2. By a marriage settlement, a rent
charge of 2001. a year was secured
to the wife for life, payable quar-
terly, with powers of distress, &c.
To enable the husband (to mort-
gage, the wife released her rent
charge to the mortgagee. The
equity of redemption was reserved
to the husband, who covenanted
to convey other lands on the trusts
of the settlement. The husband,
by his will, gave his real and per.
sonal estate to his brother, on con-
dition that he would allow his
wife 300l. a year for life. Held,
that the 2001. a year remained a
valid charge on the equity of re-
demption; and secondly, that it
was not satisfied by the 3007. a
year.
3. In a foreclosure suit, the mortgagee
having received rents between the
date of the Master's report and
the day appointed for payment,
the Court, on motion, referred it
back to the Master to continue
the accounts, and to fix a new day.
Ellis v. Griffiths.

Ibid.

83

NEXT OF KIN.
The ultimate trust in a marriage
settlement of a fund belonging to
the wife, was to her executors or
administrators. Held, first, that the
surviving husband, who was her
administrator, and not her next of
kin, was entitled; and, secondly,
that if by those words her next of
kin were intended, then that the
next of kin at the death of the
wife, and not of the husband (who
was tenant for life), were entitled.
Allen v. Thorp.

See PARTIES, 3.

72

undue influence has been exercised
on the part of the child, and a
party seeking to maintain such a
transaction must shew that that
presumption is adequately re-
butted. Archer v. Hudson.

Page 551
3. Though Courts of equity do not
interfere to prevent an act even of
bounty between parent and child,
yet they will see that the child is
placed in such a position as will
enable him to form an entirely
free and unfettered judgment, in-
dependent altogether of any sort
of control.

PARTIES.

Ibid.

1. Where a voluntary trust is per-
fected, the settlor is not a neces-
sary party to a suit by the cestui
que trust against the trustee, to
compel its performance. Reed v.
O'Brien.

32
2. In a suit to remedy a breach of

trust, it is not, since the New
Orders, necessary to make every
party participating in the breach
of trust party to the suit. At-
torney-General v. Corporation of
Leicester.
176
3. The ultimate limitation in a mar-
riage settlement of a fund belong-
ing to the husband was "for the
next of kin or personal represent-
atives of the husband, in a due
course of administration, accord-
ing to the statute of Distributions."
The husband left his wife sur-
viving, and A. B., his next of kin,
was a feme covert. In another

suit, the fund had been treated as
part of the residuary estate of the
husband, and had been ordered
to be paid over to two charities,
who were residuary legatees. A
bill being filed by the represent-
atives of A. B., the next of kin,
claiming the fund: -Held, that
the next of kin of the wife of the
settlor and the charities were ne-
cessary parties, but that the repre-
sentatives of the deceased husband
of A. B., who had administered
to his wife, were not necessary
parties to the suit.
Kilner v.
Leech.
Page 202

4. An estate subject to a mortgage
was devised to executors for a
term for payment of debts, and
subject thereto, to one for life,
with remainder over. The execu-
tors joined in a transfer of the
mortgage, and raised a further
sum alleged to be necessary for
payment of the debts. The tenant
for life, with the concurrence of
the executors, afterwards sold the
property absolutely, and the pur-
chaser paid off the mortgage. A
bill being filed by the remainder-
man to redeem the purchaser, on
payment of the original mortgage
only, and the cause being set down
on an objection for want of par-
ties: Held, that the Plaintiff was
not at present, bound to make the
executors parties. Greenwood v.
Rothwell.
279

5. To a suit seeking to wind up the
affairs of a club or partnership,
all persons interested must be
made parties, though they are

VOL. VII.

numerous; it is not sufficient for
one to sue on behalf of the others.
Richardson v. Hastings.

Page 301
6. A club was dissolved, and the
committee were authorised to re-
alise the assets and wind up the
affairs. For that purpose the lease
was vested in A., B., and C. A.
and B., without the concurrence
of the other members of the com-
mittee, sold the lease and pro-
perty, and received the amount.
A. B. and D. (another committee-
man) signed the receipt, but A.
and B. alone received the money.
In a bill to make A. and B. ac-
count: Held, that C. and D. were
not necessary parties. Ibid.
There are two general rules of
the Court; first, that all persons
interested in the subject-matter of
the litigation ought to be parties;
the second, that the Court always
endeavours to do complete justice,
so that the matters involved in the
suit may not be left open to fu-
ture litigation; but these rules are
both occasionally departed from.
Ibid.

7.

8. By the rules of a club, the
bankers were alone authorised to
receive money on account of the
club. Some of the members sub-
scribed and purchased the furni-
ture, which, by deed executed by
the subscribers, was vested in the
Plaintiff A. B., in trust to repay
the amounts subscribed, and to
pay the surplus to the committee
for the benefit of the club. The
club becoming embarrassed, was
X x
afterwards

afterwards dissolved, and the com-
mittee was authorised to wind up
the affairs. Two of the committee,
C. and D., sold the furniture, and
alone received the produce, to-
gether with other general assets of
the club. A bill was filed by A.B.
on behalf &c., against C. and D.,
and E., a nonsubscribing member,
to recover the monies in the hands
of C. and D., and praying that the
furniture money might be paid to
the Plaintiff, on the trusts of the
deed," or otherwise as the Court
might direct," and that the general
assets recovered might be paid
to the bankers, or otherwise &c.
Held, that the bill was not de-
fective for want of parties, and that
neither the other parties to the
deed, nor the other members of
the club, were necessary parties.
Richardson v. Hastings. Page 323
9. Observations on what is termed
the "substantial representation,"

4.4.4

far such absent parties are bound.
Powell v. Wright.
10. After bill filed but before sub-
pæna served, the Defendant as-
signed the subject-matter of the
suit: Held, that the assignee was
a necessary party, and that the
Court would, if necessary, grant
an injunction to restrain any fur-
ther assignment.
Ibid.
11. Scheduled creditors to a cre-
ditor's deed, who were not parties
thereto, held not necessary parties
to a suit by a subsequent incum-
brancer, to have the monies out of
which it was intended to pay such

PARTNERSHIP.

A. and B. purchased realty out of
their partnership assets, which
was used for their partnership
purposes, and was in equity to be
considered as personalty. A new
partnership was formed between
A. B. and C. The realty was con-
tinued to be used for the partner-
ship purposes, but A. and B.
stipulated for a rent to be paid
them by the new partnership
composed of A. B. and C. A. died.
Held, the property was, in equity,

to