general legacy. Marquis of Hert-
ford v. Lord Lowther (Countess
Berchtoldt's case).
Page 107

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
See VENDOR AND PURCHASEr, 4.

STATUTE.

1. A Canal Act provided, that in case
the Company and the coal owner
could not agree as to the amount
of compensation for the coal taken
for the purposes of the canal, it
should be settled by a jury sum-
moned by the commissioners,
whose verdict was "to be con-
clusive, and should not be re-
moved by certiorari or other pro-
cess whatever, into any of the
Courts of Record at Westminster,
or any other Court." A bill was
filed, praying an injunction to re-
strain proceedings before a jury,
on the ground that the Defendant
was entitled to no compensation,
and that the special jurisdiction
provided by the Act was not so
constituted as to be likely to come
to a just conclusion. Held, that
the Plaintiffs were not entitled to
an injunction if the Defendant was
entitled to any compensation, the
amount of which had to be ascer-
tained; but whether this Court
had any jurisdiction to interfere in
the matter, if it had clearly ap-
peared that the Defendant was
entitled to no compensation, quære.
The Barnsley Canal Company v.
Twibell.

19

2. The 1 W. 4. c. 36. sec. xv. rule
17., does not authorise the Court
to order that the costs of a De-
fendant's contempt for not answer-
ing, and who is too poor to pay
them, may be costs in the cause.
Robey v. Whitewood.
Page 54
3. A person at his death was mem-
ber of a banking company esta-
blished under the 7 G. 4. c. 46.,
and subject to its liabilities. After
the expiration of three years, a
suit was instituted for the ad-
ministration of his estate, and
the common decree was made for
taking an account of his debts.

Persons who were creditors of the
banking company at the testator's
death claimed before the Master.
Held, that their claims did not
come within the scope of the
decree; secondly, that their claims
were barred by the lapse of three
years; and, thirdly, that the proper
way of bringing their claims be-
fore the Court was by petition,
and not by exception. Barker v.
Buttress.

134

steps for more than twenty years
to keep it alive, the Statute of Li-
mitations held not to apply. Bur-
rell v. The Earl of Egremont.

Page 205
2. Estate of a testator engaged in a
'Banking Company established
under the 7 Geo. 4. c. 46. held re-
leased after the expiration of three
years. Barker v. Buttress. 134.

See JUDGMENT.
TAXATION, 1.

STAYING PROCEEDINGS.
1. Where the Defendant submits to
pay the whole demand of the
Plaintiff, the Court stays the pro-
ceedings; but if there be
a ques-
tion in dispute as to the Plaintiff's
right to recover certain expenses,
and the Defendant does not sub-
mit thereto, the Court will not in-
terfere summarily and stop the
suit. Field v. Robinson.
2. A Defendant submitted to the
claim of the Plaintiff except the
costs of a distringas. The Court
would not stay the proceedings till
the question was agreed upon or
determined.
Ibid.

SUBPOENA.

66

the 33rd Order of May 1845,
upon a Defendant of unsound
mind not so found by inquisition.
Biddulph v. Lord Camoys.

581

Page 580
3. Upon an application to serve a
subpoena abroad, under the 33rd
Order of May 1845, an affidavit
merely shewing the place of resi-
dence abroad of the Defendant
seven weeks previous is insuffi-
cient. Fieske v. Buller.
4. Liberty being given under the
33rd Order of May 1845, to serve
a subpœna in Ireland, the periods
limited under the 2nd article were
ten days to appear, six weeks to
plead, answer, or demur, not de-
murring alone, but no order was
made as to the time for demurring
alone. Brown v. Stanton.

582

SUING ON BEHALF, ETC.
1. In a continuing partnership, if a
few have an interest in a particular
subject adverse to all the rest, a
bill may be filed against the few,
by one "on behalf, &c." Richard-
son v. Hastings.
323
2. In the case of an insolvent part-
nership not formally dissolved, a
bill may be filed by one or more
on behalf of the rest against the
governing body, to have the assets
collected and applied towards the
payment of the debts, without
seeking to ascertain the rights and
liabilities of the parties as between
themselves, but leaving them open
to future litigation.

Ibid.

1. Within twelve months after pay-
ment of a bill of costs, a client
presented a petition for its taxa-
tion, but the petition having spe-
cified no items of overcharge, no
order could be made. The twelve
months having then expired, the
Court refused to allow the petition
to stand over, for the purpose of
amendment, by specifying the
items. Barwell v. Brooks. 345
2. Terms of taxation after the ex-
piration of one month from the
delivery of the bill. In re Brom-
ley.
487
Special direction given on an
order for taxation, that if the
solicitor should be unable to es-
tablish any of the charges by
reason of the death of his clerk,
or the absence of the books and
papers delivered to the client, the
Taxing Master should report spe-
cially thereon. In re Watts. 491
4. Taxation

3.

2. Principles on which the Court in-
terferes to prevent the use of
trade marks. Croft v. Day.

TRUST.

The Irish Society held to be trus-
tees for public purposes and not
accountable to the Companies of
London, notwithstanding the lat-
ter were, after providing for the
public objects, entitled to the sur-
plus revenues of the estate vested
in the former. Skinners' Company
v. The Irish Society.

See BREACH OF TRUST, 2.
JOINT TENANTS.

TRUSTEE.

593

1. Costs refused to one of two
trustees who had declined to
transfer a fund to the party en-
titled, and had severed in his de-
fence. Allen v. Thorp.
72
2. A testator devised real and per-
sonal estate, on certain trusts,
which, as the Court considered,
the testator intended to be per-
formed by his trustees named,
and the survivors and survivor,
and by the heirs and assigns, or
by the executors or administra-
tors, of the survivor. The will
contained no power to appoint
new trustees. The surviving trus-
tee devised and bequeathed the
trust estates and powers to A., B.,
and C., upon the trusts of the first
will: Held, that this devise and

5. A. B. and the other committee-
men of a public company mort-
gaged the company's estate, and
covenanted personally to pay the
money. They afterwards entered
into a personal obligation, by
bond, for another debt. A. B.
died, having certain shares vested
in him as trustee to the company.
By the decree, the shares were
ordered to be sold, and the pro-
duce applied in payment of the
debts of the company, for which
the estate of A. B. was liable.
Held, that the representatives of
A. B. had a right to have the
fund applied in payment of the
bond debt, in priority of the mort-
gage debt. Lawrence v. Kempson.