The COURT (Mellor and Lush, JJ.) were of opi- | nion that the exemption contained in the local Acts is not affected by the Public Health Acts. Sect. 23 of the Public Health Act of 1872 clearly contemplates the continuance of the local Acts, unless certain steps are taken which have not been taken in this case. Sect. 43 also assumes their validity. That being so, the respondents must levy their rates in the same manner as the commissioners under the local Acts, and subject to the same exemption. Rule absolute to quash the order of sessions. Wednesday, Jan. 17, 1877. DARGAN v. DAVIES. Impounding-Neglect to supply impounded animals with provender--Whether pound-keeper or party impounding liable to penalty-12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 5. By 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 5, " every person who shall impound or cause to be impounded any animal, and shall neglect to provide such animal with food and water, is liable to a penalty of 20s. Held (upon a case stated by justices who had dismissed an information against the keeper of a common pound under this section), that the section did not apply to the keeper of the pound, but to the party bringing the animal to the pound. THIS was a case stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, by John Lort Stokes, Vice-Admiral, and Peter Phelps Clerks, two of the justices of the peace for the county of Pembroke, and the following are the material parts of such case: An information had been preferred by Thomas Dargan, the appellant, against Martha Davies, the respondent, under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, charging that the respondent did impcund forty-eight sheep in the common pound on the 6th Jan. 1876, and on that and the two following days did unlawfully neglect to provide and supply the said sheep with a sufficient quantity of fit and wholsome food and water contrary to that statute. The justices had dismissed the information with costs. It was proved that one D. Williams, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on the 6th Jan. 1876, impounded forty-two sheep, which he had theretofore seized damage feasant. They were confined until their release as follows: thirty-four were taken out at midday on the following Friday, and the remaining eight on the next Tuesday. During the whole time the thirty-four sheep were so confined the said D. Williams did not provide any of the forty-two with food or water, but after the release of the thirty-four the remaining eight were about 7 a.m. on Saturday the 8th Jan. provided with hay. The respondent was at the time of the said sheep being so impounded and confined the keeper of the pound, but she did not provide or supply the sheep with any food or water or in any way interfere beyond receiving and keeping them in such pound until their release. The key of such pound was in the sole possession of the respondent during this period. and she in her capacity of pound-keeper had the sole control over such pound. The justices having dismissed the information on the ground that 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 5 “did [Q.B. DIV. not, under these circumstances, apply to or include the respondent, but to the person or persons who delivered or caused to be delivered the said sheep into her custody," the question for the opinion of this court was "whether under the above circumstances the said information was legally and properly dismissed." Morton Smith referred to the Acts in pari materiâ (being 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 59, s. 4; 17 & 18 Vict. c, 60, s. 1), and argued that the section in question extended to the respondent. No counsel appeared for the respondent. MELLOR, J.-This case has been extremely well argued by Mr. Smith, but I have come to the conclusion that the keeper of the pound is not within the terms of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 5. That section provides that " every person who shall impound or confine, or cause to be impounded or confined, in any pound or receptacle of the like nature any animal, shall provide and supply during such confinement a sufficient quantity of fit and wholesome food and water to such animal; and every such person who shall refuse or neglect to provide and supply such animal with such food and water as aforesaid shall for every such offence forfeit and pay a penalty of 20s." It appears to me that this section applies to the real actor, to the person who delivers the animal to the pound-keeper, and not to the pound-keeper himself. The Legislature has made no special provision as to the keeper of the pound, and, from the absence of such a provision, the Legislature must be taken to have considered that the imposition of the 208. penalty on the person employing the keeper of the pound was sufficient to ensure the object in view. The providing of food and water for twelve hours is left to such person, and if such person omits to provide the food and water during such twelve hours, any person of a benevolent mind may, by the 6th section, enter the pound, supply the food and water, and recover the cost of the food and water from the owner of the animal. LUSH, J.-I also am of opinion that these statutes contain no words to embrace the keeper of the pound within their sanction. The recital contained in the preamble of the Act 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, is very strongly in favour of the respondent. From that preamble it appears that the history of the law is as follows: First, by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 59, every person impounding any animal was required to supply such animal daily with good and sufficient food and nourishment while impounded. By the same Act every such person so providing the animal with food and nourishment was authorised to recover from the owner of the animal not exceeding double the value of the food and nourishment supplied. Such person was also at liberty, instead of proceeding for the value of the provender, to sell the animal after seven days from the time of the impounding. Then came the Act 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, which repealed the Act 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 59, and the 5th and 6th sections contained the provisions which my brother Mellor has referred to. Finally comes the Act 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60. This recites, after summarising the two previous Acts, that "it is doubtful whether the Act 12 & 13 Vict. c. 49, gives any remedy to the person impounding for the recovery of a compensation for the food and water supplied for any animal, and no power is given to sell the animal, although full DUFFELL v. CURTIS-TYNE COAL Co. v. OVERSEERS OF WALLSEND PARISH. C.P. Div.] provisions for these purposes were contained in 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 59. The Act then provides that every person who has impounded an animal, and supplied him with food and water, may recover double the value of the food and water supplied from the owner, or may, if he please, sell the animal and pay himself, rendering the overplus, if any, to the owner. I think the mention of the person impounding," in this section, and the absence of any mention of the keeper of the pound, is conclusive to show that the keeper of the pound is not subject to the penalty imposed by 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 5. 66 Judgment for the respondent. Solicitor for the appellant, A. Leslie. COMMON PLEAS DIVISION. Reported by S. HARE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. APPEAL FROM INFERIOR COURT. Thursday, Jan. 18, 1877. Sunday trading - Refreshment-house licenceHours of closing where no wine licence-29 Car. 2, e. 7, sect. 1-23 Vict. c. 27, sects. 6, 7, & 27-27 & 28 Vict. c. 64, s. 5. A licensed refreshment-house keeper, although he does not hold a wine licence, may not sell articles for consumption off the premises on Sundays. CASE stated by the magistrates of Yarmouth. The appellant was convicted at the petty sessions of the borough, held on 19th July 1876, under 29 Car. 2, c. 7, sect 1, for having exercised the worldly business of his ordinary calling, between the hours of 3 and 6 p.m., on Sunday, 16th July 1876. He was a baker and confectioner, and held a refreshment licence under 23 Vict. c. 27, s. 6; but did not hold a wine licence under sect. 7. The question for the decision of the court was whether sect. 27 of the latter Act, which enacts that the house of a person holding a wine licence "shall not be open for the sale or consumption therein of any article whatever at any time during which the houses of licensed victuallers shall be closed on Sunday," . . . . &c., applied to the present case. .... Poland, for the appellant.-The words of the Act (23 Vict. c. 27), apply to a refreshment house keeper who does, and not to one who does not, hold a wine licence. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 64, sect. 5, only enacts that a refreshment house must not be open between 1 and 4 a.m. The cakes were sold for consumption off the premises. The Statute 29 Car. 2, c. 7, is suspended by the limited licence obtained. No counsel appeared to support the conviction. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I am of opinion this conviction ought to be confirmed. The observance of the Lord's Day Act is enforced or neglected according to the public opinion of the moment, or to the zeal of the informers. In this case the appellant sold cakes and sweetmeats to grown-up people and children; and from the fact that he carried on his trade Sunday after Sunday, there is good reason to infer that he knew the articles he sold would not be consumed on the premises. Prima facie the statute of Charles II. is against [C.P. DIV. him. Is there anything that takes his case out of its provisions? Does the license to keep a refreshment house do so? I am clearly of opinion that it does not. The statute 23 Vict. c. 27, s. 6, permits a person who keeps a house for the purpose of selling refreshment to be consumed therein to procure a licence for his house; and, having done so, he may proceed to take out a wine licence under sect. 7, when he will come within the provisions of sect. 2. But the later statute contains nothing to exempt the appellant from the penalty of breaking the statute of Charles II., for the trading of which he has been convicted, that is, the selling of articles to be consumed elsewhere, is not part of the calling of a refreshment house keeper, as defined by the statute mentioned above, under which the license was granted. GROVE, J.-I am of the same opinion. I hold that the construction of the statute as permitting the sale in licensed houses on Sunday of refreshments to be consumed on the premises to be a reasonable one; but it must not, in my judgment, be extended to make a licensed refreshment house an ordinary trading one in such articles. The other part of the case is matter of police regulation. Since the legislature has fixed closing hours for public houses, I cannot see why closing hours should not be fixed for other refreshment houses; and that has been done. As to 27 & 28 Vict. c. 64, s. 5, it distinctly says that nothing therein contained shall authorise any person to keep open any refreshment house, or to sell refreshments otherwise than at the times and upon the conditions prescribed by the Acts of Parliament in that behalf made. Conviction upheld. Solicitor for the appellant, A. Storey. APPEALS FROM INFERIOR COURTS. Monday, Jan. 29, 1877. TYNE COAL COMPANY (LIMITED) v. OverseeRS OF WALLSEND PARISH. Rating appeal-Colliery drowned out-Value to a tenant of pumping machinery-Principle of assessment. A colliery, the pumping engines of which only were at work, and which appeared to be a hopeless loss, was assessed to the relief of the poor at a rate calculated upon the land and machinery as a going concern, having a prospective value. Held, that the land must be rated at its value to a tenant for year to year, and the machinery at its value independently of the land. CASE stated by the justices of the County of Northumberland. The question for the opinion of the court was whether the Tyne Coal Company (Limited), the appellants, were rateable for certain reservoirs, buildings, engine, railway and colliery. The appellants are under-lessees of the Wallsend Colliery at a rent of 2001. a-year certain. They have power to work existing shafts, and to take surface lands, paying compensation for them. Upon this surface land they have constructed two large reservoirs, boiler sheds, and an engine house, with a large chimney. A railway has been laid from the colliery to a wharf on the river Tyne. The greater part of the buildings, reservoirs, plant, and railway, are substantially constructed. All of C.P. Div.] them are intended for permanent use, and are used with the sole object of getting coal. The boiler shed contains twelve boilers set in masonry. THE TYNE COAL COMPANY (LIMITED) v. OVERSEERS OF WALLSEND PARISH. The mine was drowned out many years ago, and no coal has been got since 1854.The water was considerably reduced before 1870, but since then, notwithstanding continual pumping, it has remained at about the same level. The appellants have been assessed to the relief of the poor of the parish in respect of "land, shafts, buildings, engines, pumps, and fixed plant" at the rateable value of 12507., upon a gross estimated rental of 15001. They admit that they are rateable in respect of the lands taken by them; but they contend that, as the mine is totally unproductive, they are not rateable in respect of any of the other particulars, which are used solely for the purpose of unwatering the mine. Herschel, Q.C. and E. Ridley, for the appellants, admitted that the principle is well established that in valuing mining property for rating purposes, the value of the plant may be taken into consideration; and that, in estimating the plant and buildings, an extra value may be put upon them because of the mine beneath them. They contended that this principle should work the opposite way when the mine is valueless. Sir Henry James, Q.C. and Webster, for the overseers. The mine is not rated. What is rated is the land, with what is upon it, which includes the shaft or opening in the land. The reservoirs also, and the railway and wharf, used for bringing coal to the pumping engines, are not exempted. They are all beneficially occupied, and the fact that they do not produce any return is immaterial. The machinery, &c., are there for the purpose of pumping out water; and making the mine a valuable property. Suppose the pumping were done by a contractor, his works would be rateable. This case stands upon the same footing; here the owner is his own contractor. [Lord COLERIDGE.-The question in these cases is always what would a person give for the tenancy ?] The working of the mine has been beneficial in the sense that the water in it has not been allowed to increase. [Lord COLERIDGE.-The time will come when the engines will be rateable. Then the duty of the engine and its rateability will be at an end. You cannot levy a rate for past years. The engines are now worked in the hope of future profits. Why do the appellants continue to pump if they consider the mine of no value? Reg. v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. Rep. 4 Staley v. Castleton, 5 B. & S. 505; Kittow v St. Cleer, 44 L. J. 23, M. C. Herschel, Q.C., in reply.--None of the cases cited support the claim of the respondents. They have failed to show any case in which property not capable of being let to a tenant from year to year, and not producing any profit, has been held to be rateable. The case of Staley v. Castleton was that of a cotton mill which, owing to the scarcity of cotton during the American war, was idle, and used as a warehouse. There the rate allowed was that of a warehouse. In Reg. v. Metropolitan Board of Works, the pumping station, &c., had an occupation value as land. The board must have rented them if it had not been proprietor, and a tenant might easily have been found to [C.P. DIV. take them off its hands. That is not our case. The case of Metropolitan Board of Works v. West Ham (40 L. J. 30, M. C.) applies the principle of the last case to the buildings upon the land; that is, they were capable of being let, and had an independent value apart from that of the land. Neither is that our case. Harter v. Salford (6 B. & S. 591), was a case where the owner of a silk mill, having ceased to work it, was rated for a building used as a warehouse for machinery. In Reg. v. Bilston (5 B. & C. 851), the pumping engines of a mine were exempted from rating. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-In this case our judgment must be for the appellants. This is an appeal against a rate assessed upon certain machinery, and buildings in connection with the machinery, all of which are occupied and used to drain a coal mine drowned out, and yielding no profits. In order to bring myself within the authority of the decided cases, I must decide that the surface of the land is rateable at whatever it would be worth in the hands of a tenant from year to year; and that the engine-house, pumps, &c., are to be assessed separately, if they have any independent value, upon the authority of the case of Metropolitan Board of Works v. West Ham. If there be any independent value in them apart from that of the worthless mine, upon the principle of that case, to that extent they ought to be rated. This fact was not raised by the case, and so I express no opinion upon it. I decide upon the assumption that these engines, &c., are of value only in connection with something at present valueless, and that they have no separate and independent value; that they are part of a valueless whole, which has been valuable at some time now past, and may be so again, when they will be rated at the value which they may then be ascertained to have. When they do so become valuable, either the land will be rated at an additional value, or the mine itself, or perhaps the subjects of this appeal themselves, will be rated. In deciding as I do, I desire to conform to the cases which have already been decided. GROVE, J.-I Concur in the opinion expressed by my Lord. It is not disputed that the land is rateable, or that if it has any adjuncts which increase its value they may be rated; but the appellants contend that besides the land there is nothing in this case rateable. The facts stated show that the mine is absolutely valueless, that it has no value for which a person would give anything. It was argued that a rent might be obtained from a speculator. But that is not the principal upon which rating should be settled. If there were a house to live in upon the land, then there might be some reason for assessing the rate higher than the actual value of the land. At the most the work going on now could only give the property a prospective value, and that we cannot value for rating purposes. The case of Metropolitan Board of Works v. West Ham is inconsistent with such a principle. You do not rate land because it may have a contingent value, any more than you reduce a rate because there may possibly be a loss upon the rated property in the future; you take its present value. I should be prepared to decide this case upon that ground only. But the case goes further. My brother Lush, J., in the case of Reg. v. Metropolitan Board of Works, held that the rateable quality of the land and buildings of the defendants was not affected by the particular use to which it was ap C.P. Div.] WARDEN v. TYE-BULLOCK v. DUNLAP. plied. Here is a stronger case. The mine has no reasonably prospective value. It has been in the same position for six years, during which time the engines have done no useful work. It would not be right to rate them, because they may at some future time have some value, whilst there is no probability of their having a future, or any, value. I conceive nothing would induce a tenant to give 18. more rent for the land because the engines were on it. The only cases at all supporting the contention of the respondents, but falling far short of it, are the case of Reg. v. Metropolitan Board of Works, from which it would appear that there was a rateability upon pumping engines, because they had a value, explained by the case of Metropolitan Board of Works v. West Ham, which shows that the sewage works had a value, not because they were sewage works, but because they might be valuable in the hands of a tenant, and might be used by him for some other purpose. The only utility of the pumps, &c., in question, is in respect of the mine, and the same remark applies to the wharf and the railway. They are so unprofitable that they would even be a drawback to a tenant. Rate ordered to be amended in terms of the judgment. No costs. Solicitors: Cookson, Wainewright, and Pennington; H. C. Coote. APPEAL FROM INFERIOR COURT. Thursday, Jan. 18, 1877. Drunkenness, penalty for―Licensed person drunk on his own premises-The Licensing Act 1872, ss. 12 and 13. A publican cannot be convicted under sect. 13 of the Licensing Act 1872, for being drunk on his own premises. CASE stated by the justices of Northamptonshire. The appellant was summarily convicted under sect. 13 of the Licensing Act 1872, which enacts that "if any licensed person permits drunkenness, or any violent, quarrelsome, or riotous conduct to take place on his premises, or sells any intoxicating liquor to any drunken person," he shall be liable to a penalty, &c. It appeared that the appellant was a licensed person, and that he was found drunk by the respondent, a policeman, upon his own licensed premises. He was fined 51. and costs, and the conviction was ordered to be indorsed upon the licence. Poland, against the conviction.-The conviction is under the wrong section. Sect. 13 makes it an offence for a licensed person to permit a person to be drunk on his premises; but the drunkenness must be that of another person-the landlord cannot be the person drunk. The section goes on to say that if any licensed person intoxicating liquor to any drunken person.' This shows that the person must be another than the person, for he cannot sell to himself. Sect. 12 is the one applicable to this case, by which every person found drunk is liable to a penalty of 10s. 66 sells any Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I come to the conclusion that the case does not fall within the section under which the conviction has been made, and that it cannot be sustained. The Licensing Act 1872, is divided into heads, one of which, entitled [Ex. Div. "Offences against public order," consists of several sections, numbered 12 to 18 respectively, all except the first regulating the duty of licensed persons in relation to others. Except sect. 12, every one of them is clear in this respect; and sect. 13 in particular says that " "if any licensed person permits drunkenness, &c., on his premises, or sells any intoxicating liquor," &c., he shall be liable to conviction. He cannot sell to himself in his own house. Part of the section, therefore, cannot apply to the licensed person; and, using a fair construction of the whole of the Act, I think the rest of the section cannot. I come to the conclusion, therefore, reluctantly but clearly, that the words of sect. 13 do not include the publican himself, but reserve his case to be dealt with in another way. GROVE, J.-I am of the same opinion. Sect. 13 clearly points to the conduct of the landlord with relation to others; for he must take care persons do not get drunk, &c., &c., but it does not relate to a licensed person himself getting drunk. There is another provision made for that case. By sect. 12 any person found drunk is liable to punishment. However much we may regret it, we cannot uphold this conviction. The court has only to construe an Act as it finds it, and in my opinion sect. 13 was not intended to apply to this Conviction quashed. Solicitor for the appellant, J. J. Rae. case. EXCHEQUER DIVISION. Wednesday, Nov. 15, 1876. (Before CLEASBY, B.) BULLOCK. DUNLAP. Detinue and trover-Property found on a person suspected of having stolen it-Trial and acquittal of suspected party-Property detained by constable-Application by constable to magistrate for order, under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 29, as to disposal of property-Adjournment by magistrate to a day not yet expired-Action by acquitted party against constable-Demurrer. The plaintiff being found by a police constable wearing a diamond pin and diamond ring, was taken into custody and charged by him with stealing them, and being committed by a police magistrate for trial on such charge, was afterwards indicted and tried thereon and acquitted. The de fendant, a superintendent of police into whose possession the pin and ring had lawfully come in the course of the proceedings, did not deliver them up to the plaintiff upon the latter's acquittal, but, before action and within a reasonable time after such acquittal, applied to a magistrate for an order under sect. 29 of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, "for the delivery of the said goods to the party who should appear to the magistrate to be the rightful owner thereof, or such other order as to the magistrate should seem meet." The magistrate entertained the application, and, after hearing evidence in support of it, and the evidence of the plaintiff in support of his claim to the goods, adjourned the hearing to a day which has not expired, and no order has yet been made. In an action by the plaintiff against the defendant for the detention and conversion of the said pin and ring, in answer to which the defendant stated the facts as above set forth, and alleged that he detained the goods as a constable in the performance of his duty, it was Held by the Exchequer Division (Cleasby, B.), overruling a demurrer to the statement of defence, that the action was not maintainable, and that the defendant having within a reasonable time applied to the magistrate for an order under sect. 29 of the statute, and done all that the Act of Parliament called upon him to do to render up possession of the goods in question, and the matter being still in the hands of the magistrate, the defendant was not responsible because he was not able before action to relieve himself of the possession of the goods. THE statement of claim in this case was as follows: The plaintiff is a dealer in jewellery, in Churchstreet, Soho, and the defendant is a superintendent of the metropolitan police. 1. The plaintiff, in the month of Oct. 1875, was in possession, as his own property, of a certain diamond pin, which he was then wearing in his cravat scarf, as well as of a certain diamond ring, which was also in his possession as his own property. 2. One Charles Butcher, a metropolitan detective police constable, on seeing the plaintiff and observing the said diamond pin being so worn by him as aforesaid, charged him with stealing the same, as well as the diamond ring, and took him into custody upon such charge, and then took from him both the said pin and the ring. 3, 4. The plaintiff was, thereupon, subsequently taken before Mr. Newton, a metropolitan police magistrate, who, after various repeated remands, committed him for trial on such charge, upon which he was subsequently indicted and tried, and acquitted. 5. The said Charles Butcher delivered the said pin and ring to the defendant, as his superior officer. 6. The defendant detains from the plaintiff the use and possession of the plaintiff's goods and property, that is to say, the diamond pin and ring, and has also converted to his own use and wrongfully deprived the plaintiff of the use and possession of his said goods and property. The plaintiff claims a return of the said goods or their value, and 201. for their detention, and in respect of the conversion of the said goods, the plaintiff claims 1007. The statement of defence :- 1. That the said goods and property were not the plaintiff's, as alleged. 2. As to the alleged conversion of the said goods and property, the defendant denies the statement in paragraph 6 of the plaintiff's statement of claim. 3. As to the alleged detention of the said goods and property, and depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession thereof, the defendant says that, after the plaintiff had been charged with stealing the said goods and property, and had been tried and acquitted (as alleged), the said goods and property were in the lawful possession of the defendant, as and being a constable, within the meaning of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 29; and the defendant, as such constable, being ignorant as to who was the rightful owner thereof, before the commencement of this suit, and within a [Ex. Div. reasonable time after he became possessed thereof, duly made an application to a magistrate then having jurisdiction in that behalf, under the said section of the said statute, to make an order for the delivery of the said goods to the party who should appear to be the rightful owner thereof, or such other order as to such magistrate should seem meet. 4. That the said magistrate entertained the said application, and heard evidence in support thereof, and the plaintiff appeared before the said magistrate in the matter of the said application, and gave evidence in support of his claim to the said goods and property. 5. That the said magistrate afterwards adjourned the hearing of the said application to a day which has not yet expired. 6. That the said application is still pending before the said magistrate, and no order has yet been made therein by the said magistrate, under the said section of the said statute. 7. That the defendant, as such constable as aforesaid, and in the performance of his duty in that behalf, and not otherwise, detained, and still detains, the said goods and property, and the possession thereof from the plaintiff, until an order has been made under the said section of the said statute, as he lawfully might for the cause aforesaid. Demurrer to the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th paragraphs of the statement of defence as bad in law, on the ground that the matters therein contained do not disclose any legal defence. Sect. 29 of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, referred to in the above statement of defence, enacts "That if any goods cr money charged to be stolen or fraudulently obtained, shall be in the custody of any constable, by virtue of any warrant of a justice, or in prosecution of any charge of felony or misdemeanour in regard to the obtaining thereof, and the person charged with stealing or obtaining possession as aforesaid, shall not be found, or shall have been summarily convicted or discharged, or shall have been tried and acquitted, or it such person shall have been tried and found guilty, but the property so in custody shall not have been included in any such indictment upon which he shall have been found guilty, it shall be lawful for any magistrate to make an order for the delivery of such goods or money to the party who shall appear to be the rightful owner thereof, or, in case the owner cannot be ascertained, then to make such order with respect to such goods or money as to such magistrate shall seem meet. Provided always, that no such order shall be any bar to the right of any person or persons to sue the party to whom such goods or money shall be delivered, and to recover such goods or money from him by action at law, so that such action shall be commenced within six calendar months next after such order shall be made." The plaintiff's points for argument. — First, that the paragraphs demurred to disclose no facts which in law disentitle the plaintiff to maintain and continue this action; secondly, that the plaintiff being no party to the said proceedings before the magistrate, the said statute does not take away his right to maintain and continue an action in a court of law; thirdly, that the statute referred to, although enabling a magistrate under certain circumstances to make an order as to the property, does not interefere with the liability of |