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[1877 A.D.] the Transvaal on its western border, and the picture of utter collapse which existed in the state is complete. In 1877 the condition of the Transvaal appeared so menacing to the peace of South Africa that Sir Theophilus Shepstone was despatched to the country by the high commissioner, Sir Henry Barkly, to confer with President Burgers as to its future government.

By this time Burgers had had his eyes opened to the true state of things. He was no longer blinded by the foolish optimism of a visionary who had woven fine-spun theories of what an ideal republic might be. He had lived among the Boers and attempted to lead their government. He had found their idea of liberty to be anarchy, their native policy to be slavery, and their republic to be a sham. His was a bitter awakening, and the bitterness of it found expression in some remarkable words addressed to the volksraad: "I would rather," said Burgers in March, 1877, "be a policeman under a strong government than the president of such a state. It is you - you members of the raad and the Boers who have lost the country, who have sold your independence for a drink. You have ill-treated the natives, you have shot them down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to pay the penalty. To-day a bill for £1,000 was laid before me for signature, but I would sooner have cut off my right hand than sign that paper, for I have not the slightest ground to expect that when that bill becomes due there will be a penny to pay it with."

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BRITISH ANNEXATION (1877 A.D.)

After spending some months at Pretoria, Shepstone satisfied himself that annexation was the only possible salvation for the Transvaal. The treasury was empty, the Boers refused to pay their taxes, and there was no power to enforce them. A public debt of £215,000 existed, and government contractors were left unpaid. Out of a male population of less than nine thousand, three thousand had already signed a petition for annexation. Sir Theophilus Shepstone therefore, in April, 1877, issued a proclamation annexing the country. The proclamation stated: "It is the wish of her most gracious majesty that it [the state] shall enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of its people." The wisdom of the step taken by Shepstone has been called in question. No one who acquaints himself with the simple facts of the position will deny that Shepstone's task was an extremely difficult one, and that he acted with care and moderation. The best evidence in favour of the step is to be found in the publicly expressed views of the state's own president, Burgers, already quoted. Moreover, the menace of attack on the Zulu side was a pressing and serious one. Even before annexation had occurred, Shepstone felt the danger so acutely that he sent a message to Cettiwayo, the Zulu chief, warning him that British annexation was about to be proclaimed and that invasion of the Transvaal would not be tolerated. To this warning Cettiwayo, who, encouraged by the defeat of the Boers at Secocoeni's hands, had already gathered his warriors together, replied: "I thank my father Somtseu [Shepstone] for his message. I am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch have tired me out, and I intended to fight with them and to drive them over the Vaal."

A still further reason for Shepstone's annexation, given by Sir Bartle Frere, was that Burgers had already sought alliance with continental powers, and Shepstone had no reason to doubt that if Great Britain refused to interfere, Germany would intervene. The only military force at Shepstone's

[1878-1879 A.D.]

command at the time of annexation was twenty-five policemen, and it is quite certain that, apart from the attitude of President Burgers, which cannot be said to have been one of active opposition, a large number, probably a majority of the Boers, accepted the annexation with complacency. Burgers himself left the Transvaal a disappointed, heart-broken man, and a deathbed statement published some time after his decease throws a lurid light on the intrigues which arose both before and after annexation. He shows how, for purely personal ends, Kruger allied himself with the British faction who were agitating for annexation, and in order to undermine him and endeavour to gain the presidency actually urged the Boers to pay no taxes. However this may be, Burgers was crushed, but as a consequence the British government and not Paul Kruger was, for a time at least, master of the Transvaal. In view of his attitude before annexation, it was not surprising that Kruger should be one of the first men to agitate against it afterwards. The work of destruction had gone too far. The plot had miscarried. And so Kruger and Jorissen were the first to approach Lord Carnarvon with an appeal for revocation of the proclamation. To this request Lord Carnarvon's reply was that the act of annexation was an irrevocable one. Unfortunately, the train of events in England favoured the intrigues of the party who were bent on getting the annexation cancelled. In 1878 Lord Carnarvon resigned, and there were other evidences of dissension in the British cabinet.

Kruger, who since the annexation had held a salaried appointment under the British government, became one of a deputation to England. On this occasion Sir T. Shepstone not unnaturally determined to dispense with his further services as a government servant. In the beginning of 1879 Shepstone was recalled and Colonel Owen Lanyon, an entire stranger to the Boers and their language, was appointed his successor as administrator in the Transvaal. In the meantime, the Zulu forces which threatened the Transvaal had been turned against the British, and the disaster of Isandhlwana occurred. Rumours of British defeat soon reached the Transvaal, and encouraged the disaffected party to become still bolder in their agitation against British rule.

In April, Sir Bartle Frere visited Pretoria and conferred with the Boers. He assured them that they might look forward to complete self government under the crown, and at the same time urged them to sink political differences and join hands with the British against their common enemy, the Zulus. The Boers, however, continued to agitate for complete independence, and with the honourable exception of Piet Uys, a gallant Boer leader, and a small band of followers, who assisted Colonel Evelyn Wood at Hlobani, the Boers held entirely aloof from the conflict with the Zulus, a campaign which cost Great Britain many lives and £5,000,000 before the Zulu power was finally broken. In June Sir Garnet Wolseley went to South Africa as commander of the forces against the Zulus, and as high commissioner "for a time," in place of Sir Bartle Frere, of the Transvaal and Natal. After the settlement of the Zulu question, Sir Garnet Wolseley proceeded to Pretoria and immediately organised an expedition against the old Transvaal enemy Secocoeni, who throughout the Zulu campaign had been acting under the advice of Cettiwayo. Secocoeni's stronghold was captured and his forces disbanded.

It will be seen from this review of the events following annexation that the first work accomplished, over and above establishing a solvent and responsible government in the country, was the demolition by the British of the two native foes who for so long had harassed the Boers. In speaking, after the conclusion of the native wars, on the question of the revocation of the Act of Annexation, Sir Garnet Wolseley assured the Boers at a public gathering that

VOL. XXX →

[1879-1880 A.D.] so long as the sun shone the British flag would fly at Pretoria. In May, 1880, he returned to England. Meanwhile events in Great Britain had once more taken a turn which gave encouragement to the disaffected Boers. Already in November, 1879, Gladstone had conducted his Midlothian campaign. In his speeches he denounced in the strongest terms the annexation which had been carried out by the Beaconsfield government. Referring to Cyprus and the Transvaal, he went so far as to say, "If those acquisitions were as valuable as they are valueless, I would repudiate them, because they were obtained by means dishonourable to the character of our country." Expressions such as these were translated into Dutch and distributed among the Boers by some of their leaders, and it is impossible not to admit that they exercised a good deal of influence in fanning the agitation for retrocession already going on in the Transvaal. So keenly were the Midlothian speeches appreciated by the Boers that the Boer committee wrote a letter of thanks to Mr. Gladstone, and expressed the hope that, should a change in the government of Great Britain occur, "the injustice done to the Transvaal might find redress.'

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In April, 1880, this change in the British government did occur. Gladstone became prime minister, and shortly afterwards Frere was recalled. Could events be more auspicious for the party seeking retrocession? If words in the mouth of an ex-minister at election time meant anything, retrocession could only be a matter of time. The loyalists, not only in the Transvaal, but throughout South Africa, were disheartened and disgusted. The retrocession party in the Transvaal redoubled their efforts and their appeals. They were not destined to meet with such immediate success as the British premier's speeches, delivered during the heat of an election, very naturally led them to anticipate. On being directly appealed to by Kruger and Joubert, Mr. Gladstone replied that the liberty which they sought might be "most easily and promptly conceded to the Transvaal as a member of a South African confederation." This was not at all what was wanted, and the agitation continued. Meanwhile in the Transvaal itself, concurrently with the change of prime minister and high commissioner, the administrator, Colonel Lanyon, began vigorously to enforce taxation among the Boers. Men who would not pay taxes to their own appointed governments, and who were daily expecting to be allowed to return to that condition of anarchy which they had come to regard as the normal order of things, were not likely to respond willingly to the tax-gatherer's demands. That many of them refused payment in the circumstances which existed was natural.

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In November matters were brought to a head by some wagons being seized for the non-payment of taxes, and promptly retaken from the sheriff by a party of Boers. Lanyon began to recognise that the position was becoming grave, and wired to Sir George Colley, the high commissioner of Southeast Africa, for military aid. This, however, was not immediately available, and the Boers in public meeting at Paardekraal resolved once more to proclaim the South African Republic, and in the meantime to appoint a triumvirate, consisting of Kruger, Pretorius, and Joubert, who were to act as a provisional government. Within three days of the Paardekraal meeting a letter was sent to the administrator demanding the keys of the government offices within forty-eight hours. Hostilities forthwith began, and then followed a series of the most disastrous skirmishes, the most contradictory and most vacillating changes of policy which have ever embarrassed a military force or discredited

[1881 A.D.]

a government. No outbreak or rebellion ever occurred under more anomalous conditions. While the administrator and high commissioner were endeavouring to carry out with very inadequate resources the declared policy of the British government and their own instructions, continual pressure was being put on the British prime minister, not only from the insurgent Boers but from his own followers, to carry out the policy he had avowed while out of office, and to grant the retrocession of the country. But it was not until Great Britain was suffering from the humiliation of defeat that the premier was convinced that the time for granting that retrocession had arrived. The first shots fired were outside Potchefstroom, which was then occupied by a small British garrison, who, aided by the loyal inhabitants of the town, successfully sustained a siege of the place until after the close of the war. On December 29th, a small body of some 240 men, chiefly belonging to the 94th regiment, while marching from Lydenburg to Pretoria, were surprised and cut up by the Boer forces. Half the men were killed and wounded, the other half, including some officers, were taken prisoners. Of the prisoners, captains Elliott and Lambert were subsequently treacherously shot by the Boers while crossing a stream after they had been released on parole. In the meantime Pretoria, Rustenburg, Lydenburg, and other small towns had been placed in a position of defence under the directions of Colonel Bellairs, who remained in command at Pretoria, the garrison consisting of a small number of troops and the loyal inhabitants. Sir George Colley, with about fourteen hundred men, marched towards the Transvaal frontier, but before reaching it he found, on January 24th, 1881, that the Boers had already invaded Natal and occupied Laing's Nek. He pitched his camp at Ingogo.e

Disaster followed disaster in rapid succession. On January 28th, with a battalion of the 58th infantry and a company of mounted infantry, he made a rash and desperate attempt to dislodge the forces of two thousand Boers who had firmly intrenched themselves on the heights of Laing's Nek. The result was disastrous and the British retired with a loss of 190 officers and men. On February 8th, while conducting a reconnoitring party of three hundred on the Newcastle road on Ingogo heights, Colley was surprised by a superior Boer force and only after the severest sort of fighting, in which he lost half his men, was he able to cut his way back to the main body of his troops.a

On February 27th came the crowning disaster of Majuba hill. Majuba is a flat topped mountain towering some two thousand feet over the western side of Laing's Nek. Colley conceived the idea of ascending it and thus turning the flank of the Boer position. With five hundred and fifty-four men selected, from various regiments, the ascent was made on the night of the 26th. In the morning the Boers saw the force on Majuba and for a moment thought of abandoning their position. On second thought they determined to make a bold attempt to drive Colley off the hill. Less than two hundred volunteers under General Nicholas Smit carried out the feat of actually storming the top of Majuba. Creeping up under cover of the steep hill-side they gradually worked their way up, shooting every man that exposed himself on the summit. No attempt had been made to occupy the lower slopes which commanded the approach, and the bayonet charge which might have saved the day at the last moment was never carried out. The British troops broke and rushed headlong down the hill. Sir G. Colley and ninety-one men were killed, one hundred and thirty-four wounded, and a number of prisoners taken. Of the Boers one man was killed outright and another died afterwards of his wounds.

Ten days previous to the disaster at Majuba, Sir Evelyn Wood had arrived at Newcastle with reinforcements. On Colley's death he assumed command,

[1881 A.D.] and on March 6th concluded an armistice with Joubert at Laing's Nek. Lord Kimberley then telegraphed offering an amnesty to the Boers. Gladstone announced in parliament that an opportunity for a settlement of affairs in the Transvaal had arisen. On March 6th the terms of peace were arranged between the Boers and Sir Evelyn Wood. The most important of these terms were that the Transvaal should have complete self government under British suzerainty, and that a British resident should be stationed at Pretoria. The treaty of peace practically conceded all that the Boers demanded, and was never regarded as anything else than surrender either by the Boers or the loyalists in South Africa. It had hardly been concluded when Sir Frederick Roberts arrived at the Cape with ten thousand troops, and after spending forty-eight hours there returned to England.

In the meantime, while the English general was making a treaty under the instructions of British ministers on the frontier, the beleaguered garrisons of Pretoria, Potchefstroom, and other smaller towns were stoutly and gallantly holding their own. The news of the surrender reached Pretoria through Boer sources, and when first received there was laughed at by the garrison and inhabitants as a Boer joke. When the bitter truth was at length realised, the British flag was dragged through the dust of Pretoria streets by outraged Englishmen. At Potchefstroom the garrison under Colonel Winsloe were hard pressed. During the siege a third of their number had been killed and wounded. The Boer commander, Cronje, was duly informed of the armistice by his leaders, but in spite of this knowledge continued the siege for ten days afterwards, until Winsloe and his little band were compelled to surrender. In May the terms of settlement already agreed upon were drawn up at Pretoria in the form of a convention and signed. The preamble to the Pretoria Convention of 1881 contained in brief but explicit terms the grant of self government to the Boers, subject to British suzerainty. In later years, when the Boers desired to regard the whole of this convention (and not merely the articles) as cancelled by the London Convention of 1884, and with it the suzerainty which was only mentioned in the preamble, Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that if the preamble to this instrument were considered cancelled, so also would the grant of self government be cancelled. The Pretoria Convention contained thirty-three articles. The most important of these reserved to her majesty "the control of the external relations of the said state, including the conclusion of treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers," and the right to march troops through the Transvaal. The boundaries of the state were defined, and to them the Transvaal was strictly to adhere.

The retrocession of the Transvaal was a terrible blow to the loyalists. The Boers on the other hand, found themselves in better plight than they had ever been before. Their native foes Cettiwayo and Secocoeni had been crushed by British forces; their liabilities were consolidated into a debt to Great Britain, to be repaid at convenience and leisure-as a matter of fact, not even interest was paid for some time. If ever a small state was well treated by a large one, the Transvaal was so in the retrocession of 1881. Unfortunately, this magnanimity was forthcoming after defeat. It appeared as though a virtue had been made of a necessity, and the Boers never could regard it in any other light.

The new volksraad had scarcely been returned, and Kruger elected president, before a system of government concessions to private individuals was started. These concessions, in so far as they prejudiced the commerce and general interests of the inhabitants, consisted chiefly in the granting of monop

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