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first instance, with its fleet in the Western sea. The same conduct applied when France and Spain were united, or were expected to unite.

men of war of the line, with a proportionable number of frigates. What had Great Britain to this? Twenty men of war of the line under admiral Keppel, eleven of which he saw leave St. Helen's, under admiral Parker; one of which sailed under admiral Montague for Newfoundland, and another for the West Indies; in all 33. He could not help observing, however, the very humiliating appearance it had, to see a vice-admiral of the red-squadron unaccompanied to his station, at the very eve of a war; and another admiral obliged to go in the same manner; nor at the same time of lamenting the fate of this country, which was reduced to running the hazard of trusting its flags aboard single ships; and of course, in the event of hostilities, subjected to the probability of capture. Taking this account to be as he had stated it, his grace observed, in case of an union of the naval force of France and Spain, it would appear, that the whole of our fleet fit for service would be found to amount to $3 ships; while it was acknowledged, that the navy of France and Spain amounted to 64 or 65.

The noble earl would probably say, though we were able and willing to detach, that it was impracticable on account of contrary winds. He could assert, how

Before he proceeded, he would be glad to know what was the reason that the information of the state of the Toulon fleet, which was so full, and in general correct, should have stopped short for the last ten days, previous to the account of its sailing, which appeared by the papers not to be known here till the 29th of April? He would assure their lordships, that it was publicly mentioned in the streets of Paris, on the 17th of April, that the Toulon fleet had sailed on the 13th; how, then, came it to pass, that administration had no certain account to the 29th; at soonest till the 27th? a space of full ten days, in which time a man might have hopped from Paris to London! His grace allowed, that the fact might be well known to administration; but that they might not have thought it prudent to detach; if the latter was the case, then the situation of this country was truly deplorable. Our navy, when upon the former occasions an attack from France on these islands was said to be possible, if not probable, was affirmed to be our national bulwark; it was added emphatically by the noble earl at the head of the Admiralty, that it was the duty, and that no man was fit to pre-ever, that at the time it was said the side at that board, who was not able at all times to have fleets superior to any that France and Spain united should be able to bring against us. Taking this public declaration on one hand, and opposing it with the inability to detach from our home defence, would reduce the person who made this confident assertion to the dilemma of being accountable to the nation by his head, of assuring it that he would always have a superior fleet to any thing which France and Spain could bring against us or that, having a fleet in our ports strong enough to spare a detachment, he had neglected to send one, after so many repeated informations of the His grace said he must advert to the equipment, and at length the sailing of vauntings and boastings of the noble earl the Toulon fleet. From the papers on (Sandwich) early in the present session, the table, there were 16 men of war of the when a noble earl (of Chatham) now no line at Toulon, or had sailed from thence; more, and whose loss must be deservedly 25 at Brest, and 23 at Cadiz. Without, regretted by every lover of his country, therefore, taking into account what might told him, that we had not 20 ships of the be in the French and Spanish West In-line, fit for actual service; the noble earl dies, or at home in other ports, he was fairly justified in affirming, that the naval force at sea, or fit for it, belonging to France and Spain, consisted of 64 or 65

fleet was detained by contrary winds, that the Victory came round from Chatham, and that two men of war of the line had separately sailed from Portsmouth harbour for Plymouth. Why not, then, send the eleven? The fact, he believed, was, that no part of the fleet had its stores on board, to proceed upon any distant service, which was totally inexcusable, as the ministers must have known some weeks before, if any such detachment could be spared, that the papers on the table pointed out the necessity of being every way prepared either for a short or long voyage.

at the head of the Admiralty answered, that we had 35 ready to proceed to sea at a day's notice, and seven at a fortnight; yet it had now come out, that the whole

number, allowing for odd ships, at the end of six months, did not exceed that number; and that those in any state of forwardness did not exceed the other seven; so that the whole of the noble earl's assertions amounted exactly in May to what they were meant to import in the preceding November; from which he drew this inference, that considering the different means used within the six months now alluded to, the deceased noble earl was fully justified in his assertion.

not attended to; the truth was, that France had been, for the two or three last years, acting a most insidious part; and had done us more mischief than if she had actually declared against us.

As to the assertion made by the noble duke, of what had fallen from him on a former occasion, the words imputed to him were, that he said, " that the person who held the office of first commissioner of the Admiralty ought no longer to hold it than while he had a fleet, on every occasion, equal to any that France and Spain could bring against us." The noble duke had misstated his words. What he said was, "that he thought administration ought, at all times, to have a fleet at home supe

such a fleet, which he by no means agreed to, he certainly would be liable to his share of the blame, as an individual composing that administration; but not in the character of first lord of the Admiralty.

The noble earl had but one answer, and that one he had once already given, to defend his breach of promise to the nation; that was, that seamen could not be procured on account of the loss of the supply we always procured in time of warrior to France and Spain." If we had not from America. The noble earl should have foreseen this eventual defalcation, or he was not worthy of the high post he occupied. He should have allowed for this loss, have provided against it, or shaped his measures accordingly. He knew, long before his late boastings, that that supply would be cut off; consequently he had no right to count on it, or took credit for the present, though he knew it was a false one. His grace concluded with moving, "That it appears to this House, that his Ma-vember last, that we had not 20 ships of jesty's ministers did receive intelligence at different times, in the months of January, February, March, and April last, of the equipment of the Toulon fleet, which sailed under the command of the count d'Estaing on the 13th of the said last month of April."

The Earl of Sandwich begged to remind their lordships, that the question of detaching or not detaching was not now before the House: because, to enable the House to decide upon so important and delicate a question, the force, intentions, and disposition of our enemies should be known; which would be subjects extremely improper to be discussed in that assembly. As to the general censure thrown upon the conduct of naval affairs, and pointed personally to him, he begged leave to differ from the noble duke in the application. He was no more answerable than any other individual in administration; if the measures were wisely planned, he was entitled to share the credit; if otherwise, to share the blame. If, on the other hand, the measures committed to his charge had been faithfully executed, as far as lay in his power, he must stand fully justified to the public. The noble duke had lamented, that the advice of him and his friends was

The noble duke had made another charge, which he thought himself bound to reply to, which was by implication, supposing that what had fallen from him in a former debate, in answer to a noble statesman, now no more, who insisted in No

the line ready for actual service, could not be true; that we had 35 ready for sea, and seven more in great forwardness, the crews being more than half formed; and the proof on which the noble duke rests his charge is, that we have not now more than that number. If the noble duke's proof fails him, his argument is at an end. His lordship said, there were 21 under admirał Keppel; 15 gone to Plymouth; the Mars, since that time, was condemned; another was burnt to the water's edge; two were at Plymouth; two more had part of their crews shipped on board of the grand fleet; the Terrible had 240 sick a-board, and was therefore unfit for sea; two others were cruising: one paid off; one sailed to the East Indies, and two came into dock, in order to undergo a slight repair; so that the whole number fit for sea was 49; of course the Admiralty was not quite idle, from November till May: nor was it any proof now, that because we had 49 ships of the line, most of them fit for actual service, that we had not more than 20 in November. It might be said, that although we had 49, it was not equal to the combined fleets of France and Spain; on this he could only observe, that it was not certain that Spain would join France; or

if she did, could any one say what state the force thus united was in? Friendly assurances from the court of Madrid were received: but even supposing the worst; besides the 49 ships last mentioned, 10 more had been put in commission for a considerable time, and were completing their crews several more ships were ready to take crews aboard; and if seamen could be procured, he had no dread of his being able to procure ships enough for their reception; add to this, that there were nine ships of the line more now in America, or on their respective stations in the West Indies.

The noble duke seemed to lay great stress on our neglect in permitting France to collect so formidable a naval force: besides one reason already assigned (their perfidiousness,) he wished the noble duke would recollect, that France, for the last three years, had, contrary to her constant policy heretofore, directed her chief attention to her marine; and had by that means, put it on its present respectable footing. But even still, if seamen could be had, there was very little to be dreaded from her naval power. The noble duke lived in an extensive maritime country, where it might be presumed, he had great influence. The most essential service he thought, at this conjuncture, when he had every reason to believe a war to be inevitable,would be, for his grace to exert himself, and support the naval officers in their endeavours to procure seamen. The noble duke was lord lieutenant of that county; and therefore required no aid from government, in order to strengthen his hands. The noble duke says, if we are able to detach a fleet, it should have been sent to Gibraltar to watch the Gut, and prevent a junction of the French and Spanish, or French or Spanish fleets from the Mediterranean to the ocean: and the reason assigned by him is, that it was the constant practice, in former times. If his grace rests his argument there, he is most certainly mistaken; for it was not even so at the approach of the late successful war. We did not send a squadron there, though hostilities had commenced at sea for some months.

The Duke of Richmond replied, that the noble earl took a responsibility on himself, when he assured the House, that it was the duty of the first commissioner of the Admiralty to have a fleet at all times superior to the combined force of France and Spain. The noble earl had contra

dicted that assertion. To preserve parliamentary decorum, all he could say was to appeal to their lordships, whether such an expression as that imputed to the noble lord, had not more than once come from him. But, in his lordship's defence, he perceived he had blended another matter, by way of justification, which to all substantial purposes confirmed what was imputed to him, as if he had acknowledged what he now so earnestly denied. Says the noble earl, I am not individually responsible: I have acted in concert with others, and am willing to share the blame, in common with the rest of his Majesty's confidential servants. Now, how does the case stand? The noble earl himself acknowledges, that administration ought at all times to have a superior naval force to that of France and Spain; he allows we have not such a force; he consequently confesses that administration are culpable; and being so, makes himself responsible for every consequence which may follow his neglect or incapacity. But, independent of this circumstance, he has not been less industrious to convict himself in his official capacity. A superiority at sea, he grants, ought to be maintained; that superiority has not been maintained; why, then, remain in an office to execute ministerially, when he must know that those who have acted with him have failed in their first duty, that of having a superior fleet to any that France and Spain can bring against us? As to his lordship's answer to the state of the navy, in November, by giving a list upon paper of 49 ships of the line, in his opinion it only served to confirm the assertion of the deceased noble earl; for, with all his lordship's ingenuity, the total, after deducting the ships condemned, burnt, disabled, repairing, stripped of part of their crews to be put on board others, &c. did not amount, on the 20th instant, to more than about 35 ships of the line, ready to proceed to sea, at a day's notice, and seven in a fortnight. He defied the noble earl to contradict him. If so, then it was fair to say, that either the state of the fleet in November was fallacious, or the noble earl, with the aid of a six months press, during the two last of which it was carried on with all imaginable vigour, had done next to nothing; though, from the evidence now on the table, he was fully apprized for the greater part of the time, that France was arming, and preparing to strike a blow against this kingdom, or some of its dependencies.

As to what had been recommended to | him, in order to assist in procuring sea men, he was ready to do every thing in his power. He disliked the mode of manning our navy by a press; but necessity superseded all other consideration. The time was now come when we must contend for the very existence of this country as a free state. He disapproved of a press, when the purpose it was intended to serve was the enslaving our brethren in America; but as soon as the French minister, by drawing the mask aside, had declared the intentions of his court, he began to entertain very different sentiments; and as a proof that he did so, he appealed to the noble earl, who as a minister, must know, that he offered his services, and engaged to raise a regiment; stipulating no other condition, but that he might be permitted to serve as a professional man, without pay or any species of emolument whatever. It was not thought proper to accept of this tender; but his duty to his country nevertheless pointed out to him to advance its interests to the utmost of his ability, without waiting to do it in the manner most agreeable to him.

The Earl of Bristol. In the weak state of body I am in, your lordships will easily believe it must be a very strong impulse of the duty I owe my King and country that could induce me to appear before your lordships lame as I am, and intrude on those deliberations which this country now so much stands in need of. I assure your lordships that all the bodily pains I have gone through, ever since I had the honour of being last in this House, great as they were, were not equal to that which I felt in my mind, at being deprived, in so critical and dangerous a moment, of giving every assistance in my power in my different capacities, to endeavour to extricate this country from the deplorable state it is reduced to, through the fatal counsels of those who have been intrusted with the affairs of this kingdom.

My lords, the noble duke has fully expatiated on the two principal heads of his motion, which are, first, to prove the intelligence received regularly ever since the 3d of Jan. 1778, of the fitting of the Toulon squadron, till the 13th of April last, of their sailing; and our never taking any steps to prevent their sailing, by having a squadron at Gibraltar, or ever sending orders for any to sail till the 20th of this month. Secondly, by such omission, our having effectually deprived the colo[VOL. XIX.]

nies of any security from that squadron, left our trade and even our own coasts, exposed to, the insults and attacks of that squadron. And, my lords, what has fallen from the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty, in opposition to these motions, being in my opinion, still stronger arguments for the resolutions moved for, I must observe to your lordships, that it is notorious, though we have been near 20 months preparing for a war with France, that, till within these six weeks, we have never had a ship make any attempt to look into Brest, to observe what that fleet was about; till the Bienfaisant the other day was ordered; but whom the French never suffered to approach the port. Nor can I learn that we have ever had a ship or frigate look into Toulon, although that fleet has been fitting ever since Nov. 1777; and it is notorious, that part of the French fleet were in the road of Toulon ever since January; and between that time and the 13th of April, that they sailed, you have had no ships to watch them: and surely, my lords, had our fleet been in the boasted situation we have heard, and that there had been even 35 sail of the line ready for immediate service in March last, why were not 12 or 14 ships dis patched to the Mediterranean, which must have effectually prevented the Toulon fleet from passing the Streights; and I believe, would have effectually prevented their moving from Toulon. No, my lords, the French fleet would never have stirred, nor would any squadron have attempted to have gone into the Streights, whilst ours were lying at Gibraltar, or in the Streights' mouth. As certainly, had any ships sailed from Brest, you might then have spared others to follow those, and join your own, provided you had ships off Brest, to watch their motions also. Your lordships must all remember, that admiral Osborn, in 1759, kept the French fleet a whole winter from passing the Streights, by his diligence in cruizing for ever in an easterly wind: and though that since was fatal to his life, yet it not only kept the French from sailing, but he took three of their ships, by which he ruined that intended expedition, and obliged the rest to return to Toulon, having locked them up for some time in Carthagena. I was one of that squadron, and cannot think any of your lordships can have forgot that memorable service, except the noble lord, who might have profited by the example, and by sending a squadron to the Medi[4 E]

terranean, have saved himself the shame which I think the ignorance of the present situation of the Toulon fleet now covers him with; as also, the censures, to say no more, with which his fellow-subjects must for ever load him, should any blow be given by that fleet: nor will any providential impediment, which may occur to prevent that squadron as yet from acting, disculpate his lordship and his brethren: their inactivity, after the wanton profusion of the public money, remains the same, and renders them equally censurable, equally culpable.

The noble lord told us, in March, he had 90 frigates, to replace those with lord Howe, if any were wanted; if so, why were not two or three sent off Toulon, two or three off Brest, and one to attend the motions, at a distance, of the enemy's fleet when sailed, by which you might have had almost a certainty of their destination. At present you know not where they are they are on the coast of Barbary; they are off Minorca; to-day they are returned to Toulon; in short, they are in a fog, in the clouds. Is this ignorance to be borne, my lords? My lords, if we had not frigates, at least I would have had some light vessel hired, if only a clean tartan, to have kept them company till they passed the Streights; there was time sufficient to have had that executed. My lords, it turns out there were no frigates fit for service. Why not send one of the lightest line of battle ships, or two, for that important service, instead of keeping them cruizing at a great distance from the Channel, where they could neither protect our coasts from insults of the American privateers; nor could they protect our trade, or even be a watch over the motions of the enemy's fleets in any part. So much, my lords, for the wise conduct and distribution of those few ships fit for service, which I am positive, till within these eight weeks, did not surpass 22 sail of the line here in England: but instead of this, my lords, the services of every kind were to be neglected and postponed, and even the trade delayed with their convoys, till the first lord of the Admiralty could shew his Majesty this boasted fleet; and for that purpose rendezvoused them at Spithead, where they ought at this time never to have been collected; but the Plymouth ships should have remained either there or at Torbay, ready for immediate service: instead of which, they are brought all to Spithead, where there

was neither beer nor water sufficient for such a number, and locked up afterwards, as your lordships see, by the westerly winds.

Your lordships will remember that this fleet has been fitting since Nov. 1776; that it was March 1778, that the first lord of the Admiralty told us he had then 35 sail of the line ready for service; and that from 1771, we have always had 20 sail of guardships of the line, which his lordship always boasted were ships fit for service, not hulks, useless as they were left to him; and that, after all this, and with drawing from every service every ship that could be collected, and straining every nerve, there could only be 31 ships of the line produced to his Majesty. My lords, I am happy that his Majesty has been pleased to honour his fleet with his royal presence: no man can respect or love his sovereign more than I do; but I cannot say that was the moment to have chosen, to have collected the fleet, to have shewn his Majesty, by which means every thing must be postponed, and every service of the state neglected; and for what? Only to shew his Majesty 31 ships; the poor remains of once so great a fleet! Nor was his Majesty told how these were fitted and manned; that even two of the capital ships of that squadron, intended for the two senior flags, were only tolerably manned a few days before his Majesty's arrival. The Prince George, admiral Keppel's ship, having had near 300 men changed; and the Queen, admiral Harland's, between one and two hundred vagabonds exchanged for as many picked men ; and where could these men have been so picked, had not other ships been dismantled for them? the Resolution, Burford and Centaur, and two admirals just returned from a three years station each, whose men were also taken, I mean admiral Gayton, from his Jamaica station, and admiral Mann from the Mediterranean. These are facts known to the whole fleet: exclusive of this, there is not a 74 gun ship which does not go out with 50 seamen less than her war comple ment. My lords, is this being manned fit for action? Is this being fitted after two years preparation? But, my lords, many and many admirals and captains have complained to me of this reduction in time of war. His lordship will perhaps tell us many have approved of it to him. No wonder they have so; they knowing the noble lord's method of acquiring approbation. I desire no such. I have nothing

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