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The Marquis of Rockingham said, he rose to take notice of the criminal ignorance of the first lord of the Admiralty, relative to the force and destination of the American privateers, which could assemble and proceed to the coasts of Great Britain, alarm both kingdoms, and distress our trade, and that unknown to the noble earl till he learned it from the traders between Great Britain and Ireland, and the inhabitants of the sea coasts. His lordship observed, that no answer had been given to the strength of the garrisons of Mahon and Gibraltar; but that a noble viscount had asserted, that strong additional works had been raised. Now taking the fact in the noble viscount's own way, it was a further motive for strengthening the garrison; additional works called for more men to defend them; consequently, if 6,000 troops were requisite for the defence of Gibraltar in case of an attack, the new works requiring a whole battalion, it followed, that no less than 7,000 would be now sufficient. He insisted, this circumstance alone was the fullest corroboration of what had been asserted by the noble earl, who recommended a motion for the state of that fortress. He concluded by observing, that the concession made by the noble earl in office, not only proved, that administration were negligent, but that, in consequence of their ignorance and incapacity, our commerce had materially suffered; and we had, as the only safe means of carrying it on, been obliged either to ship our property in foreign bottoms, or pay most exorbitant premiums to insure it.

Lord Townshend allowed, that additional works called for a proportionable increase of men to man them; but denied, that was the case in those lately erected at Gibraltar. The fortifications were not extended, but rendered more tenable, and complete.

The Duke of Richmond. The noble earl at the head of the Admiralty has said, that supernumerary men, which are ready to be turned over to the line of battle ships, are to all intents and purposes of as much use as if they actually were on board them. My lords, I am not a judge of sea affairs, but from the analogy of our professions, I think this cannot be. Men collected from various quarters, unacquainted with the officers, and unused to the particular mode of discipline in a strange ship, can never be so useful as those that have been trained together [VOL. XIX.]

some time. I have heard that various commanders have various fashions. On board some ships, it is to the boatswain's whistle, in others to the music of a fife, that the men work. But I believe every sea officer will tell the noble lord, that he wishes to have his men on board as long as possible, before they go to sea, and that new men cannot be so useful as old ones. I entirely agree with the noble lord as to the importance of Gibraltar and Minorca. They are essential to our Mediterranean trade, to our weight with the Italian states, and to keep the states of Barbary in order. We once lost Minorca, and a successful war restored it. But if ever we lose Gibraltar, which is, as it has been justly called, a British fortress in the heart of Spain, we shall never get it back again. Our possession of it is particularly galling to the pride of Spain, and no consideration will ever tempt her to restore it. I intended to have moved for the state of the troops in those garrisons, but it escaped my memory. I therefore beg leave to move, for "Copies of the last monthly returns of his Majesty's forces, as well foreign as British, in Gibraltar and Minorca."

The Earl of Sandwich begged to set the noble duke right; no ships were filled with supernumeraries only, because supernumeraries, collectively considered, certainly could not be deemed as serviceable as that part of the complement of any ship which had been some time on board, however many individuals among the supernumeraries might be perfect masters of their profession, and able seamen in every sense of the word. The custom of manning the navy was not to give a ship her full complement at once, but just before she sailed to perfect her complement by a small portion of supernumeraries, by which means, from the various employments on board, all the hands were immediately useful, and in a very short time the supernumeraries were to the full as serviceable in every point as the rest of the crew.

The Duke of Bolton observed, that as the object of the motions was to ascertain the present state of the navy, he could not but endeavour to supply that deficiency which he foresaw they would leave in the information aimed at. With this intention it was, that he should move for "a state of the number and condition of the ships in ordinary."

The noble earl at the head of the Admiralty said, that in the course of a year, [21]

with the assistance of the ships in ordinary, we should, in case of a rupture with the House of Bourbon, be able to equip 90 line of battle ships for sea. He could not say, after all he had heard for some years past, in that House, of the formidable state of the navy, though strictly true, that it answered his expectations. The navy, since the noble earl came to preside over it, had cost the nation sums unparalleled within a like period of a peace-establishment; yet after a twelve-month's press, the whole we had for the protection of our trade, for home defence, and every kind of miscellaneous service in every part of the globe, by the noble lord's own account, amounted to no more than 35 ships of the line for the home defence, and 54 in Asia, Africa, America, and the rest of Europe included. The noble earl told your lordships, almost three years since, that he could send to sea at three days warning, 20 ships of the line completely manned, and fit for actual service; now, says his lordship, we have 35; so that all a twelve-month's press has done for us, is to enable us to send to sea, should occasion require, fifteen more ships. I can affirm from my own knowledge, that with a very low peace establishment, I think only 8,000 seamen, a six months press, on the breaking out of the late war, enabled us to send 80 ships of the line to sea. number upon paper, I do maintain, ought to be 150, not 90 as stated by the noble earl.

Our

The Earl of Sandwich strongly objected to this motion as highly improper; the earl said it would materially affect the interests of Great Britain, by holding out to its natural enemies a species of information which they could not by any other means obtain, and which it was the duty of the King's servants, at all events, to keep from them. It was of no importance, how notorious our positive and immediate naval strength was, but it was a matter of most serious concern to conceal from all mankind how much we had it in our power to increase that strength, and how long it would take us to give it such an addition as would render it more formidable than that of any other country could possibly be rendered. Foreigners went into our yards, and saw a great number of ships in dock, and apparently nearly ready for sea. It was right that they should entertain an opinion, that they were all nearly ready, although it often happened when he, perhaps, stood alone in a knowledge that,

from various private reasons, several of those apparently ready ships could not be sent to sea for some time. It was politic always to conceal our naval resources, and it was a policy so obvious, that it was by no means peculiar to Great Britain. France did, and had long done, the same; nay, she had gone further, she had shut up her dock-yards from the eye of every stranger, and had a most formidable fleet on paper, which she held out to terrify the world, when he well knew, from secret intelligence, that many of her ships upon paper, were ships on paper only, and that they could not be put to sea, were there occasion for their services. He begged, therefore, that the noble duke would withdraw his motion. If the noble duke wished only to know what ships could soon be fitted out, in addition to the 42 already in commission, he would readily tell him; in about a twelve-month we might have 90 line of battle ships at sea, and speedily after that period many more.

The Duke of Bolton readily withdrew his motion; because he saw it would, as the noble lord had said, rather tend to distress than serve this country. From the noble earl's repeated boasting of the good state of our navy, the readiness with which our ships were manned, and the abundant quantity of timber in our yards, he had conceived that it was of very little consequence, how public our naval strength was made; he now, however, was sorry to say, he found that the noble lord's boastings were merely vain-boastings. In 1757, he well remembered, after a press of six months, 80 sail of the line were ready for sea.

We had of late heard of a warm press, and yet the first lord of the Admiralty declared, that we had now only 54 ships ready, and that in twelve months more we could not increase that number to more than 90 sail. An incontrovertible proof, that so far from our navy being in an excellent condition, it was in a most deplorable condition.

The Earl of Sandwich observed, that the duke had started a new matter; that if speedily equipping ships had been necessary, he certainly could have had a great many more ships ready than there now were; but the necessities of the state always governed the conduct of the Admiralty-board, and he should hold himself highly culpable, if he put the nation to a larger expence than occasion required. The earl begged their lordships to recollect, that a sufficient naval force to serve

of course the nation at large, who were finally interested. He had the last speech from the throne now in his hand, and a deep sense of the public calamity in his heart: they would both co-operate to inforce and justify the measure he meant to propose. He was sorry to say, the speech contained a very unfaithful picture of the

the purposes of the American war had been got ready as soon as it was called for; and that the present naval armament was prepared the moment it was known that the House of Bourbon was arming; he added, that had a foreign war broke out, there is no doubt but an increase equal to the occasion might long since have been made to the navy, and concluded with de-state of public affairs. This assertion was claring, that till there was occasion, he should not think it incumbent upon him to add to the public burthen.

The Duke of Grafton imputed the present calamitous situation of the country to the want of information; and insisted particularly, that the Capture Act, passed in the 16th of his present Majesty, and softened by the pretended powers vested in the crown, for appointing commissioners to treat with America, was not only the cause of the subsequent disasters, but of the colonies declaring themselves independent. If, however, the powers granted by the Act were what ministers pretended they meant to give, he wished to know what were the fruits they produced; and what steps had been taken by the commissioners to carry them into execution. His grace then moved, for "such papers as relate to the fulfilling that part of the Capture Act, so far as the same empowers certain persons to declare any colony, province, city, town, precinct, port or place at the peace of his Majesty with a return of such colony, province, city, town, precinct, port or place, that since passing of the above Act may be declared to be at the peace of his Majesty."

The Earl of Suffolk hoped the noble duke did not mean, by the generality of his motion, to take in any papers leading to treaty; or particulars preparatory to it; but which never produced any effect. If that was his grace's intention, he certainly would oppose the motion; if not, he had no objection.

The duke of Grafton's motion was agreed to.

Debate in the Lords on the Earl of Chatham's Motion for General Burgoyne's Orders and Instructions.] Dec. 5. The Earl of Chatham rose. His lordship began

with remarking, that the King's speech at the opening of the session conveyed a general information of the measures intended to be pursued; and looked forward to the probable occurrences which might be supposed to happen, and affect the great bodies to whom they were addressed; and

If

unquestionable; not a noble lord in administration would dare rise, and even so much as controvert the fact. The speech held out a specious outside-was full of hopes; yet it was manifest, that every thing within and without, foreign and domestic, was full of danger, and calculated to inspire the most melancholy forebodings. His lordship hoped, that this sudden call for their lordships' attention would be imputed to its true motive, a desire of obtaining their assistance in such a season of difficulty and danger; a season in which, he would be bold to maintain, a single moment was not to be lost. It was customary, he said, for that House to offer an address of condolence to his Majesty upon any public misfortune, as well as one of congratulation, on any public success. this was the usage of parliament, he never recollected a period, at which such an address became more seasonable or necessary than at present. If what was acknowledged in the other House was true, he was astonished that some public notice was not taken of the sad, the melancholy disaster. The report was, the fact was acknowledged by persons in high authority, [lords Germain and North] that general Burgoyne and his army were surrounded, and obliged to surrender themselves prisoners of war to the provincials. He should take the account of this calamitous event, as now stated, and argue upon it as a matter universally allowed to be true. He then lamented the fate of Mr. Burgoyne in the most pathetic terms; and said, that gentleman's character, the glory of the British arms, and the dearest interests of this undone, disgraced country had been all sacrificed to the ignorance, temerity, and incapacity of ministers. Appearances, he observed, were indeed dreadful; he was not sufficiently informed to decide on the extent of the numerous evils with which we were surrounded; but they were clearly sufficient to give just cause of alarm to the most confident or callous heart. He spoke with great candour of general Burgoyne: he might, or might not, be an able officer;

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but by every thing he could learn, his fate
was not proportioned to his merit: he
might have received orders it was not in
his power to execute. Neither should he
condemn ministers; they might have in-
structed him wisely; he might have exe-
cuted his instructions faithfully, and judi-
ciously, and yet he might have miscarried.
There are many events which the greatest
human foresight cannot provide against;
it was on that ground, therefore, he meant
to frame his motion. The fact was ac-
knowledged; the general had miscarried.
It might not have been his fault; it might
not be that of his employers or instructors.
To know where the fault lay, he was de-
sirous of having the orders given to gene-
ral Burgoyne laid before the House. So
much of the plan at home, had, however,
transpired, as justified him in affirming
that the measures were founded in weak-
ness, barbarity and inhumanity. Savages
had been employed to carry ruin and de-
vastation among our subjects in America.
The tomahawk and scalping-knife were
put into the hands of the most brutal and
ferocious of the human species. Was this
honourable war? Was it the means which
God and Nature [alluding to what had
fallen from lord Suffolk on the opening of
the session] put into the hands of English-
men, to assert their rights over our colo-
nies, and to procure their obedience, and
conciliate their affection? His lordship
spoke in the most pointed terms of the
system introduced within the last 15 years
at St. James's: of breaking all public and
family connection, of extinguishing all
public and private principle. A few men
had got an ascendency, where no man
should have a personal ascendency; by
the executive powers of the state being at
their command, they had been furnished
with the means of creating divisions. This
brought pliable men, not capable men,
into the highest and most responsible si-
tuations; and to such men was the govern-
ment of this once glorious empire now
entrusted. The spirit of delusion had
gone forth; the ministers had imposed on
the people; parliament had been induced
to sanctify the imposition; false lights had
been held out to the country gentlemen:
they had been seduced into the support of
a most destructive war, under the impres-
sion, that the land tax would be diminish-
ed, by the means of an American reve-

nue.

The visionary phantom, thus conjured up for the basest of all purposes, that of deception, was now about to va

nish. He condemned the contents of the speech in the bitterest terms of reproach. He said it abounded with absurdity and contradiction. In one part it recommended vigorous measures, pointing to conquest, or unconditional submission; while in another, it pretended to say, that peace was the real object, as soon as the deluded multitude should return to their allegiance. This, his lordship contended, was the grossest and most insolent delusion. It was by this strange mixture of firmness and pretended candour, of cruelty and mercy, justice and iniquity, that this infatuated nation had been all along misled.

His lordship returned to the situation of general Burgoyne, and paid him, indeed, very high compliments. He said, his abilities were confessed; his personal bravery not surpassed; his zeal in the service unquestionable. He experienced no pestilence, nor suffered any of the accidents which sometimes supersede the most wise and spirited exertions of human industry. What then, says his lordship, is the great cause of his misfortune? Want of wisdom in our council, want of ability in our ministers. His lordship laid the whole blame on ministers: it was their duty to shield that ill-treated officer from the temporary obloquy he must suffer under, till he had an opportunity to justify himself in person. His motion bore no personal relation to the conduct of that able, but abused officer; it was meant to be solely pointed to draw forth those instructions, which were the cause of his defeat and captivity. General Burgoyne was subject to the events of war; so was every other man who bore a command in time of war; for his part, when he was in office, he never attempted to cover his own incapacity, by throwing the blame on others; on the contrary, he gave them every support and becoming countenance in his power.

His lordship condemned the plan of operations, which he insisted was sent from hence; that of penetrating into the colonies from Canada. It was a most wild, uncombined, and mad project; it was full of difficulty; and though success had declared in our favour, would have been a wanton waste of blood and treasure. He next animadverted on the mode of carrying on the war, which he said was the most bloody, barbarous, and ferocious, recorded in the annals of mankind. He contrasted the fame and renown we gained in the last war, with the feats and dis

graces of the present; then, he said, we arrived at the highest pinnacle of glory; now we had sullied and tarnished the arms of Britain for ever, by employing savages in our service, by drawing them up in a British line, and mixing the scalping-knife and tomahawk with the sword and firelock. The horror he felt was so great, that had it fallen to his lot to serve in an army where such cruelty was permitted, he believed in his conscience he would sooner mutiny than consent to serve with such barbarians. Such a mode of warfare was, in his opinion, a contamination, a pollution of our national character, a stigma which all the water of the rivers Delaware and Hudson would never wash away; it would rankle in the breast of America, and sink so deep into it, that he was almost certain they would never forget nor forgive the horrid injury.

His lordship recurred to the melancholy momentous situation of public affairs in general. He said, America was lost, even by the accounts which administration in the Gazette had thought proper to impart. General Washington proved himself three times an abler general than sir William Howe; for, with a force much inferior in number, and infinitely inferior in every other respect, as asserted from an authority not to be questioned (lord Germain) he had been able to baffle every attempt of ours, and left us in such a situation, that if not assisted by our fleet, our troops in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia must probably share the same unhappy fate with those under general Burgoyne. He condemned the motives of the war in the most pointed and energetic expressions, and the conduct of it in still stronger; and compared the situation of this country to His lordship observed, that similar in-that brought on his dominions by the duke structions relative to the Indians had been of Burgundy, surnamed the Bold.—A imputed to him. He disclaimed the least prince of the House of Savoy had his prorecollection of having given any such in-perty seized by him; the injured prince structions; and in order to ascertain the matter, so as to remove any ground of future altercation on the subject, he called upon administration to produce the orders, if any such had been given.

one instance of his magnanimity, by imputing his misfortunes to his own obstinacy; "because," said he, "this was owing to my not submitting to be well advised." The case of the duke of Burgundy was applicable to England. Ministers had undertaken a rash enterprize, without wisdom to plan, or ability to execute.

would not submit; war was determined on; and the object strongly resembled the paltry pretence on which we had armed, and had carried fire, sword, and devastation, through every corner of America. We had, he said, swept every corner The seizure was about a cargo of skins; he of Germany for men: we had searched would have them, but the prince of Saumur the darkest wilds of America for the scalp- would not submit. The duke was coning-knife. But those bloody measures be-jured not to go to war; but he persisted: ing as weak as they were wicked, he re- "he was determined steadily to pursue commended that instant orders might be the same measures:" he marched against sent to call home the first, and disband" the deluded multitude:" but at last gave the other-indeed, to withdraw our troops entirely; for peace, he was certain, would never be effected, as long as the German bayonet and Indian scalping-knife were threatened to be buried in the bowels of our American brethren. Such an expectation was absurd, mad, and foolish. The colonies must consider us as friends, before they will ever consent to treat with What had occasioned, since last war, us: a formal acknowledgment of our er- the rise in the value of English estates ? rors, and a renunciation of our unjust, ill-America, which he now feared was for ever founded, and oppressive claims, must precede every the least attempt to conciliate. He declared himself an avowed enemy to American independency. He was a Whig; and though he utterly from his heart abhorred the system of government endea voured to be carried into execution in America, he as earnestly and zealously contended for a Whig government, and a Whig connection between both countries, founded in a constitutional dependence and subordination.

lost. She had been the great support of this country; she had produced millions; she afforded soldiers and sailors; she had given our manufacturers employment, and enriched our merchants. The gentlemen of landed property would probably feel this; for, when commerce fails, when new burdens are incurred, when the means by which those burdens were lightened are no more, the land owner will feel the double pressure of heavy taxes: he will find them doubled in the first instance, and

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