dered unserviceable 1,928; and therefore that the whole loss of seamen and marines belonging to the above-said ships and vessels amounts to 4,314 men. 2. That 42 ships of the line of battle are now in commission in Great Britain, and on home service. 3. That a considerable number of the said 42 ships of the line of battle are not manned, nor fit for sea. 4. That 11 frigates, 14 sloops, and 11 cutters, are now in commission in Great Britain for home service, and that they are short of complement upon the whole number 397 men. 5. That his Majesty's ship Panther of 50 guns, and Andromeda frigate, are also in commission, but not manned; and that there are also in commission four of his Majesty's yachts, mustering 159 men, seven store ships, six of which appear to have been lately purchased into the King's service, and eight hired armed ships, of which no returns appear to have been made by the officers who command them." The Earl of Sandwich directed his reply chiefly to two points to a detection of some particulars stated by his grace, and to an eulogium on his own administration. On the first head, his lordship said, that the number of ships of war under lord Howe were mis-stated, for that 10 frigates had been sent to America since the last returns were made; that the line of battle ships in commission were not 42, but 51: one of which being unfit for service, left 50 of the line in commission; that was, 35 completely manned, seven formerly in commission, to man which, we had already 3,000 seamen and marines, and nine put in commission, since the papers were moved for. He contended, that 600 men were a full war complement for a 74; and that of course, if affairs should make it necessary, we should be able, in a few days, to proceed to sea with 42 ships of the line completely manned and equipped. On the second head, he said, when he came to preside at the Admiralty board, our navy was in a most ruinous, condition: but that was not all; the point of ever being able to build or repair was despaired of, was given up. The ships built of green timber, in the heat of the late war, had all rotted. In such a state of national distress, what was to be done? He turned his thoughts seriously to the subject, and devised two expedients. He procured a Bill to be passed, to restrict the East India Company to build no more than a certain number of tons an

nually, (from 60,000 to 45,000); the

other was, to purchase foreign timber, and thereby break the monopoly of the timber merchants. Here his lordship deviated into a long detail, relative to the East India Company, the iniquity of the ships husbands, &c. When he came to preside at the head of the Admiralty, the timber merchants had entered into a combination; in consequence of which they not only raised the price of timber, but compelled the Company to take 17,000 loads of timber yearly more than they had any real demand for. He immediately saw the necessity of breaking this combination, between the timber merchants and ships husbands, to enhance the value of timber on one hand, and to rob the East India Company on the other; which was, in fact, to effect the ruin of the nation, and employ the Company as the instrument, merely to enrich a few avaricious, unprincipled individuals. To put a stop to so iniquitous a procedure, he was the means of carrying a Bill for restraining the tonnage of the East India Company, and reducing it from 60,000 tons and upwards, to 45,000, and ordered at the same time 15,000 loads of foreign timber to be purchased: by which the combination was soon dissolved; when the timber merchants were deprived of their artificial vent in one instance with the Company, and discovered that the navy could be supplied independently of them in the other. By these means he had preserved the native timber from the ravages of the Company, and laid in such a stock of foreign timber, as had enabled us to procure enough of native growth: so that instead of 13,000 load, which was the stock in hands at all the yards, we had now 64,000 load, or a stock of three years consumption, in the space of a little more than six months. The advantages of which were, that we could, if occasion required, not only build faster, but build of seasoned timber, not subject to the ravages of the salt water, worms, change of climates, &c. which green timber was always known to be.

He said, it was ridiculous to affirm, that all foreign timber was bad, the contrary was notorious. If because it had failed in the repair of the Mars, that would be a reason to reprobate the use of it; as well might we reprobate that of native growth, because ships built of native timber rotted, which was the case in respect of the Ardent; yet, that single instance, which would be exactly similar to the inference made by the noble duke, would be

no good ground to conclude, that all English timber was bad, or subject to immediate decay. He reported several instances of foreign timber proving equal to the best of British growth; particularly the Foudroyant, taken from the French in 1758, and at the end of 20 years had received but one repair, and now was as fine and sound a ship as any in the navy. The same was the case with the Alarm, and another frigate, drove into Marseilles in distress, where they received a repair, and still continued in the best condition.

His lordship confessed that the trade had suffered, but that inconvenience could not be remedied; it was a consequence of the mode of carrying on the war in Ame rica: frigates were necessary for that service; and if we could have had more to employ on the several stations alluded to by the noble duke, most surely our trade would have been better protected. He assured the noble duke, that he would not have employed large ships as cruizers in the Bay, if he could have helped it: but the alternative was not, will you or will you not use those vessels? but, will you use those or none? There was no arguing against necessity; and though there was a want of frigates, for the reasons already assigned, the deficiency was not so great as had been stated by the noble duke; for notwithstanding there might be no more frigates on the immediate home service, there were no less than 50 employed on other services, besides those stationed in America: but he denied that the want of cruizers had been the occasion of the rapid decline of the African trade. The fact was, that that branch of commerce had been overdone; that the trade was on the decrease for several years before the troubles with America broke out, and must be nearly in its present state if they never had. As soon, and as far as circumstances would admit, cruizers had been stationed in the proper latitude; admiral Young, at Barbadoes, had detached from his squadron a ship of considerable force for that purpose; admiral Dayrell, lately appointed to succeed him, had instructions of a similar nature; and if our trade had suffered, either in that, or any other quarter, no blame was imputable to him; it proceeded solely from the cause first assigned, that the frigates were necessarily destined to another service. But taking the facts to be just as his grace had stated them, he could not deserve censure; he acted ministe

rially; the measures were deliberated upon elsewhere; and if he did his duty, as obeying the orders he received, he was by no means responsible for the events.

Earl Gower said, the delicate situation the noble earl who spoke last stood in, was a sufficient reason for his not putting a negative on the resolution: for his part, he thought at so critical a period as the present, it would be extremely improper to expose the state of our navy to our foreign enemies. The proposed resolutions were totally unnecessary; and if agreed to, though productive of no other ill, might be the occasion of throwing the people into a consternation, and create ill-founded apprehensions. On this ground he should move, that the chairman do leave the chair.

The Earl of Bristol. Though I have for some time been fully prepared for this particular stage of the enquiry; though till within these three or four days, I have waited with great impatience to go into every branch of the navy; yet, my lords, I shall now forbear. The noble duke who first agitated this enquiry, has fully convinced me of the state of our forces at home and abroad, and of the enormous expence it has already been to this country these three last years to so little purpose. And the noble duke who has opened this day's business, respecting the navy, has done that in so able a manner, and so much coinciding with my own observations upon it in general, that he has left me nothing to add; nor will I, my lords, by any thing I could say on the different branches which his grace has not mentioned, let it go abroad, that we are on the eve of a war with France, I have been laying open to our enemies what we ought to conceal: but on the contrary, I will rather say, that I hope the navy of England may yet be put in such a state, as to resist and overcome all our enemies; though, my lords, I should never have agreed with the noble duke in the address proposed to result from these resolutions, without an amendment, which should have been to have addressed his Majesty to put his navy on the most respectable footing: but that as I had long seen the fate of every resolution in this enquiry, I should expect all to have a negative equally put on them, and therefore should content myself with doing what I thought I owed my country at this time.

The Duke of Richmond said, though he had concluded his part of the enquiry, as

to further detail, with the state of the army in America, he could not give a silent vote when he heard the deplorable state of the navy so ably and so fully proved; and what was still more to be wondered at, when the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty substantially acknowledged the facts, though he endeavoured to palliate them, or evade the conclusions, which they evidently admitted. It was the most reprehensible conduct imaginable, that ministers had adopted, in the course of the enquiry. In the former part of it, when the military force of this island was proved to be very short of the lowest peace establishment, the language from the other side, was, "What our internal defence may be, is of very little consequence. It is our navy we are to depend upon in the day of trial; it is our great national bulwark; it is invincible, and superior to any thing our natural enemies can bring against us. We are able to cope with the whole united force of the House of Bourbon. The more France and Spain know of our navy, the better: a thorough knowledge of its state is the best means of securing us against the designs of our enemies." I recollect when a noble earl (Chatham), seemed to entertain even a doubt of the boastings of the noble earl at the head of the Admiralty, his lordship was almost hooted out of the House. What do we hear this day? That all those doubts were well founded; that all those boastings proceeded from misre presentation. The noble earl (Gower) has told you so, in so many words. He has put a negative on the resolutions, not because they are not founded on truth, but because they would be an avowal of the naval insufficiency of this country. So, when the nation is proved not to be in a proper state of military defence, you are told, your navy is your sole dependence. When that is enquired into, you are again told, its weakness must not be exposed!

He reminded the noble earl (lord Sandwich) when upon a former occasion, the want of frigates, which he now confessed, was objected to, at the opening of the preceding session, as 87 of them was said to be then in America, his lordship replied, "that we could, and would have 87, or 90 more, to replace them." On this ground, as well as the uniform language of the noble earl, by which he specially pledged himself to that House, his lordship was answerable for the conse

quences; and would probably be made amenable at the bar of the public. He concluded, by observing, that if parliament continued to disgrace itself, by upholding such an administration, it would necessarily fall into contempt; the certain consequence of which would be, national ruin.

The Earl of Sandwich said, the number of frigates, if he said they were 90, which he did not doubt, as the noble duke seemed to recollect his particular expression so well, what he meant was, including every other service but that which lord Howe was concerned in; and he was clear that he was justified in saying so; for taking the number in the West-Indies and Europe, they amounted to nearly 90. Here his lordship said, he must have recourse to the information, which he so often pressed on their lordships' memory, relative to the state of the British navy, when he was called to preside at the Admiralty-board. He said, the ships in the heat of the war, being built in a hurry, of green timber, suddenly rotted, and were rendered useless; which, with the scarcity of timber, rendered vain almost, all hopes of being able to put our navy once more upon a respectable footing. However, having surmounted that obstacle, he turned his next attention to the guard ships, which instead of being of any use, were become a burden and disgrace to the service: rotten, useless vessels, not half manned, and half the crews unfit for service, in case of an emergency. He saw all this, and determined to turn this source of national weakness and disgrace into a source of national strength. Instead, therefore, of wasting the public treasure, to no purpose, he put the guard-ships upon a respectable footing. He ordered them to be always in a condition and state of repair, fit for immediate service; he increased their number to 17, and had three quarters, or nearly three quarters, of their complements of able prime sailors, always aboard; and managed matters so, that with the aid of a few days press, he had it always in his power to send 20 ships of the line to sea at a very short notice. His lordship adverted to something, which fell from the noble earl (of Bristol) in a former debate, whose professional abilities he highly extolled; as importing that he would not trust himself aboard the ship (the Queen) destined for him. He could assure the noble earl, that he need not be afraid to trust himself aboard that ship; for notwithstanding what he might have

heard to the contrary, she was completely equipped for sea, and every way ready for immediate service. If however, his lordship still retained any doubt, concerning her condition, he would soon give orders to have another vessel ready for him to hoist his flag aboard.

The Earl of Bristol. I should not have risen again to trouble your lordships, but that I have been so applied to, and that I think it necessary to say something upon it, late as it is. But, my lords, as I shall always consider myself as last, so shall I suspend answering that part of the noble earl's speech (lord Sandwich) until I have wiped off the imputation which his lordship unjustly has thrown upon as great and good an officer, as any in the world; to whom this country is so much obliged, and whom nothing his lordship or any other man can say, can stain. I mean lord Hawke. The noble lord tells us, when he came to the Board of Admiralty, he found the guard-ships all rotten, fitted with rotten stores, and not kept as if intended for service. My lords, this is such an imputation on that great man's character, as I never will admit of. I had the honour of sitting at that board, at that time, with the present first lord of it: and I never understood that those were the reasons for changing those guard-ships. Those ships had been thought long enough in commission, and that others would be more proper ships, and might be better fitted as such; but the great reason of all was, that many of the captains had been their full three years, and that some practices had crept into some of them, which was necessary to be remedied, by paying them off. But this was no more a fault in lord Hawke, than if such were to happen now in some of the ships; and that the noble lord now at the board were to change the captains, or the ships. That as to ships of 74 guns, which his lordship says, 600 men is more than a sufficient complement for, I can by no means acquiesce in that opinion. The last war I had 650 men in the Dragon, and which was not the largest class of ships of that rate; and I could have dispensed very well with fifty more. As to what his lordship has said of the Queen; I shall be always ready to serve my king and country when I am wanted; but I will ever persist in my determination not to go aboard any ship so manned. I abhor the present mode of ministers and their hirelings whispering away the characters of their admirals and generals; [VOL. XIX.]

and suffering them to be run down, to save themselves, for not being capable of giving proper instructions. I will therefore mention those two brave officers, the Howes; better, nor more disinterested men, never served the King. How are they pulled to pieces, without cause! Had I not experience of the cruel fate of a great, and I will say, brave admiral, that of admiral Byng, who was sent out with a fleet so insufficient for the purpose, and who fell a sacrifice to screen an infamous ministry? My lords, I will be no scape-goat for any administration; let me go out with proper ships, properly manned, and I will defy all ministers whatever, and will be answerable for the rest.

The Committee divided on the question that the chairman leave the chair: Contents, 64; Not-contents, 26. The House being resumed, the Resolutions were all put and negatived.

Debate in the Lords on the American Conciliatory Bills.] March 5. Previous to the order of the day being read,

The Duke of Grafton rose. He said he must trouble their lordships with a few words, relative to a matter exceedingly important for the House to be aware of, before they began a debate upon the Bills which had passed the other House, and upon which the fate of this country materially depended. He had a question to put to the lords in office, which it was their duty to reply to without reserve, and which, from the respect he entertained for their lordships, he should hold himself blameable, were he not at that particular moment to agitate. His grace then said, that a hon. kinsman of his (Mr. Fox) had received information, that the court of France had actually signed a treaty of commerce with the deputies of the American Congress; that his kinsman had communicated that information to no other person but himself, and that it had made so strong an impression on his mind from the channel through which it came, that if the two secretaries of state, and the whole cabinet council, were to declare the contrary, they could not do away that conviction which he felt of its being matter of fact.

His kinsman had in the other House of Parliament put the question to the minister of that place, who had given an evasive answer, but the matter was of too important a nature, and at that time too immediately critical, to be passed over in silence. Some explanation was due to [ 3 H]

their lordships, previous to their entering into debate upon Bills, the effect of which altogether depended on the drift of that explanation; he therefore hoped one or other of the secretaries of state would rise, and give their lordships that information on the subject, which they had an undoubted right to be masters of. If the information was true, it was absurd to insult parliament, with the appearance of reconciliation, that was no longer practicable. If ministers replied in the affirmative, they were culpable in the highest degree, in concealing intelligence of so important a nature from parliament; and under the cover of that concealment, leading it into measures of futility and public dishonour. If they reply in the negative, their conduct was still, if possible, more reprehensible, their incapacity more glaring, in being entirely wanting in that species of information, which it was the duty of their stations to procure. His grace desired the House to recollect, that it was on the 5th of March, he put this question to the King's ministers.

Viscount Weymouth said, the noble duke had himself assigned a sufficient reason for the silence of every lord in office, by declaring, that if they and the whole cabinet denied the fact, and that in ever so explicit a manner, he would not be convinced, nor give up his belief of it. Respect, however, to their lordships, and that duty which he always conceived, he was bound to discharge, by giving them every possible satisfaction respecting all sorts of questions in his power to answer, and fit to be answered, would not suffer him to remain silent; he had, indeed, heard of the treaty from out-door report, and he had heard that an hon. gentleman in another place had asked the minister the question, and received a satisfactory answer. With regard to what the duke had thrown out, the most convincing way of reply would be not to argue upon it, but to come immediately to the point, for which reason he would fully and fairly speak to it; he did therefore, in the plainest and most precise manner, assure their lordships, that he knew not of any such treaty having been signed or entered into, between the court of France and the deputies of the Congress, and he hoped their lordships would not fail to remember, that it was on the 5th of March likewise, that he stood up in his place, and declared he knew nothing of any such treaty, nor had any authentic information of any such

treaty being either in contemplation or existence.

The Duke of Grafton said, the noble viscount had not explicitly replied to his question; that the noble viscount took it up at the time that it was mentioned by his hon. kinsman in the lower House; that many days had elapsed since, more than sufficient for ministers to have ascertained the fact; that if they had not got at the truth of a matter so exceedingly important to be known at this pressing crisis, it must appear to all the world that the King of Great-Britain was served by the most shamefully ignorant and uninformed ministry that ever undertook the management of public affairs. His grace again enforced the idea of its being true that such a treaty had been signed, and urged the King's servants to tell the House all they knew respecting it.

Viscount Weymouth declared, that the noble duke, by mentioning his hon. kinsman having put the question in the lower House, naturally obliged him to recur to that point of time. That he had precisely and plainly stated a fact, namely, that he really knew not a word of any such treaty having been signed.

The order of the day for the second reading of the American Conciliatory Bills, was then read.

The Earl of Radnor said, this country was wrong in the out-set, and hitherto continued obstinately to persevere in impolicy and injustice. What the effect of the present Bills might be, he did not pretend to determine. We had no right to tax unrepresented America. The idea was no less absurd and unjust, than the event had hitherto proved disgraceful and unprosperous. Englishmen, as they carried their rights with them, on their first migration, so they retained the spirit, resolution, and firmness of Englishmen, in bravely asserting and maintaining those rights. The constitution declared, in so many words, that no Englishman can be taxed but by his own consent. It has been the language of all ages, since the first foundation of the monarchy. The most weak, cruel, despotic, and ambitious monarchs have acceded to this doctrine, as a first principle, not directly to be controverted, though they have often attempted to evade it. They acknowledged the general rule, and never ventured further than to state exceptions to it. Apply this reasoning to the claims of this country, and see whether they can