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of doing it, is to refer them to general principles.”* man of average understanding, who has been early trained to the habit of this constant reference to principle, will not only find himself soon acquiring great additional knowledge, with decreasing effort; but cannot go far wrong, however suddenly, or at whatever disadvantage, he may be called upon to act in case of emergency and difficulty. How different is it with-if one may be pardoned such an expression—the unprincipled lawyer! The slightest unexpected difficulty-a hair's-breadth variation from the line of ita lex scripta-utterly discomfits him, and develops his profound ignorance of the science of the law. We had many more observations to offer upon this head, but our space forbids it.

IV. No one can have devoted himself to the perusal of the labours of our great legal luminaries-our Cokes and Plowdens-without discovering such an extent, accuracy, and profundity of knowledge, as may be looked for, in modern days, in vain. How was it obtained? Where were then the elementary treatises upon, the synthetical compendia of, law with which our times are so prolific, and on which lawyers of the present day now place so much dependence? "At present," says that legal giant of our own time, Lord Eldon,+ "lawyers are made good cheap, by learning law from Blackstone, and less elegant compilers. Depend upon it, men so bred will never be lawyers, (though they may be barristers,) whatever they may call themselves." That our forefathers were not entirely destitute of Treatises, Abridgments, and other assistants to legal study, is true: for the names of Glanville, Bracton, Britton, Fleta Saint

* Elements of the Phil. Hum. Mind, p. 425.

+ Ante, p. 392.

German, (in his Doctor and Student,) Perkins,-will at once occur to the reader as instances to the contrary. But how few are they-and at what long intervals of time -when compared with the rapidly multiplying Treatise writers of modern times! It was the incessant and systematic study of individual cases, both oral and writtenconstant attendance on the courts-and perusal of the Reports, which conduced to the formation of the legal greatness of the former sages of the law. The present enormous, and continually increasing number of Reported Cases, undoubtedly calls for aids to the modern practitioner, which were not so requisite to his predecessors : but, nevertheless, we all require to be cautioned against contracting a habit of exclusive, or mere primary, reliance upon such assistance. Able, accurate, and convenient Treatises now abound upon almost every head of law: how many persons are there who are indolently satisfied with them, and abandon the profitable labour of independent research, and with all its great direct, and incidental advantages! The author has been informed that the late Mr. Justice Bayley strenuously deprecated the perusal of Treatises, however able. "Read the Cases," said he, "for yourself and attend to the application of them, in practice." One can hardly be expected to follow this advice, to its literal extent: but thus far it may be regarded as sound and practicable :-Treatises are useful to guide you to the Cases, which you must then examine and study for yourself; and also to methodise your researches, and afford you convenient access to their results. If our Treatises become SUBSTITUTES for the close study of the various cases of which they consist, they will form a grievous stumbling block to both students and practi

tioners, who will become bitterly conscious of it, as soon as they are called upon to argue in open court, and are opposed to those who have not been equally foolish with themselves.

LASTLY. Let not the student be surprised or disheartened, if, for a considerable time, legal studies present to him a repulsive aspect. Let him PERSEVERE. Before steady energy and attention, "grim-visaged LAW will smooth its wrinkled front!"

"I have heard it observed," says Dugald Stewart, "that those who have risen to the greatest eminence in the profession of law, have been, in general, such as had at first an aversion to the study.* The reason probably is, that to a mind fond of general principles, every study must be at first disgusting, which presents to it a chaos of facts apparently unconnected with each other. But this love of arrangement, if united with perserving industry, will at last conquer every difficulty,-will introduce order into what seemed, on a superficial view, a mass of confusion, and reduce the dry and uninteresting detail of positive statutes into a system comparatively luminous and beautiful."+

The same remark occurs in a letter from Mr. Gray to his friend Mr. West. In the study of law the labour is long, and the elements dry and uninteresting; nor was ever anybody (especially those that afterwards made a figure in it) amused, or even not disgusted, at the beginning.'

"The famous antiquary, Spelman (says Burke), though no man was better formed for the most laborious pursuits, in the beginning deserted the study of the laws in despair-though he returned to it again, when a more confirmed age, and a strong desire of knowledge, enabled him to wrestle with every difficulty.'-Fragment on the History of the Laws of England, Burke's Works, vol. x. p. 553 (8vo ed.).”—Addenda to vol. 1st of Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 475 (6th ed.).

+ Philosophy, vol. i. p. 475 (6th ed.).

With this consolatory paragraph, the author closes the present chapter; hoping that it may be found to contain practical suggestions calculated to be useful to those for whom they are intended, if only by putting them upon inquiry amongst those who are better qualified to advise, than he who has here undertaken to do so. Quot homines, tot sententiæ; and possibly few persons of such capacity and experience as warrant their being consulted upon the subject, may concur in all, or even the majority, of the opinions contained in this chapter: but they are the result of much observation and reflection, and communication with many of the ablest and most eminent members of the profession.

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CHAPTER XV.

SPECIAL PLEADING

ITS HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND EXCELLENCE EXAMINED AND ILLUSTRATED.

THE sense in which the word "Pleading" is popularly understood, namely, as signifying the oral addresses and arguments of counsel, on behalf of their clients, in open court, has long served to mislead non-professional persons; who are still more mystified by the terms "special pleading" and "special pleader." We shall endeavour, in this chapter, to give a plain and popular, but at the same time faithful account of this most important and characteristic feature of our English jurisprudence:-of the means by which LAW is separated from FACT, and by which, in other words, the provinces of the judge, and of the jury, are kept distinct. We have, in former chapters, bestowed some pains upon the subject of equity pleading *; and glanced in ensuing onest at the systems adopted in the Criminal and Ecclesiastical Courts: giving interesting specimens of all in the Appendix. We have now, however, to deal with one of a much more exact and difficult nature than any of them; exhibiting, in the language of Chancellor Kent,§ a "science equally curious, logical, and

* Ante, chap. ix., pp. 368, et seq.

+ Ante, chaps. xií., xiii. App. pp. vi. et seq.; lxxxviii. et seq; ciii. et seq. § 4 Kent, Comm. 544.