to see the state of humiliation this country must be in, when any nation had dared to conceive the idea of delivering such an insult. With regard to the danger that had been expressed we were in, from an invasion, and our defenceless state to repel any such, he did

not see the case so dangerous as people had represented. He owned that Ireland was in a defenceless state; but he thought it impossible for ministers to see, and not take immediate care to provide a remedy. As to England, he had not the same apprehensions; for we had, including the militia, 33,000 troops with which we could take the field. Besides which, he did not doubt, but that when our country was in vaded, our rights and liberties attacked, every individual would show the same spirit that the Americans had done: and he thought that a pretty strong proof how impracticable a thing it was to invade a free country, while the spirit of liberty remained in it; but though this was his idea respecting an invasion, he did not see that we were in a situation to carry on such a war as that we were now threatened with. What troops we had were mostly lost in a service where they could do no good: we had no allies to add to our own forces; and in this situation the force of the whole House of Bourbon was now united to the power of America. When we look back to the advantages which we derived from that force last war, was there a man upon earth who could think it possible, now that force was against us, that we could ever shew our face, or appear upon the seas? That our trade must be totally undone that in short, there remained nothing for us but to try to regain the Americans. There was no other measure we could possibly take, but to immediately adopt the proposal thrown out by governor Pownall, who had proved to demonstration that there was no other method of having peace with America, but acknowledging them to be what they really were, and what they were determined to remain, independent states; and making an alliance with them as such. That peace with America was absolutely necessary; and every other idea of peace was only deceiving ourselves, and exposing the public to a hazard that must end in disappointment, if not ruin, to this coun

try.

That he thought he saw in the House a secret conviction of the truth and necessity of this proposition, which he hoped their good sense would ripen into some act on the present occasion; for if it did not, the opportunity would be lost; and we should be at last obliged to come into that from necessity, which we might now make some merit of. That he always thought, as things were suffered to go on, that this would be the ground on which we must make peace at last; and he had receiv

ed great comfort from the proofs that the hon. gentleman had given that that ground was still open to us. And indeed, as a further proof, that gentleman had communicated to him, since he spoke, a matter that did absolutely confirm it; which was, that he . had seen a letter of Dr. Franklin's, shewn to him by the person to whom it was written, since the signing the treaty between France and America; wherein he said, that if Great Britain would give up the idea of supremacy, and treat with the Americans as independent states, she might yet have peace with America. If that peace was necessary, as every body must see it was, what had we to do, but immediately to take up the idea that had been so fairly thrown out?

Lord North repeated his opinion relative to a resignation of his employments; and as the interest of the empire, no less than his own pride, required his continuance in office, he was determined not to quit the helm while the ship of the state was tossed about in a storm, until he should have brought her safe into port. He could not see any great foundation for the present alarms: if the stocks were now low, it was merely the effect of a sudden panic, the general concomitant of a dread of war. Since he had come into the House, he had received intelligence that the first payment of the subscription to the new loan had been made: the seeming backwardness to fill the loan was to be attri buted to the largeness of the national debt, rather than to the approach of a war. Great Britain had always been so punctual in the payment of interest, that she never could want money. The dread of an invasion was a mere bugbear; and though such a thing were to take place, the nation had very little reason to be apprehensive for the consequences. Our navy never was, at the commencement of a war, in such a flourishing condition as at present; the new levies were almost completed, and would, together with old troops at home, form a body of 30,000 men for the defence of the kingdom. That the public might be the more at ease with regard to an invasion, his Majesty had resolved to have recourse to that constitutional measure, and call out and embody the militia. The insult offered by France was of the most disgraceful nature; his Majesty, in resentment, had recalled lord Stormont, his ambassador at Versailles; and as he knew that the honour of the nation was dear to every gentleman, so he trusted that

Colonel Barré said, if the noble lord had been a pensioner of France, he could not have acted more for the French interest than he had done. He recapitulated the several Acts brought in by his lordship against the Americans. Each minister, he said, had been guilty in his different department, but the noble lord had been guilty in all.

Governor Johnstone observed, that he always had been, and still was, against the independence of America. He always saw it in the light of imaginations and visions, which gentlemen here were pleased to amuse themselves with. It was not the idea of America herself. He was extremely sorry to see the idea adopted by gentlemen with whom he had acted; that if he found he had been acting with gentlemen who were ready to give up the supremacy of this country over America, and to acknowledge the independency of America, he would sooner cross the floor, and join those ministers, whose measures he had always disapproved, than continue to act with those who were entailing ruin upon this country.

Mr. Henry Dundas said, if there was no other help for it, and nothing else could be done, he should rather wish for the proposition thrown out by the hon. governor of forming a fœderal union, than losing America totally, or letting her fall into the hands of France. He did not chuse to part with America as an enemy. But as that time was not yet come, every measure should be tried first; and if it was unavoidable, we could but acquiesce in what we could not prevent.

Sir George Yonge said, Very well! you mean to come to that at last; and you now let us see you mean it.

Mr. Aubrey said, that since the noble lord in the blue ribbon had so strongly expressed his desire of retiring, which, it seemed, the dread alone of his successor's causing confusion in the state prevented him from, he begged leave to remind his lordship, that there was one great statesman, at least, (lord Chatham), who had neither forced the cabinet, nor ever scrambled for a place, but who had once already conducted our public affairs with the perfect unanimity of the two Houses, as well as with that of the nation at large. That

he did not now mean to arraign the conduct of the noble lord, who must, however, allow him to say that his administration had been at least unfortunate. That he and his friends had had the management of the American war for three years; which had produced nothing but a series of disappointments and disasters; plainly shewing them not to be a match for America alone. How, then, would they resist the power of France, added to that of America? That war, under those circumstances, would be a state of despair. That, therefore, at so critical a moment, he could not help imploring the interposition of the noble earl be had alluded to. That the noble earl was not only looked up to by this country, but was so feared, as well as respected, by every foreign court in Europe, that his very name would more contribute to put a stop to the hostile designs of the whole House of Bourbon, than all the mighty preparations we had lately heard so much boasted of; or any, that, he feared, the present condition of this country was able to make.

The House divided upon the Amendment: Yeas 113; Noes 263. The Address was then agreed to.

The King's Answer to the Commons' Address.] His Majesty returned this Answer:

“Gentlemen;

"I return you my hearty thanks, for this very dutiful and affectionate Address. I make no doubt, that, assisted by the advice of my parliament, and supported by the spirit of my people, I shall, under the Divine Providence, be enabled to repel every insult on the honour of my crown, to maintain the rights of my subjects, and to defend all my dominions."

Debate on Mr. Fox's Motion relative to the Failure of the Expedition from Canada. March 19. The House went into a Committee on the State of the Nation. The subject was the expedition from Canada. The papers being read,

Mr. Fox rose. He stated the plan of the expedition as wrong and impracticable; not being directed to any point, nor in any sense the right way. Though the minister of the American department (lord G. Germain) might say, and he understood did say, that he took the idea and the plan from general Burgoyne; yet he affirmed the contrary. The plan was not general Burgoyne's; it differed from general

the nation; it now appearing, as he had always foretold it would, to involve in it the case of absent men. As a charge was now brought against a noble lord, who was secretary of state in the American department, it must now be decided upon; otherwise he should move for the chairman leaving the chair.

Mr. Mucdonald said, enough was now brought to shew there was blame somewhere it was a fact admitted on both sides the House. One side laid the blame on the noble lord; and that charge he thought must be decided upon. But he begged the committee to recollect, that if it was decided that the blame did not rest upon the noble lord, a further enquiry remained to be made, Who it did rest upon?

Burgoyne's; and wherever it did so, it blundered. This expedition was not a plan of diversion in our faveur, but a diversion against ourselves, by separating that force which ought to have been united to one point, that of dispersing the rebel army; instead of which, it left general Howe too weak, upon the plan the noble lord suggested to him; and sent general Burgoyne, with a still lesser army, to a place where the enemy were much stronger. He said this only for argument, to shew that the measure was originally wrong in the design; and added, that he should move something on this point. But the matter upon which he should make his present motion, was that part of the execution which belonged to the minister, not to the officers. The principal and indeed sole design of sending general Burgoyne from Canada, was that of forcing his way to Albany, and making a junction with general Howe. This was a plan of co-operation, in the execution of which two parties were concerned, but orders were given only to one party; the other party was left ignorant of the design. This appeared from the minister's letters to the commanders, and from the commanders' letters to each other. It was intending two men to meet at one place, but giving orders to only one to go there; and then blaming the execution, because the other, who did not know he was to go there, did not meet him; but who, on the contrary, had acquainted the person with whom the orders lay, that he was going another way. Upon these grounds, he insisted, that the whole disconcertion and failure of general Burgoyne's expedition, was owing to either the ignorance or negligence of the secretary of state who had the direction of it; by which one of his Majesty's armies was totally lost, and in consequence of that, thirteen provinces were lost, to the utter ruin of this country. He moved, that the committee would come to three Resolutions, which were, in substance, That the plan of the Canada expedition had been ill concerted; that, from the measures adopted, it was impossible it should succeed; and that the instructions sent to general Howe to co-operate with general Burgoyne, had not been such as were necessary to insure success to the latter. After which, he said, he should offer a fourth resolution of censure upon lord George Germain,

Lord Nugent principally spoke to the impropriety of the enquiry into the state of

Mr. Joliffe. The event of the expedition to Canada, has not only annihilated the idea of the conquest of America, but has lost an army of 8,000 men; has cost this country an infinite sum, and the lives of many thousands of its best subjects. It is the blackest page in the English history; it is a disgrace which this nation never can recover. But, dreadful as the consequence of this event is, and may be, much as this country must ever deplore a catastrophe so fatal, and sincerely as I wish the heaviest vengeance to fall on those who merit it, I think it would ill become the candour which ought to distinguish this House, it would even be a subversion of justice, were we to condemn those who concerted the plan, merely because it has not proved successful. The design cannot be judged of by the event. It would be an insult to common sense, were I to pretend that I thought the loss of Burgoyne's army was the effect of chance; or that this country would not minutely enquire and resent it. It is impossible to conceive 8,000 men reduced to the situation they are, without great fault in some one. I could have wished that this enquiry had been deferred; for, indisputably, it would be the highest injustice, it would be cruelty in the extreme, to extend your enquiry to the conduct of general Burgoyne. He even knows not of the subject of your deliberations. Whether his rashness precipitated this army into destruction, or whether his delays produced this unhappy surrender, we can come to no resolution. We ought not to suffer ourselves to form an opinion. To censure, or even to question, his conduct at this time, would be a breach of all the laws of justice, by which, every man ought

to be present when he is accused. If, Sir, I am unwilling to condemn, or even to scrutinize, the conduct of general Burgoyne, it becomes me to be no less guarded in what I say of sir William Howe. Great guilt may rest with him; but there being no paper of importance relative to him before us, except the letter of lord G. Germain of the 18th of May, we must be silent respecting that great officer, until he returns to England. I shall therefore only submit to you my sentiments on the conduct of the noble lord at the head of the American department; and I hope to demonstrate, that the loss of this army can no way be attributed to him; that the plan was not only practicable, but that it was necessary for him to adopt it; and that he contributed every thing in his power to

ensure success.

At the opening of the campaign, in 1777, the attention of the whole nation was taken up by the intended junction of the armies, and thereby cutting off all communication between the northern and southern provinces. Every one approved the measure. I am warranted, therefore, in saying, that the voice of the whole country concurred with the noble lord; and had it succeeded, there cannot be a doubt of the most happy consequences. Unless the rebel army could be brought to a general engagement, skirmishes might protract the war, at a vast expence; and though successful, but little forward the conclusion. The reputation of general Burgoyne, the universal opinion of his skill and bravery, made him appear to the noble lord and to the whole world, as the fittest general that could be found for such an expedition. He solicited it by his letter 1st of January, 1777; by No. 9 he states his plan for the campaign. The nation called for it. The general solicited the undertaking; and himself forms the plan. The noble lord would have deserved every degree of censure, had he impeded, or even if he had not forwarded the attempt. I have no doubt he thought well of it; but had his opinion been contrary, it would be impossible to justify his resisting the calls of his country, and the solicitations of a brave and favourite general. The advantage of crossing the country was obvious; by this means all communications between the northern and southern provinces would have been prevented. Had general Burgoyne received the expected co-operation, the army under general Washington must have been re

duced to the necessity of a general engagement. The advantages being infinite, had the event been successful, was not the minister warranted in attempting it? Would he not have been condemnable, if he had adopted any other?

Let us now, Sir, enquire, whether the Secretary of State complied with the requisitions of the general, and by every means in his power, promoted the success of the undertaking. No complaint having been made, that every necessary to forward the expedition was not afforded, I might be warranted in concluding that the general was supplied with every thing he could wish. But yet, let us examine that matter. General Burgoyne, by his thoughts on the war, expresses himself thus: I conceive the operating army, exclusive of troops left for the service of Canada, ought not to consist of less than 8,000 regulars, rank and file; the artillery, in the memorandums of general Carleton, a corps of watermen, 2,000 Canadians, and a thousand or more savages; the Canadians and savages were totally out of the power of the secretary of state; and he could only give direction to sir Guy Carleton, to provide them, if possible. All that was within the immediate power of the secretary of state were the regular troops, and the necessaries of the army. By the letter, 28th March, 1777, from lord G. Germain to sir Guy Carleton, he is required to put 7,173 effective men under the command of general Burgoyne, and 675 under the command of col. St. Leger; making together 7,848. It was hardly possible to be nearer the number; and I defy the most determined persecutor of ministry to say, this event was owing to the want of 150 men.

By the letter from lord George to sir W. Howe, 18th May, 1777, he has these words: "the King trusts, whatever you meditate may be executed in time to cooperate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada." This is a proof that cooperation was expected by all parties. Could the minister do more? Will any man conduct your affairs, if he is to be accountable not only for the expediency, but for the success, of every measure? A general of the greatest military skill, executing a design of his own suggesting, commanding the number of troops he required, supplied with every necessary his imagination could suggest, supported by a co-operation of the armies, so far as the minister is concerned, could there be a