It appears, also, that John Inman employed John Whitley as his solicitor, and although the evidence is not quite free from ambiguity, I think it shews that the deed of 24th of February 1802, giving the power to Sarah Inman, was prepared by John Whitley, and that the expense of preparing the same was charged to, and deducted out of the estate of John Inman, after his death. The deed itself and the will of Sarah, were found in the possession of John Whitley, who was the executor of John Inman, and the surviving trustee.

It was alleged, for the Defendants, that under the deeds of November 1795, George Inman was entitled to have the whole income applied for his support during his life, and that subject to his life interest, one moiety of the principal was absolutely vested in Sarah Inman. That neither George Inman nor John Inman and his wife had any power or authority to alter the nature of the reversionary interest vested in Sarah, and consequently, that the power alleged to be given by the deed of 24th of February 1802 was not well created.

But it appears to me, that as against the husband of Sarah and with his consent, the interest which Sarah had under the deed of 1795 might well be modified in the manner intended by the deed of 1802. By that deed, executed for reasons and under circumstances of which no sufficient explanation is given, but which may probably have been executed for the purpose of making the trust on which the purchase money was to be held, more conformable to the trust created by the deed of January 1795, George qualified his life interest, in a manner beneficial to Sarah, and the deed contained a limitation of a moiety of the principal which was prejudicial to the contingent interest which John had in the reversionary interest of his wife. I think that with John's

consent,

1844.

INMAN

V.

WHITLEY.

consent, this limitation, as well as the power of disposition given to his wife, might be valid. The real question seems to be, whether John did, in fact, consent to it; and however little moral doubt there may be on the subject, yet, as he did not execute the deed to which he was a party, the Defendants found their resistance to the Plaintiffs' claim, principally, upon the defect of evidence that John ever did any thing to deprive himself of the right, which, under the deed of 1795, he had to his wife's interest, in the event which happened of her dying in his lifetime.

The evidence is indeed extremely defective. I can attach but little importance to the letters which have been produced, and the entries from the books of Whitley afford of themselves but little information, and are in fact erroneous.

If any further information could be hoped for, I should be willing to direct inquiries respecting the custody of the deed of 1802, and of the will of Sarah, and the concurrence of John in the arrangements intended to be thereby made. But upon the case as it now stands, resting upon the instruments and the presumptions arising from the relations between the parties, and the facts that John Inman acted principally in the execution of the trusts, and that the deed and will were found in the possession of the executor of John, I think, that in the absence of further inquiry and information, John must be deemed to have acquiesced in the arrangement, and accepted the trust for the benefit of his wife's appointees.

BARWELL v. BROOKS.

1844.

May 7.

A

months after payment of a a client pre

SOLICITOR'S bill having been paid on the 15th Within twelve of April 1843, a petition was on the 11th of April 1844 presented for its taxation under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. The petition did not specify any items in the bill of which the correctness or propriety was challenged. The petition came on upon the 7th of May, and, as no taxation could be ordered on account of this omission,

Mr. Kindersley asked that the petition might stand over, with liberty to amend by specifying the items complained of.

Mr. Turner. Twelve months have now elapsed since

bill of costs, sented a petition for its taxation, but the petition having spe

cified no items of overcharge, no order could be made. The

twelve months having then expired, the

Court refused to allow the petition to stand over, for the purpose of

amendment,

the payment, and no order can therefore be made for taxation. (a) The Court will not, by allowing the pe- by specifying tition to stand over, extend the time limited by the the items. statute. The petitioner will not be without remedy; his present solicitor is liable for neglecting to state the items.

The MASTER of the ROLLS.

I must yield to this objection, and I am inclined to think that I must not give leave to amend. After payment, the items complained of ought to be distinctly stated in the petition. In a former case I came to the conclusion that it was sufficient to present the petition for taxation within the twelve months (b); but if the Court were to permit a party to present an ineffective petition,

(a) In re Downes, 5 Beav. 425. (b) Sayer v. Wagstaff, 5 Beav, 415.

1844.

BARWELL

v.

BROOKS.

petition, and then, after the expiration of twelve months, allow him to make out a substantive case by amendment, it would be in effect enlarging the time limited by the statute.

As at present advised, I think that to obtain a taxation after payment the client must present an effective petition within the twelve months, and that a petition on which no order can be made cannot, after the twelve months have expired, be allowed to be amended for the purpose of making it effective.

On a subsequent day,

The MASTER of the ROLLS said he remained of the same opinion.

June 5.

of between six and seven

BRADSTOCK v. WHATLEY.

After a delay HE subpoena in this case was served on the 20th of THE April 1844, and on the 5th of June following, (after an interval of between six and seven weeks,) the Plaintiff applied ex parte for liberty to enter an appearance for the Defendant under the 8th Order of the 26th of August 1841. (a)

weeks, the Court declined, ex parte, to grant to the Plaintiff liberty to enter an appearance for a Defendant

under the 8th Order of August 1841.

Mr. Bevir, in support of the application.

The MASTER of the ROLLS said, that, after the delay which had occurred, he could not make the order; but

(a) Ord. Can. 165.

the

the Plaintiff might either serve a subpœna again or give the Defendant notice of the application. (a)

The Plaintiff afterwards served the Defendant with notice of the motion, and the order was thereupon subsequently made.

(a) See Edmonds v. Nicoll, 6 av. 334.

1844.

BRADSTOCK

v.

WHATLEY.

M KEVERAKIN v. CORT.

MR. BAILY, for the Plaintiffs, moved, under the 28th Order of the 26th of October 1842 (a), for the appointment of a guardian ad litem of the Defendant John Cort, who was a lunatic, but had not been so found by inquisition. He cited Brooks v. Jobling. (b)

It appearing, by affidavit, that the Defendant was of unsound mind, that the subpoena had been served, and that no writ de lunatico inquirendo had been issued gainst the Defendant,

The MASTER of the ROLLS appointed Mr. Johnson, the solicitor of the suitor's fund, guardian to the Defendant John Cort, by whom he might appear and answer the Plaintiff's bill and defend the suit.

June 12.

The Solicitor of the Suitor's Fund appointed, under

the 28th

Order of the

26th of October 1842, guardian ad litem of a lu

natic De

fendant not so found by inquisition.