parts they follow, with a nearly literal precifion, the words and even the form of thankfgiving, which is found in these old declaratory statutes. The two houses, in the act of king William, did not thank God that they had found a fair opportunity to affert a right to choose their own governors, much less to make an election the only lawful title to the crown. Their having been in a condition to avoid the very appearance of it, as much as poffible, was by them confidered as a providential escape. They threw a politic, well-wrought veil over every circumstance tending to weaken the rights, which in the meliorated order of fucceffion they meant to perpetuate; or which might furnish a precedent for any future departure from what they had then settled for ever. Accordingly, that they might not relax the nerves of their monarchy, and that they might preserve a close conformity to the practice of their ancestors, as it appeared in the declaratory statutes of queen Mary * and queen Elizabeth, in the next clause they vest, by recognition, in their majesties, all the legal prerogatives of the crown, declaring, "that in them they are most " fully, rightfully, and intirely invested, incorpo" rated, united, and annexed." In the clause which follows, for preventing questions, by reason of any pretended titles to the crown, they declare (observing also in this the traditionary * ist Mary, Seff. 3. ch. 1. language, " language, along with the traditionary policy of the nation, and repeating as from a rubric the language of the preceding acts of Elizabeth and James) that on the preferving “ a certainty in the SUCCESSION thereof, the unity, peace, and tran"quillity of this nation doth, under God, wholly " depend." They knew that a doubtful title of fuccession would but too much resemble an election; and that an election would be utterly destructive of the unity, peace, and tranquillity of this na"tion," which they thought to be confiderations of fome moment. To provide for these objects, and therefore to exclude for ever the Old Jewry doctrine of " a right to choose our own governors," they follow with a clause, containing a most solemn pledge, taken from the preceding act of Queen Elizabeth, as folemn a pledge as ever was or can be given in favour of an hereditary fucceffion, and as folemn a renunciation as could be made of the principles by this society imputed to them. "The lords " fpiritual and temporal, and commons, do, " in the name of all the people aforesaid, most humbly and faithfully submit themselves, their " heirs and posterities for ever; and do faith" fully promise, that they will stand to, main"tain, and defend their faid majesties, and " also the limitation of the crown, herein specified " and contained, to the utmost of their powers," &c. &c. So So far is it from being true, that we acquired a right by the Revolution to elect our kings, that if we had poffefsed it before, the English nation did at that time most solemnly renounce and ab+ dicate it, for themselves and for all their pofterity for ever. These gentlemen may value themselves as much as they please on their whig principles; but I never defire to be thought a better whig than Lord Somers; or to understand the principles of the Revolution better than those by whom it was brought about; or to read in the ✓ declaration of right any misteries unknown to those whose penetrating style has engraved in our ordinances, and in our hearts, the words and spirit of 'that immortal law. It is true that, aided with the powers derived from force and opportunity, the nation was at that time, in some sense, free to take what course it pleased for filling the throne; but only free to do so upon the same grounds on which they might have wholly abolished their monarchy, and every other part of their constitution. However they did not think fuch bold changes within their commission. It is indeed difficult, perhaps impoffible, to give limits to the mere abstract competence of the supreme power, such as was exercised by parliament at that time; but the limits of a moral competence, fubjecting, even in powers more indifputably fovereign, occasional will to permanent reason, and to the steady maxims of faith, justice, and fixed fundamental policy, are perfectly intelligible, and perfectly perfectly binding upon those who exercise any authority, under any name, or under any title, in the state. The house of lords, for instance, is not morally competent to diffolve the house of commons; no, nor even to dissolve itself, nor to abdicate, if it would, its portion in the legiflature of the kingdom. Though a king may abdicate for his own perfon, he cannot abdicate for the monarchy. By as strong, or by a stronger reason, the house of commons cannot renounce its share of authority. The engagement and pact of fociety, which generally goes by the name of the conftitution, forbids fuch invafion and such furrender. The constituent parts of a state are obliged to hold their public faith with each other, and with all those who derive any ferious interest under their engagaments, as much as the whole state is bound to keep its faith with feparate communities. Otherwise competence and power would foon be confounded, and no law be left but the will of a prevailing force. On this principle the fucceffion of the crown has always been what it now is, an hereditary fucceffion by law: in the old line it was a fucceffion by the common law; in the new by the statute law, operating on the principles of the common law, not changing the substance, but regulating the mode, and defcribing the perfons. Both these descriptions of law are of the fame force, and are derived from an equal authority, emanating from the common agreement and original compact of the flate, communi fponfione reipublice, and as fuch are equally binding t binding on king, and people too, as long as the terms are observed, and they continue the fame body politic. It is far from impossible to reconcile, if we do not fuffer ourselves to be entangled in the mazes of metaphysic sophistry, the use both of a fixed rule and an occasional deviation; the sacredness of an hereditary principle of fucceffion in our government, with a power of change in its application in cases of extreme emergency. Even in that extremity (if we take the measure of our rights by our exercise of them at the Revolution) the change is to be confined to the peccant part only; to the part which produced the necessary deviation; and even then it is to be effected without a decomposition of the whole civil and political mass, for the purpose of originating a new civil order out of the first elements of society. A state without the means of fome change is without the means of its conservation. Without such means it might even risque the loss of that part of the constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve. The two principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at the two critical periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a king. At both those periods the nation had loft the bond of union in their antient edifice; they did not, however, dissolve the whole fabric. On the contrary, in both cafes they regenerated the deficient part of the old conftitution through the |