The Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803

rule of that House for one person always to take the chair on such occasions. Lord Scarsdale had often presided with great dignity and credit to himself, and it would imply a tacit idea of his not having discharged his duty to the satisfaction of their lordships, if he were now set aside. The earl said, he had, for a great many years, sat in that House; that he remembered when lord Delaware was the constant chairman of the committees, and he never knew an instance of their lordships appointing a new chairman when the old one was present.

almost every one which had been presented. Several were only brought in that very day, although the motion for their being prepared had been made nine weeks since; and some of those which had been only then delivered, had been before the Commons for many days. Others which he considered as very material, had not been brought at all to either House. He pointed out the difficulty that there was to understand many of them, particularly the returns of the army, from the totals stating the gross complement of each corps although several of them were not full; and in proof of what he asserted, mentioned the return of the artillery corps serving in Gibraltar, which was returned at 500 and odd, its full complement: whereas, the number actually fit for duty was short of 250. After adducing various proofs of his arguments from the papers themselves, the duke shewed that it was impossible to go fully into the enquiry that day; he should, therefore, content himself with speaking to a single and very material point, relative to which the information afforded the House was adequate and complete.

His grace then moved, "That their lordships resolve themselves into a committee of the whole House," which being agreed to, lord Suffolk moved, that the papers on the table be referred to the said committee, and then the duke named the duke of Portland as chairman. The lords in administration almost at the same instant named lord Scarsdale for the same office. This gave rise to a debate.

The Duke of Richmond, in support of his nomination, said, he had no particular reason for naming the noble duke, but that his character and abilities entitled him to every honour their lordships could bestow; and as it was always usual for the person who moved for a committee of the whole House to be complimented with the nomination of the chairman, he wished the nomination might be adhered to, more especially as it would be a kind of insult to the noble duke were it set aside.

The Earl of Denbigh called loudly for lord Scarsdale, and said, as the business of the committee would be arduous, and the noble lord had been for years used to do the duty, be conceived he was the fittest person to preside then, and he did not doubt but the noble duke who had been nominated, would himself be of the same opinion.

The Earl of Sandwich said, it was a

The Duke of Richmond said, it was an ill omen to the important business before their lordships, to enter upon it without the cordiality and amicable union of sentiment, with which he hoped to find every lord inspired; that he was sorry to see party spirit so early burst forth, and declared their lordships had offered no solid objection to the noble duke's taking the chair.

Lord Camden contended, that there was no necessity for the chairman being a person of profound sagacity and exalted talents. That there was not in either House, a person of the meanest capacity who was not fully equal to the discharge of the duty; that the business was extremely simple and within the comprehension of every one, but that as the duke had been first nominated, it was but just that he should take the chair, and that the lords in administration opposing it, augured ill to the enquiry, and savoured of the want of candour, and that inclination to give proof of personal prejudice which he, for one, detested, and had hoped would not have appeared in the course of the very important business then before their lordships.

The Duke of Grafton asserted that there was no order or resolution of the House which entitled one lord to be chairman more than another, but that, in strict duty, each of their lordships ought to discharge the office in his turn.

The Earl of Effingham said, if lord Scarsdale had so often done this duty, it was an argument why he should not then be troubled, but that the House ought to thank him for what he had done, and resolve to relieve him from the like trouble in future.

Earl Gower observed, that the usage of the House was in favour of the noble lord, who always presided in committees of the whole House; that if, as had been as

serted, it did not signify who took the chair, and that the office might be discharged by the meanest capacity, why then depart from the established mode of proceeding? and if the present contest, who should fill the chair, predicted any thing, it must be, that the noble duke meant to create a difference of opinion about a matter, which he and his friends acknowledged was of no sort of consequence.

Earl Talbot saw no reason for proposing a new chairman, but now the noble duke was proposed, it would imply some degree of disrespect to reject him. He was sorry to see a difference of opinion arise upon a matter of little consequence, and recommended his noble friends to consent to the first nomination.

Lord Dudley allowed, that in the other House it was usual for the member who moved for the committee, to name the chairman, but in that House, the usage had been uniformly otherwise; because the chairman in committees of the whole House, if present, is looked upon in the light of perpetual chairman. Such being the rule, in his opinion, those who at tempted to depart from it, testified a spirit of party, not those who wished to adhere

to it.

Their lordships then divided upon the question, whether the duke of Portland should take the chair, when the numbers were, Contents 33; Not Contents 58. As soon as lord Scarsdale had taken the chair of the committee,

pences already incurred in the prosecution of this destructive war, and our resources in men and money, for another campaign. This would be doing business properly; it would inform us, what we had spent, and what it would cost us for the next year. It would lead us to enquire, what we were likely to get in return; but, above all, it would urge us to consider seriously of the probability of succeeding, and instruct us, if what we sought was equivalent to what we were about to risk, or if equivalent, whether the object was attainable.

His grace acquainted their lordships, that the part of the enquiry, which he intended to enter into this day, would be confined to the state of our military defence within these kingdoms. He then proceeded to the performance of this task with a solemnity suited to the great interests which were to be taken into consideration; and, with a candour, coolness, and precision, no less calculated to fix the attention, than to conciliate the good opinion, and court the confidence of those who might be supposed to differ from him, opened the leading objects which he meant to obtain in the course of the intended enquiry. His first observation was, that at no time were the affairs of this country. in a more alarming and critical situation. The very business their lordships this day went upon was the most irrefragable proof of it. It imported, on the very face of the order now read, that their lordships were convened to enquire into, to deliberate and decide upon, the present tremendous The Duke of Richmond rose. He in-state of the country. He never meant to formed their lordships, that he had sufficiently explained the importance and great objects of the present enquiry, and after the best judgment he was able to form on the great outline of the army, they would be to enquire what the force was in America in 1774, the year preced-most safe, honourable, and speedy means ing the breaking out of the American war, what were the troops foreign and native, sent from hence the three succeeding years; and by comparing the latest returns with the whole of the troops in America, or sent thither in 1774, 1775, 1776, and 1777, whatever the deficiency might appear, that would be the real loss of men by death, wounds, captivity, sickness, and slain in battle; and deducting out of this deficiency, those sick or captives, the remainder would give the total and actual loss. A similar mode of computation would answer for the navy. Next, it would be proper to enquire into the ex

conceal, because he looked upon it to be his duty, as taking a leading part in this great business, to explain to their lordships the objects he wished to obtain by his several motions for papers; and the grand object of all, to determine on the

of putting an end to the American war. In the first instance, it would be proper to point out some preliminary matters, well worthy the consideration of the House. Our ability to carry on the war, so as to obtain the final object to which it has been hitherto avowedly directed, that of compelling our colonies to yield to unconditional submission; and supposing, contrary to the most decisive experience, that that object was clearly attainable, the danger of wasting our resources of men and treasure; and while, in the act of exhausting both, the danger of leaving these kingdoms in a defenceless state, and of

course at the mercy of foreign powers. If, in the course of the enquiry, it should come out, that the first was totally impracticable, though no other impediment, more than had hitherto obstructed the execution, should arise; if the interference of foreign powers, as to the second contingency, should break the thread of the measures pursued for the last three years; in either of these events, it would follow, that the plan was impracticable. Out of both those considerations, another would most certainly arise, not directly connected, though originating from the American war; that was, the opportunity it would give our rivals in power and greatness to avail themselves of the weak state of the home defence; and from the circumstance of our fleets and armies being on the other side the Atlantic, meditate some blow which might endanger the safety, if not strike at the very existence of this country. The greater part of the premises here stated was in proof on their lordships' table, particularly relative to the impracticability of conquest, and the weak state of our internal defence; and he presumed, the just suspicions we had a right to entertain of the conduct of the House of Bourbon, would not seem illfounded, when that very construction was given from the highest, as well as most authentic authority. It was the language of administration in one of their most solemn acts. The very construction now made was delivered from the throne. The words of the King's Speech were, "that his Majesty had ordered a considerable augmentation of his naval force, on account of the armaments still continued to be carried on, in the ports of France and Spain."

He would now proceed to apply the reasoning to the facts. He would, from the papers on the table, satisfy their lordships that, after three unsuccessful campaigns, nothing had been effected towards the conquest of America. He would shew, that we had employed, during that period, the whole of our strength to no purpose; that our greatest exertions this year would fall considerably short of the two preceding; that we should not of course be able to effect, with a smaller army, what we were not able to do with a greater: and that, too, against an army considerably strengthened by numbers, improved by discipline, and rendered confident by success. That the last assertion was incontrovertible, though we almost

stripped this country to the last man; that supposing, for argument sake, our force in America, without calling any more troops from the home defence, would be equal to what it was on the opening of the last campaign; yet, the passage in the speech alluded to, holding out strong suspicions of hostile intentions from France and Spain, pointed out the necessity of pros curing a suitable defence for these kingdoms.

His grace then proceeded to explain to their lordships his particular plan. The returns of the present state of the armies in America would shew the numbers of effective men serving there at the conclusion of the last campaign; and what would be ready to take the field early in the next; on which this plain question would arise; What additional forces could be spared, either to recruit the losses already sustained, or augment the whole army; so as from what has happened, to give a rational prospect of success in the ensuing campaign? This would involve in it another question, which could only be answered by administration. What treaties, or if any, with foreign powers? If there are any, will the troops taken into our pay make up the deficiencies: or are they to be made up out of the old corps in the kingdom, or the new ones now levying? If it should come out that there was no aid to be expected from the continent, then of course either the troops within the kingdom, or the new levies, must be sent to make up the deficiency caused by the last campaign; or finally, the measure of Ame rican coercion must be totally abandoned. Ministers declared the contrary; the war against our subjects in the colonies was intended to be pursued with all possible vigour. The inference was then evident, that some one or other, or all the methods mentioned, must be adopted. He hardly believed that foreign aid was much to be relied upon. He less expected that raw, undisciplined troops, could effect what veteran troops were unequal to. Consequently, the deficiency and losses which the army in America sustained in the course of last year, were to be supplied from the old corps; which conclusion fairly imported, that naked and defenceless as we are, it was intended to render us more so, by stripping us of our old corps. To point out the necessity of rather adding to, than diminishing our home defence, the Resolution he meant to propose this day would be more particularly directed.

cessary to fix the establishment at 12,000 men; and at the latter, when part of the troops were drawn from that kingdom, to serve in other parts of the British empire, the Irish parliament consented to an augmentation of 3,300, on condition, and in consequence of a royal message, delivered, as he believed, by the noble lord last alluded to, that 12,000 men should be kept within the kingdom, for its defence in time of peace. He observed, that the Irish parliament had, upon application from hence, sent 4,000 men to serve in America, which, with the deficiencies consequent on the difficulty of obtaining recruits, and other circumstances, had reduced the effective force in that kingdom, as he had before observed, to 4,800, with muskets on their shoulders.

His grace then entered into a detail of | the army now in Great Britain. He said the returns on the table made the amount to be 15,600. Out of this number, the officers commissioned and non-commissioned amounted to 1,230. The staff, including surgeons, surgeons' mates, &c. 577; the invalids 2,200, who were unfit for field service; the cavalry, consisting of the horse and grenadier guards, and the blues, 400; the dragoons, consisting of dragoon guards, &c. 1,400; which being severally deducted from the total, would leave the rank and file to amount to about 10,600. If it was further considered that London would call for a part of this force; that the three great fortresses, which were the keys of this kingdom, would require men for garrisons, [supposed to mean Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham,] and that garrisons would be wanting for other places of strength, though not of such importance; he could not possibly see, in the case of a sudden attack from France, or any other power, that we had any force we could possibly spare to meet our enemies in the field. It is true, our militia, if properly trained to the use of arms, might be rendered serviceable. But he meant now to speak of troops fit for actual service, ready to meet a veteran, numerous, and powerful enemy. He did not mean to take off from the merit of the national militia. He recollected how useful they proved during the late war, and doubted not but they might be rendered so again; but the question was not now, how useful they were capable of being made. The point their lordships were most specially to consider was, what state of defence we were now in? The immediate application, then, he insisted to press on their lordships, from the present state of the army in this kingdom, was, to shew, in case of any such intention on the part of ministers, that it would be extremely improper and dangerous to send any of the old corps out of the kingdom.

His grace next took a view of the state of the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca, and of the army in Ireland. The former, he insisted, were not defended by more than half their war complement; nor the latter, by half what had been deemed necessary for its defence, both by the Disbanding Act, passed in the reign of William 3, and an act of its own parliament, passed during the lieutenancy of a noble ford over the way (viscount Townshend.) At the former period, it was thought ne[VOL. XIX. ]

His grace then took a general view of the state of the military, both voted for home defence, and elsewhere. He said, that the troops for guards, garrisons, &c. were 2,000 short; and that there was a deficiency, upon the whole of the army voted for the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca, and for the defence of Great Britain, of upwards of 5,600 men. Whence he drew this conclusion, that out of the first recruits enlisted, this deficiency must be made up. And even then, as to the home defence, it would be no more than a peace establishment; 17,000 men were necessary for that defence in time of peace; he would, therefore, submit to their lordships, whether in so precarious and dangerous a state of things, foreign and domestic, it would be at all prudent to part with any of the old corps, when even it was known that they were so much short of what parliament and the nation judged they ought to be in times of tranquillity. His grace then moved the following Resolution:

"That this Committee, taking into consideration the continuance of the arma ments in the ports of France and Spain, of which his Majesty was pleased to inform parliament in a Speech from the throne at the opening of this session; and also taking into consideration that a very large part of our naval and land forces are on the other side of the Atlantic ocean, and therefore not applicable to the defence of this kingdom upon any emergency: and that the forces in Great Britain, Ireland, Gibraltar, and Minorca, are at this time less in number by 5,673 men than the establishment has been in times of tranquillity and peace; is of opinion, that no [2 U]

He would now proceed to apply the reasoning to the facts. He would, from the papers on the table, satisfy their lordships that, after three unsuccessful campaigns, nothing had been effected towards the conquest of America. He would shew, that we had employed, during that period, the whole of our strength to no purpose; that our greatest exertions this year would fall considerably short of the two preceding; that we should not of course be able to effect, with a smaller army, what we were not able to do with a greater and that, too, against an army considerably strengthened by numbers, improved by discipline, and rendered confident by success. That the last assertion was incontrovertible, though we almost

His grace then proceeded to explain to their lordships his particular plan. The returns of the present state of the armies in America would shew the numbers of effective men serving there at the conclusion of the last campaign; and what would be ready to take the field early in the next; on which this plain question would arise; What additional forces could be spared, either to recruit the losses already sustained, or augment the whole army; so as from what has happened, to give a rational prospect of success in the ensuing campaign? This would involve in it another question, which could only be answered by administration. What treaties, or if any, with foreign powers? If there are any, will the troops taken into our pay make up the deficiencies: or are they to be made up out of the old corps in the kingdom, or the new ones now levying? If it should come out that there was no aid to be expected from the continent, then of course either the troops within the kingdom, or the new levies, must be sent to make up the deficiency caused by the last campaign; or finally, the measure of American coercion must be totally abandoned. Ministers declared the contrary; the war against our subjects in the colonies was intended to be pursued with all possible vigour. The inference was then evident, that some one or other, or all the methods mentioned, must be adopted. He hardly believed that foreign aid was much to be relied upon. He less expected that raw, undisciplined troops, could effect what veteran troops were unequal to. Consequently, the deficiency and losses which the army in America sustained in the course of last year, were to be supplied from the old corps; which conclusion fairly imported, that naked and defenceless as we are, it was intended to render us more so, by stripping us of our old corps. To point out the necessity of rather adding to, than diminishing our home defence, the Resolution he meant to prono would be more particula

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The Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year ...