Quæ non valeant singula juncta juvant. Quæ temporalia ad agendum, sunt perpetua ad excipiendum. Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur et omne per quod pervenitur ad illud. Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illud. jus domini regis et subditi concurrunt jus regis preferri debet. plus fit quam fieri debet videtur etiam illud fieri quod faciendum est. res non valet ut ago valeat quantum valere potest. Qui approbat non reprobat. Qui cum alio contrahit, vel est, vel debet esse conditionis ejus non ignarus. Qui ex damnato coitu nascuntur inter liberos non computentur. Qui hæret in literâ hæret in cortice. Qui in utero est, pro jam nato habetur, quoties de ejus commodo quæritur. Qui jussu judicis aliquod fecerit non videtur dolo malo fecisse quia parere necesse est. Qui non habet in ære luat in corpore. Qui per alium facit per seipsum facere videtur. Qui providet sibi providet hæredibus. Qui rationem in omnibus quærunt rationem subvertunt. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus. Qui sentit onus sentire debet et commodum. Qui suum recepit, licet a non suo debitore, non tenetur restituere. Qui tacet consentire videtur. Quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit. Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto. Quisquis est rei suæ moderator et arbiter. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit. Quod fieri non debet factum valet. Quod fieri debet facile præsumitur. Quod inesse debet inesse præsumitur. Quod meum est, sine me alienum fieri nequit. Quod non apparet non est. Quod non habet principium non habet finem. Quod nullius est, est domini regis. id ratione naturali occupanti conceditur. Quod nullius est, fit domini regis. Quod nullius est, fit occupantis. Quod remedio destituitur ipsâ re valet si culpa absit. Quod statim liquidari potest, pro jam liquido habetur. Quod sub certâ formâ concessum vel reservatum est non trahitur ad valorem vel compensationem. Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba fienda est. Reipublicæ interest voluntates defunctorum effectum sortiri. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Res judicata pro veritate accipitur. perit suo domino. Resoluto jure dantis, resolvitur jus accipientis. Respondeat superior. Res perit domino. Res sua nemini servit. Rex non potest peccare. nunquam moritur. Salus populi suprema lex. Scientia utrinque par pares contrahentes facit. Scire debes cum quo contrahis. Scire et scire debere æquiparantur in jure. Scribere est agere. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas. Simplex commendatio non obligat. Spoliatus ante omnia restituendus. Stabit præsumptio donec probetur in contrarium. Summa ratio est quæ pro religione facit. Summum jus, summa injuria. Tenor est qui legem dat feudo. Testimonia ponderanda sunt, non numeranda. Transit terra cum onere. Ubi eadem est ratio eadem est lex. ratio ibi idem jus. jus ibi remedium. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. Verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem. generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. illata inesse videntur. Verba posteriora propter certitudinem addita ad priora quæ certitudine indigent sunt referenda. relata hoc maximè operantur per referentiam ut in eis inesse videntur. Via trita via tuta. Vicarius non habet vicarium. Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. Volenti non fit injuria. Voluntas est ambulatoria usque ad mortem. Voluntas reputatur pro facto. 812 SECTION II. HOW ΤΟ ACQUIRE READINESS AND ACCURACY IN THE Ir legal principles could be applied as easily as they are acquired, there would be an end of the greatest difficulty which is experienced in prosecuting the legal profession. "Practice makes perfect" in this respect, as in every other; and should the student not have the opportunity of seeing sufficient practice in chambers, he must make practice for himself-by imagining cases of ordinary occurrence submitted to him for an opinion. Let us suppose him, for instance, to have carefully read and reflected upon the law of self-defence, as thus stated in Blackstone : "The first species of redress of private injuries which is obtained by the act of the party himself, is the defence of one's self, or the mutual and reciprocal defence of such as stand in the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant. In these cases, if the party himself, or any of these, his relations, be forcibly attacked, in his person, or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force; and the breach of the peace which happens, is chargeable upon him only who began the affray." *—Let him now put such simple cases to himself as the following, and endeavour to apply the above principles to them, with as much precision as if his opinion were actually asked by a client. Suppose, while a man is riding on horseback, another should beat the horse, from which the rider is obliged to dismount for fear of being thrown; would he be justified in * 3 Bla. Co. 3-4. horse-whipping the offender? [See 1 Mo. 24; 1 Siderfin, 433.] Or, suppose, that while a gentleman and his wife were riding on horseback on the high road, a man were to commence violently shouting, obviously intending to alarm the lady's horse, and persisted in doing so in spite of earnest remonstrance, till the horse began to rear and plunge violently: would the gentleman be justified in riding him down, if he could not otherwise put a stop to such dangerous uproar? Would a man be justified in knocking down one whom he saw in the act of aiming a blow at one of his most costly mirrors? If one, seeing at a little distance, a man threatening to strike his little sister, were to rush up and strike the man, would he be liable to an action? If a father were to come up the instant after his child had been struck by a man, and, in the frenzy of alarm and passion, were, without knowing whether his child had actually been struck, to knock down him who had struck it, -would the father be liable to an action? Thus let him go on imagining cases occurring among husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and servants, and others-accustoming himself, in short, to the prompt application of legal principles, not only in such cases as those above instanced, but in all the little occurrences and transactions of business which might lead to litigation. Suppose, for instance, a tradesman who has undertaken to repair a chronometer by a particular day, fail to complete the repairs by that day, and his customeran East India captain-should call for it, just before setting sail for India; can he insist on having his chronometer in its unfinished state, without paying the tradesman anything or can the latter insist upon being paid for the little that he has actually done?* Or suppose a man were to give another a cheque on his banker, which was not presented in time, would the banker be justified in paying it? Or suppose a banker-or the holder of a billwere to pay it before it was due ?-A fertile fancy can never be at a loss for such means as these, of exercising the mind, in the application of legal principles, and thus preparing it for the ready and skilful discharge of actual business. Thus our student, if in right earnest in his studies, may either when at chambers, or even while walking, whether alone, or in company with "like-minded friends,”—find "Books in the running brooks, Cases in stones, and-law in everything!" Another expedient may be mentioned, easier, but not less useful, than the foregoing. Let the student, after having carefully mastered the details of a particular case in the Reports, frame variations of particular circumstances, and consider what would have been the effect of such an altered state of facts. Let him imagine himself conducting such a case in court, when it took such an unexpected turn as that suggested, would that turn have varied the rule of law previously applicable to it, or not? Introduce-suppress-vary particular facts; will it signify? Suppose the woman had married, at a particular moment-or a man become bankrupt in the midst of certain transactions-or one of several partners had retired or become insolventthat a certain document had been missing-or a sentence omitted or changed, &c.-what would, in any of such events, have been the precise situation of the parties? See Sinclair v. Bowles, 9 B. & C. 92. † See Serle v. Norton, 2 Moo. & Rob., 401 (et Notas). It would be highly imprudent and dangerous to do so. Vide Smith's Merc. Law, 239 (3rd ed.), and Chitty on Bills, 260, 395 (9th ed.). |