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ACCOUNT.

1. Difficulty in making a decree against parties, depending on the result of accounts, which could not be satisfactorily taken, in consequence of the loss of the books of account. Rowley v. Adams.

Page 395

He

2. A testator gave large legacies out of his "surplus capital." By the decree special accounts and inquiries were directed; but the Master was unable to take the accounts, by reason of the nonproduction of the books. found, however, on the imperfect. evidence before him, large sums due to the testator, and large partnership assets, which however varied in each of his three reports: he also found that the executors might, with due diligence, &c., have possessed themselves, out of the partnership property, of suf

ficient to pay the two legacies. The Court, however, was of opinion, that there was no reason for thinking that the testator's surplus capital could, if at all, have been realized without putting an end to the business, which the executors, under the circumstances, were not bound to do; that though the executors had not fully or properly performed their duty, still it was more a matter of conjecture than of proof what the assets and liabilities were; that the results were not accurate or approaching to accuracy, and that it had not been satisfactorily made out, either that there were partnership assets, out of which the legacies could have been recovered or secured, nor that the assets were such as to make it impracticable for 'the executors to obtain payment of the legacies. The Court, in this

state

state of things, declined to charge
the executors. Rowley v. Adams.
Page 395

See DECREE, 2.

against the tenant for life to re-
cover the title deeds, and receive
the rents. Denton v. Denton.
Page 388

ACQUIESCENCE.

1. A feme covert was entitled to a
reversionary interest in a sum of
money vested in her husband and
another as trustees. By deed, ex-
pressed to be made between the
tenant for life of the one part,
and the trustees (including the
husband) of the other part, the
tenant for life, who alone executed
the deed, declared that the trus-
tees should hold the fund on cer-
tain modified trusts, whereby the
wife's reversionary interest was
made subject to her power of ap-
pointment by deed or will. The
wife died, leaving her husband sur-
viving, having appointed the re-
versionary interest away from her
husband. The husband afterwards
died, and the reversionary interest
subsequently came into posses-
sion. The Court considered, that,
under the circumstances, the hus-
band ought to be deemed to have
acquiesced in the arrangement,
and accepted the trusts for the
benefit of the wife's appointees;
and held, that the appointees of
the wife were entitled as against
the representatives of the hus-
band. Inman v. Whitley. 337
2. Trustees, after acquiescence, re-
strained from legal proceedings

ADMINISTRATION SUIT.

1. A person at his death was member
of a banking company established
under the 7 G. 4. c. 46., and sub-
ject to its liabilities. After the
expiration of three years, a suit
was instituted for the administra-
tion of his estate, and the common
decree was made for taking an
account of his debts. Persons
who were creditors of the banking
company at the testator's death
claimed before the Master. Held,
that their claims did not come
within the scope of the decree;
secondly, that their claims were
barred by the lapse of three years;
and, thirdly, that the proper way
of bringing their claims before the
Court was by petition, and not by
exception. Barker v. Buttress.

134

2. A residuary estate was divisible
amongst several persons. An ac-
count was made up, and the adults
received their shares. The infants
filed a bill for an account against
the executors and the other resi-
duary legatees. The latter being
satisfied, deprecated the proceed-
ings. The accounts turned out to
be substantially correct: Held,
that the costs were payable out of
the Plaintiffs' share alone. Mac-
kenzie v. Taylor.
467

ADMISSION

2. A testator bequeathed an annuity
of 500l. a year to his daughter for
life, and directed an investment in
the funds for securing it, and after
her decease, he directed the "an-
nuity" should go as his daughter
should by will appoint, and in
default, the "annuity" should be
applied towards the maintenance
of her children till twenty-one, and
then the "principal sum" to the
children, with a gift over" of the
said principal sum of money:'
Held, that the daughter had the
power of appointing the principal
Samuda v. Lousada.

sum.

Påge 243

3. The grantee of an annuity effected
a policy on the life of the grantor,
at his own expense. The grantor
had a power of redemption on
payment of 2500l., and it was
provided, that in case the grantor
should, "at the time of making
such repurchase," by notice in
writing elect to take the policy,
the grantee would assign to him
any policy "then vested" in him,
which might be effected in re-
spect of the annuity; but it was
declared that it should not be in-
cumbent on the grantor to keep
on foot any policy. The policy
became valuable, and the grantor
gave the month's notice of re-
purchase, and declared his elec-
tion to take the policy. Held,
that the grantee had no right
afterwards to surrender the policy
for his own profit; and, semble,
that although he might have let
the policy drop, yet he was not,

at any time, entitled to surrender
it for his own profit. Hawkins v.
Woodgate.
Page 565

ANSWER.

See SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER.

APPORTIONMENT.

Executors were directed to apply a
competent part of the interest of
a fund towards the maintenance
and education of the testator's
son, during his minority, and ac-
cumulate the rest; and, after
attaining twenty-one, to apply a
moiety of the dividends for his
support till he attained twenty-
five, and to transfer the fund at
twenty-five, with a gift over if
he died between twenty-one and
The son attained
twenty-five.
twenty-one between the periods
of payment of the half yearly di-
vidends. Held, that there should
be no apportionment, and that he
was entitled to the whole half-
yearly dividend received after he
came of age. Campbell v. Camp-
bell.

482

APPROPRIATION OF PAY-

MENTS.

A. B., an equitable mortgagee, lent
the title deeds to C. D., the mort-
gagor, to enable him to arrange a
sale of the property. C. D. was
indebted to A. B., both on the
mortgage and on a trade account,
C. D. paid to A. B. a part of the
produce of the sale; but there
was no evidence of his having

made