perfection that cleaves, in fome degree, to creatures of the higheft capacities, as they are creatures, that is, beings of finite and limited natures. The prefence of every created being is confined to a certain meafure of fpace; and confequently his obfervation is ftinted to a certain number of objects. The fphere in which we move, and act, and understand, is of a wider circumference to one creature, than another, according as we rife one above another in the fcale of exiftence. But the wideft of these our spheres has its circumference. When, therefore, we reflect on the Divine nature, we are fo ufed and accustomed to this imperfection in ourselves, that we cannot forbear, in fome measure, afcribing it to HIM, in whom there is no fhadow of imperfection. Our reafon indeed affures us, that his attributes are infinite; but the poornefs of our conceptions is fuch, that it cannot forbear fetting bounds to every thing it contemplates, till our reafon comes again to our fuccour, and throws down all thofe little prejudices, which rife in us unawares, and are natural to the mind of man.

We fhall therefore utterly extinguish this melancholy thought, of our being overlooked by our Maker, in the multiplicity of his works, and the infinity of thofe objects among which he feems to be inceffantly employed, if we confider, in the first place, that he is omniprefent; and in the fecond, that he is omniscient.

If we confider him in his omniprefence, his being paffes through, actuates, and fupports, the whole frame of nature. His creation, and every part of it, is full of him. There is nothing he

has made, that is either fo diftant, fo little, or fo inconfiderable, which he does not effentially inhabit. His fubftance is within the fubftance of every being, whether material or immaterial, and as intimately prefent to it, as that being is to itfelf. A It would be an imperfection in him, were he able to move out of one place into another; or to withdraw himself from any thing he has created, or from any part of that space which he diffufed and fpread abroad to infinity. In fhort, to speak of him in the language of the old philofophers, he is a being whofe centre is every where, and his circumference no where.

In the fecond place, he is omniscient as well as omniprefent. His omnifcience indeed neceffarily and naturally flows from his omniprefence. He cannot but be conscious of every motion that arifes in the whole material world, which he thus effentially pervades; and of every thought that is ftirring in the intellectual world, to every part of which he is thus intimately united. Were the foul feparate from the body, and with one glance of thought should start beyond the bounds of the creation; should it, for millions of years, continue its progrefs through infinite fpace, with the fame activity, it would still find itself within the embrace of its Creator, and encompaffed by the immensity of the Godhead.

In this confideration of the Almighty's omniprefence and omnifcience, every uncomfortable thought vanishes. He cannot but regard every thing that has being, especially fuch of his creatures who fear they are not regarded by him. He is privy to all their thoughts, and to that anxiety

of heart in particular, which is apt to trouble them on this occafion: for, as it is impoffible he fhould overlook any of his creatures, fo we may be confident that he regards, with an eye of mercy, those who endeavour to recommend themselves to his notice; and, in unfeigned humility of heart, think themselves unworthy that he fhould be mindful of them.

ADDISON.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENTATIVE PIECES.

SECTION I.

Happiness is founded in Rectitude of Conduct.

ALL men pursue good, and would be happy, if they knew how: not happy for minutes, and miferable for hours; but happy, if poffible, through every part of their exiftence. Either, therefore, there is a good of this steady, durable kind, or there is not. If not, then all good must be tranfient and uncertain; and if fo, an object of the lowest value, which can little deserve our attention or inquiry. But if there be a better good, fuch a good as we are feeking; like every other thing, it must be derived from fome caufe; and that cause must either be external, internal, or mixed; in as much as, except these three, there is no other poffible. Now a fteady, durable good, cannot be derived from an external cause; fince all derived from externals muft fluctuate as they fluctuate. By the fame rule, it cannot be derived from a mixture of the two; because the part which is external, will proportionably destroy its effence. What then remains but the cause internal? the very caufe which we have supposed, when we place the fovereign good in mind,-in rectitude of conduct.

HARRIS.

SECTION II.

Virtue Man's highest Interest.

I FIND myself existing upon a little spot, furrounded every way by an immenfe unknown expanfion.-Where am I? What fort of place do I inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated in every inftance to my convenience? Is there no excess of cold, none of heat to offend me? Am I never annoyed by animals, either of my own, or a different kind? Is every thing fubfervient to me, as though I had ordered all myfelf? No-nothing like it—the farthest from it poffible. The world appears not, then, originally made for the private convenience of me alone ?-It does not. But is it not poffible fo to accommodate it, by my own. particular induftry? If to accommodate man and beaft, heaven and earth, if this be beyond me, it is not poffible. What confequence then follows; or can there be any other than this-If I feek an interest of my own detached from that of others, I seek an intereft which is chimerical, and which can never have existence.

How then muft I determine? Have I no intereft at all? If I have not, I am stationed here to no purpose. But why no intereft? Can I be contented with none but one: feparate and detached ? Is a focial intereft, joined with others, fuch an abfurdity as not to be admitted? The bee, the beaver, and the tribes of herding animals, are fufficient to convince me, that the thing is fomewhere

at leaft poffible.

How, then, am I affured that it

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