much consideration, and converse with men of great and acknowledged intellectual eminence-to suggest one such: but before coming to it, something must be necessarily premised concerning a subject already referred to in the former section of this chapter-LOGIC.

Can a man reason well who knows nothing of logic? No-says one of its greatest living professors-Dr. Whately; who accuses Locke of serious error in holding the contrary. We believe that Dr. Whately's views are those now generally, and justly, prevalent. The following passage will be found very worthy of the student's meditation, before proceeding to the subject matter of the ensuing pages; in which one work of an illustrious writer will be found selected for elaborate exercitation: but that work is, in the opinion of a very eminent living logician (Dr. Copleston, the Bishop of Llandaff), "not intelligible, even in a single page, to one who is ignorant of LOGIC." The following, then, is the passage referred to :—

"In every instance in which we reason, in the strict sense of the word, i. e. make use of arguments, whether for the sake of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point; whatever may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain PROCESS takes place in the mind, which is ONE AND THE SAME in all cases, provided it be correctly conducted.

"Of course it cannot be supposed that every one is even conscious of this process in his own mind; much less, is competent to explain the principles on which it proceeds; which indeed is, and cannot but be, the case with every other process respecting which any system has been formed; the practice not only may exist independently of

* See the reasons assigned in Whately's Logic, Chap. I. § 1, " Analytical Outline of the Science."

the theory, but must have preceded the theory: there must have been language before a system of grammar could be devised; and musical compositions, previous to the science of music. This, by the way, will serve to expose the futility of the popular objection against logic, that men may reason very well who know nothing of it. The parallel instances adduced, show that such an objection might be applied in many other cases, where its absurdity would be obvious; and that there is no ground for deciding thence, either that the system has no tendency to improve practice, or that even if it had not, it might not still be a dignified and interesting pursuit.

"One of the chief impediments to the attainment of a just view of the nature and object of logic, is the not fully understanding, or not sufficiently keeping in mind, the SAMENESS of the reasoning process in all cases. If, as the ordinary mode of speaking would seem to indicate, mathematical reasoning, and theological, and metaphysical, and political, &c., were essentially different from each other, i. e. different kinds of reasoning, it would follow, that supposing there could be at all any such science as we have described logic, there must be so many different species, or at least different branches of logic. And such is perhaps the most prevailing notion. Nor is this much to be wondered at; since it is evident to all, that some men converse and write, in an argumentative way, very justly on one subject, and very erroneously on another; in which again others excel, who fail in the former. This error may be at once illustrated and removed, by considering the parallel instance of arithmetic, in which every one is aware that the process of a calculation is not affected by the nature of the objects, the numbers of which are before us; but

that (e. g.) the multiplication of a number is the very same operation, whether it be a number of men, of miles, or of pounds; though nevertheless persons may perhaps be found who are accurate in calculations relative to natural philosophy, and incorrect in those of political economy, from their different degrees of skill in the subjects of these two sciences; not surely because there are different arts of arithmetic applicable to each of these respectively.

"Others again, who are aware that the simple system of logic may be applied to all subjects whatever, are yet disposed to view it as a peculiar method of reasoning, and not, as it is, a method of unfolding and analysing our reasoning whence many have been led (e. g. the author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric)* to talk of comparing syllogistic reasoning with moral reasoning; taking it for granted that it is possible to reason correctly, without reasoning logically; which is, in fact, as great a blunder as if any one were to mistake grammar, for a peculiar language, and to suppose it possible to speak correctly, without speaking grammatically. They have, in short, considered logic as an art of reasoning; whereas (so far as it is an art) it is THE art of reasoning; the logician's object being, not to lay down principles by which one may reason, but by which all must reason, even though they be not distinctly aware of them to lay down rules, not which may be followed with advantage, but which cannot possibly be departed from in sound reasoning."+

It will be clear, from the foregoing intimation of the nature and design of the logical system, and also from what has been already advanced in the foregoing chapter of this

* Dr. Campbell.

+ Whately's Logic.

work, that no law-student can safely neglect to acquire at least some general knowledge of logic: in support of this assertion, a great number of eminent legal authorities might easily be arrayed. On the other hand, however, it is equally necessary to bear in mind an observation of Seneca. 'Prospicienda ista, sed prospicienda tantum, et a liminè salutanda: hactenus utilia, animum si præparent, non detinent. Tamdiu enim istis immorandum est, quamdiu nihil animus agere majus potest. Rudimenta sunt nostra, non opera.'

It can hardly be necessary to eulogise the concise and luminous treatise on Logic, of Dr. Whately, or spend many words in explaining how admirably it is adapted for the purposes of the student. He has pointed out with precision the true province of logic: has disentangled the science from the metaphysics with which it had so long been at once blended and confounded. It is very difficult to point out any portion of the work which may, by our student, be advantageously passed over: but perhaps the "Analytical Outline of the Science," Chap. I. (pp. 18-53) and Chap. III. "Of Fallacies,"* (pp. 135-212) may be mentioned as worthy of peculiar attention. The same distinguished author has also recently published a condensed and popular treatise on Logic, under the unpretending name of

* «The chemist," says Dr. Whately, "keeps by him his tests and his method of analysis, to be employed when any substance is offered to his notice, the composition of which has not been ascertained, or in which adulteration is suspected. Now a fallacy may aptly be compared to some adulterated compound; 'it consists of an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood, so entangled, so intimately blended, that the falsehood is (in the chemical phrase) held in solution: one drop of sound logic is that test which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom.' "— Whately's Elem. of Log. [quoting from "An Exam. of Ketts' Logic"] p. 31, 3rd ed.

Easy Lessons in Reasoning"--which consists, as already stated, (ante, p. 176-7) of a small volume of 160 pages, and An observation may be had for a couple of shillings! occurs in this latter work which may be here usefully presented to the reader :

"To frame indeed a system of rules which should equalise persons of all varieties of capacity, would be a project no less chimerical in this, than in other departments of learning; but it would certainly be a great point gained, if all persons were taught to exercise the reasoning faculty, as well as the natural capacity of each would permit for there is good reason to suspect that on this point men fail quite as often from want of attention, and of systematic cultivation of their powers, as from natural deficiency and it is at least worth trying the experiment whether all may not be, in some degree, trained in the right exercise of a faculty, which all, in some degree, possess, and which all must, more or less, exercise, whether they exercise it well or ill."*

:

CHILLINGWORTH is the writer whose works are recommended for the exercitations of the student. Lord Mansfield, than whom there could not be a more competent authority, pronounced him to be "A PERFECT MOdel of Archbishop Tillotson calls him

ARGUMENTATION."+

Pref. pp. iv. v.-The student who may have inclination, capacity, and leisure for the task, is referred to Mr. Mill's "LOGIC," recently published. It is entitled "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative, and Inductive; being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation," by John Stuart Mill. In two volumes; London, Parker. An account of this work is given by an acute writer in Blackwood's Magazine for October, 1843 (vol. liv. pp. 415-430); where will be found an interesting view of the existing state of the controversy between the supporters and opponents of the syllogism: on which subject Mr. Mill's work contains an elaborate and masterly disquisition.

+ Butler's Hor. Subsec.