The Editorial and Advertising Offices of "The Aeroplane" are at 166, Piccadilly, W. The Editor cannot undertake to return unsolicited manuscripts, whether accompanied by stamps or not, though every endeavour will be made to do so. Telegraphic Address: AILERON, London. 'Phone: MAYFAIR 5407. Abroad, 3 months 2 2; 6 months, 4/4; 12 months, 8/8 On an Unattainable Ideal. [POST SCRIPTUM :-The writer of the following articles wishes to state that they were written before Mr. Lloyd George made his speech at Bristol and without any certainty that the right hon. gentleman took any interest whatever in aircraft.] It appears to a good many people who know something of the problems of supply and demand in the aircraft industry that there are distinct opportunities at the moment for a scheme whereby the industry might be better organised for the increase of output. Let it be granted at the outset that every firm in the country is turning out many times as many aeroplanes as the nation has the least right to expect, considering not only the mere lack of support accorded by the authorities before the war, but the actual repressive influence brought to bear on any attempt at real enterprise in the way of producing new and improved types of aeroplanes, and especially new types of engines. Moreover, the majority of firms have done splendidly since war began, despite the drawback of absurdly extravagant and unnecessarily complicated specifications which have been insisted upon in many cases. Also, practically everyone in the industry has done his best to produce first-class work, and to use only the best material. Here and there, as in every country, there are black sheep who are careless of quality so long as they can produce quantity and draw their money for it. Here and there, men deliberately hide bad work, so as to avoid losing their pay for the time spent in producing it. Here and there, though cupidity or stupidity, generally the latter, suppliers of raw material supply bad stuff. Here and there, Trade Unions have endeavoured to murder our sailors and soldiers by calling strikes and holding up output. But, on the whole, the aircraft industry deserves to be congratulated on the way it has worked for the good of the nation to supply munitions to a Government which not so long since was going the right way to work to destroy the very source of such supplies. For all practical purposes the British aircraft industry has only really come into being since war began, and, naturally, there must be defects not only in the organisation of individual factories but in the organisation of the industry as a whole. It is not quite clear as yet whether Mr. Lloyd George's new Ministry of Munitions is to include the supply of aircraft or not. If so, and if the right people have to handle the work, much good may be done, but if the wrong people tackle the job confusion will be very much worse confounded. Meantime, the various firms might do quite a good deal to help themselves and one another, and so ultimately to help the Flying Services, and the nation as a whole, if they would co-operate for their common good. It is a big problem to tackle, and it may be untackleable, but it is worth discussing at any rate. The proper people to tackle it would be the Aero Section of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, if that somnolent sub-section ever did any thing worth while, and failing that, the Manufacturers' Committee of the Royal Aero Club would do well to meet and talk the subject over. An Original Scheme. Right at the beginning of the war, one who is now an officer in the King's Service, and is doing rather more than well as such, propounded an ideal scheme of organisation, which, if it had been workable, would have vastly increased our output. This notion was that the Naval, and, if possible, the Military, authorities-provided the latter could temporarily tear themselves loose from civilian official influence should call a meeting of the head men of the aircraft industry and their chief technical men, at which the needs of the Services, in a general way, as to different types of machines required, should be put before the trade, and then the various firms should be divided off by mutual agreement between the Navy and the Army; so many to do nothing but Admiralty work, and so many to do War Office work, according to their previous experience and personal predilections. So far, something rather like that has been done. Firms working for the Navy do not work for the Army, and vice versa, except in one or two cases where a new type of machine is produced which happens to appeal more to the other Service than to the one for which the firm is working. There was, however, no general meeting of the authorities and the trade to arrange the dividing up, and there was no attempt to organise the trade as a whole or instil into it regular esprit de corps, let alone national enthusiasm, or a "fine imperial fury," as might have been done. There has been plenty of individual fury, chiefly over being "messed about" in orders, inspections, specifications, and drawings, but that is not quite the same kind of "furor." Mr. Churchill's Effort. The only effort in the right direction was made at the Admiralty some time last September when Mr. Churchill met the heads of the Navy's aeroplane builders to discuss the building of B.E.2cs. In that case his own energy and enthusiasm was, if anything, too infectious, for though a few of the hardened sinners of the trade refused point blank to touch the type, others were moved to promise delivery of their first machine in six weeks-thinking, of course, that it was an ordinary problem in aeronautical engineering, and not an exercise in a kind of airy differential miscalculus on the part of the designers-with the result that the best of them took three months to deliver, others took six months, and some never delivered at all, but shifted over to other types which were easier to make and no less effective. That, however, was not part of the original scheme. The Real Utopia. The next step in the scheme propounded was that the heads of the firms and their designers should get together and evolve the plans for the types required. That is to say, the Naval firms would fix the designs for perhaps four types of machines, a light and a heavy seaplane, a "pusher" gun-carrier for land work, and a fast scout. The Army firms would do likewise for the Army. These designs would be absolutely standardised, and nothing else would be made for three months. Each firm would be told off to make certain parts. One group would make nothing but wings, or, perhaps, one firm would make nothing but one type of wing. Another would make nothing but fuselages of one type. Another would make nothing but floats. And so on. The Crystal Palace would be taken over as an erecting shop, and all manufacturers would deliver their parts there by a special service of motor lorries, so as to be independent of railways, and consequent chaotic deliveries. All the erectors from the various firms would be concentrated at the Crystal Palace, and billeted in the outer buildings not required as workshops-this, of course, was before the days of the Royal Naval Division-and the erection of these standard type machines would go ahead at a rate never possible under any other system. The only exception would be that each firm would be allowed to keep a few erectors and a small section of its shop to itself so that it could turn out a few experimental machines, which, if they performed well, or proved any new theory in design, would be considered at another meeting at the end of three months as possible alterations in the existing standard types. The scheme was a thoroughly sound one, but it. could only be worked under a benevolent despotism, so that anyone who ran counter to the scheme could be taken out at dawn and shot by the Veteran Reserve, or could be subjected to some such appalling punishment. The flaw is that it depends on everyone sinking their own interests for the nation's good, and, of course, patriotism of that kind is out of date in these days. And think how such a scheme would interfere with the liberty of the subject, and vested interests, and all our other fetishes. A man may go cheerfully and fight for his country, for there is a strong sporting element about it, and, anyhow, if he gets killed he is dead, and nothing else matters. But to ask a man who is a creative artist in his own line to admit that someone else's designs are better than his, and then to add insult to injury by telling him to disorganise his own factory in order to make these other designs, is rather more than a democratic Government dare ask of those who keep it in office and pay its salaries, though bureaucratic France has gone further than we have towards it. In these days we are neither Pagan enough to be intellectually honest and brutally thorough, nor Christian enough to be spiritually honest and thoroughly charitable to one another, so we must just rub along on compro mises. On the Urgency of Organising the Industry. When one comes to consider organising the Aircraft Industry under modern conditions one is up against a very difficult proposition. The chief difficulty is that very few men can absolutely trust one another, and fewer still realise that honesty is the best policy, considered purely as a policy. Some of the most unprincipled of men have built large fortunes and wonderful reputations for integrity on an appreciation of that simple fact; yet it is only the very big men who can see the value of honesty purely as a commercial asset. In all businesses all over the world everyone is always trying to "do someone down," or to "hotstuff" him in the vernacular of the aerodrome-into or out of something or other. Even in the Services there is not absolute mutual trust and co-operation, and those who were in South Africa may recall a generally believed instance of a senior officer deliberately withdrawing a force under one of his juniors which had Christiaan de Wet conveniently bottled in a kloof so as to prevent the junior from getting the credit of the capture, with the result that the elusive Christiaan escaped and lived to be a political nuisance for something like twelve years, and a rebel in his old age. height they ought to reach. The result is at best punctured planes, and the fact that the tale of casualties is not higher is due more to the grace of God than to any ability of the machines. Squadron-commanders are not altogether to blame, for Wing-commanders and still higher authorities expect a certain number of machines to be always in flying order, and a squadron that does not put up sufficient hours in the air is apt to be disliked, whereas if the flying officers of that squadron merely disappear towards Germany and do not return, that is the fortune of war, and another matter altogether, about which no awkward questions are asked. Still, if one cannot expect mere human beings like ourselves to trust one another completely, a proper system of organisation may make it worth while for everybody in the industry to co-operate honestly to their mutual advantage. At present there is undoubtedly a great deal of overlapping of effort, and consequent waste of time. Saving of time means increasing output, and increased output means more money-putting the lowest valuation on co-operation, and leaving out the argument that increased output also means more new machines which are badly needed by our Service aviators. The Crying Need of the Flying Corps. It is officially admitted that we need more highexplosive shells. We may as well admit that there is a crying need for more aeroplanes also. We may as well admit that machines on active service have to be kept flying for days, if not weeks, after they are due for overhaul, with the result that they stagger off with tired engines and soggy planes, and wander about over the German "Archies"-whose shooting is getting better and better every day-at half the The mechanics of the R.F.C. do their utmost-"and then some," as the Americans say to keep engines and machines in a fit state to fly, but they cannot make new aeroplanes and new engines in marquees in Flanders, near as they get to doing so at times. What is needed is new aeroplanes and more new aeroplanes, and then new aeroplanes again. And that is why it is worth while to make some serious effort to organise the industry on a still more efficient system, or to institute some form of co-operation between the various firms, in their own interests as well as in those of the nation at large. Will the Industry Help? If any aeroplane makers, or makers of component parts, have any ideas on this subject they will assist matters very materially by letting me know their views, and they may rely on these views being treated as entirely confidential if they so desire. What I want to know is how may output best be increased with existing supplies of material and existing factories. I venture to give hereafter a few points which have already been suggested to me by men of experience in engineering production. These are only minor details, it is true, but if even they were carried out effectually several aeroplanes per week could be added to the total output, and, let it be remembered, that the presence of one single new aeroplane may mean not merely saving the lives of a pilot and an observer who would have been killed if compelled to fly the mechanically fatigued machine which it would have replaced, but may mean saving a battalion, or even an army corps, owing to that observer getting safely home with information which he would never have acquired on a less efficient machine, or Official records show that Curtiss Motors run longer without over- European Representative, LYMAN J. SEELY, Savoy Hotel, London. Factory and Offices THE CURTISS MOTOR COMPANY, HAMMONDSPORT, N.Y. which would have been lost when he was shot down. It seems almost impossible to make the English mind see the imminent urgency of every detail in armament work, or to make it realise that five minutes' delay in delivering an aeroplane or a shell. or that a badly cut thread on a screw, or that a nut insufficiently locked, may cost hundreds of lives and millions of pounds. On Suggested Details of Organisation. Concerning Small Workshops. If ever Mr. Lloyd George's new department takes an active part in organising the aircraft industry, the following suggestions may be found of some value, or may themselves suggest other points, and as such they are commended to the consideration of the authorities. Firstly and foremostly, we are not using our small workshops to anything like the best advantage. All over England, and particularly in the London area, there are hundreds of small general engineering firms, or metal-working shops, where aeroplane parts could be made. I know personally of one such shop whose owner has tried over and over again to get Government work and has been refused because his maximum output of a particular article has been perhaps 500 a week where the War Office wanted 5,000 and could not be bothered with handling his small output. Yet such machinery as he owns is very good, his workmen are skilled artisans, and he is a very capable manager himself. Some lives have been lost every week because his paltry 500 component parts of some bigger jobs were not there, but no one seems to realise that in ten weeks he would have made the 5,000 parts now required from a bigger firm, and that the supplies of that particular item of ammunition would then be a week to the good. Nor does anyone seem to see that ten such small shops would turn out every week as much as one big shop. Supplies of Fittings. Now, the right way to tackle such a problem is this. Take, for example, sheet-steel fittings for aeroplanes of certain standard type. Let the Admiralty, or the War Office, or the Munitions Department, if it likes, take a small warehouse in London, and put in charge thereof an engineer with experience of aircraft building, and give him commissioned rank-either R.N.V.R. or Royal Engineer Services, or something of that sortjust to impress the people with whom he is dealing. Let him find ten, or a dozen, or more small firms, and let him run that group. He must lay out for each firm its work for the week, and must supply to that firm from his warehouse the raw material for the work. That raw material must be supplied to him direct from the steel makers-Firth, Vickers, Flather, Kayser-Ellison, and so forth—on his own order; all Admiralty and War Office red tape, of the kind illustrated last week, must be cut out, and this officer must run his show as if he were the manager of a firm responsible only to his directors, in his case the Director of the Air Department or the Director of Military Aeronautics. He must have a supply of ready cash with which to pay each small workshop every Friday night for the goods delivered the previous Tuesday. The small workshop owner must take away on the Tuesday fresh raw material for the week's, work after he has delivered the made-up stuff. The made-up stuff must be fetched from the warehouse by the aeroplane firms to whom it has been allotted by a central "stores" department (Admiralty or War Office, as the case may be), which department must be simply a "clearing-house paper vouchers, and must not touch the material itself. It must also keep the records of the weekly balances of each of these warehouses. " for These departments must be staffed and managed by men from the despatch departments at Selfridge's, Harrod's, the Army and Navy Stores, and so forth, who are used to handling and collating vouchers and dockets. They will see that the storesclerks under the engineers in charge of warehouses keep their tallies correctly. The warehouse manager himself must be an engineer, for he has to act as overseer and inspector of workshops, and he has to judge the quality of the work done and material issued. I can myself lay my hand on two or three men at least at present in the Services who would be ideal men at such work and who are simply wasting their time and their very considerable ability in their present jobs. There is nothing really novel in this scheme, because it has all been done for centuries past in the Irish linen trade, in the Yorkshire woollen trade, in the Coventry watch trade, and in the Birmingham gun trade, among others; but it has never been done in the Services, partly because it is much too simple, but chiefly because it means that trust has to be placed in a mere engineer who is not an executive officer. Perhaps, as this is an engineer's war," it may help to raise the status of such common folk as officers of the A.S.C. (mechanical transport) and engineer officers, R.N. A Natural Sequence. From the fact that it is possible to get all sorts of parts made outside by small firms, it follows in natural sequence that it is folly for any aeroplane firm to attempt to make all its own parts, especially its metal parts. It is curious, however, that, while it is possible to get any quantity of woodwork done by outside firms, that is just the work that most aeroplane firms prefer to do themselves, for the good and sufficient reason that ordinary carpenters and cabinetmakers have not an aeroplane the slightest idea of using timber as builder uses it. A piece of wood which a cabinetmaker would love because of its pretty curly decorative grain would give an aeroplane hand hysterics because of its obvious brittleness, and that is why an experienced woodworker of the ordinary sort cannot be trusted to touch aeroplane work till he has been born again with the eye of a different faith. Nevertheless, small wood-working shops can do a lot of work for big firms if they are placed under the supervision of experienced aeroplane woodworkers detailed for the work from aircraft factories, and to this extent they can be made to help output considerably. By getting practically all the metal and wood work done outside, in the way indicated, the main workshops of the big aeroplane firms can be turned almost entirely into erecting shops, and, as erecting is the most highly specialised work of all, that must be done for the present by the firm's own men. A Safeguard. Every effort should be made by the firms to train new erectors, and to run subsidiary erecting shops away from their main buildings, for an aircraft raid or a perfectly spontaneous fire which destroyed any one firm's erecting shop at present would be a very serious matter, therefore the more this work is spread about the better. As a corollary to this, one sees the wisdom of having the "proprietary" aeroplanes which have proved their value, such as Avro, Farman, Short, Sopwith, and Vickers two-seaters, and the Bristol, Martinsyde, and Sopwith tabloids, made by sub-contractors, or by firms contracting direct with the Government, which pays a royalty to the original designers. This is now being done to a very considerable extent, in just the way |