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1844.

In re TRYON.

to be taxed; that counsel's opinion was unnecessary, not having been taken with a view to assist the execution of the deed, but to determine the propriety of disclaiming a trust of two terms of years which he had refused to accept, and that in addition to this, Mr. Tryon had been informed that such a course would be objected to as unnecessary. Secondly, that it was not necessary for a solicitor, having an agent in town, to come to London to examine deeds, when that duty might be as well performed by the London agent, or by his clerk, as by the principal. (a)

Mr. Rolt, contrà, contended that there ought not to be any taxation of the bill, which had been finally settled. That Mr. Tryon had made the deduction of 51. 5s., and parted with the deed of disclaimer on the terms of receiving the 22l. 6s. 4d., and that the account having been thus finally settled by agreement, ought not to be re-opened.

He argued also, that the items complained of were proper.

The MASTER of the ROLLS, on the whole, was of opinion, that the payment had been conditional, though, if it had been absolute, it might, upon the special circumstances, have still been subject to taxation.

That Mr. Curling's name having been used without his authority, he was justified in taking the opinion of counsel on the matter; but that as to the travelling expenses, the general rule was not to allow such costs unless

(a) Crossley v. Parker, 1 Jac. & W. 460.; Alsop v. Lord Ox

ford, 1 Myl. & K. 564.; Horlock v. Smith, 2 Myl. & Cr. 525.

unless there were some specialty, and this would have to be considered by the Master on the taxation, which he must direct.

He therefore ordered a taxation of the items complained of, and reserved the question of costs.

1844.

In re

TRYON.

NOTE.-The Taxing Master, on taxation, disallowed the charges for the journey, &c., and allowed 21. 2s. only for the examination of the deeds; but he allowed the costs of the opinion, with some deduction. The parties then arranged the matter, and the case was not again brought before the Court.

THIS

HUSSEY v. DIVETT.

HIS was a bill of revivor and supplement, to bring new trustees before the Court. It was set down to be heard against the new trustees only, and not as against the other parties, with respect to whom it was simply sought to revive the suit.

Mr. W. H. Clarke, for the Plaintiff.

April 23.

A bill of revivor and supplement was filed to bring before the

new trustees

Court. It was supplemental as to the trustees, but a bill of revivor as regarded the other De

fendants. Held, that it was only ne"It is to cessary to set

Mr. Freeling objected, that this suit had been set down against the new trustees only, and that the practice was as stated in 3 Daniell's Practice (a): be recollected, that, in all cases where there is a bill of revivor and supplement, the case must be set down for hearing against all the parties, although the bill is only a bill of revivor against one, and an order to revive has been obtained."

A MSS.

down the bill
to be heard
as against the

new trustees.

(a) Page 232.

1844.

HUSSEY

v.

DIVETT.

A MSS. case, of Nelthorpe v. Marriott, was referred to.

The MASTER of the ROLLS thought that no general rule could be laid down, and that each case must depend on its particular circumstances. However, as it was admitted that this bill contained no new facts connected with the parties against whom it was sought simply to revive the suit, and as its purport was limited to the bringing the new trustees before the Court, the objection could not be sustained.

July 18.

Twenty years ago, twenty

seven persons

conveyed real and personal estate to trustees to sell, and to divide the produce. Held, that a bill might be filed by a few, on behalf &c., against the

trustees, to make them

account; and that it was not

necessary to make all the persons interested parties to the suit.

THIS

SMART v. BRADSTOCK.

HIS bill was filed by the three Plaintiffs, "on behalf of themselves and all other the persons interested in the real and personal estates of Walter Woodcock," and the produce of such estates, under two indentures dated in 1824 and 1826.

Disputes having arisen between the parties entitled under the will of Walter Woodcock, such parties (being twenty-seven in number) executed the deeds in question, whereby they conveyed the real and personal estate to trustees, on trust to sell, and to divide the produce between the parties beneficially interested. This

bill was filed to make the trustees account.

Mr. Bevir, for the Defendant Bradstock, objected, that the suit was defective for want of parties, and he insisted that all the persons beneficially interested under the deeds stated, ought to be made parties, to protect their interests. That there was no allegation in the bill

that

that the persons interested were so numerous that it would be impossible to make them parties to the suit; and in a case before Vice-Chancellor Wigram (a) it was considered that twenty creditors, interested in a real estate, were not so large a number, that the Court would, on the ground of inconvenience alone, allow a few of them to represent the others, and dispense with such others as parties in a suit to recover the estate against the whole body of creditors.

Mr. Kindersley and Mr. Shapter, for another Defendant.

Mr. Turner and Mr. Bird, for the Plaintiffs.

Where parties are numerous, the Court will not require the presence of all of them, if it sees that they are substantially represented by other parties to the suit, whose interests are not conflicting. It is always a matter of convenience, and to hold the contrary would result in a denial of justice; Harvey v. Harvey. (b)

In the case of a joint stock company, the Court allows a few on behalf of the rest; Taylor v. Salmon (c); and the reasoning in that case is equally applicable to the present.

The MASTER of the ROLLS.

I must hold that the absent parties are sufficiently represented: they have exactly the same interests as those of the Plaintiffs. The parties were twenty-seven in number twenty years ago; there is no telling what number they may amount to at the present time, and the justice of the case would probably be defeated, if the Plaintiffs were required to make them all parties to the

suit.

(a) Harrison v. Stewardson,

2 Hare, 530.

(b) 4 Beav. 215.

(c) 4 Myl. & Cr. 134.

See

Richardson v. Hastings, antè, 301.
323.; Powell v. Wright, antè, 444.
Gordon v. Pym, 3 Hare, 223.

1844.

SMART

v.

BRADSTOCK.

1844.

July 22.

A testatrix,

being liable to

pay an annuity to A. for life, purchased an annuity during B.'s life,

and effected a

policy on B.'s

life for 2000l. By her will she recited, that on the

death of B. 2000l. would

be recovered to her estate.

In the event of B. dying in the life of A.,

the executors were to provide A.'s annuity out of

her estate. In the event of

A.'s death before B., she

gave the pur

the

chased annuity to C., he paying premiums; and on the death of B.

she gave to C. the 2000l. B.

died in the life of A. Held, that C.

was not entitled to the 2000/

LECKIE v. HOGBEN.

THE testatrix, being under an obligation to secure an annuity of 2001. a year to her brother Remington Leckie for life, purchased an annuity of that amount, payable during the life of Fanny Burgess, whose life she insured for the sum of 2000l. The testatrix being also bound to pay an annuity of 150l. to Mrs. Gill for life, purchased a leasehold property for securing it.

The testatrix had a power of appointing certain property standing in the names of trustees; and by her will, after giving certain legacies, she gave the interest of the remaining sums referred to in her marriage settlement, to her husband for life, and on his death she gave half of the residue to James Henry Leckie, and the other moiety to Mrs. Robinson and her children.

By a codicil, dated in September 1835, she expressed herself as follows: "Whereas I am bound to pay my brother Remington Leckie an annuity of 2001. sterling per annum during natural life, for which purpose I have purchased an annuity on and during the life of Mrs. Fanny Burgess, on whose life I pay annually the sum of 80l. 16s. 3d. to the West of England Life Assurance Office, in order that, at her death, the sum of 2000l., or more, may be recovered to my estate; in the event of Mrs. Fanny Burgess dying before my brother Remington Leckie, I leave it to the discretion of my executors to provide my said brother Remington Leckie his annuity from my estate, as they shall think best. In the event of my brother Remington's death before the above-named Mrs. Fanny Burgess, I give and bequeath

the

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