1843.

PRINGLE

บ.

CROOKES.

The bill, in praying an account of the receipts of Todd and Co. after the testator's death, asked only for an account of ali sums of money received by them on account of his personal estate subsequently to his death. The bill, however, specifically stated several sums as having been received by Todd and Co., during their agency from the executors, amounting in the whole to the sum of 2253l. 4s. 10d. The bill did not state that these sums were parts of the purchase money arising from the sale of the real estate; but it distinctly appeared from the answer that they were received on account of such purchase money.

By a decree of the Court of Exchequer, the Master was directed to take an account of all and singular the dealings and transactions in the bill mentioned between Todd and Co. and Robert Marshall deceased, and of all sums of money received by them on his account in his lifetime, and of all and singular the said dealings and transactions with them, and of all sums of money received by them, on account of his personal estate, since his de

cease.

The Master, in his report, stated the nature of the account, and that it continued to be an account current up to the death of Todd; and that the several sums, amounting together to the sum of 2253l. 4s. 10d. were received by Todd and Co., and were entered to the credit of the estate of Robert Marshall in the same account current, and were payments on account of the purchase money for the Ridge estate.

Before the Master's report had been made, the Defendant Crookes, having ascertained that the Master in tended to charge him with the purchase money which Todd and Co. had received and entered to the credit of Robert Marshall's estate, presented a petition of rehearing,

hearing, alleging that he was aggrieved by the decree, and he submitted that the cause ought to have been ordered to stand over, with liberty for the Plaintiff to amend his bill by adding parties thereto (meaning the heir-at-law of the testator), or that the accounts, by the decree directed to be taken, of the dealings and transactions with Todd and Co. since Robert Marshall's decease, and the payments consequential thereon, ought to have been confined to the personal estate and effects of Robert Marshall.

After the report had been made, the Defendant Crookes filed several exceptions thereto, and thereby, amongst other things, insisted, that the Master ought not to have brought the several sums, amounting to 2253l. 4s. 10d. into account, for that the payments were not made on account of Robert Marshall's personal estate, but on account of his real estate, and the decree did not authorize any account thereof to be taken.

The cause now came on for rehearing and on the exceptions.

Mr. Pemberton Leigh, for the Defendant Crookes, claimed the right to begin.

Mr. Kindersley, contrà, for the Plaintiff.

The MASTER of the ROLLS.

The Defendant Crookes has the right of reply on his exceptions he therefore is entitled to begin on the exceptions.

As to the rehearing, the objection to the decree is either one of want of parties or to a part only of the decree. In either case the Defendant will be entitled to reply. The Defendant must therefore begin.

1843.

PRINGLE

v.

CROOKES.

1843.

PRINGLE

v.

CROOKES.

Mr. Pemberton Leigh and Mr. Montagu for the Defendant, then contended, that either the decree or the Master's finding must be erroneous, for if the decree warranted the accounts of the produce of the real estate, then it was wrong, being made in the absence of the heir at law; and, on the other hand, that if it did not warrant such account, then that the Master was wrong in including the 2253l. 4s. 10d. in his report.

Mr. Kindersley, Mr. G. Turner, and Mr. Parry, for the Plaintiff, argued, that the decree did not direct any account of the real estate. That the bill was not for the administration of the estate, but one for an account by a principal against his agent, and that it mattered not from what source the receipts of the agent on account of his principal had been derived.

I have read the pleadings in this case, and I am of opinion that the bill neither required, nor in any way entitled the Plaintiff to a decree for the administration of the estate of the testator Robert Marshall, received by the Defendant Crookes and his deceased partner Thomas Todd.

The bill is not expressed with the clearness and precision which might have been wished, but Todd and Co. having been the agents and consignees of the testator in his lifetime, and of his trustees and executors after his death, the object of the bill was, to have, as against Crookes the surviving partner and against Todd the executor of the deceased partner, an account of the receipts and payments of Todd and Co., as such agents and consignees.

If there had been greater doubt than there is upon the bill, such doubt would have been removed by the answer of Mr. Crookes and the first schedule thereto, which, with great clearness and propriety, set forth the nature of the transactions and accounts between Todd and Co., as the agents of Marshall in his lifetime, and of his Jamaica executors after his death.

It appears, that the executors in Jamaica, not only made to Todd and Co. consignments on account of the crops and produce of the estate, but also remittances on account of the monies arising from the sale of the estates, under the direction of the testator's will. The bill, for some reason which has not been explained, in praying an account of the receipts of Todd and Co. after the testator's death, asks only for an account of all sums of money received by them on account of his personal estate subsequently to his death. The bill, however, specifically states several sums as having been received by Todd and Co., during their agency, from the executors, and the sums specifically stated amount, in the whole, to the sum of 2253l. 4s. 10d. The bill does not state that these sums were parts of the purchase money arising from the sale of the real estate; but it distinctly appears from the answer, that they were received on account of such purchase money. There was no amendment, either of the statements or of the prayer of the bill, on that account; and the decree of the Court of Exchequer, in conformity with the prayer of the bill, directs the Master to take an account of all and singular the dealings and transactions in the bill mentioned between Todd and Co. and Robert Marshall deceased, and of all sums of money received by them on his account in his lifetime, and of all and singular the said dealings and transactions with.

them,

1843.

PRINGLE

v.

CROOKES.

1843.

PRINGLE

v.

CROOKES.

them, and of all sums of money received by them on account of his personal estate since his decease.

The Master, in his report, stated the nature of the account, and that it continued to be an account current up to the death of Thomas Todd, and that the several sums amounting together to the sum of 2253l. 4s. 10d. were received by Todd and Co., and were entered to the credit of the estate of Robert Marshall in the same account current, and were payments on account of the purchase money for the Ridge estate.

Before the Master's report was made, the Defendant Crookes, having ascertained that the Master intended to charge him with the purchase money which Todd and Co. had received and entered to the credit of Robert Marshall's estate, presented a petition of rehearing, alleging that he was aggrieved by the decree, and submitted that the cause ought to have been ordered to stand over, with liberty for the Plaintiff to amend his bill by adding parties thereto, or that the accounts, by the decree directed to be taken, of the dealings and transactions with Todd and Co. since Robert Marshall's decease, and the payments consequential thereon, ought to have been confined to the personal estate and effects of Robert Marshall.

After the report was made, the Defendant Crookes filed several exceptions thereto, and thereby, amongst other things, insisted that the Master ought not to have brought the several sums amounting to 22531. 4s. 10d. into account, for that the payments were not made on account of Robert Marshall's personal estate, but on account of his real estate, and the decree did not authorize any account thereof to be taken.

The