restless and dangerous spirit of ambition | knowledged by all the world: and your and aggrandizement, which has so often Majesty cannot be considered as responinvaded the rights, and threatened the li-sible for the disturbance of this tranquilberties of Europe. "We should be wanting in our duty to your Majesty and to ourselves, if we did not give your Majesty the strongest assurances of our most zealous assistance and support. Every sentiment of loyalty to your Majesty, and of love to our country, will animate us to stand forth in the public defence, and to promote every measure that shall be found necessary for enabling your Majesty to vindicate the honour of your crown, and to protect the just rights and essential interests of these kingdoms." The King's Answer.] His Majesty returned this Answer: "My Lords, "I thank you for this loyal and affectionate Address. Nothing shall be wanting on my part that may tend to the effectual support of the just rights of my crown, and the true interests of my people. These great and important considerations shall ever be the immediate object of my attention." Debate in the Commons on the King's Message respecting the Treaty between France and America.] The Message being read, lord North rose and moved the following Address of Thanks: "Most gracious Sovereign, "We, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of Great Britain in parliament assembled, return our humble thanks to your Majesty, for the communication of the Paper presented to the lord viscount Weymouth, by the order of the French king; and for acquainting us, that in consequence of this offensive declaration, your Majesty has thought proper to order your ambassador to withdraw from the court of France: and we beg leave to assure your Majesty, that it is with the utmost difficulty we can restrain the strongest expressions of the resentment and indignation which we feel for this unjust and unprovoked aggression on the honour of your Majesty's crown, and the essential interests of your kingdoms, contrary to the law of nations, and injurious to the rights and possessions of every sovereign power in Europe. "The good faith and uprightness of your Majesty's conduct towards foreign powers, and the sincerity of your intentions to preserve the general tranquillity, must be ac lity, if you should find yourself call, d upon to resist the enterprizes of that restless and dangerous spirit of ambition and aggrandizement, which has so often invaded the rights, and threatened the liberties of Europe. "We should be wanting in our duty to your Majesty, to our constituents, and to ourselves, if we did not give your Majesty the strongest assurances of our most zealous assistance and support: and we have the firmest confidence, that, in every demonstration of loyalty to your Majesty, and of love of their country, your faithful subjects will vie with each other; and that no considerations will divert or deter them from standing forth in the public defence, and from sustaining, with a steady perseverance, any extraordinary burthens and expences which shall be found necessary, for enabling your Majesty to vindicate the honour of your crown, and to protect the just rights and essential interests of these kingdoms." Lord George Germain seconded the motion, but said nothing else. Mr. Baker thought it was not sufficient to say we were in this dilemma, which the French ambassador's paper told us; but enquiry should be made how we came into it: and moved the following Amendment, after these words" assistance and support :" "hoping and trusting that his Majesty will be graciously pleased to remove from his counsels those persons in whom his people, from past experience, have reason not to repose confidence, in the present momentous situation of public affairs." Sir George Yonge seconded the amendment, and said, that nobody could feel more than he did the general resentment at the daring insult offered us by the crown of France: that it ought to be resented, and the injury repelled; and he did not doubt we had strength and spirit to do it. But that he could not help at the same time lamenting the very distressing situation of public affairs, and the continued scenes of misconduct, which he was convinced had encouraged the House of Bourbon to offer this insult. That we should in vain offer support to his Majesty, if we did not at the same time inform him of the incapacity of those in whom he had trusted for the management of his affairs; and the little reason his people had to place any confidence in them. That it was evident : to all men, the French had from the begin- | a war, the most alarming that ever this ning fomented this American war. To country was threatened with. That as put the matter out of doubt, the present experience would make it impossible for notification confessed that their connexion the nation to have any confidence in the with America took its date from the de- present ministers, after such repeated inclaration of independency in July, 1776; stances of folly, neglect, and incapacity, that it was plain negociation had been the removal of them could alone realize carrying on ever since; that the servants any offers of support, and revive the of the crown ought to have known this; drooping spirit of the people; and that that he therefore concluded they did know he was convinced this single measure it; they were unfit to govern a great would cause more alarm to our enemies, country, if they did not; that, without from the apprehension of the probable vidwelling upon their having concealed and gour and wisdom of our counsels, when denied it, at least, they ought to have been trusted in abler hands, than all the warprepared for this event; that, instead of like preparations we might make, if dithis, the treaty, and the notification, ap- rected by the same imbecility which we peared to be a matter of as great surprise had hitherto experienced, and they had so to the ministers as to any body else. That well availed themselves of. He was their being unprepared for it had left the ashamed to see those ministers who had kingdom equally so; and exposed, naked, brought us into the disgrace of receiving and defenceless, after a disgraceful war such an insult, as that French paper was, with America, for three years, to the at- should dare to be the people to lay it betacks of the united force of the House of fore parliament, and to tell the House Bourbon, without means to resist it. That that they were ready to carry on the war. our land forces were barely sufficient for Therefore he rose to second the Amendour defence, without any means to garri- ment, which expressed the sense of the son or strengthen our distant fortresses, nation. That these ministers ought first settlements, or dependencies: that our to be removed, before any step is taken. navy, at the utmost, consisted of no more The French would not have dared to offer than 30 or 35 sail of the line fit for ser- such an insult to any other ministry. vice that twice that number was necesGovernor Pownall: sary for the various operations of war; that we had not a ship in the Mediterranean; so that Gibraltar and Minorca were left unguarded: that we had none in the East Indies, or in Africa, and but a weak force in the West Indies: that France had strengthened herself in all these parts; and, in short, all our dependencies were in imminent danger. That our credit was at the lowest ebb; and the people had no confidence in government: that the French knew all this; and were by these circum-siness, I will not mix, even in my ideas, any stances encouraged to offer us this insult: that the people knew it; and his Majesty ought to know it: that we best could inform his Majesty of the case of his people; and the best time of doing it, was when we were offering him our support; to express our desire, that he would do the only thing which could make any support effectual. That nothing could tend more to depress the spirit of the people, or encourage our enemies, than the notion, that the same men who had so uniformly disgraced us, and degraded the honour of the nation, as well as diminished and exposed to danger, not only the dependencies, but the very vital strength of this empire, were likely to be still further trusted to carry on [VOL. XIX.] I do not rise to defend ministers ; the object of this day is much above all such considerations. I do not take into my estimation the pretensions of any set of men; and as to the present ministers, by an examination of their past conduct, which is to come under consideration in a few days, we shall be better able to judge how far they are to be trusted for the future. In the magnitude of this day's bu secondary objects. I am sorry that it has entered into or makes any part of, the ideas of my hon. friend who spoke last, because, as there is no man in the House for whom I have a higher respect, so there is no one to whose sentiments I am more disposed, on many occasions, to subscribe. But I see that some mistaken ideas of the state of this business has misled him. He thinks that this treaty has been under negocia tion (our ministers ignorant of it all the while) for two years past. From an exact narrative of the state of the business, he will see that the very idea of such a treaty has not been six months in existence; and the actual negociation not more than three months. As I never presume to assert [30] Britain. They must be sensible, that if ever America is to be conquered by them, it must be within the present year: that if it be impossible to do it in this year of the dispute, it will be madness to expect more success afterwards, when the difficulties of the Americans' former situation are removed: when their new independent go any thing in this House, in which I am not | pendence, more or less limited, on Great grounded as to the fact or the truth; as I have never asserted any thing which the House has not found to be true in the event; so, upon such important matters as I shall now disclose, I will not do it without accompanying that which I shall assert with the actual proofs. And I the rather do it on this occasion, as I think that that state of this business, which my informa-vernments have acquired stability; and tion enables me to give, is the best commentary on the nature and purpose of the French paper laid before us; and also does best point out the conduct we ought to hold in consequence of it. when the people are become, as they soon will be, well armed, disciplined, and supplied with all the means of resistance. "The British ministry must therefore be sensible, that a continuation of hostilities against the colonies, after this year, can only tend to prolong the danger, or invite an additional war in Europe; and they therefore doubtless intend, after having tried the success of this campaign, however it may end, to make peace on the best terms which can be obtained. And if they cannot recover the colonies, as subjects, to admit their claim of independency, and secure them by a fœderal alliance. Therefore no means are left for France to prevent the colonists from being shortly reconciled to Great Britain, either as subjects or allies, but to enter imme In August last, the Americans, by their commissioners at Paris, began to press the ministers of France to appear avowedly in their favour, and to give them substantial and effective assistance. But these ministers, for various reasons of state, were deaf to these calls; they did not choose, by committing themselves in the alliance with America, to involve themselves in a war with England. They did not mean to give real support to America, nor to meet in arms the force of Britain. They wished, by remaining ostensibly neuter, to encourage Great Britain to go on in a ruinous contest; and, by pri-diately into such engagements with them vately assisting the Americans, to encourage them to go on in giving cause for such contest. They wished the continuance of the war; and to assist neither party further than to prolong it, and to widen the breach. On this occasion, and to obviate these ideas of false policy, the Commissioners from the Americans presented a Memorial to the Court of France bearing to this very point; of which I will read some parts: "The court of France supposes that the war between Great Britain and the united American colonies will certainly continue for a considerable time longer, without any open interference on the part of France. But this supposition is even more fallacious than the former; the British government have every thing to lose, and nothing to gain, by continuing the war. "After the present campaign, they will therefore doubtless make it their great and last effort to recover the dominion of America, and terminate the war. They probably hope that a few victories may, by the chance of war, be obtained; and that these on one hand, and the wants and distresses of the colonists on the other, `may induce them to return again to a de as will necessarily preclude all others; such as will permanently bind and secure their commerce and friendship, and enable them as well to repel the attacks, as to spurn at the offers of their present enemy. "It must be remembered, that the first resistance of the colonists was not to obtain independency, but a redress of their grievances; and that there are many among them who might even now be satisfied with a limited subjection to the British crown. A majority have indeed put in for the prize of independency: they have done it on a confidence that France, attentive to her most important interests, would soon give them open and effectual support. But when they find themselves disappointed; when they see some of the powers of Europe furnish troops to assist in their subjugation; another power proscribing their commerce; and the rest looking on, as indifferent spectators; it is very probable that despairing of foreign aid, and severely pressed by their enemies, and their own internal wants and distresses, they may be inclined to accept of such terms as it will be the interest and disposition of the British government to grant them. Lord George Germain, but a few weeks since, declared in the House of Commons, that his hope of ending the American war this year, was principally founded on the disappointment which the colonists would feel, when they discover that no assistance is likely to be given them from France. The British adherents in America will spare no pains to spread and increase that disappointment, by discouraging representations; they already intimate that France, equally hostile to both parties, foments the present war, only to make them mutually instrumental in each others' destruction. "Should Great Britain, by these and other means, detach the colonies, and reunite them to herself, France will irrecoverably lose the most favourable opportunity ever offered to any nation, of humbling a powerful, arrogant, and hereditary enemy; an opportunity which no human wisdom could have produced, and which the most zealous of her patriots could scarcely have hoped for. But it is not simply the opportunity of reducing Great Britain which France will lose by her present inactivity; for her own safety, and that of all her Au erican possessions, will be endangered the moment in which a reconciliation takes place between Britain and America. The King and ministry of Great Britain know and feel that France has encouraged and assisted the colonists in their present resistance; and they are as much incensed against her, as they would be, were she openly to declare war. In truth, France has done too much, unless she intends to do more. Without giving the colonists effectual assistance, it would have been better to have left them wholly unassisted. The British nation, naturally inimical to the French, is anxious for peace with America, that she may turn her arms against this kingdom; and at once gratify her revenge and her avarice. This is now the general language of the people, and of the leaders of the opposition. But any one, who reflects upon the preceding observations, cannot doubt but that whenever peace with America is obtained by Great Britain (whatever may be the conditions of it) the whole British force now on the continent of America will be suddenly transported to the WestIndies, and employed in subduing the French sugar-islands there, to recompense the losses and expences which Great Britain has suffered and incurred in this war, and to revenge the insult and injury France has done her, by the encouragement and assistance which she is supposed to have secretly given the colonists against Great Britain." This Memorial was presented about the middle of August. It had no effect; but, on the contrary, as the French ministers saw that the distresses and apprehensions, which the Americans felt, began to press hard upon them, they took that occasion (profiting by their distress) to try to drive a hard and inequitable bargain with them, on the ground of their necessities. Instead of assisting them, they rather added to their apprehensions, by seeming disposed to give up their support. When the account of general Burgoyne's advance, and of his taking Ticonderoga, arrived in France; when the Americans had almost lost all hopes; the French wished to see them driven to despair. They reasoned, that, from necessity, the Americans must surrender their interests into their hands without conditions. On this occasion all negociation with France was at a stand; and mutual reproaches arising, had almost driven matters to an open breach betwixt the commissioners and the French ministry. The commissioners wrote to the Congress, stating their situation. Here, Sir, was a moment that Providence seemed to offer to the good fortune of this country. In this moment, communications of this state of things came to a very private and very inconsiderable individual; they were made to me, with direct explanations, that the Americans were willing to open a treaty with this country, for reconciliation and re-establishment of peace; and that although the acknowledgment of their independency was a causa sine qua non, yet on that point, and on all such points, with which the affairs of America and this country were entangled, they would do every thing to save the honour of their parent country. In what I now disclose I betray no confidences; I discover no man's secrets; I am authorised and at liberty for all I say. The overture was made by communication of a letter, with explanations thereupon. The letter was dated Paris, 11th September, 1777. It represented, that "the French ministry still kept them" (the American commissioners)" by their conduct, in a very perplexing state of uncertainty; for although they continued to afford very considerable assistance, yet their caution to avoid a war with England seemed to be redoubled. That if the Americans urged them upon the subject, they shrugged up their shoulders, and said, the Newfound land ships and the Spanish galleons were not yet arrived. The Americans saw that the Congress would undoubtedly be much disgusted at this conduct; and suggested in the letter, that if the English ministers had wisdom enough immediately to acknowledge the independence of America, there was good reason to think that such a treaty might be made with her, as would put Great Britain in a happier and more flourishing situation, than she could possibly arrive at by pursuing any other conduct; and as to the mere point of honour, America, they said confidently, would help them out in that matter. This opportunity, however, they feared would be irretrievably lost in a short time; as it was natural to think that general Burgoyne's temporary success would probably rekindle the frenzy which had begun to abate in England; the event, therefore, seen in this view, might be considered as equally unfortunate to both countries." Overtures of such a nature coming thus to me, an unconnected individual, who had no communications with ministers, as such, nor any right to such communications, what was I to do, or not to do? I decided, in the moment, that the suppression of such an important communication would have been criminal to my country. And yet, Sir, as I would neither commit myself to any individual, nor be so unjust as to commit any person in employment by such a communication, I did not communicate with the minister; I did communicate this matter where I thought it most proper so to do; and by means of which I knew I should have an authentic answer. I said, that communications had come to me, by which I knew positively that there was now, in the present moment, an opportunity of opening a treaty with the Americans; but that an acknowledgment of their independency was a causa sine quâ non. I explained, however, that every method to save the honour of the mother country, which could be devised or proposed in the points and forms of business, would be adopted and accepted, so as to cover appearances; and even to aid ministers in the execution. Thus far I went in what I communicated; and said I was ready to go into a full explanation of the whole; but would make that only to cabinet council. I had my answer, "that the ground was inadmissible in the first instance." And there this matter dropped; and this one opportunity (such as can never happen twice) was lost for ever. After this, in the latter end of September or beginning of October (so my information says; but I will not be positive as to the precise period) the American commissioners renewed their negotiations with the French ministry on a new line of treaty. They formed and communicated a project of a treaty, consisting of several articles, respecting commerce, and the necessary support and protection of it, if entered into. Several of these articles, I think eight or nine, were accorded to, (in November), as a kind of stipulation, or convention; but with conditions annexed, to be reciprocally expected from the Americans. This therefore stood ad referendum. Several copies of this project in convention were (Dec. 27), by different ships, sent to America; and in this state this matter remained before Christmas. May I be permitted here to refer myself to the House, and to ask, whether, after I had seen the Americans, through extreme pique at the conduct of the French towards them, and in despair of their own affairs, almost of the further existence of their cause; coming to England, and wishing once more to treat: yet when under circumstances by which they were reduced to the lowest ebb; when they had lost all hope in their own resources; when they despaired of any assistance from abroad; still refusing even to have propositions made towards the opening a treaty, unless on the ground of their independency; and when afterward I had known that they and the French had convened in articles and stipulations for commerce, which totally superseded our Act of Navigation; whether I had not ground for saying what I did before Christmas, when I first announced to this House, and perhaps to the country, "that our supremacy over America was gone for ever; and that our Navigation Act was abolished and abrogated;" and as to the particular state of the negotiations, had I not ground to say that they remained as a convention on a project of a treaty sent to America, but not signed, precisely as I stated it? I wish the fact had been attended to, and acted upon, at the time. It was perhaps even then not too late. Although the French had continued thus to train on the Americans, and refused to sign any treaty; yet in the moment that the noble lord (North) brought forward, in this House, his idea of reconciliation between Great Britain and America; and that the French saw it was such |