observation upon the objective. Whether by innate ideas Des Cartes meant something coëval in its existence with the mind to which it belongs, and illuminating the understanding before the external senses begin to operate, or not, as Locke supposed, certainly the great tendency of his philosophy was to commute the subjective with the objective to lead to a high a priori philosophy and science to turn back the Baconian movement by reversing its method. The task, therefore, of Locke's philosophy was to restore the Baconian method by developing its psychological basis. Therefore, repudiating all knowledges prior to experience beginning in the senses, Locke says: "If it be demanded when a man begins to have any ideas, I think the trne answer is, when he first has any sensation. I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coëval with sensation." Locke then enounces two-sources of ideas, in the passage which we have already quoted; and, in accordance with the principle that sensation is prior to all ideas in the understanding, he treats of the ideas of sensation first, and of refléction second; being induced to do this by the great purpose of his philosophyto throw observation upon external nature. But that Locke meant to assert that there is an interval of time between our knowledge of matter and of mind, cannot be maintained; and least of all, that the knowledge of matter has the priority. It really mortifies us that these stale criticisms, which make Locke a mere Sensationalist, should be written anew in the history of philosophy by a countryman of Locke's at this late day. Mr. Morell has, as it were, per mitted Cousin to hold his hand while he writes the history of philosophy. He has, therefore, divided all philosophers into two classes, Sensationalists and Idealists. This division is based upon the supposition, that Eclecticism is the true account of the development of philosophy. This view of the development of philosophy, taught him by Cousin, led him to follow that philosopher in his strictures upon Locke, and class him amongst Sensationalists. Eclecticism assumes that no one man, from the very necessary order of philosophical development, can lay open the foundations of philosophy broad enough to bear the superstructure-can lay open sufficiently sensation and self-consciousness as sources of knowledge. It postulates, that every philosopher and his age has developed either the one or the other of these sources of knowledge, but never both. And that, in the order of things, a great mind, endowed with a universal genius of criticism, and possessed of all learning in philosophy, must discover a higher method than had thus far been pursued the méthod of Eclecticism; a method assumed to be as far above induction and reflective analysis, as the eclectic philosopher is above those one-idea philosophers who, given up to either Sensationalism or Idealism, are his necessary. forerunners in the development of philosophy. But this boasted Eclecticism, when searched to the bottom, is discovered to be a mere scheme of compilation, a universal plagiarism.

As we can know things only in so far as we have a faculty of knowing in general, it is necessary, in order to a true theory, of knowledge, that we determine the scope of this faculty. This Locke endeavoured, to do. He maintained that all our knowledge is obtained through observation. He further maintained that the faculties of observation are two: 1. Sense, or external perception; 2. Self-consciousness, or internal perception. The fundamental problem, therefore, of Locke's philosophy, was to determine the conditions of our faculties of knowing. But Locke, did not see this problem very definitely, if at all.

All knowledge is divisible into two great branches: 1. The objects of knowledge; 2. The mode of knowing. The objects of knowledge Locke properly divided into two great classes, external and internal, corresponding to his two faculties of sense and reflec tion, or self-consciousness. The mode of knowing is also divisible into two parts: 1. The possibility of knowing from the nature of thought; 2. The possibility of knowing from the nature of existence. This last discrimination Locke had no notion of. The problem of the conditions of knowledge, therefore, never presented itself distinctly to Locke. It is true, that occasionally he is constrained by the exigencies of thought to utter truths which properly fall under the problem of the conditions of thought. He says, for instance: "He would be thought void of common sense who, asked on the one hand or on the other, were to give a reason why it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." Here is a distinct recognition of the principle of contradiction, which, of course, has its origin and guarantee in the intellect or common sense. Locke, too, believed in necessary and universal truths, as distinguished from contingent; which, of course, can only find their guarantee in the intellect, being in no way derivable from or through sensitive cognition. And in his criterion of certainty he was extremely subjective, maintaining that the subjective in knowledge is much more certain than the objective; thereby errone ously ignoring the simultaneity of the subjective and objective in the fundamental antithesis of consciousness, and the consequent equal certainty of each. "Our existence (says Locke) is known to us by a certainty yet higher than our senses can give us of the existence of things, and that is internal perception, or self-consciousness, or intuition, from whence may be drawn, by a train of ideas, the surest and most incontestible proof of the existence of God." This, surely, is not the doctrine of a mere Sensationalist. If Locke had been called by the polemical necessities of his times to consider the conditions of thought as a special problem, he would doubtless have evolved, other principles similar to those we have just mentioned; and, while he would have denied that they are innate, as articulate propositions, he would have admitted that they are silent in laws necessitating thought to its judgments. For

it should be observed that, Locke's essay was not the mere theory of a recluse student, but had a polemical birth in the midst of an age in which the discussion of great fundamental doctrines were stirring, in an extraordinary degree, the practical activities of life. Locke was a mighty champion in the universal strife; and his essay was written to counteract the subjective tendency of the Cartesian philosophy. Hence the great stress laid on sensation as a source of knowledge or ideas, to the comparative neglect of the other source, termed by him reflection. But it is only a comparative neglect; for, in the first place, he purges, as we have seen, the source of reflection from the doctrine of innate ideas, which, in a logical point of view, are substantially the idols of Bacon. Then, after carefully affirming the existence of two sources of ideas, he proceeds, in accordance with the demands of philosophy in that age, to develope the source of sensation. Locke's philosophy is, there fore, not a one-sided philosophy. Like Bacon, Locke was a labourer in the great field of practical activity. Not only was he a physician skilled in the practice, and well read in the theory of medicine, but he was a powerful writer on government and legislation, and not only these, but a polemic, strong in theological discussion. To estimate, therefore, the mental theory of Locke's essay, it is necessary to view it through the medium of the times, and of the part he took in the strifes of thought. But what is chiefly to be praised in Locke's writings, is the love of truth which everywhere prevails. "Whatever I write (says he), as soon as I shall discover it not to be truth, my hand shall be forwardest to throw it into the fire."

Locke had enounced the doctrine that all our knowledge is founded on experience, meaning by experience the whole sphere of conscious mental activity, thereby embracing in it reflection, as well as sensation. Hume, seizing upon this doctrine, and narrowing experience to sensation, resolved all our universal necessary judgments into mere factitious habits of mind, and subverted the foundations of theoretical truth, and laid the basis of a scheme of absolute skepticism. For, if our fundamental primary judgments are not necessary, but are mere habits of mind formed from the observation of the contingent, coëxistent, and antecedent, and consequent phenomena of external nature, then is human opinion but waves of thought moved by the accidents of the shifting winds of ever-changing phenomena; and what seems true this moment may seem false the next. This chaos of thought was brought into order and certainty by Reid. He it was who evolved out of the con- . tents of human consciousness those fundamental, necessary, primary beliefs, which constitute both the basis and the criterion of human knowledge. In Locke's time, the vice of philosophy was too great subjectivity. In Reid's time, it was a total abnegation of all certain knowledge, but especially of those fundamental judgments which alone fix certainty in thought a vice which sprung out of

the extravagant objectivity to which Locke's philosophy had been carried by Hume, confining all thought to the elements furnished by sensation. If Hobbes and Gassendi had obtained in Britain as great ascendency in Locke's time as Hume did in Reid's, Locke would perhaps have dwelt as much more on reflection as he did on sensation, and the philosophy of Reid would have been anticipated. But, in the conditions of the development of human thought, it was perhaps necessary that the development by. Locke should take place, so that its apparent one-sidedness should appear in Hume, and thus a necessity be produced for a reëxamination of buman thought to its ultimate basis in the primary facts of consciousness. Reid, therefore, in fact, took up philosophy where Locke left it, and continued the Baconian movement, with a fuller development of the subjective than there was in Locke, but still guided by the fundamental doctrine of Bacon, that truth consists in the correspondence or agreement between thought and its object; and that, in order to secure the truth; observation of phenomena is the indispensable condition. The movement was still towards a fuller outward observation of external nature. And the Baconian method received a fuller theoretical development in the psychological doctrine of Reid, that we perceive external objects themselves, as conciousness testifies, and not merely representations of them, as all previous philosophers had taught. And by his doctrine of the simultaneity and consequent equal certainty of the knowledge of the objective and the subjective, Reid overthrew the doctrine of Des Cartes, that our knowledge of external things must be referred by a secondary act of thought to consciousness for verification. And in this doctrine of Reid, for the first time in philosophy, the subjective and the objective obtained their equilibrium. In his philosophy neither preponderates over the other. While, therefore, in the philosophy of Reid, the subjective is prevented from being commuted with the objective, the certainty of the objective is equalized with the subjective.

But it came to pass, that the doctrines of Reid were misrepre sented and perverted by Brown, and the Sensationalism of Destutt Tracy of France; and kindred doctrines of Hume, diluted with rhetoric, were proclaimed by him in their stead. Brown made consciousness convertible with feeling; and the thought, that the whole is greater than its part, is considered by him as a feeling. Thus the most extravagant Sensationalism again prevailed in Britain. And though the proud boast of Bacon-that, so potent was his induction as a method of investigation, that it would put common minds on a level with the most powerful--has not been realized, yet it has brought into the fields of physical science the merest empirics in company with true scientists. Thus the downward tendency of physical inquiry needs to be counteracted by a discipline of higher studies. Human reason needs to be rescued from the dirt of a gross Sensationalism.

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While this downward tendency of the objective method of Bacon has been realized in Britain, the subjective method of Des Cartes has been realizing its results on the continent of Europe, In the philosophy of Spinosa, it tended to Pantheism, In that of Leibnitz, from its opposite pole, it made man a mere machine, and the physical world his counterpart, moving in harmony, not by interdependent cog-wheels, but by an unseen spiritual agency; ⚫ which doctrine, when sifted to the kernel, is also of Pantheistic tendency. But under the influence of the Cartesian method, enlarged in its scope to suit the necessities of its condition, human reason, at last, in the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, consum mated the grand apotheosis of error, by throwing aside the many idols of the ancient philosophy pointed out by Bacon, and substituting for them one supreme idol, impiously called the Absolute or Infinite.

But the greatest degradation of philosophy remains to be told. The prejudice against the Aristotelian logic, which begun in Ba con, was augmented by Locke; so that logic was almost ignored in Britain. The marvels accomplished in physics, by cooperation, through the method of induction, gave importance to men whose moderate abilities would ever exclude them from the higher study. of our intellectual nature; while the patient attention to details, which physical inquiries demand, caused an almost exclusive cultivation of the powers of observation, to the neglect of the higher faculties of the mind: Logic, therefore, as well as metaphysics, sunk to the lowest level, in the almost exclusive cultivation of physies.

In this state of philosophy, Archbishop Whately revived logic, in a work not displaying much ability, but, at all events, attracting the attention of thinkers. The work did not, however, place logic on that elevation which the indications of its history in the mediæval and the succeeding ages would have pointed out to any one well read in its literature. Nevertheless, it was an omen of the beginning of the cultivation of the higher faculties of the mind in an age of intellectual decadence. But, as low as the level of Whately's logic was, it was too high for the empiric spirit of a Sensational philosophy. Mr. John S. Mill, in his Logic, Ratiocinat ive and Inductive, dragged down logic into the very mire of empiricism. Taking Brown, who, we have seen, makes consciousness convertible with feeling, as his guide in the philosophy of the mind, he constructed a system of logic in which the higher faculties of the mind are ignored. While Whately, with some show of reason, resolved induction into deduction or syllogism proper, Mill most preposterously resolved all deduction into induction; and thereby consummated the degradation of logic. Mr. Mill repudiates entirely all necessary truths; consequently ignores the formal laws of thought, of which pure logic is the science, and reduces