religion. Their tone is harsh and irritated. Their words are no longer the words of calm, unprejudiced inquiry, but the words of partisans who have a cause to uphold. To take a mild instance, Professor Huxley rather goes out of his way to remark, "in addition to the truth of the doctrine of evolution, one of its greatest merits in my eyes, is the fact that it occupies a position of complete and irreconcilable antagonism to the vigorous and consistent enemy of the highest intellectual, moral, and social life of mankind, the Catholic Church." Surely this is not a fair and dispassionate account of the history of the great Catholic Church. Not to travel beyond this one instance of evolution, the Professor must know certain good Catholics who hold all parts of the evolutionary theory that can honestly be said to have been proved; and the Church has passed no condemnation on their conduct. More than this: she has not condemned even parts not proved. For Professor Huxley agrees with Haeckel that the assumption, that spontaneous generation has actually occurred, is essential to the theory of evolution. But it has never been proved, in the proper sense of that term, that this process did occur, or that it can occur, or even that the molecules of matter are capable of being compounded into live substance under the manipulation of an intelligent being. On this question Professor Tyndall can only say, "I lean to the affirmative," or, "those who hold the doctrine of evolution are by no means ignorant of the uncertainty of their data, and they yield it no more than a professional assent." Nay, Professor Huxley himself elsewhere confesses, "I see no reason for believing that the feat [of producing abiogenesis] has been performed yet;" and, if the whole course of the world's development were laid bare to him, he says, "I should expect to be a witness of the evolution of protoplasm from not living matter." Must it not, then, have been something more than calm reason that prompted him to say absolutely, Evolution is a true doctrine, and I am glad of it, for it is incompatible with Catholicity? The Catholic Church fears no proved result of science. If at times her action has been such as to check scientific theories, ultimately accepted by her, she is not ashamed to own, that she would rather human knowledge should be delayed a little by her over-caution, than that, by overhaste, men of science should enounce propositions contrary to faith, and therefore not true. If there is an eternity for man, it is manifestly better that his temporal well-being should receive a slight check, than that his eternal interests should suffer. But besides the authoritative action of the Church, there is the offence given to men of science by private, irresponsible controversialists on the Catholic side. And here, I acknowledge much just cause for complaint. Certainly defenders of religion often do give provocation, by reckless speaking on scientific matters which they have never been at the trouble to understand, and by stigmatizing as impious teachings which do not warrant that imputation. But all causes have their perverse, or at any rate their innocently mistaken, champions. Surely, no persons more than scientific men themselves, regret the unjustifiable attacks made on religion by the less proficient of their Own followers. There are faults on both sides. It is something almost superhuman to carry on a serious controversy without some admixture of temper in the discussion. Truth for truth's sake is a motto easily taken up, but with difficulty reduced to practice. Yet I trust that we Catholics in the main have this one single, loving purpose in combating the views of scientific. unbelievers,-to impart to others beliefs which we possess, which we firmly hold to be of momentous con sequence, which in fact, we feel con- what was the particular humility of vinced, are decisive of the eternal St. Augustine by describing its ophappiness or of the eternal woe of posite, as found among our modern our fellow-men. It is kindly meant, men of science. There is amongst even when the idea is mistaken, im- them an excess of unyieldingness and portunately to urge a change of posi- defiance in the matter of religion. tion upon one whom we regard as They begin, they tell us, with the standing in a place of extreme peril. Cartesian principle, never to accept And if it is not always pleasant to be anything as true that is not clearly admonished, yet no one, whatever seen to be true. I will not pause to he might think of the reality of the examine how they keep the positive danger, would have the heart to part of this precept, in the results speak harshly to a neighbor who had which they accept as certain. My left his own peaceful bed at night, concern now is with the negative and had come, at the cost of great part, which I take to be this: Never trouble and with no gain to himself, to reject as untrue what there is sufto express his anxious conviction ficient evidence for admitting as that his acquaintance was quietly true. A juryman may act as unjustly sleeping in the arms of destruction. by ignoring adequate evidence as by Our aims then are good. And on accepting inadequate evidence. Now the side of our opponents, we only it is a huge fallacy to suppose that beg that they will forget any unjusti- evidence is never adequate unless it fiable offence they may now and then be physically or metaphysically dereceive, may cease to regard the in- monstrative, so that it compel the vestigation into religion as a contro- assent, independently of any good versy with antagonists, in which con- or bad will in the matter. There is troversy they are pledged to a side, such a thing as moral evidence, and and may come to look at the matter of moral evidence, within the limits as really a great question, on which of what is sufficient proof to claim they are not clear, but as to which it the assent of honest men, there are is their highest interest and bounden varying degrees of cogency, admitduty to get all the light they can. ting greater or less room for impruSuch is the dispassionate temper we dent doubt, while for prudent doubt desiderate. Of course, prejudice is no room is allowed. In these cases, so subtle a thing, that it is easy for other things being equal, the dea person to believe himself quite im- cision will be affirmative or negative partial, when more careful self-exami- according to the impartiality of the nation would show him that he is will. Any obstinacy in this deternot. An unbeliever might find it mining faculty is fatal to a right well worth his while to put to him- judgment. And here precisely lies self this question, slowly, seriously, the need of what I call humility, by and searchingly: In my attitude to- which I here mean a due subjugation wards religious inquiry, am I quite of the intellect, by the will, to eviwithout bias? dence that is sufficient indeed, but not superabundant, nor as full as the intellect might like. But it is bad practical logic to throw away a competency because it is not affluence. Even poor pay, that just suffices for the necessities of life, is better than no wages. So again, in broad daylight, I cannot only see my way and see it thoroughly, but I may cheer my progress with a view of the coun 2. The next characteristic mentioned of St. Augustine was, that his investigation was humble. Oh, it is objected, that means weakly, submissive, and crouching to authority. No such thing. I think it is now pretty universally recognized by competent men of all shades of opinion, that there is a proper humility and an improper pride. I will explain VOL. XII.-4 may be try; but if dusky night comes on, and shows me no more than the brown outline of the road, I am thankful for that much light, if it is enough to guide me to my destination, and I should be a fool to shut my eyes to it because it is not more. Now the Christian evidences may not seem overwhelming in their force, but they are enough to carry conviction to the mind that rightly studies them. They leave the will free to doubt perversely if it choose; hence the merit of faith, which is a free service. It follows, then, that men must come to the study of religion, not in the spirit of defiance and with the stubborn resolve to yield only to compulsion. Compulsion there will be none, if but on this account alone, that, by clinging mainly to difficulties, the large cumulus of favorable evidence counteracted. Christ has declared plainly enough and often enough, that humility of heart is needful for those who would come to the knowledge of God. And this declaration, from such a source, deserves the attention of every thinking mind. For Christ surely was no ordinary man. It was by the persevering assertion of Christ, and of his words and deeds, that the Apostles converted the world. They did not trust to dialectics. Neither have Christian controversialists, nowadays, much hope in mere argument. Argument there had been in abundance among the pagan philosophers, and its general result was darkness and perplexity. Then a Man was born in poverty, lived a short and obscure life, and died in ignominy. Yet he said that he had come to enlighten the world. And, sure enough, he did set at rest the minds of the best portion of mankind; so that the great Christian body have, since that time, felt satisfied that they know who God is and what he wants of them, and what destiny he has in store for them. When, then, I say, such a Teacher tells us that humility, or a due submissiveness and teach ableness of mind, is needful for a proper inquiry about religion, is it the part of wisdom, or of foolhardy temerity, to disregard his counsel? And, be it remembered, it is not blind submission to authority that is asked, but submission to authority, on evidence morally certain, that the authority is trustworthy. Professor Huxley has said: "I will part with my liberty to do evil, on the cheapest terms, to the first man that will take it of me." In the like spirit, a Christian is glad to lose the liberty of error by following the safe guidance of authority, after he has first duly examined the credentials of the Church that claims his submission. Is there anything degrading in such self-distrust? 3. St. Augustine's third lesson to us lies in the fact that, while seeking a religion, he was open to receive aid from all the faculties of his being that were capable of furnishing assistance. Now scientific men are apt to make their inquiry into the supernatural a matter of pure dry intellect, and of intellect only partially applied, namely, according to the method of physical research alone. A one-sided cultivation of the mind is always dangerous. "Philosophy,' says Rousseau, "deadens the heart.' And so to be all head and no heart is the limit towards which the exclusive pursuit of physical investigation tends. Religion, however, is an affair neither of pure intellect nor of pure sentiment, but of both intellect and sentiment. There are innate tendencies in human nature, which, under the survey and sanction of reason, have a right to exert their sway. One of these tendencies is a craving after religion; and it is not wise at once to stifle such a desire without giving its claim a hearing. In certain practical matters pure intellect should not work alone; and some things may be set about too scientifically. In Laputa they constructed clothes by mathematics; but the theodolite, backed by an array of equally grand instruments, proved less satisfactory in its results than our poor solitary measuring-tape. Surely the sacred state of matrimony would not be the gainer if man and wife were to choose each other, as partners for life, on grounds purely and scientifically intellectual! Neither can the reverence of children for parents be regulated by formulæ as complicated even as those which describe the laws of the moon's subjection to her planet. We can never, without suffering for it, take leave of common sense; and common sense tells us that we often need one faculty to supplement another. Thus touch helps sight to give to the eye its primary idea of solidity. Similarly, religion in its exercise needs some play of the affections; and these same affections may reasonably be supposed to have a part to perform in the discovery of religion likewise. More than this; beyond all man's natural powers, we Christians further assert the necessity of divine assistance; for as St. Augustine says: Si Dei providentia non præsidet rebus humanis, nihil est de religione satagendum. But on this head I say nothing here. The object of these pages is merely to suggest a few natural dispositions of mind requisite for a man who, knowing not God, professes to be an honest inquirer after him. To such a one I say, in your inquiry use all the means you have got, and do not cling to reason to the extent of un reason. So much for the threefold lesson to be read in the example of St. Augustine. When the Saint comes to divide unbelievers into classes, he mentions only one class, as in every case blameworthy, "those who, aware of their ignorance, have no will to make inquiry." And it is to be feared, that, in this category, rank a large number of the incredulous of our day. Not that these do not inquire after a fashion, but because their inquiries are not con On ducted in a proper spirit and method. A preliminary bias vitiates the whole process. Belief and credulity are terms that are become synonymous, though, as St. Augustine is careful to notice, they differ toto cœlo. In matter of religion, the common feeling is, that any following of authority is essentially degrading, though the whole analogy of human life, in other concerns, goes to show that man was made to depend on the judgment of others, his own reason stopping short at the point of settling whom to trust. Hence, the sick man lets the physician deliberately reduce his strength to the lowest ebb, though this process, for anything that the patient can know about the matter, is no way.to the acquisition of robust health. the authority of another he believes a mystery, and submits to an apparent absurdity. But this same person will hear of no authority in matters more abstruse than that of medicine. He cannot credit what St. Augustine says of authority in the question of religion: "This is the order of God's providence in the matter of right religion; this is the tradition of our holy forefathers, which has been handed down to us; to wish to derange and upset this order of things is nought else but to want to discover a sacrilegious entrance into the true worship. Whoso shall act after this manner, neither if what he wish be granted him, shall he reach the point whither he desires to arrive. For men of his stamp, though their wit be excellent, yet if God be not with them, remain grovelling in the dust.' Even Plato had come to the conclusion that it was needful to have a teaching authority, "and some more sure way, such as a divine revelation, relying on which, as on some safe ship, we may happily finish the voyage of life." Again, it is pitiable to think how many bar the way against themselves of arriving at an acceptance of the Christian belief, because they will criticize what authority says before they study the motives for submitting to that authority. Such conduct is not tolerated in the student of other matters. What pupil would be allowed to interrupt the very first lectures of his professor of physics by such premature questions as these. If heat is a mode of motion, how do we cool hot tea by stirring it? If light is propagated by modulations, how do we actually see the rays in straight lines? If musical harmony depends on a certain regularity, proportion, and interlacement of atmospheric waves, how is it that these conditions are not utterly destroyed by the ever-varied modifying obstacles encountered in different concert-rooms, and by the ever-varied relative position of the several instruments? The interrógator would be very properly bidden to wait a bit, and not seek to learn everything at once. He would be told there must be order in the acquisition of knowledge. This first. Secondly, there are always inferior minds, to whom the knowledge of superior minds must be for ever incommunicable. I suppose this relation often exists between a chemist and his assistant in the laboratory. Yet the former will be highly indignant if his subordinate refused to perform his functions at every stage where the means adopted and the end desired should seem to him irreconcilably at variance. With these two principles in mind, then, that knowledge must proceed step after step, and that to the lower intellect a thing may seem absurd and impossible, which to the higher intellect is rational and possible, we cannot resist the conclusion that it is illogical, and worse, except in very obvious cases, to begin the inquiry whether God has spoken, by criticizing what God is said to have spoken, instead of investigating the fact, whether God has spoken. To many minds, the apparent absurdity of transubstantiation is alone and at once conclusive against Catholicity; and this, although, at the same time, they confess that they do not know what substance is, or how it exists, or what are its possibilities of nonexistence and change. Yet they would be inexpressibly vexed at a man born blind, and therefore ignorant of perspective, who should admit, from his sense of touch, that in statuary solid figures were possible, but should absolutely refuse to believe that solidity could be represented by painting, on the, to him, incontrovertible principle that what was of two dimensions could not be so transformed that, remaining still of two dimensions, it should exhibit three dimensions. "And how dare you, sir, who are shorn of one faculty, dare to contradict us who have that faculty, on one of the very points of the faculty's clearest testimony?" Just so; and this suggests the reflection that there may be a Being whose range of perception excels ours, by considerably more than ours excels that of a blind man; and that if a large and intelligent portion of the human race assert that there are evidences, widely scattered up and down, of such a Being having made communications to man about matters momentously concerning man's interest, the only prudent thing, in that case, is to examine, most diligently and most perseveringly, every accessible part of evidence so important, and not refuse to weigh the evidence because of what it testifies. Of supine negligence in this matter we can only say with Pascal: "Cette négligence en une affaire où il s'agit d'eux mêmes, de leur éternité, de leur tout, m'étonne et m'épouvante: c'est un monstre pour moi. Je ne dis pas ceci par le zèle piéux d'une dévotion spirituelle: je prétends au contraire que l'amour propre, que l'intérêt humain, que la plus simple lumière de la raison, nous doit donner ces sentiments. Il ne faut voir pour cela que ce que |