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[1899 A.D.]

a grim joke, as has been remarked, to those who lived to appreciate it. De la Rey, the Boer commander, had meanwhile been enforced by Cronje, who disposed his troops, contrary to the accepted practice in the defence of rivers, on both banks of the Modder. Unaware of the enemy's presence, the British eagerly advanced toward the green river banks where they expected to enjoy the breakfast that had been promised them. The resulting surprise has been thus graphically pictured by Conan Doyle":

"They swept onwards into the fatal fire zone- and then, and only then, there blazed out upon them four miles of rifles, cannon, and machine guns, and they realised, from general to private, that they had walked unwittingly into the fiercest battle yet fought in the war. Before the position was understood the guards were within seven hundred yards of the Boer trenches, and the other troops about nine hundred, on the side of a very gentle slope which made it most difficult to find any cover. In front of them lay a serene landscape, the river, the houses, the hotel, no movement of men, no smoke-everything peaceful and deserted save for an occasional quick flash and sparkle of flame. But the noise was horrible and appalling. Men whose nerves had been steeled to the crash of the big guns, or the monotonous roar of Maxims and the rattle of Mauser fire, found a new terror in the malignant 'ploop-plooping' of the automatic quick-firer. The Maxim of the Scots Guards was caught in the steel-blizzard from this thing—each shell no bigger than a large walnut, but flying in strings of a score - and men and gun were destroyed in an instant. As to the rifle bullets, the air was humming and throbbing with them, and the sand was mottled like a pond in a shower. To advance was impossible, to retire was hateful. The men fell upon their faces and cuddled close to the earth, too happy if some friendly ant-heap gave them a precarious shelter. And always, tier above tier, the lines of rifle fire rippled and palpitated in front of them. The infantry fired also, and fired, and fired - but what was there to fire at? An occasional eye and hand over the edge of a trench or behind a stone is no mark at seven hundred yards. It would be instructive to know how many British bullets found a billet that day."

Cavalry and infantry were alike useless in the face of such a resistance, and the battle resolved itself soon into an artillery duel. The British, reinforced by the timely arrival of the 62nd Field Battery, which had come thirty-two miles over unknown roads in the night time in the space of eight hours, at length began to silence the Boer guns. Later in the afternoon a part of the 9th brigade succeeded in crossing the river higher up, and as troop after troop dashed through the water and gained the other bank, the Boers realised that the British had turned their right flank, and that the tide of battle had set in against them. Critics of the battle are severe on Lord Methuen for his attempts earlier in the day to cross the river in the face of the deadly Boer fire, but his personal gallantry was highly commendable. When the Boers at length abandoned their resistance and withdrew from their rifle pits under cover of darkness, the British loss had reached five hundred killed and wounded, among the latter being their commander,a

Lord Methuen now found that his force had exhausted its forward momentum, and that other than heroic tactics would have to be employed to raise the siege of Kimberley.

The extent of the operations and the gravity of the situation now began to be felt in England, every available man was called up from the reserves, and the war office made what at the time appeared to be adequate provision for the waste which it was seen would occur in a war under modern conditions. On November 30th the mobilisation of a sixth division was ordered, offers of

[1899 A.D.] colonial aid were accepted, and every facility provided for local recruiting in the South African ports. All through the early weeks of December confidence was considerably restored. Buller was arranging for the relief of Ladysmith, which had already shown its spirit by two successful sorties to the besiegers' batteries. In every theatre the British strength was consolidating. But the full significance of British incapacity to cope with the situation presented by these two small nations in arms had not yet been appreciated. The confidence restored by the lull during the early part of December was destined to be roughly shattered./

STORMBERG AND MAGERSFONTEIN

General Gatacre, commanding in the northern parts of Cape Colony had advanced to within thirty miles of Stormberg, where the Boers had occupied a strong position. Determining to break if he could the Boers' hold on the Cape Dutch, he advanced against Stormberg on December 9th, with a force of about three thousand men. By a forced night march he reached the place about dawn on the following morning, and before he realised his proximity to the enemy, his tired force was beset in front and on both flanks by a galling fire from the hidden Boers. Instead of attempting to extricate themselves the British threw themselves forward in a confused, disorganised mass on their opponents. The British artillery was useless against the riflemen scattered among the sheltering crags. Finally, when to retreat was as dangerous as to advance, an attempt was made to withdraw. A part of the infantry in the front column were surrounded and captured. All military formation was at an end, and the troops, thoroughly demoralised, struggled back as best they might.

The loss in killed and wounded was not great, but upward of seven hundred prisoners were left in the Boers' hands. The disastrous result was due primarily to the undue strain Gatacre had put upon his troops, and the shock of the surprise; but, making all allowances, the failure, according to competent critics, was greater than it should have been. The British fell back the next day to Steikstroom, but the Boers, victors at Stormberg, largely disorganised Cape Dutch, were in no position to follow up their success.

On the night of the day following Gatacre's fatal rout at Stormberg, Lord Methuen, who had continued his advance from the Modder river, met an even more disastrous repulse in his attempt to storm the rocky heights at Magersfontein. Cronje had been reinforced until he had eight thousand men at his disposal and his position was the strongest he had yet occupied. The British, as usual apparently forgetful of the awful lessons they should have learned, advanced through the darkness in a drizzling rain, the Highland brigade in the lead. As at Stormberg they were assailed by a deadly fire before they realised their nearness to the enemy. Again we quote from Conan Doyle's spirited story of the fight:

"The storm of lead burst upon the head and right flank of the column, which broke to pieces under the murderous volley. Wauchope (the Highland commander) was shot, struggled up, and fell once more forever. Men went down in swathes, and a howl of rage and agony, heard afar over the veldt, swelled upon the frantic and struggling crowd. By the hundred they dropped

some dead, some wounded, some knocked down by the rush and sway of the broken ranks. A few dashed forward and were found at the very edges of the trench." To stand their ground in the face of such a fire was impossible and the remnants of the brigade fell backward upon the main column.

[1899 A.D.]

By sunrise Lord Methuen had succeeded in reforming his broken lines, and the battle resolved itself into another Modder river. An attempt to turn the British right flank was gallantly defeated by the Coldstream Guards but with the close of day Lord Methuen made up his mind that a further attempt to carry the heights was useless and dejectedly withdrew to his former camp at Modder river. The day's fighting had cost the British upward of a thousand men in killed, wounded, and missing, the losses of the Highland brigade alone reaching seven hundred. "Never," says one writer "had Scotland had a more grievous day than this of Magersfontein. It may be doubted if any single battle has ever put so many families of high and low into mourning from the Tweed to the Caithness shore." a

But even the defeat at Magersfontein, the British thought, could be suffered with equanimity, since Buller was about to bring his own force into play, and Buller, it was confidently supposed, would not fail. He had collected at Chievely in Natal a brigade of mounted men, four brigades of infantry (generals Lyttelton, Hart, Barton, and Hildyard), and two brigade divisions of artillery, and he carried with him the trust alike of the army and the nation.

COLENSO

Sir George White had been thrust back into Ladysmith on October 30th. On November 2nd telegraphic communication had been interrupted. On the day following the railway line was cut. Buller had arrived in Natal on November 25th, and by December 15th was ready to advance upon the enemy who under their vigilant young commander, Louis Botha, lay strongly intrenched along the Tugela. The task before the British was a severe one, but neither general nor private soldier seems to have had the least misgivings as to its success.

Buller's plan called for a simple frontal attack. The troops were to be thrown across the river at two points, the main column at Colenso bridge, the Irish brigade three miles below at Bridle Drift. It was the story of Modder river and Stormberg and Magersfontein over again. The Irish troops in quarter column, unable to find the ford, were exposed to a withering fire while hunting for a place to cross, and lost all regimental formation. They bravely held their position for five hours, exposed to the Boer fire in front, and to the misdirected shells of British guns in the rear. At length relief came in the order to retire, but not until between five and six hundred of them had fallen. "It is superfluous," says a critic, "to point out that the same old omissions were responsible for the same old results. Why were the men in quarter columns when advancing against an unseen foe? Why had no scouts gone forward to be certain of the position of the foe? Where were the skirmishers who should have preceded such an advance?"

In the mean time Hildyard's English brigade had advanced upon Colenso and, with the loss of some two hundred men, had succeeded in reaching the station. Their more open formation alone kept their losses from being as heavy as those suffered by the Irish. While this was going on the two field batteries which were to cover the British advance had recklessly been wheeled forward and unlimbered in an exposed position within a thousand yards of the Boer line where officers, gunners, and troops were practically exterminated by the Boer fire. A brilliant and heroic attempt to save the guns was only partially successful, and the greater part of them fell into the Boers' hands. An attack of Dundonald's mounted colonials on the extreme left was likewise

[1900 A.D.] repulsed, whereupon Buller gave up his attempt and withdrew his shattered forces from the fatal field. The British loss approximated eleven hundred men and ten guns.a

The full nature of the failure was not realised by the British public, nor the spirit in which the general had received the finding of fortune. How he had lost heart, and actually suggested the surrender of Ladysmith, was only known to them later, but the cabinet knew, and in the face of the serious situation thus created the cabinet took strong action. They appointed FieldMarshal Lord Roberts, V.C., to the supreme command in South Africa, with Lord Kitchener as his chief of the staff. A wave of military enthusiasm shook the empire, and as the final requisition for mobilising a seventh division practically drained the mother country of trained men, a scheme for the employment of amateur soldiers was formulated, resulting in the "imperial yeomanry and volunteer" movement, which proved one of the most striking features of the South African campaign. Pending the arrival of Lord Roberts and reinforcements, the situation in South Africa remained at a deadlock: the three besieged towns-Mafeking, Kimberley, Ladysmith - still held their own, but no headway was made by the relief columns; all they could do was to stand on the defensive. The only bright spot, as far as the British were concerned, was to be found in northern Cape Colony, where General French, with two cavalry brigades and a scratch force, was able, by a magnificent display of strategy, to keep at arm's length a superior force of the enemy, over a front of thirty miles in the vicinity of Colesberg. General French's achievements during this phase of the war were the more noteworthy since he had pitted against him the military skill of both De la Rey and De Wet, two of the three men of military genius produced by the war on the Boer side. On January 6th the Boers in Natal made a desperate attempt to reduce Ladysmith by storm. The garrison, already weakened by privation and sickness, made a stubborn resistance, and after one of the most sanguinary engagements of the war, at Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill, the garrison repulsed the attack with severe loss to the enemy, itself having five hundred casualties, including Lord Ava, the eldest son of the marquis of Dufferin.

When Lord Roberts arrived in Cape Town on January 10th, 1900, three garrison towns were still invested, and the relieving forces were still maintaining their rôle of passive resistance. The commander-in-chief's first duty was to create out of the tangle of units in Cape Colony a field army capable of advancing into the enemy's country via the Orange Free State.i

SPION KOP

Nearly a month had elasped since Buller's disastrous frontal attack on Colenso. Meantime he had reorganised his army and had been reinforced by Sir Charles Warren's division. His force then amounted to nineteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, and he had sixty guns. He still held the confidence of his troops who were eager to be led forward to the relief of their comrades in Ladysmith. Therefore on January 10, 1900, he moved out to attempt a flank attack on the Boers along the Tugela. On the 17th, by an excellently planned and well carried out movement, he created a diversion by a feigned attempt to cross the river at Potgeiter's Drift, fifteen miles west of Colenso, while at the same time he actually crossed with the greater part of his army five miles further west. Save for the fact that they were across the river however the British advantage was not great for they were further from

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