pended; not spent in private jobs; not wasted, in maintaining a set of servile dependents, or corrupting the representatives of the people in parliament. Let every operation of government be as open as day-light; and then any loan the service of the state may require, will, I venture to promise, be easily obtained. I have a great esteem for several individuals in France; but though the people of this country are much degenerated from what they were, I would have the noble duke consider the sort of people we shall have to contend with, infinitely more degenerated than us, should a war ensue. Men who have lost all that love of glory, military prowess, and superior discipline, which was known to prevail during the reign of Louis the 14th; I profess, I believe such is the spirit of our very women, that if the combat were left to them alone, they would be equal to the task of driving the French out of this kingdom, should they attempt to invade us.

America. The noble duke's reply of yesterday, to what fell from the noble earl, was founded principally upon that expression of his lordship, which I have just alluded to, "That there were means for this country to go to war with France, though he knew not what." This expression, the noble duke misinterpreted, and asked how the noble earl could talk of the policy of going to war, when in the same instant, he acknowledged he knew not the means? The expression, my lords, I think, is exceedingly defensible. It was a mere mode of speaking. It was not the place, nor was it necessary, that the noble earl should explain, in the hurry of debate, nor disclose plans more proper to be considered elsewhere. Possibly, the noble duke would not rest contented with general assertions; he would call for more substantial proofs. He would ask, where are the men, where is the money? I answer his grace, I see the bar full of men, there are three or four hundred now in this House. The streets of London are full of men. I see men every day pass in crowds on the Bath road, which was one continued street almost, abounding with passengers, horses and carriages, till the late distresses thinned it. Look round you on every side, and see what a scene of population and opulency presents itself. Look into Hyde-Park, St. James'sstreet. Look into the city, there is money enough there. Perhaps the noble duke will say, though there is money enough there, the minister could not, notwithstanding all the plenty, obtain the late loan, but on very disadvantageous terms. Let the noble duke consider, there is an essential difference between having money, and lending it. The monied men, and I think very wisely, have no confidence in the present administration, they will not trust their money in such hands. No honest or intelligent men would; and whoever did, not only did a foolish thing, but actually did their country a disservice. Let the present blundering set of ministers resign: let honest and capable men fill their places. Men capable of giving spirit and vigour to the operations of government. Let the present paltry practices of petty private negociations be given up. Let every thread of the secret system be cut, and all those little low schemes of crafty lawyers, devised by them to sooth their own vanity, be abandoned. Let the public be convinced, that their money is honestly and fairly ex

The present ministry have been the ruin as well as disgrace of this country. They trifle, they negociate, they patch up; and the whole of their evasions and tricks is but a patch-work, formed of shreds of pitiful expedients. The whole of their conduct, since the shameful transaction about Falkland's island, has been entirely in this way. If other men were at the helm, France dared not act in this manner; her ministers know it. Vergennes, one of the ablest men in France, has said as much: I have it from the best authority. He has ludicrously complimented them on account of their political sagacity. He acknowledges their ways to be past finding out. He says, no man can tell the next thing they mean to do; and he, or some other of the French cabinet, has said, whilst the present ministers stay in, France has too much good sense to go to war. This country should have long since determined for peace or war. I have heard much of invasions, but I know France and Spain both to be vulnerable in many places. But four years since, a revolt might have been easily fomented in Brittany; the inhabitants were ripe for incurrection. Much is said of the disposition and compact figure of France. I believe they are far from being so united, as some persons would persuade us. Spain, in many respects, is equally vulnerable. I know a particular part of that kingdom, which I shall not now name, where she might be easily and successfully attacked.

their opinions as to the measures proper to be pursued: but there is only one opinion entertained of the present ministers; they are held in almost universal contempt, if not detestation. The city of London, which, to its honour, has conducted itself so judiciously throughout this business, contains persons of both descriptions. I do not deal in little, private letters, or secret intelligence. I despise every kind of importance drawn from such resources; but two particulars lately came to my knowledge (not, I do assure your lordships, of my own seeking) which will shew the different dispositions I have been describing. One was, an intended operation on our stocks, which would shake public credit to its lowest foundations, and reduce the value of stocks at least 6 per cent. The other was, for a spirited attack upon a part of the territories of the crown of France, which if made must prove successful.

When the noble duke, my lords, asks for the means, I answer him, that great things may be done, by opulent and spirited individuals. There was a time in which, if possible, this nation stood in a more perilous situation than even it stands in at present, and yet it was saved by the public spirit of the city of London, and the happy exertions of a few patriotic individuals. The period I mean was, when Spain threatened to invade us in the latter end of the reign of queen Elizabeth. Spain was to have borrowed a large sum of money, in 1585, to victual her fleet, from the bank of Genoa. Sir Thomas Gresham heard of this, and managed matters so dexterously, as to borrow this very money, I think 40,000l. by which means the Spaniards were obliged to defer their project for that year; so that when the Armada put to sea, this country was in a state of preparation, and the event is too well known to repeat. Thus, by the zeal and good sense of a few opulent merchants, among whom sir Thomas Gresham took the lead, this country was preserved from the yoke of the Spanish tyranny, or from being reduced to a Spanish province.

The noble duke asks, what can one man do, be his talents ever so great? I will remind his grace what one man did do, in the very affair to which I have been alluding: the commander of our fleet fought the Spanish armada, contrary to his positive instructions, and defeated it. I will tell his lordship what one man did upon a more recent occasion: Prince [VOL. XIX. ]

Ferdinand of Brunswick, with 40,000 men, beat the French with 100,000; and, by his amazing military talents, kept the whole land force of France engaged, while we were making conquests of their colonies and dependencies in every quarter of the globe. Prince Ferdinand was but one man, but then he was one of those men, who are very extraordinary persons, and who would, if occcasion made it necessary, be of most essential service to this country. And if a war should be the consequence of the present misunderstanding, which I think it must, I know no man more fit to call to the head of our army than that illustrious prince. I am persuaded it is not the characteristic of an English general officer to be jealous. I know there are many able general officers in my eye, but I know, too, they are too generous, too noble minded, too much attached to their country, to let their own personal pretensions stand between such an appointment, and the national interest and preservation. A noble lord, for whose military character I have a very high opinion, and who has been lately, I understand, called to the head of his profession, (lord Amherst) will, I trust, excuse me, I do not recommend the present appointment to take off from his merit: I know it ; it is universally acknowledged by his country; but his own modesty would urge him to agree with me in the propriety of the hint I have now thrown out.

My lords, I say, one man can achieve great things, if he possesses the confi dence of the people, and by that hold can call forth that spirit which has always proved victorious when properly and judiciously directed. What was the state of Holland in the celebrated year 1672, when obliged to fight against France and England united? The United Provinces were then precisely in the state of despondency that Britain is now: add to this, that her troops and fleets were undisciplined and spiritless. The two brothers, Andrew and Cornelius De Witt, endeavoured all they could to rouze them to a sense of their situation. One of them turned admirat himself, and fought the enemy, but nothing would do; the people were degenerate; all military discipline, regula tion, and subordination, were at an end. Burghers and burghers' sons were placed in the highest and most important com mands: nay, so far had this evil spread, that military and naval officers employed substitutes! In fine, the people were so [3 X]

who are represented at Versailles, as men so mutable, various, and so contradictory in their measures, that the last was of such a nature, that no man, unless possessed of the spirit of divination, could tell what the next would be.

immersed in sloth, corruption, and so overwhelmed with despondency, that 12 or 13 straggling soldiers would have possessed themselves of a very strong fort, which led to the capital, if a servant woman had not braved the danger alone, and timely pulled up the draw-bridge. What was the consequence of all this? The only two virtuous men in the republic, the two De Witts, were sacrificed to the ill-founded prejudices of an enraged populace. The people grew desperate. Offers had been made to Louis 14, their conqueror, then the most potent prince in Europe, and aided by England, to give up every thing, but just to retain the name of sovereignty. It was refused by that haughty monarch with contempt. This rouzed the people to act as one man. Their supineness was no more; rouzed from their political lethargy, every man became a sailor or a soldier; and the event corresponded with the means employed. Charles the 2nd saw his error. He was detached from so unnatural an alliance. Holland once more recovered its freedom, and, in a very few years after, was able to vie with the first powers in Europe. It was the high, political knowledge of the De Witts that proved the cause of their unhappy fate; as statesmen, they could never be persuaded that Charles the 2nd would have been so great a madman or ideot as to have joined France in forming a system of power which must have ultimately ended in the destruction or conquest of his own kingdoms. De Witt's observation, who was the wisest and ablest statesman in Europe, when he heard Charles had acceded to the treaty with France, so evidently repugnant to the interests of his crown and people, was, that "no man could possibly pretend even to guess at the extent of folly." I confess the observation has made a deep impression on my memory. I have often revolved it in my mind; and I think the period is now arrived, when it may be applied with the strictest justice. It points directly to the conduct of the present members in administration, who seem determined to push their folly farther than any men in office had ever done before. Indeed, it may, by some of their advocates, be urged in their favour, as tending to mislead our enemies; for I have heard more than once, that the principal difficulty with the French cabinet has been to explain by system, what has hitherto remained inexplicable, the conduct of the British administration; $

My lords, our ministers, if they deserve that name, seem in a state of stupefaction. They see ruin approaching, and take no one measure to prevent, or even arrest its progress. They neither prepare for peace nor war. They know, they must know, that an invasion is intended. I have had repeated advices, within these three weeks, that the coasts of Brittany and Normandy are lined with troops. There is not a person who has lately left that country, with whom I converse, who has not assured me of the fact. What is the nominal minister? The servus servi. What are those who act with and in subordination to him? The servi servorum of this phantom of power and mock importance. What has their employers desired them to say? That the court of Spain will not join France. The arrival of a courier from Madrid is announced! These are the joyful tidings; the stocks rise one per cent. till the pitiful trick is detected, and they fall to their former price. Then again it is whispered, we are to have no war. It cannot be, say the whisperers, if America is declared independent. Here again is another subterfuge. Were I to resort to conjecture, I should be apt to suspect the latter to be the case. Ministers here are silent; they will not speak, or they know nothing. The minister in the other House has lost all credit, even with his greatest friends and admirers. He is never of the same opinion two days running, or even twice in the same debate. No man, in or out of the House, pays the least attention to what he says. He says any thing, and of course says nothing. "I would not take the ghost's word for a ducat," is an expression extremely applicable to him. But it is not even their tricks, evasions, and successive contradictions, that so much surprize me, as their total inattention to national security. Do they know the length of coast that is to be defended? That Plymouth, which is almost insulated, will require 10,000 men for its defence; Portsmouth as many more; Chatham and the county of Kent an equal number? Are ministers ignorant, that if the French should make good a landing, that there is not a single post from the water-side to the metropolis but one, and