safety but in immediate retreat. Having thus compelled one army to re-cross the Rbine, the Archduke turned to attack that of Moreau, who still maintained his position in Bavaria, in spite of all the efforts of the Austrian General Latour.

Augsburg and Munich had surrendered to the French arms; but fearful of the overpowering force which might now be brought against him, since his flank was left exposed by the defeat of Jourdan, Moreau's first object was to retire upon the Iller.

His retreat was a series of conflicts, of which the battle of Biberach stands the more conspicuous, and his passage through the Black Forest is certainly one of the most hazardous enterprizes of the kind upon record. To arrive at the Rhine, it was absolutely piecessary for Moreau's plans that this route should be taken, though it led through the Valley of Hell, a dangerous defile, of the outlet of which the Austrians had possession.* Jomini appears to be of opinion that if the Archduke had advanced with greater rapidity, the progress of his enemy might bave been more successfully impeded; but by skilful arrangements all difficulties were overcome, and after fighting two considerable battles, Moreau retired with the remainder of his troops across the Rhine little more than six months after his first crossing it in force.

The preliminaries of Leoben, in the following year, put a stop to the exertions of Austria, and in the autumn, by the treaty of Campo Formio, peace was proclaimed between the empire and France. This, however, can only be considered as a feverish truce, and in the year 1799 hostilities were renewed. The Archduke was for a time again employed, but owing either to the state of his health, or to political circumstances, we find the chief command of the Austrian armies shortly after entrusted to other hands. General Kray succeeded to this important post, and the emperor himself having joined the army, on quilting it left the command with his brother the Archduke John. The battle of Hohenlinden then occurred, and all its fatal consequences, for Moreau, like Turenne, who is said to have been timid and circumspect in his youth, appears, like bim, to have become bold and enterprizing as he advanced in years. This battle clearly appears to have been lost from a want of previous concert, and an extraordinary and inconceivable degree of local ignorance.-A very little examination will be sufficient to shew that the Austrians ought never to have quitted the line of the Inn; for, by abandoning it, the

When Marshal Villars, in the year 1702, was pressed by the Elector of Bavaria to traverse the Black Mountains in order to effect a junction with the Electoral forces, he is said to have written in reply, 'The Valley of Neostadt, which you mention, is that which is called the Valley of Hell. Your Highness, therefore, must pardon my using the expression, but I have not sufficient of the Devil about me to pass through it.'


Archduke John fell into the snare which was laid for bim by Moreau, and found bimself embarrassed in a country where his superiority of cavalry could be of no avail.

* It is an acknowledged principle,' says a very intelligent French writer on this subject, that the base of a plan for offensive operations should form the best possible line of defence,-and this fundamental principle cannot be violated with impunity, because nothing is more difficult than a sudden transition from offensive to defensive operations, when false ineasures, or an unlucky turn of affairs may have overset the plans of the General who attacks. If the line of defence which ought to have formed his basis has not been well taken up, if the advantageous points, and such as were strong by nature, have not served him as points from which to advance, they will not stand him in stead on the retreat; all will fall into confusion-tbe beaten army, however high in courage, cannot be brought into line except at a great distance, and will have lost at once all the advantages of the offensive in action, as well as those of positions for defensive warfare.'

This is what was unhappily experienced by the Austrians after the battle of Hohenlinden. By abandoning the Tyrol as a point of support, and the line of the Imm, they gave up almost every thing; that of the Salza, it is true, still remained, but when this also was given up, and Salzburg in the possession of the enemy, it was easy to perceive that the fate of Austria was decided ; and that an army which had shewn itself unequal to maintain either of the strong lines which it had successively abandoned, was not likely to rally by retiring upon the capital of which it had already exhausted the resources.

Moreau shewed great ability in profiting by this state of affairs, and advancing with a rapidity which allowed his enemy no repose, no time to recruit his disorganized troops. The unfortunate divisions too, which at that time prevailed amongst the Austrian generals, in no small degree contributed to the want of unity which was evident in all the subsequent operations of the army; and the absence of the Archduke Charles, who possessed the talent of conciliating the good will of those under him without relaxing from the strict course of military discipline, could not fail of being felt most severely at this crisis.

Our limits will not permit us to enter into any lengthened inquiry on the probable causes of the decided superiority on the part of France, which marked the long succession of hostilities we have briefly noticed. A few remarks, however, on the subject will not be superfluous.

• Austria was worsted,' says the Archduke, in the conclusion of his work, “because to the operations of the French, which were grounded on a well combined system of fortresses, a careful survey of the whole theatre of war, and the direction to one end of all the force employed, в в 4


she had only to oppose the bravery and superior organization of her army, and some splendid, although insulated, exploits of her commanders.' But we suspect that the seat of the evil lies deeper.

In spite of the example of Laudon and of the Archduke Charles,' (says a writer who appears to have formed a very accurate estimate of the intrinsic merits of the different European armies,) 'the Austrians have always kept on the defensive within lines and positions, and have never availed themselves of the advantages which they might have derived from a more active and energetic saystem of warfare. There is no change required in the Austrian army, for it is, as a body, as much superior to that of the French, as the French soldier individually excels the Austrian; but the Imperial Generals always make war after their own heavy and iminovable manner. The French only seek to attain their object with a total disregard of what it may cost; the chief care of the Austrian is to retain what he possesses, and every possible loss is calculated with a nicety unknown to the French.'

On many occasions, we believe, that a battle would have proved less destructive, and entailed fewer sacrifices by the abandonment of territory, than the retreat which was chosen as the alternative; and the constancy of the Austrian army under so many reverses of this description proves, in the fullest manner, the excellence of its composition, and its superiority under difficulties to that of the French. A very large proportion of its fotce is always employed in keeping up the chain of communications and other minor services, so that one portion of the troops which might, if near at hand, perform good service, cannot be brought into action, before that which it may be sent to succour is beaten or dispersed. The point of honour too which leads the Austrian officers to attach so much discredit to the loss of cannon is mischievous and absurd in the highest degree; for although the desertion of colours must certainly imply discomfiture and disgrace, it is not so with artillery, which ought only to be considered as one of the implements of war.

A state of hostilities has almost always proved disastrous to Austria, though her people are warlike in the extreme, and the love of arms and distinction the ruling passion amongst her nobility. This, generally speaking, has arisen from the same causes, and from similar defects in the conduct of her armies and the

syse tem of her government. Her trials in the course of the last twentyfive years have been greater by many degrees than she ever experienced before ; and those who have attached credit to the assertions so frequently made by Buonaparte, that English gold alone for so long a period kept the nations of the continent at war, cannot be aware how little any subsidies from this country are able to • compensate for the losses which Germany has suffered in her


finances and population during the late wars in which she was engaged.

A considerable portion of the disasters which have befallen the Austrian armies has been sometimes attributed to the Aulic Council, by which their operations are in a great measure directed; it is possible that some disadvantages have arisen from the check which this superintending body may have proved to the free and unrestrained exercise of military talent, but we are not inclined to impute to it a degree of blame beyond what it deserves.

This tribunal was originally contined in its jurisdiction to the hereditary domains of the Emperor; it formed a court which decided, without appeal, in all processes entered there; and though at first sight it appears extremely hazardous to allow of any control over armies actively engaged from such a quarter, the effects of an arrangement of this kind may not be so pernicious as might be appreliended. Many, powers ander every government are necessarily dormant; and it is not therefore safe to argue against the practice of any public body, because its constitution may be defective in theory.

Having concluded our remarks on the Archduke's first work, we must now advert to a second, which is of later date. To the military man both are valuable; but in the account of the campaign of 1799, as in the former publication, the great minuteness of local description, and the constant recurrence to the principles originally laid down, may perhaps fatigue the general reader. The causes which have produced such frequent reverses to the Austrian aruis—the slowness of their movements—their defective commissariat—the disadvantages arising from a want of unity in command, and from the guidance of armies in the field by men in office at home-all the defects, in short, which we bave already noticed in speaking of the first campaign, are acknowledged by the Archduke in their fullest extent; and his Imperial Highness seems more inclined to dwell upon the faults of the Austrians, and even upon such as may be attributed to his own military conduct, as illustrations of his own principles, than upon the success to which his countrymen may fairly lay claim.

After a very minute description of the whole seat of war, which is divided by the author into three regions, viz. the plain of Italy, the plain of Germany, and the mountainous country intervening, be proceeds to blame the two contending powers for supposing that the possession of the latter would ensure that of the plains.

• Instead (says he) of maintaining a contest for the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, and the Grisons, the first object of the French should have been 10 push for Vienna, that of their opponents to defend the line of the Danube ; but France was at that time under the unsettled government


of the Directory, and although the peace lately concluded with Austria was not supposed to be lasting, she had not made the best use of the respite which it afforded.'

It is curious to observe to what rude shocks received opinions are subject in these days of new light and reform. By men of our un-military habits the occupation of the detiles, fortresses, and snug retreats of a mountainous region have always, we apprehend, been considered of the first importance; but here we are told, and that too by a great commander, that all the advantages atteudant on mountain-warfare are on the side of the assailant; and are hence led to infer, that the only theatre of war upon which a General ought to perform is one where he may exbibit with effect bis whole stock of strategical and tactical knowledge. To account for the prevalence of this error, (which it is one of the chief objects of the Archduke's work to correct,) we are told, that cir- . cumstances and the opinions of others give a bias and direction to the affairs in which most men are engaged, and that the majority of persons, especially in matters of importance, adapt their way of thinking to that of others. This, we doubt not, is very much the fact; but we must leave it to the military men of the age to decide, on an examination of his work, whether his Imperial Highness has made out his case against the Alps under their several denominations in the Tyrol and Grisons.

The French seem to have discovered by experience the insufficiency of their means to carry on the great designs they had projected at the outset; nor was a better order of things established until Massena became commander-in-chief, and considerable levies were ordered to reinforce his army. The Austrians, in the mean time, had overrun the Grison country, and were greatly superior to the enemy in numbers along the whole line of the mountainous region. The assistance they derived from the natives of this country appears to have been trifling, which affords another proof that the patriotism of the Swiss is greater in theory than practice—and that they fight with more spirit when in the pay of another country than gratuitously for their own.

Whilst the French armies in this quarter were placed under one head, the Archduke and Bellegarde were injudiciously kept independent of each other. In spite however of this disadvantage a severe attack was made on the French line in the neighbourhood of Zurich, in the beginning of June; and from that time, till the middle of August, both parties remained on the defensive in their several positions.

Omitting the operations on the Rhine, as comparatively of little moment, we shall now turn to the brilliant career of Suwaroff, in the plains of Italy—an insulated period of success during the long

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